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Preface and Acknowledgements 
Juris Rozenvalds 
This collection of essays explores different aspects o f the complex p rob lem of 
identity, placing special emphas is on ethnic and political identity. The idea for the book 
arose out of the Depar tment of Political Science at the Univers i ty of Latvia and was 
closely connected with intense debate in society in Latvia concern ing EU accession. 
Latvia was a m o n g those candidate states with the highest percent of euroscept ics . 
One o f the ma in sources of the euroscepticism in Latvia was fear that the specific 
identity of Latvia and Latvians will be endangered within the European Union. As the 
referendum on EU accession in September , 2003 showed, there were also substantial 
differences be tween Latv ian and Russ ian-speaking ci t izens of Latvia wi th respect 
to ' "yes" or " n o " vot ing . In o rde r to d i scuss re la t ions b e t w e e n different types of 
identity as wel l as to c o m p a r e the exper ience of the Bal t ic states and other "o ld" 
and " n e w " members o f the European Union , as international conference Chang ing 
and Over lapp ing Identit ies: Latvia Facing EU Enlargement took place on Sep tember 
17-18 . 2004 at the Univers i ty of Latvia with part icipation of scholars from Latvia, 
the Uni ted States, Estonia , Li thuania .Germany, Finland. Russ ia , and Ukra ine . This 
collection of essays includes mos t of the papers presented within the conference, as 
well as discussion on D a v i d Lai t in 's b o o k Identity in Format ion: Russ ian-Speak ing 
Polulations in the Near Abroad (Cornell University Press , 1998.), which concluded 
the conference. 
O r g a n i z e r s of the con fe r ence are ve ry grateful to the Rep re sen t a t i on of the 
European Commiss ion in Latvia for awarding us a P H A R E grant which m a d e possible 
organization of the conference as well as publication of this book. At a t ime authors 
of the book are fully respons ib le for its content and ideas expressed in this book can 
not be viewed as posi t ion of the European Union. Grat i tude has to be expressed to the 
U.S. Embassy in Latvia for financial suppor t which m a d e possible the s imul taneous 
translation of all the papers from Latvian to English and the reverse. Organizers of 
the conference appreciated successful cooperat ion with the Secretariat of Minis ter 
for Special Ass ignmen t s for Society Integration Affairs and Minis ter Nils Muizn ieks 
personal participation in the conference. Last but not least it has to be pointed out 
that organizat ion of the conference as wel l as publ icat ion of this vo lume would not 
be possible without substant ial support from the prorector for scientific w o r k of the 
University of Latvia Professor Indrikis Muiznieks as wel l as the adminis t rat ion of 
the Facul ty of Social Sciences . 
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Opening Address by Nils Muiznieks, 
Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration 
The topic of this conference - ident i ty - has a l w a y s been of great interest in 
Latvia. H o w are w e changing? H o w will changes in our identit ies affect our ability 
to coexist with each other? What can the g o v e r n m e n t do to influence changes in 
a pos i t ive d i rec t ion? Resea rch and confe rences l ike these can help answer these 
quest ions . 
M y office, the Sec re t a r i a t of the S p e c i a l A s s i g n m e n t s M i n i s t e r for Soc ia l 
Integration, has tried to maintain close relat ions with researchers and base our work 
on research . The Na t iona l P r o g r a m m e for the In t eg ra t i on of Soc ie ty was based 
on a large survey, and m y office has conduc ted var ious init iat ives only after serious 
research. Prominent examples include our direct mai l c ampa ign a imed at the parents 
of non-ci t izen children, the new National P r o g r a m m e for the Promot ion of Tolerance, 
our r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for pr ior i ty fund ing to the Soc ia l In tegra t ion Founda t ion , 
and more . 
Many of the speakers at this conference will address the very intr iguing issue of 
the identity of Russians or Russ ian-speakers in Latvia in compara t ive perspect ive. 
Since the international envi ronment affects our identi t ies , w e will also explore the 
potential impact of the ongoing en largement of the European Union on our identities. 
H o w is European Union m e m b e r s h i p chang ing the w a y w e look at ourselves and 
others? W h a t will it mean to have the Bulgar ians , R o m a n i a n s , Croats and maybe 
even the Turks in the European Un ion? 
Our foreign gues ts have arr ived in La tv ia in the w a k e of the most sustained 
mobil isat ion of Russians , part icularly Russ ian youth, that w e have seen in the last 
10 years . We have also jus t wi tnessed the creat ion o f a n e w organisat ion, the United 
Congress of Russian Communi t i e s in Latvia ( O K R O K ) wi th pre tens ions of unit ing 
a significant number of Latvia ' s Russ ians . T h e ques t ion arises: what is the relative 
strength of ethnic versus l inguistic identi t ies in Latvia? Is what unites Russ ians more 
powerful than their m a n y differences? 
1 have a lways argued that Russians are diverse. The i r g roup boundar ies are not 
rigid - about 4 0 % enter m ixed mar r i ages wi th La tv ians and others . They are not 
homogeneous in their rel igious affiliation and observance - about 7 0 % are Or thodox, 
1 5 % are Old Bel ievers , and 7 % are Ca tho l ic . Vir tual ly all have Russ ian as their 
native language, but their level of l inguistic integrat ion is h ighly dependent on age 
and region. Accord ing to the 2000 census , about 5 3 % speak Latvian. Accord ing to 
surveys, about 4 % speak no Latvian at all and 4 3 % speak it at a basic level. Household 
budget surveys suggest that economic inequali ty is m o r e p ronounced among Russians 
than a m o n g Latvians . Until now, Russ ians have not been very well organised on the 
social or political level - slightly m o r e than one ha l f are ci t izens, sl ightly less than 
one half are not, and a small number have ci t izenship o f Russia. Latvia has more than 
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40 non -gove rnmen ta l o rgan iza t ions and several part ies c l a iming to represent the 
interests of Russ i ans . Is the mobi l i sa t ion su r round ing ed u ca t i o n reform and the 
formation of a new would-be umbrel la organizat ion a sign that this is changing? 
A related but distinct quest ion is: are Russ ians more s imilar to Latvians or to 
Russians in Russia in te rms of their values? M y former assis tant , Olga Pisarenko, 
just finished an interest ing mas te r ' s thesis in sociology on this topic. She reworked 
data from the European values study, the Balt ic and Russia Baromete r s and the ISSP. 
She found that in the rea lm of family values , gender roles , at t i tudes towards God, 
work and m a n y aspects of poli t ics, Latvia 's Russians are c loser to Latvians in Latvia 
than to Russ ians in Russia . However , much of the data is several years old and some 
values probably changed over the last several years. 
Latvia and the Baltics are a big social science laboratory - there are few countries 
to have tread such an interest ing integration path so quickly, there is a significant 
amount of data available, as well as a growing pool of local expert ise on identit ies, 
ethnicity, and ethnopol i t ics . F rom my perspec t ive , a key ques t ion is the extent to 
which identity change is subject to policy intervention. H o w can we best p romote a 
sense of be long ing to a democra t ic . European Latvia? 
1 a m v e r y p l e a s e d to h a v e such d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o r e i g n gues t s a n d f r i ends 
participating, in particular Professor David Laitin. I am told that his book Identity 
in Format ion is the point of departure for m a n y doctoral disser tat ions in the United 
States. At one point . 1 was solicited to do a review and read the book very carefully -
it is a frustrating, fascinating mix of methodologies , it has a controversial definition of 
assimilation, and there is little discussion of the international context (EU membership . 
Russ ia ' s pol icy) on ident i t ies . But it is very s t imulat ing and has not received the 
attention it deserves in Uatvia. I am gratified that this conference features Professor 
Laitin and a discussion of his work. I wish you all a successful conference. 
I 
ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES 
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The De-Cosmopolitanization of the Russian Diaspora: 
A View from Brooklyn in the "Far Abroad" * 
Krievu diasporas dekosmopolitizacija: 
skats no Bruklinas uz "talajam arzemem" 
David D. Laitin 
Stanford Universi ty, U S A 
e-mail: d la i t in@stanford .edu 
This paper builds on the author's findings in Identity in Formation (Cornell. 1998) where he 
examined the integration of Russians into the new states of the near abroad. It examines the 
Russian diaspora in Brighton Beach, New York, to investigate how the context of the receiving 
country conditions the Russian diaspora's political identities. Based on family interviews 
conducted in Spring 2004, the paper first provides a "modal life history' of the current waves 
of Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet Union. It then discusses why "Russian-
speaking population." a new identity category shaped in the near abroad, has not become the 
focal or primary identity in the New York area. Third, the paper discusses the solid emergence 
of a Jewish-American identity for those who were identified as Jews on the 5m line of their 
Soviet passports. Fourth, the paper relates these findings to the author's theoretical approach 
to identity choice, and the "tipping" model. Finally, implications for Latvia's policy regarding 
its Russian-speaking populations are drawn. 
Key words: Russian diaspora. Russian Jews. Latvia, Brighton Beach. 
T h i s p a p e r was o r i g i n a l l y p r e p a r e d for the c o n f e r e n c e on " C h a n g i n g and 
Overlapping Identi t ies: La tv ia facing EU Enlargement" . I was invited to speak at 
this c o n f e r e n c e b e c a u s e my b o o k Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking 
Populations in the Near Abroad', based on field research in 1993-94, identified the 
emergence in the republ ics of Russia 's "nea r abroad" a n e w identi ty ca tegory with 
political impl icat ions: viz . russkoiazychnoe naselenie - a ca tegory that c o m b i n e d 
Russ ians , Be la rusans , U k r a i n i a n s and Jews w h o faced the c o m m o n ca tac lysm of 
l inguis t ic m i n o r i t y - s t a t u s in light of the 1988-89 l a n g u a g e laws . Th i s e m e r g e n t 
identity ca tegory was specific to the condi t ions of late- and post-Soviet na t iona l i sm, 
and the new poli t ical oppor tun i t i e s available to titular nat ional i t ies . 
My results pointed both to the common cataclysm that affected Russian-speakers in 
all republics but pointed out as well the significant differences among Russian integration 
strategies in four of the fourteen newly independent republics. From the data collected 
for this project, I speculated that there would be an assimilationist dynamic a m o n g 
Russian-speakers in the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia. This would be different from 
Ukraine, where I speculated there would be a Belgium-like modus vivendi between 
Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking zones; and different again from Kazakhstan 
where I speculated that there would be a long-term emigra t ion dynamic in which 
Russian-speakers would leave the republic of their birth and move either to the West 
or to a country that was more welcoming to Russian-speakers. 
Thanks to Anna Gurfinkcl for her research assistance. 
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The book was premised on a conjecture that " R u s s i a n s " would not have fixed 
cultural propensi t ies to resist integration into the republ ics on to which they had been 
"beached" (after the Soviet collapse). Rather, I assumed, the social , cultural, economic 
and pol i t ica l context of the i r r es iden t r e p u b l i c s w o u l d in f luence h o w R u s s i a n s 
integrated into their republ ics of res idence. 
The book theorized that Russians would condit ion their behavior on three external 
factors w h e n they considered integration: the economic re turns , the gain or loss in 
in-group s tatus , and the gain or loss in ou t -g roup (i .e. t i tular) accep tance . Whi l e 
condi t ioning their behavior on these factors, Russ ians w o u l d seek to coordina te with 
other Russians in their republic, and that these coordinat ion dynamics , w h e n examined 
on the m i c r o level , could t r igger cul tura l c a s c a d e s or " t i p s " . In the long te rm, I 
argued, there would be a cultural cascade in Estonia a n d Latv ia by Russ ian-speakers 
to becoming (culturally) Estonians and Latvians . 
To d e v e l o p the t h e m e o f the po l i t i ca l con tex t o f R u s s i a n in tegra t ion - and 
thereby to further d i scred i t the no t ion that Russ ians or R u s s i a n - s p e a k e r s h a v e a 
cultural proclivity that m a k e s them resistant to integrat ion - I sought to learn how 
Russians handled assimilat ion pressures w h i l e l iving in the "far abroad" . I therefore 
conduc ted field research on Russ ian m i g r a n t s ( c o m i n g f rom the late G o r b a c h e v 
period and thereafter) in Brighton Beach , Brooklyn , New York, USA, wi th an implicit 
comparison with Russians w h o migrated to Israel, also from the late Gorbachev period 
till the present day. Al though I have relied on some seconda ry sources and newspaper 
archives, my data are principally in terviews in N e w York that I col lected in Spring 
2004. These interviews elicited twenty-five distinct family histories. 
The pre l iminary findings - repor ted here in - are surpr i s ing yet suppor t ive of 
m y conjecture. The (most ly Jewish ) Russ ians w h o left Rus s i a in the last quar ter 
century had a choice w h e n they r eached Vienna to e m i g r a t e to Israel or to wait 
longer, but eventually reach ( through Italy) the U S . Presumably , those w h o chose 
the US w e r e more secular, and less i m b u e d with r e l ig ious ideals than those w h o 
went to Israel. However - to exaggerate the difference for purposes of sett ing u p the 
implicit comparison — the Russians in Br ighton have pr incipal ly identified themselves 
as " J e w s " ; whi le the Russ ians in Israel h a v e p r inc ipa l ly identif ied themse lves as 
"Russ ians" . As I had argued , there is no s ingle Russ i an rou te to integrat ion in all 
societies; indeed, the focal point of their identi ty cho ice is not predic table ex ante, 
and is highly contingent on (often unexpec ted ) local factors. Only after a per iod of 
uncer ta inty can a single identity choice s h o w itself to be p reeminen t and serve as a 
focal point for n e w immigrants . 
My quest ion for this paper remains the same as it was in Identity in Format ion: 
H o w has the context of minori ty status condi t ioned the Russ ian d iaspora ' s political 
identities? To answer this quest ion, 1 will first p rov ide a " m o d a l life h is tory" of the 
current w a v e s of Russ ian-speaking migran t s from the fo rmer Soviet Union (FSU). 
I will then discuss why "Russ ian - speak ing popu la t i on" has no t b e c o m e the focal or 
pr imary identity in the N e w York area. Thi rd , I wil l d iscuss the solid emergence of 
a Jewish-Amer ican identi ty for those w h o were identified as Jews on the 5* line of 
their Soviet passports . Four th , I will relate these findings to m y theoretical approach 
to identity choice, and the " t ipp ing" model . Finally, I will relate the findings to issues 
today facing Latvia. 
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I. A Modal Life History of the Third and Fourth Waves 
of Immigrants from What is today the FSU to the USA 
For the elder generat ion of immigrants , the trip to the US w a s a second migrat ion 
from their homelands in the pa le of settlement. Many of the respondents report in their 
family his tories an emigrat ion from their home towns to the Ura ls and Kazakhs tan in 
response to the German invas ion in World War II. Here is but one such story: 
"In 1941,1 finished ten years of school, in which the medium of instruction was Ukrainian, 
graduating the day of the occupation. The Germans bombed the bridge on the Dnieper, 
and we built a temporary bridge, and we were evacuated, and waited at an open railroad 
platform, with the sick and elderly, and for protection, they put us in carriages. 
There were four in our family while everyone was evacuated to Kazakhstan, my 
mother, my brother and my sister (my father was on the front). 
Mr father's sister lived in Orsk. in the southern Urals near Chilabinsk, on the border 
with Kazakhstan. My family sought her out in Orsk. We had no news of her, no links, but 
decided to find her We arrived at Orsk. and couldn't find a trolley or bus, so walked to 
the town. Our relative was married to a railroad worker, who directed us to her home, 
and we all moved in with her family, eight people, lived together. There was a flood that 
fall, announced on the radio, as Orsk was in a goige, and we all sat on their houses 
above the flood level. But eight people in a small wooden house was too much. 
In the Urals, I worked for the Ministry of Black Metallurgy, demolishing the factories 
from the west, and reconstructing them in the Urals, and storing engines and such for 
re-use after the war. All the equipment was listed, and I made these lists, and sent them 
to Moscow. In this way, they could send spare parts to factories operating all over 
Russia during the war. We lived in tents doing that work, twenty people to a tent. 
MY boss went to Moscow, and then the workers began applying to return to their home 
areas, but needed permission. My boss was head of the komsomol, and said it was too 
dangerous to return, and everything was destroyed. I applied twice and was denied 
permission, as they were afraid that there would be no one to do the work there. [DL: I 
asked if it were because she was Jewish. She laughed and said "no one cared about those 
things then. We were 80% Ukrainian them and 20% Jewish, but no one there knew who 
was who and we all spoke Ukrainian. It was after the war that religion mattered"}. 1 then 
joined the communist party. My boss then advised me to "just go " and not to worn- about 
permission or paperwork. 1 returned to Ukraine in October 1943, a month in journey. 
With my mother and little sister, we went to our old apartment that was watched over 
bv a friend who stayed in Ukraine. My brother died in the Urals. My father went from 
Poland to the Japanese front and then returned to Ukraine. My boyfriend died in 
Stalingrad" [Interview 9], 
If ant i -Semit ism was absent in the internal refugee camps in Kazakhstan and the 
Urals, the Russ ian Jewish immigran ts w h o m I interviewed are very empha t ic that 
ant i -Semit ism became a ser ious problem in the FSU. In a survey of these immigrants . 
8 5 % of the respondents point to this ant i-Semit ism in the FSU as serious. 2 
But it began for m a n y o f them after the war. As one interviewee explains : 
"There was no anti-Semitic discrimination in the army; that came later. Everyone 
was treated equally in the army; no one had time then to find out what nationality 
you were. In January 1944, I was taken as a war prisoner. I hid from the Germans 
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that 1 was Jewish [he had m o n e y from an Is lamic country on h im, and convinced the 
Germans he was a Mus l im] and that is how 1 survived. We were taken to Rumania, 
and then to Russia, as POWs...But upon arriving home, I was questioned by SMERSH 
for four days, first by lower officials and then to a regional center, where they wanted 
to know how I was alive, what I was doing in Europe during the war. They thought 
I must be an anti-Soviet spy" [ Interview 13]. 
As a complemen t to the interview concern ing Orsk , w h e r e the a rduous work 
in factory rebui lding was described, in an art icle "13 Years Later" publ i shed in the 
Russian- language New York newspaper Novoe Russkoe Slovo n.d. there is a personal 
m e m o i r of rufusnik t imes: "Noth ing will erase the m e m o r i e s of my chi ldhood, from 
which I r emember bitter ant i -Semit ic remarks that ' t h e y ' only like to visit doctors , 
and Russians have to w o r k for them, and dur ing the w a r ' t h e y ' all went to Tashkent, 
and Russ ians had to fight for them.. ." 
I n t e r v i e w e e s r e p o r t e d t he f ee l i ng of a n t i - S e m i t i s m a s par t a n d p a r c e l of 
everyday life. 
"In Russia, very little children hate Jews, I don't hiow why. I told my children that they 
must study in school, better than everybody, because your grade will be lowered. When 
I tried to pass examination to Leningrad University, it was difficult, because the special 
tribunal put two hours more questions to me than was required, only for me personally, 
and the head of the tribunal said, 'unfortunately, I haven't found the question that you 
don't know the answer 'and they had to give me a '5'. And of nry friends, even with high 
grades, due to the special situation for Jews, it was hard to get jobs" [Interview 2], 
This led to real fear for their security, as expla ined by another in terviewee: 
"/ did not leave Kiev for financial reasons. I was doing well there. In Kiev, I was living 
across from Central Stadium, at the Central Square. During perestroika, many mass 
meetings took place there. I heard a lot of promises that the Jewish people would be 
killed (and many anti-Russian speeches as well). I became afraid, as many friends 
compared Ukraine then to Germany in 1932, and we heard the same messages coming 
from Krimenchug, from Kharkiv and elsewhere in Ukraine. My friends started leaving, 
and I decided to follow, in large part out of curiosity, like jumping out of a parachute. (1 
was wrong about the future, but those were still scary times, with the waning of Soviet 
power. But as independent Ukraine, with the collapse of the USSR, there is no longer 
a cultural life, due to lack of money. The Soviet Union was good to me. I was from a 
poor family, yet 1 got educated and went to a technical institute) " [Interview 8]. 
In N o v o e Russkoe Slovo. Odessa-born Iakova Smirnov, w h o came to the U S in 
1977. at age twenty-six. tells the fol lowing j o k e summar i z ing the feeling J ews had 
in Soviet t imes: There is a long line in a grocery store for sausage . D u e to shortages 
in supply, the m a n a g e r tells all J ews to l eave . Three hours later he tells all non-
communis t s to go h o m e . Three hours later he says all is g o n e , and eve ryone else 
must return home. O n e of the remaining communis t s compla ins , " the Jews h a v e all 
the luck again ." Today his Odessa-s ty le humor is apprec ia ted in NY, as it is s imple 
and intellectual at the same time. 
Survey research by S a m u e l Kl ige r cap tu res a g e n u i n e irony ab o u t this firm 
consensus about an t i -Semi t i sm: Al though the 1970s w a v e o f emigran t s from the 
Soviet Union faced real d iscr iminat ion , the w a v e that has g o n e th rough the post-
Soviet per iod faced even s t ronger feel ings o f an t i -Semi t i sm. In 1 9 9 1 , more than 
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50% of pol led Soviet c i t izens wanted Jews to leave the count ry . An irony of all 
these feelings is that "Those Jews who now live in M o s c o w ( including 'ha l f - Jews ' ) 
comprise a significant part of the new Russian e l i te . . . their we igh t in Russian polit ics 
and business is much m o r e significant than in any other Chris t ian count ry . . ." 3 . Thus , 
according to KJiger, it was perceived discrimination, not the actual fact of doing worse 
than others in the Soviet Union , that condi t ioned Jewish res t lessness . 
Rest lessness along with a new political opportuni ty to emigra te based upon a 
series of agreements s igned with American adminis t ra t ions , led to visa applicat ions 
for emigra t ion to Israel . But these appl ica t ions were in the ear ly years t aken as 
signs of disloyalty to the Soviet state with g rave consequences for the appl icants 
once their applicat ions were refused (and thus they lived as refusniki. For example . 
"Upon application for a visa, I immediately lost my position in the Russian Academy 
of Sciences. I survived by writing dissertations for Central Asian graduate students 
who paid me because there is no way their abilities in writing Russian would allow 
them to get advanced degrees" [Interview 25] . 
Refusniki created new life-styles living in the Soviet Union. They created "Jewish" 
circles, where beforehand they were largely secular. "As refusniki, we tried to celebrate 
Jewish holidays, but it was pretty dangerous. We tried to learn Hebrew and the Jewish 
religion, because the Russian government oppressed it. Each time we changed place 
for our group studying Hebrew, for fear that the police would suppress us" [Interview 
2]. They used their savings to leam English. As one refusnik reported, "We studied 
English for many years before coming. The instruction of course was vety mediocre. 
While we were waiting for an invitation, we started taking private lessons, contracting 
a veiy successful English teacher from Leningrad, who had tutored generations of 
immigrants. 1 had connections with teachers in the US who would send me teaching 
materials. We studied for a year with her. We didn't study any Hebrew. We knew all 
along that we were going to NY. " Yet to get to the US , they first had to receive an 
invitation from Israel. To get invited to Israel, potential migrants had to procure an 
invitation from Israel, from an Israeli, saying that they are relatives seeking to join 
their families. Ln rtinety percent of the cases [a guess from interview 22] , it was a false 
connection, bu t Soviet authorities did not pay attention, as all knew it was a fraudulent 
document. "We received such an invitation from 'cousins', and we brought it to the 
Special Department of the KGB. and filled out detailed forms, and we had to specify 
the family connections with our invitees. We were then known as potential immigrants, 
but our jobs were in jeopardy immediately upon receiving the invitation... My husband 
was a research physicist, and he was fired. First, he was denied permission to consult 
secret data archives. Then a British scientist came to his lab to consult with him; we 
invited him to our house, with members of the lab. This was forbidden without KGB 
approval, and this was used as the pretext for firing him...I was then teaching Latin, 
French and History at a vocational school for nurses, and 1 too was fired... After my 
husband was fired, we filed our documents. Tliere were dramatic consequences of 
this application. My husband's father has access to highly secret strategic military 
documents, and was a long-term member of the communist party, going back to his 
youth. Being an honest man, after we applied, he went to the head of his department 
to inform him, even though he had no intention of emigrating, and did not share our 
views on the future, but as a grandfather he 'understood'. The next day he was sent 
into retirement, even though he was the leader of a major project. " 
18 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
In the mid-1980 ' s , the fourth and final Soviet w a v e of Russ ian-Jewish emigrat ion 
began. Under deals with Secretary' Gorbachev, the gates w e r e open to Jews want ing 
to go to Israel to rejoin families - those w h o crea ted such fictions got visas. A n d 
Gorbachev got wheat! In 1989, the US Congress des ignated Soviet Jews as a category 
eligible for admission to the US as refugees if they could demons t ra t e a credible fear 
of persecut ion if they remained in the U S S R 4 . 
F rom Moscow, those who received visas wen t to Vienna to be processed to go 
to Israel. In Vienna, those want ing to emigra te to the U S got support from H I A S 
(Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), to travel to R o m e (where H I A S was headquartered) 
and to apply for refugee status in the U S . As one in te rv iewee explained: 
"We went first to Austria, paid for by HIAS. We had already made plans that we were 
going to NY, because two years earlier our best friends emigrated, and we decided to 
join them in NY... We went from Vienna to Rome. Everything was well-organized. We 
stayed for two weeks in the vicinity of Rome (in a lovely town Monticello), in August. 
(Rome was the home of HIAS. on Regina Margarita street). Once you received your 
package of money from HIAS. you had to find and rent an apartment, which was paidfor 
by HIAS, and we found one in a lovely city near Rome. My son was knowledgeable about 
Roman history, and he knew everything by heart, and loved touring Rome... Everyone 
was seeking to extend their Italian vacation complementary of HIAS" [Interview 22] 
The migrants t raveled in three-generat ion modu le s , a l though in most cases the 
grandparents were reluctant taggers-on. "I came to the US because of this daughter. 
I didn't want to go, because I had this work in the Ukraine, and I was a member of 
the Union of Lawyers in the USSR, which gave me status. But here I can't work as 
a lawyer not until my language is good. This language thing is a very- big problem 
for me" [Interview 4] , 
Another case is similar: "I was a military officer, a colonel, and served for 29 years, 
a veteran of WWII. I finished my military service in Tashkent. There was big anti-
Semitism there. My children did not want to live there, and came here. So what should 
I do, I came with them" [Interview 10]. Or again: "I had a "mother's heart" to be 
near my younger son. The older son [DL: w h o also did not want to emigrate] came 
with us to keep the family united" [ Interview 19]. 
These integrated family units made rapid economic and linguistic progress in the 
US. As reported on the web-si te of the Internat ional Un io n 'Uni ted Russ ia ' ["Russian 
immigrants in America . Statistical and social por t ra i t ." V. Supian, from the U S and 
Canada Institute], in 1990, the average income of the Russ ian household was S32.500. 
about average for the country. "The adaptat ion process is quick and relatively painless 
for mos t of t h e m — t w o thirds find work during the first yea r in this country." 
This is no surprise. Not only did self-supporting family units come together. But in 
terms of human capital, these immigrants were amongst the highest ever to enter the U S . 
In one survey. 6 0 % of the interviewed Russian Jewish immigrants (RJIs) had five or more 
years of higher education, in contrast to 3 5 % of American Jews (as surveyed by the 1998 
Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion) \ The parents of the mid-generation migrants 
were also very highly educated: 8 4 % had at least one parent with a college degree; 6 1 % 
had both parents with college degrees 6 . A different study, this by the National Foundation 
of American Politics, shows that children of recent irrimigrants excel. They had the best 
results in math and science, and children of those w h o have H 1 B visas (granted to those 
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with Ph.D. 's) - 100,000 coming annually - had eighteen of forty finalists in the contest 
"scientific talents". Second place in 2004 went to Boris Alexeev, whose father arrived 
from Russia with a H 1 B visa. And at the International Physics Olympiad held in South 
Korea in 2004, the American team consisted of two recent immigrants, among them the 
only female participant Elena Ydovina, whose father has a H1B visa (as reported in Novoe 
Russkoe Slovo July 26. 2004 "The Country where talents blossom"). 
The Russ ian-speaking local press inundates its readers wi th stories of Russ ian 
economic success . A story ent i t led " T h e t eache r wi th go lden h a n d s " (by Vadim 
larmolinets in N o v o e Russkoe Slovo M a y 8. 2001) reports on Vladimir D e m i n g . 
w h o emigra ted twen ty - seven years ago from St. Pe te rsburg , where he worked in 
jewelry des ign. But his pass ion was restoration, and educated himsel f in it and is now 
teaching these skills, and taking Amer ican students to Russia to observe restoration 
projects , at the Fash ion Inst i tu te of Technology . In N o v o e R u s s k o e S lovo , there 
appears an interview by Alexander Grant wi th Semen Zakharovich Kislin. Kislin was 
b o m in D e c e m b e r 1935 in Odessa , and emigra ted from the U S S R in 1972. He was 
there a director of a supermarket and is n o w head of a company . Transcommodi ty . 
with a 1.1 bil l ion dollar annual revenue s t ream. When he c a m e to NY, he spoke no 
English; he pol ished cars and cleaned vegetables . His company is the largest supplier 
of cast-iron in the world. 
Immigran t ambit ion "overleaps itself". For example , in m y interview 13, a parent 
reported proudly that her child had passed the exam to enter Stuyvesant High School , 
a prest igious public school open only by examinat ion. However , the parents knew 
they were moving out of the city, and knew the son would not therefore be eligible 
to enroll . But they nonetheless had their son take the exam, as a kind of p roof of 
his academic success. 
Not only do the RJIs have impressive h u m a n capital; they also had Soviet training 
in breaking bureaucratic barriers, quite a useful skill for immigrants seeking to make 
it in a n e w country. One of my interviewees reported that after Vienna, everyone was 
seeking to extend their Italian vacation complementary of H I A S . "We were called to 
the US consul on the day when I had plans to lead an excursion [for which she was 
receiving a wage , most ly to lead trips for Russian-speaking tourists, many of w h o m 
were on H I A S stipends]. We called the consulate and said I was sick. We didn't come. 
Next week, we found that our HIAS subsidy was withdrawn because we did not come 
for the appointment. We went to HIAS to straighten things out and our reception there 
was horrible. They knew we had two children and an aged parent. How can they do it 
without warning? They refused to reinstate it. My husband and 1 sat in their offices and 
said we were not going anywhere until our financial aid was restored. It paid off. and 
it was restored. We got what we wanted, and very soon after we left" [Interview 22] 
Or as reported in the press : " A s one of the Russian comedians once said that if 
somebody learned to steal from and deceive his own country, it would be easy to 
succeed in doing it e lsewhere. This seems to be the case with the Russian mafia—even 
Italians are amazed at their schemes and fear lessness" ("The school of c o m m u n i s m 
is the best p lace to learn to be a professional cr iminal ." O g o n e k N 2 3 , June 3 , 1996) 
Old-fashioned corrupt ion was hardly absent from the Russian Jewish repertoire . 
A m e r i c a n ana lys i s of t h e Pu t in p res iden t i a l e lect ion in 2 0 0 3 , i nc lud ing that of 
Secretary of State Powel l , saw it as a sham. Yet some Russians living in NY went to 
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vote, both in the Russ ian consula te in Manha t t an and in the " M i l l e n i u m " theatre in 
Brighton. Passports were needed, and one y o u n g m a n submi t ted two . and a consula te 
employee j oked to use jus t " the live o n e " ( N o v o e Russkoe Slovo " O n e elect ion and 
two fires", by Vladimir Kozlovski i , n.d.). 
Even though success was derived from a combina t ion o f h u m a n capital, ambit ion, 
and cunning, there was unequivocal thankfulness for the count ry that offered them 
refuge, and a near unanimity among those in terv iewed that they felt total loyalty to the 
US. "All the Russians who appear here older than twenty-five have an accent, but they 
achieve a lot; they are doctors, lawyers, have huge businesses, a great country and 
God Bless America" [ Interview 4 ] . One in te rv iewee compla ined about the condi t ions 
under which he was receiving "social secur i ty" . H e and his g roup of veterans wanted 
it to be called "veteran pens ions" , as this wou ld g ive them the feeling that they had a 
right to it, because they "earned it." Yet. amid his s ta tement of indignity, he blurted 
out, "I am grateful to the US. I have received medicine without payment, gotten social 
security, and many other benefits. God bless America" [ In terview 15]. Or again, one 
immigrant nostalgically recal ls Cr imea and the Black Sea (which she m o v e d away 
from, but came back regular ly for vacat ion) m o r e beautiful (more natural) than what 
we were then looking out upon, the beach at Brighton. Yet her loyalty is unquest ioned: 
"Upon arrival to the US, we rented a room in a private house in Brooklyn. But we 
joined a lottery, where we were on a line for eleven years before we got this apartment 
in the Center for the Aged, and when we got it, my husband was dead. This was from 
Program 8, and we also got SSI and food stamps. For that we didn't have to work. 
God bless America" [ Interview 19]. A typical express ion in the in terviews was the 
following: "So we are very thankful to ... the American people. We gave nothing to 
America, but America gave us social security" [ Interview 10] 
In a newspaper story, a reporter wan ted to k n o w h o w the "Russ ian speak ing" 
[russkoiazychnye] i m m i g r a n t s c e l e b r a t e d Ju ly 4 . O n e r e s p o n d e n t a n s w e r e d the 
interview question: "I spent independence day wi th m y husband . We went to Brighton 
Beach. I am a doctor, so I cold not switch off m y cell p h o n e . But fortunately all of 
our pat ients felt well that day. In the even ing w e met u p wi th friends and went to 
Battery Park to watch the fireworks." A n d the au thor wr i tes : "ce lebra t ion is over. I 
am sure that all Russ ian immigrants felt a surge of patr iot ism and an enhanced feeling 
of be longing during Independence Day." 
I bel ieve the immigrants were coached to utter " G o d Bless A m e r i c a " for their 
citizenship interview, because they nearly all reci ted it as if it were part of a catechism. 
But there is no quest ion that they felt an u n b o u n d e d gratefulness to Amer ica . Indeed 
they were becoming super- loyal A m e r i c a n s . But mos t A m e r i c a n s have a h y p h e n 
before Amer i can - wha t wou ld it be for this w a v e of i m m i g r a n t s ? 1 address this 
quest ion in the next two sections. 
II. Not Becoming "Russian-speakers" (as in the Near Abroad) 
Condi t ioning their social and polit ical behav io r as that set of "Russ ian-speak ing 
popula t ion" living in the United States (and thereby b e c o m i n g part of a supra-ethnic 
commun i ty that wou ld h a v e included Russ i ans , U k r a i n i a n s , Be la rusans w h o also 
migrated in large number s ) was a distinct possibil i ty. Indeed this was a m o v e m a d e 
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by m a n y Jews in the republ ics of the near abroad. A n d for a variety of reasons , 
adaptation to Amer ica as "Russ ian-speaking A m e r i c a n s " was attractive. 
First of all , in the N e w York area especia l ly , there w a s full suppor t for the 
Russian l anguage and its c o m m u n i t y of speakers . Indeed there was by the ear ly 
1990s a critical mass of speakers . In 1990, there were about 300 ,000 RJIs in N Y C . 
and about 400 ,000 in the metropol i tan area. Accord ing to official N Y C sources, new 
arrivals from the FSU were the largest source of immigrants in the later 1990s 7 . And 
this facility w a s passed on to the next generat ion naturally. A report in 1991 showed 
that a l though 5 3 % [of 2 n d generat ion migrants] reported preferr ing to use Engl ish at 
home, 8 5 % claim to speak Russian "we l l " and 9 3 % report that they can unders tand 
spoken Russ ian (Kasinitz et al 2 0 0 1 . 10). 
One of m y in terv iewees explained: "Maintenance of Russian cultural life in 
Brooklyn is very good, because of the large numbers who came in the second wave. 
I consider myself an immigrant in the second wave, in 1989-92; the first wave was in 
1978-79. That first wave the people didn't have knowledge, didn't have information; 
thev suffered more than our wave of immigration. In 1989, the influx of immigrants 
was huge. We arrived here through the old route, Israel visa, Vienna, Rome (for two 
months) and then to the United States. When we ar-rived here there was such an influx 
of immigrants that we couldn't rent an apartment. Now they are lawyers, doctors, 
programmers, engineers, and artists. The first wave didn't have theater, there was no 
Millennium here in Brighton. These people have been able to preserve the Russian 
language, support newspapers, theaters, two radio stations (which we did not have 
ten years ago)" [Interview 3]. 
Inst i tut ional support to sustain a c o m m u n i t y of Russ ian - speakers was s t rong. 
As one in terviewee reported. "When I came here, at the Brooklyn Public Library, 
there was one shelf of books in Russian. Right now there is a whole huge section for 
Russian literature. Half the readers in the library here are Russian, as Russians are 
avid readers; everybody goes to the library and they read a lot; the libraries here in 
Brighton, in Sheepshead. and in Garritson, all have Russian-speaking staff. There 
was only one Russian bookstore when I came, and now there are several, with many 
children s books. It made me cry, because in Russia, you had to know someone in the 
bookstore to get children s books; and now (here) you can buy anything you like for 
Russian children, and I'm going to buy these books for my grandson. The libraries 
have all current fiction from Russia; and classics; and you can order what you want 
on line" [Interview 1]. Russian-speaking Americans don ' t even need these bookstores . 
They have no trouble get t ing any Russian book on ozon.ru, perhaps easier for the 
immigrants than for the Russ ians in Russia. 
Other med ia are also available. Russian language newspaper s are plentiful. TV 
in Russian is varied and easy to get. " 0 « TV I have four Russian language stations. 
The last Russian movie we saw was Brigada [a soap opera popular in Russia now, 
about mobs te r s in Leningrad; indeed Brigada is available for rent in all local video 
stores as well as on T V ] " [Interview 2]. There is ubiqui tous availabil i ty of Russian 
radio p r o g r a m m i n g in the N e w York metropol i tan area, from talk shows to mus ic 
to news . Theat re too is plentiful, often with shows that have jus t recently p layed in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. "As for Russian spectacles, we go sometimes, because it 
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is convenient, walking distance from my home. The Millennium theatre plays before 
a full house always" [ Interview 1]. Te lephone connec t ions to the Russ ian-speak ing 
world are as cheap as cal l ing New Jersey. "In 1989 we pa id S2 per minu te , it is now 
cheap; right now we pay three cents m a x i m u m , but St. Pe tersburg is n o w 1.9 cents 
per m i n u t e " [Interview 1]. Thus the cultural foundat ion for a self-sustaining language 
communi ty , that sees itself as having a c o m m o n identity as Russ ian-speakers , exists 
in N e w York. 
All these media oppor tuni t ies suppor t the format ion o f a " R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g " 
identity community . "We use the increas ingly popu la r t e rm 'Russ ian Speak ing ' Jews 
to include people from throughout the former Soviet Un i o n as well as the emerg ing 
'Russ ian speaking ' Jewish communi t i e s in Western Europe and Israel ." - reports one 
sociological study. It cont inues : "The second genera t ion m a k e s far fewer dist inctions 
about which Soviet republ ic they or their friends c o m e from than did the original 
immigrants themselves. There is evidence in this report (and several nice biographical 
s tatements) of Russian kids abjuring the l anguage , but then as young adults s tudying 
it and regaining competence in it. in hopes o f teaching it to their o w n children". 
There was as well a s trong emotional a t tachment to the language from several of 
my interviewees. "We speak Russian at home, I insist. In 1998 when 1 took my son to 
St. Petersburg, and my son Julian was impressed by the city and noted with glee that 
'everyone speaks Russian here. Thank you for making me speak Russian. Now I can 
understand what is going on around me. 'My children spent three summers in Lithuania 
with their former nanny, so they brushed up on their Russian, and my daughter just 
spent the summer with her former nanny in Kiev, Ukraine, and then to the Black Sea. 
She came back not speaking a word of English, and her Russian was so good, but it 
all ended about a week later. She did not mix the two languages, but every word she 
had to say in Russian was very funny. My son downloads contemporary Russian music 
from the internet, and they listen to CD's in Russian" [ Interview 11]. 
Russian-speaking communi t i e s live in distinct ne ighborhoods like Br ighton and 
Key Gardens (Queens) . A n d for the m o r e successful Russ ians from Br ighton Beach, 
they m o v e to larger houses and m o r e opulen t ne ighbo rhoods in Manha t tan Beach 
(Novoe Russkoe Slovo. March 22 , 2004 by Joseph Berger ) . Still they cluster a m o n g 
one another. Estern Schwar tz , a school teacher , repor ted that. " M o s t Russ ians stick 
to each other because they prefer speak ing their nat ive l a n g u a g e . " To give symbol ic 
significance to the emergence of this historical l anguage c o m m u n i t y in the U S , the 
newspaper N o v o e Russkoe Slovo gave publ ic i ty to s o m e o n e a t t empt ing to create 
a m o n u m e n t to the Russ ian-speak ing i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t y : " T h e r e is no decent 
m o n u m e n t to the Russ ian - speak ing i m m i g r a n t s " , w r o t e Leon id Olov iann ikov . He 
portrays this immigrat ion in world-his tor ic s ignif icance o f the three genera t ions of 
immigrants who brought to the U S A their ta lents , their k n o w l e d g e and exper ience , 
and deserve for their n a m e s to be r e m e m b e r e d forever." 
For all this, Russ ian-speakingness is not b e c o m i n g a c o m m u n i t y of fate, at least 
a m o n g the RJIs. This is so for several in ter re la ted r easons . First , there is a social 
class divide be tween the (largely J ewi sh ) third and ( largely Russ ian) fourth wave 
of immigrants , prevent ing a c o m m o n cultural front. M a n y of m y respondents deny 
the divide, but it is a real one . Again and again m y in te rv iewees insisted that they 
had close non-Jewish friends in their c i rc les , but w h e n a sked to p rov ide n a m e s and 
David D. Laitin. The Dc-Cosmopolitanization of the Russian Diaspora: A View 23 
phone numbers (to al low m e to increase m y " snowba l l " sample ) they directed me 
elsewhere, admit t ing they had n o such reference in their cell p h o n e directories. One 
interviewee, w h o admit ted to the divide, pointed out that the Russ ians w h o c a m e to 
Brighton after 1991 were different. They were poor and came to the US for financial 
reasons; whi le the earlier wave were well- to-do and came for polit ical reasons. The 
more recent ones therefore were having more p rob lems ass imila t ing [Interview 8], 
Another in terviewee had the same argument. She did not " b l a m e " the member s of 
the new w a v e ; but she found little in c o m m o n with them [Interview 22]. 
A second reason for the failure of a consol idated Russ ian-speaking communi ty 
of fate in N Y was the undeniab le intergenerational loss in the Russ ian componen t of 
communi ty language repertoires . Consider the fol lowing snippet of on-l ine doggere l , 
representing the Russian abili t ies of the second-genera t ion kids (From January 1989, 
"Weekend" The N e w Russian American.) 
Zarentovav dvychbedrumnyi apartment [I rented a two-bedroom apartment] 
I dlia nachala bziav po\paunda ikry [And purchased a half-pound of caviar] 
la ponial srazu-nado mnoi ne kaplet [I realized--I 'm doing fine] 
Moi velfer dast eshe nesmetnye dam [Welfare will help me out] 
An intergenerational loss occurs despite high levels of ethnic endogamy. This was 
routinely suppor ted in m a n y of the interviews, basical ly a loss of ability to read and 
write in the generat ion born in the US. The parents sadly admit the overarching reality 
of monol ingua l English be ing one generat ion away. "Our older son s best language 
is English, then Russian, and then Hebrew which he learns in school. At dinner we 
speak in English. If we have the energy, we force him to answer in Russian; if not, 
he replies in English and we just accept it" [ Interview 17]. A n o t h e r in te rv iewee 
pointed out a subtler shift. Those born in the U S or those w h o leave Russ ia at under 
age seven lose the " s o u l " o f the language, and it becomes a m e a n s of communica t ion 
rather than a componen t o f culture. Once this occurs , the psychologica l mot iva t ion 
of the e lder generat ion to main ta in the language at tenuates. 
A third reason that the Russ ian-speaking identity has not consolidated is due to 
neighborhood mix ing , especia l ly as Russ ians m o v e out to N e w Jersey, and to the 
wider j o b marke t in the U S . Once they leave the ne ighborhoods of high Russ ian-
speaking concentrat ion, chi ldren in public schools lose a t t achment to the language , 
especial ly in l ight of the o v e r w h e l m i n g e c o n o m i c and soc ia l incent ives to learn 
English well . 
A fourth reason is that in America, anti-Russian stereotypes are common and act as a 
constraint for young Russians, eager to make it in America, to foreshadow their Russian-
speaking heri tage. Survey respondents even in the N Y area show a great ambivalence 
about be ing k n o w n as "Russ i an" . One respondent says , " in m y ne ighborhood , in 
Brighton Beach, the general Russian population I consider bad people ." Another corrects 
friends w h o call h im Russian, and demands to be thought of as a "Russian Jew" . And 
another says, " A m e r i c a n s . . . look down on Russians because they aren ' t so religious 
and being religious is a status symbol ." One girl fears for her value on the marr iage 
market, as m a n y Amer icans " look at them [Russians] as lower. 
A final reason for the poss ible end of a Russian-speaking cultural consciousness in 
the US is the end of " in te l l igents ia" culture in an Amer ican env i ronment that doesn ' t 
reward high cul ture. "In Russia. " one respondent told m e , "we used to be theatre-
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goers, but here much less. At first we had language deficiencies in understanding. 
Also the acting level in Russia was higher than we saw off-Broadway and in Chelsea, 
so we stopped going" [ Interview 1]. Or in a more d a m n i n g s ta tement . "America is 
boring with no intellectual or poetic consciousness - this was the glue to the Russian 
language, that is now being thinned out" [ In terview 8], 
III. Becoming Jewish-Americans (And Much to Their Surprise) 
The data show that the Russian Jewish immigran t s into N e w York are becoming 
J e w i s h - A m e r i c a n s as part of a c o m m u n i t y of fate. T h i s is a surpr i se for several 
reasons , most impress ive ly due to the fact that the popu l a t i on l iving in Br ighton 
consti tutes the sub-set of refusniki that refused to go to Israel! 
But there are other reasons to see this as an unexpec ted ou tcome . For one , most 
of these immigran ts were raised in a secular Soviet cu l ture , quite ignorant of the 
practice of Judaism. One immigran t repor ted to m e , w i th h u m o r in his voice, that on 
the emigrat ion trip to the U S from Vienna, on Swiss Air, the refusniki passengers were 
all presented with kosher food, since they were k n o w n to the airline officials as Jewish 
refugees. H e had no idea what kosher mean t . T h e y compla ined to the s tewardesses 
that they no longer wan ted to be d iscr iminated against as J e w s , and that they should 
eat as normal people do [Interview 25] . In another interview, the respondent tried to 
emphas ize his religious or thodoxy. Yet w h e n I asked if he h a d a bar mitzvah, he was 
ignorant of that core ritual, one that turned boys into m e n [Interview 18]. 
Amer ican Jews have been s tunned by the res is tance of Russ ian Jews to s tandard 
rel igious practices. As ana lyzed by Samuel Kliger 1 ": " A m e r i c a n J ews have tried to 
reach Russ ian Jews as Jews while deroga t ing or failing to unders tand their dist inctive 
Russian identity." Indeed for the Russ ians , social ized into a society that is Eastern 
Or thodox and once communis t , the idea o f a c o m m u n a l Jewish life is unfamiliar. 
M a n y upon arrival cou ldn ' t unders tand pay ing for m e m b e r s h i p in a synagogue , and 
even wear ing a yarmulke was seen by m a n y immigran ts as shameful . The Russians 
wou ldn ' t speak of their rel igion (religia) as do A m e r i c a n J e w s but rather their faith 
(vera): to Russians religia connotes t i resome rituals, whereas vera refers to individuals 
contempla t ing their fate. 
In a poll of Jews in St. Petersburg, only one percent of the respondents connected 
their J ewi sh identi ty wi th "profess ing J u d a i s m " ; this is the s a m e for those who 
emigrated to Israel. A nd in the U S study of migran t s , on ly 3 .4% saw their identity 
as connected to "profess ing Juda i sm" . In Amer i ca , they explain their identi ty and 
religion in a way that does not require or imply major changes in behavior , lifestyle 
or re l ig ious pract ice . Russ ian J ews in A m e r i c a scorn the synagogue , saying such 
things as "God can hear m e without s y n a g o g u e . " 
In another study, w h e n able to give mul t ip le answers to the mean ing of being 
Jewish, only 1 1 % of the Russian Jewish immigran ts say "to practice/profess Judaism"; 
only 1 7 % say they observe Jewish cus toms . So Jewish has an ethnic flavor, as 3 3 % 
say the mean ing of be ing Jewish is " to feel onese l f par t of the Jewish p e o p l e " " . 
Kliger summar izes this si tuation well : " A s . . . s een by mains t ream Amer ican Judaism. 
Russian Jews in Amer ica cont inue to be as indifferent to Jewish her i tage and Jewish 
communa l life as they were while they w e r e living in the Soviet U n i o n " 1 2 . 
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Jewish commuriitaiiari practices are foreign to these immigrants . The vast majority 
of young Russian Jews were not circumcised. A rabbi who has performed some 8,000 
bris operations, reports that he gets cancellations on 2 0 % of the appointments, suggesting 
a kind of taboo against this standard Jewish ritual among Russian immigrants . Russian 
Jews place little importance on keeping the Sabbath. Passover is the most observed 
holiday ritual, yet in a 1993 publication, it was reported that less than 20 percent in 
Russia actually participated in a seder that year. There is some data in the US of very 
high participation in fasting on the holiday of Yom Kippur and attending a seder for 
Passover, but the methods used may have inflated the numbers . 
Not only were Russian J e w s accul tura ted to a secular env i ronmen t , but they 
cultivated highly cosmopol i tan friendship ne tworks in the Soviet period. "My closest 
friends, 1 think, are all Russian Jews, even though in Russia my closest friends were 
non-Jews. But here, practically evervone I know, and everyone 1 communicate with 
is a Jew from Russia" [ In terview 1]. "All my relatives in the US are married to 
Russian-speaking Jews. In Ukraine, many friends and colleagues were not Jewish, 
but here, I don't see any "Russians" here. I like the Russians, they're good people; 
the Ukrainians, they're good people but I don't see them" [ Interview 4] . 
Despi te their rather incomple te and insouciant relat ionship to rel igious pract ices 
and faith, Russian Jewish immigrants into N e w York are becoming Jewish-Americans 
as their pr incipal identity in which they condi t ion their social a n d political behavior. 
Why should this have happened? 
For one , there is the his tor ical power of the 5"1 l ine on Soviet passpor t s that 
indelibly classified them as Jewish by nationali ty in the context of Soviet social and 
political life. To be sure, due to their secular Soviet upbr ing ing , they developed a 
secular version of Judaism, often to the chagrin of the Amer ican Jews w h o sponsored 
them. Yet Soviet passport policy in part helped reify their identity as Jews, a reification 
that had long- term consequences . Thus the Soviet bureaucrat ic heri tage is a par t of 
the explanat ion. 
Second, there are instrumental reasons for a Jewish identity. After all, those w h o 
could m a k e a claim to be Jewish got a free t icket out of the " m a d h o u s e " that w a s the 
Soviet Union . Interview data speak directly to this theme. "In 1989 was the first time 
any kind of Jewish life was allowed in the USSR. People then could openly gather 
and study things Jewish. In Perm, over that five-year period before we left, we had a 
chance to get well-acquainted with aspects of Jewish life. A rabbi came to Perm from 
Israel in 1991. He was there for three years, and I helped him, as I spoke English. 1 
helped get him an apartment and get settled. [Now his wife interjects] . Before that 
time, three young people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came from Israel, telling 
local Jews what they would receive were they to emigrate to Israel. People then in 
Perm couldn't believe there were people from the West standing before them in their 
town. At that time, you needed coupons for sugar, and we were giving these young 
people our names to receive an invitation from Israel" [ Interview 17]. 
"I came to the US in October, 2000. My wife's father was Jewish. But my wife's 
mother was not. This allowed her and therefore us to get the status of refugees. I was 
afraid to come because I lacked knowledge of the language and was old - even today 
it is difficult for me... [Vasily's wife interjects] When Vasily turned 60, it was time to 
retire. His pension was not enough to survive, so he started collecting stuff from the 
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garbage to get money. He didn't want to come to the US; but we received refugee 
status, and one day we received a telegram allowing us to leave before November 
2000, and we had to go. In US, we get SSI ($400 per month each), food stamps, 
Medicaid (and he's had several operations, including a heart operation, without any 
need for payment), 50% reduction for use of public transport" [ Interview 23] , 
A n o t h e r in te rv iewee [ In terview 20] c a m e to the U S in 1992. In the U S , he 
did blue collar work in construct ion. H e had a heart a t tack, and cou ldn ' t work in 
construct ion. He then got a j o b in the US work ing in a j e w e l r y store. He went to a 
business college hop ing to learn p r o g r a m m i n g . He d idn ' t finish because he had two 
more heart attacks, and then he got heart surgery at L e n o x Hill Hospi ta l , paid for by 
Social Security. He b e c a m e a manage r of the j ewe l ry store. 
With refugee status (available only to Jews of all Soviet passport holders) , RJ ls had 
access to free world-class health care and other benefits. This is summed up nicely: "We 
gave nothing to America, but America gave us Social Security" [Interview 10]. 
Third, in the US, synagogues , Yeshivas, and other Jewish associations played key 
organizational roles as assimilating agents , more or less as substitutes for the services 
provided by the 19 t h century Democrat ic Party. "Upon arrival HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant 
Aid Society) met us at the airport and got us into a hotel" [Interview 7]. 
There is, to be sure, a low level o f c o m m u n i t y par t ic ipat ion in general among 
the second-genera t ion migran ts , but h igh levels of par t ic ipa t ion in Jewish c o m m u n a l 
activity. 7 1 % of the U S b o m par t ic ipa ted in act ivi t ies of the Jewish C o m m u n i t y 
Centers and 3 8 % in Jewish s u m m e r c a m p s 1 3 . Or again: "It was very- interesting, the 
way it was all set up, because at the time NYANA (New York Association for New 
Americans) was giving first month s rent and a security- deposit to the proprietor, 
which new arrivals did not have to pay back as this was a fund from voluntary 
contributions. But these people whatever they lent us, we paid them back, and then 
some [laughs]. In the meantime, they wrote off what they gave us as charitable 
contributions, which I found out later, which is OK)" [ Interview 11]. 
The support from the Jewish communit ies was astounding to the immigrants. One 
interviewee [number 16] arrived in the U S in 1993. She is Jewish, and got status as 
a refugee, and she was accepted by a Jewish communi ty in Indiana that invited her 
family.. .She had an elderly brother already here, and he did not have the money to bring 
the rest of his family here. He appealed to this communi ty in Indiana which came up 
with the money for Anna, her son, his wife, and their daughter. The Indiana community 
in Fort Wayne took them under their wing for a year. They got a beautiful two-bedroom 
apartment, and in the closet were excellent clothes, and it was fully furnished, with a full 
refrigerator, and an envelope with S300. It was a small town, yet people came with their 
cars and took them everywhere. She kept on expressing her thanks to this community. 
She lived in NY for eight years, and waited on a queue for an apartment in a house for 
elderly people where she has been living for two years and pays only S I 5 8 per month 
for a room. She gets Social Security and Food Stamps, and medicine provided, all which 
came as part of getting refugee status. She is now studying in a Hebrew college at a 
synagogue every Thursday to learn English [which is still rudimentary]. 
Or again: "NYANA found me a job in four weeks, and got a job in Strawberry's, 
a chain, as a salesperson, and that is how I learned English, together with a fellow-
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worker from Bosnia. I worked there. J was studying accountancy in a school, and then 
found a job as an accounts payable clerk... My younger child was born here, and went 
to nursery school. We didn't go directly to a Jewish Center. Igor is not a registered 
member of a Jewish Center; he doesn't have the patience to sit through the prayers. 
But last year we went on a trip with a Jewish organization to Israel for a week". 
Jewish but not Russ ian was a relevant category for this couple . [Interview 17] 
Meanwhi l e , many of the immigrants wi th school-aged chi ldren enrolled t hem in 
Yeshivas based on idea that they should l e a m something about the once-forbidden 
religion. In interviews of second-generat ion Russian Jewish migrants in the N e w York 
area, 8 3 % at tended public h igh schools . 1 7 % went to pr ivate , mos t ly Jewish schools 
(a h igher figure for parochial schools for any immigrant group in a larger s tudy of 
second generat ion immigrants in America sponsored by the Russel l Sage Foundat ion) . 
6 6 % of those born in the U S (" t rue" second generat ion) a t tended a Yeshiva for at 
least one year. F rom the one-on-one interviews, a clear impress ion that the Yeshivas 
were not academical ly demand ing , but they were emotional ly support ive and left a 
residue of ideology on the s tudents who at tended them. 
The Or thodox schools w e r e not comple te failures. I rene, one of the interviewees 
in this sociological study, a t tended Yeshivas from P'grade through High School , and 
she b e c a m e and remains (in her twenties) quite or thodox: "It was traumatic ... My 
pa ren t s . . . d id not want to b e rel igious. T h e y expla ined to m e that they have been 
this way for this long and w e r e not going to change. They said that when I g row up 
and have m y o w n house 1 could do whatever I wanted, but that I am not go ing to 
change their life." 
I heard similar stories in m y interviews. "We have met new people here in Brooklyn, 
mostly at the Yeshiva - where we take English lessons. Someone from Belarus, from 
Kishinev, from St. Petersburg, all of them Russian-speaking Jews, no Russian-Russians 
or Russian-natives (as we call them). Sometimes Russian-Russians come to the Yeshiva 
to learn English, and we get to know them and those from mixed marriages. But at the 
Yeshiva classes 95% is Judaism; 5% is English " [Interview 5]. 
U p o n arr ival , Gal ina spoke a bit of Engl ish , and Alexander some German . They 
had taken a cour se in Eng l i sh before l eav ing , but it d idn ' t w o r k very wel l . Her 
granddaughter (who jus t g radua ted from High School in Brook lyn , and was ten upon 
arrival to the US) was sent to a Yeshiva because they felt she would leam English 
more quickly there than in the public schools [Interview 9]. 
"/ registered our daughter in a Jewish kindergarten in Brooklyn, on Coney Island 
Avenue and Avenue U... We chose religious school for our kids, even though we felt 
that the quality of education would have been higher in a public school. But we felt 
we could help our kids in the secular subjects, no problem. But we knew nothing about 
Jewish subjects, so we had to rely on the school for that. We discussed this issue with 
our friends and thought about it a lot. Several friends feared that if our kids became 
religious, we would be separating ourselves from them, as they would have a different 
culture. But somehow I didn't believe this would happen, and we took a chance, and 
it didn't. We re as close to them as we always were " [ Interview 24] . 
In the study of the identities of second-generation migrants, the strongest effect on 
each of these identities is attendance in a Yeshiva for more than a year, being a Yeshiva 
graduate, and having visited Israel. It is reasonably positive for all aspects of the identity, 
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but more powerfully explanatory for the religious identity scale (where the r-squared is 
25.7, about twice as high as the other r-squares). The Yeshivas, for whatever reason parents 
chose to place their children in them, efficienUy turned young Russians into J ews 1 4 . 
Taught in Yeshivas, or social ized in other synagogue p rog rams , chi ldren begin 
to convert their parents . In the Kazin i tz s tudy, we learn of Juliana, aged 18, b o m 
in the U S shortly after her parents emigra ted . After her bir th , her mother b e c a m e 
increasingly observant and jo ined the O r t h o d o x communi ty . "She w a n t e d m e to get 
Jewish educat ion because in Russ ia she w a s not able to. T h e Jewish schools wanted 
a w o m a n w h o was rel igious, who kept all the laws, w h o covered her hair. So my 
mother conformed a bit. She did that jus t so 1 can go to a Jewish school . A n d then 
as I learned the cus toms, I started p rodd ing m y parents to fol low them." 
This same theme came through in several of m y interviews. "But if the grandchildren 
are losing full facility in Russian, they have remembered what they got in synagogue 
as children. " At this point, her daughter interjects: "What she is trying to say is that 
the grandchildren are more Jewish than me. We were not taught the religion, but our 
children were" [Interview 4] . "My closest friends, however, became Orthodox. And 
so are their children. Thev observe everything. Their children, influenced in the local 
synagogue, induced them into Orthodoxy. Their parents followed them " [Interview 22]. 
"In the US, we became interested in Judaism, and it became part of our lives. Our 
children not only became interested, but they became religious" [Interview 24]. 
The data on Table 1 lend support to th is idea that over t ime, the Russ ian Jewish 
immigrant communi ty in N e w York is b e c o m i n g m o r e self-identified as Jews. 
The interpretation of the data on Table 1 is not s t ra ightforward. One possible 
in terpre ta t ion migh t be tha t those w h o left the Sov ie t U n i o n ea r l i e r w e r e more 
religious to start with. M o r e probably, the data suggest that the longer they s tayed in 
the US , the more rel igious they got. Here is the interpreta t ion of the authors : '"it is 
our feeling that the number w h o adhere to Juda i sm has i nc reased . . .Th i s may indicate 
a real increase in the bel ief and pract ice of Juda i sm or an assimilat ion into Amer ican 
habits of ethnic-rel igious ident i f icat ion"". 
Table 1 
Evidence of Identity 
Choice Religious Attitudes of Russian-Jewish Immigrants in New York 
(Percentage who Agree) 
Freshmen 
(<3 years in NY) 
Sophomores 
(3-6 years in NY) 
Juniors 
(6-9 years in NY) 
Seniors 
(>9 years in NY) 
Being Jewish is impor-
tant or very important 63 65 65 79 
Judaism is Most 
Attractive 41 46 54 64 
Source: RINA 2000. p. 9. 
Data on the rel igious att i tudes of second-genera t ion migrants (from Kazini tz et 
al, 2001 , p . 41-48) helps confirm the latter interpretat ion. T h e data suggest an over-
t ime rel igious consol idat ion in terms of pr incipal identity: 
* 10% considered themselves Orthodox or Hasidic, but 4 0 % of the U S b o m did so. 
* 56 .7% feel it is "very impor t an t " to mar ry a fel low Jew (compared with only 1 1 % 
of native Jews). 
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* 9 4 % agree that they are proud to be a Jew 
* 8 0 % feel a sense of "be long ing to Jewish people" . 
* 4 5 % say they give to Jewish charities. 
* Many display Jewish re l igious objects in their homes . 
* 3 0 % have visited Israel (and 5 % for more than six months) . Israel is descr ibed by 
them as "fascinat ing", in which you can feel a sense of " h o m e l a n d " imposs ib le to 
feel in the U S . 
* 15% report going to synagogue at least once month ly - thus Judaism is m o r e ethnic 
than rel igious a m o n g these children of migrants 
Further sociological survey findings: 
Nearly half of the 2 n d generat ion migrants report listening to Russ ian med ia " ra re ly" 
or "not at a l l" . Only a third does so frequently. (And this is largely a function of 
those w h o arr ived after age 12)"\ 
3 0 % of the R J l s in N Y think that support for Israel is an essential part o f be ing 
Jewish, whi le only 5 % of Amer ican Jews reported s imilar ly 1 7 . 
"Those b o m in the U S are the least likely to report that mos t of their friends are 
Russian but the most likely to report that most of their friends are Jewish" 1 *. These 
data support the view that the second-generat ion migrants are qui te strongly at tached 
to Jewish symbols , organizat ions , and way of life, far m o r e so than their parents . 
In my interviews in N e w York, 1 found ethnographic ev idence that is consis tent 
with the data on increas ing identif icat ion of RJIs as J e w i s h - A m e r i c a n s . Mos t in 
evidence was an interest by m y interviewees far more in Midd le East poli t ics than 
politics within Russia. Three typical examples follow. 
"/ have no ties left in Russia. I don't miss anyone still there. But we do a reunion 
of people who emigrated from home. I have a Russian channel on TV, but I'm not 
interested in what is going on in Ukraine (when I left Ukraine, nobody cared about 
me; I only met anti-Semitism, forget it, I now have my country), but I'm interested in 
what is happening in the US, with terrorism, and with Israel. Last year I helped collect 
S200.000 for Israel. I support people who care about us... I know what's happening 
in Chechnya, but I'm not interested. Why I care about Iraq is that it is not far from 
Israel, and this is our soldiers in Iraq. We need this war for Israel" [ Interview 7] . 
"We don't have Russian TV here; we don't watch much TV. We go to the Russian 
internet sites. We don't follow closely Russian politics. Igor [her husband] logs on to 
Russian news sites a few times a month, but he follows Israeli politics on the internet 
everyday" [Interview 17]. 
"I'm interested in what goes on today in Russia, and Putin's totalitarian directions, 
but most of my friends find themselves interested more in the Israeli situation" 
[Interview 22] . 
These feelings are more than mere interest. They reflect a kind of deep concern for 
one 's own people . For example , to interviewee 1,1 made a j o k e that the immigra t ion 
flow wou ld cont inue as the next generat ion of Jewish migrants would likely be those 
evicted from the occupied territories of Israel. She d idn ' t laugh, and said that Israel 
is a very sensi t ive subject, and she did not want to talk about it in this context . 
But it was not only Middle East poli t ics that revealed their cultural identi t ies. 
In their more-or- less accepted as cliche requirements for endogamy, they were also 
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clear as to who their in-group was - the relevant set of mar r iage par tners was Jewish 
Amer icans . One in te rv iewee said explici t ly what genera l ly need not be said: "It's 
my dream that my grandchildren will marry inside the Jewish community. We are 
a Jewish family. We have the opportunity here to continue my 'nation'. This is very 
important" [Interview 7] , 
Finally, the organiza t ional ne twork o f Jewish assoc ia t ions sets a leisure t ime 
agenda for these immigran t s to be wi th o ther Jews . The re is of course the synagogue . 
"When I arrived in NY, NYANA gave us a hotel for three weeks, until I found aflat 
on Avenue K and 3T' Street. I went to the synagogue behind Hudde School. Every 
Saturday for two years 1 went to that synagogue. I didn't understand anything, but had 
it translated. They gave me a Talmud in English, and I read it in English " [Interview 
10]. This is so even w h e n the immigran t s h a d little interest in wha t the synagogue 
has to offer. "When I lived in Bayside, I relied on contacts at the synagogue, where 
I went to sen'ices every Sabbath [laughs]. I was a good Jew then. I'm not so good 
now. They did not provide social services, but I learned to read Hebrew, without 
understanding. I learned about the holidays which was very enlightening because I 
could not leam about them back home" [ In terview 11]. 
Not only the s y n a g o g u e . I n t e rv i ewees r evea l ed m e m b e r s h i p in a p a n o p l y of 
Jewish o rgan iza t ions : J e w s from the F o r m e r Sovie t U n i o n ( I n t e r v i e w e e 4 ) ; the 
United Jewish Federat ion ( In terviewee 7) ; A m e r i c a n - J e w i s h Veteran ' s Associa t ion 
( In terviewee 21). These Jewish assoc ia t iona l oppor tun i t i e s connect immigran t s to 
the wider society, but d raw them together as J ewish -Amer icans . 
AH these e thnographic points add up to a clear cho ice in cul tural identity. As 
one interviewee puts it: "Everyone calls us 'Russian Jews '. Nobody mentions us as 
'Jews'. In Russia, everyone who mentions Jew, says 'go to Israel'. Here we came, 
and they call us 'Russian '. We are not satisfied with 'Russian'. We would like to be 
'Jew', not 'Russian'" [ Interview 7] . 
Thus the identity paradox: in the secular U S , Russ ian - speak ing Jews have come 
to see themselves both socially and cul tura l ly pr imar i ly as "Jews"' . Meanwhi l e in the 
religiously defined Israel, Russ ian-speak ing Jews h a v e c o m e to see themselves both 
socially and culturally primari ly as Russ ian-speakers !* 
IV. Theoretical Implications 
The N Y RJIs that form the bas is of this paper, as w o u l d be t rue for any identity 
group, have mult iple cultural reper toires , and many poss ib le identi t ies. In the RINA 
2000 su rvey (16-18) , r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a l l o w e d to sel f - ident i fy a m o n g fourteen 
possible identities. The result: 
* 7 1 % of the respondents had Jewish in the ca tegory-mix . 
* 3 1 % said merely Jew. This was by far the h ighes t identity. 
* 6% said merely Amer ican . 
For more on Russian immigrants in Israel, see Gitelman, Zvi. Becoming Israelis NY: 
Praeger, 1982 and Gitelman, Zvi. Immigration and Identity: The Resettlement and Impact 
of Soviet Immigrants on Israeli Politics and Society. Los Angeles: Wilstein Institute, 1995, 
pp. 34-37. showing that in Israel the younger cohorts are less "Jewish" than their elders. 
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* 4 % said mere ly Russian. 
* 5 6 % connected their Jewish identity to some nationality. 
Which aspec ts of o n e ' s cul tural reper to i re b e c o m e s ac t iva ted as the p r imary 
identity that condit ions social and political behavior is contextual ly driven. In the case 
of Brighton, the impor tance of the English language for social mobi l i ty combined 
with the associat ional pay-offs for being Jewish created a context for ass imila t ing 
into Amer ica as Jewish -Amer icans for those w h o could m a k e a claim for Jewishness 
in their repertoires. 
If Jewish-Amer ican b e c o m e s the preferred mode of self-identification for many 
migrants, and if other migrants know that it is becoming a trend, the identity category 
" J e w i s h - A m e r i c a n " b e c o m e s a " t r end" . It t akes on an o b v i o u s flavor, as if this 
population was obviously and primarily Jewish-Amer ican (as opposed , for example , 
to Russ ian-speaking Amer i can ) . Whi le the initial choices were contextual ly driven, 
once the t rend was set, identi ty politics became a cascade towards a c o m m o n Jewish-
American identity. 
V. Implications for Latvia 
After the restoration of independence in Latvia precipi ta t ing the col lapse of the 
Soviet Union , Latvians had to face the difficult publ ic pol icy problem of na t ion-
building in the context of a mult i -nat ional populat ion, with a substantial fraction of 
the popula t ion nei ther Latvian by ci t izenship or by nationality. Many of these are 
Russian-speakers . 
Official d iscussions of the so-called Russian problem tend to discount the variety 
of pa ths that these Russ ians could fol low on their rou te to c i t izenship in Latvia . 
And more important , that the paths that Russians will follow can be influenced by 
incentives set by Latvians and their government . One set of incentives involves setting 
up difficult barr iers to entry into Latvian cultural life. Cons ider the fol lowing passage 
from one of m y interviews: 
"My father was born in Moscow in 1929, but it said "Latvian" on the 5'h line of 
his passport. His mother was Russian. My father's father was a real Latvian. But he 
left Latvia in 1913, a year before World War I intending to study in St. Petersburg, 
but he became an officer in the Russian army. My mother was born in Belarus, and 
she is Russian. I did not speak very much Latvian as a kid, and began studying it in 
high school. I lived in Riga, and the city had a large Russian population. I worked 
in a predominantly Russian area, and used Latvian rarely, e.g. sometimes watching 
TV, or maybe newspapers. My wife is Russian [and he laughed when I asked if she 
spoke any La tv ian] , Our daughter was 12 when we left. She studied Latvian in 
school, got good grades, but the past five years in America erased all memories of 
the language. We speak Russian at home, but she complains that it's easier for her 
to speak in English. 
"We keep in regular touch with my parents and my wife's mother in Riga. They are 
all retired. My parents were both physicians. 1 worked with computers in Riga before 
I left, and work in programming here. In the 1990s, the economy was in a shambles, 
and with so many out of work, there was literally nothing to eat. But the bigger reason 
for dissatisfaction was political. 1 feel I'm Russian, despite my [Latvian] name. My 
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wife is Russian. And we felt uncomfortable and you (who wrote this book on the topic) 
know why. J got Latvian citizenship because of my ethnicity. It was shameful for me. 
but I needed it to travel, and it was impossible to travel with the old Soviet passport. 
You can't get a visa, for they look at your passport in a foreign embassy and won If 
acknowledge its validity: Mv daughter got citizenship, but my wife did not. She has 
a so-called alien s passport. She couldn't even apply for several years because of the 
quota. It was uncomfortable, and we were willing to migrate anywhere, to Canada, 
to Australia, to the US, and applied to them all" [ Interview 14]. 
In this case, Latvia lost an extremely ta lented and ambi t ious co-ci t izen because 
he felt a s h a m e d in the w a y his wife was t rea ted by the s ta te c o m p a r e d to him. 
This suggests that there is a second set of incent ives for deal ing with the problem 
of i m m i g r a n t m i n o r i t i e s , v iz . , to m a k e the rou te t o a s s i m i l a t i o n as r e w a r d i n g 
as possible . 
In m y 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 f i e ld - re sea rch l e a d i n g up to m y ( L a i t i n 1998 ) Identity in 
Formation, I found m a n y incent ives for Russ i ans in La tv ia to b e c o m e Latv ians . 
But Latvians may nonethe less , due to a false view that identit ies are fixed and not 
sensit ive to incent ives , be miss ing an oppor tuni ty for ass imi la t ing a popula t ion that 
is fully capable of reforming their nat ional identi t ies and playing a p roduc t ive role 
in Latvia 's future. 
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Kopsavi lkums 
Raks ta p a m a t a ir g r a m a t a "Identity in Formation" (Corne l l 1998) publ ice t ie 
atklajumi par kr ievu in tegrac i ju tuvo a rzemju j auna ja s va l s t i s . Kr ievu d i a spo ra 
aplukota BraitonbTca, Nujorka , lai pe t l tu , cik l iela mera m l t n e s zemes kon teks t s 
nosaka kr ievu d iasporas pol i t i sko identitati . Pamatojo t ies uz 2 0 0 4 . gada pavasa r i 
gimenes veiktajam intervijam, raksta analizeta no bijusas P S R S iecelojuso, krieviski 
runajoso mig ran tu pede jo v i lnu " m o d a l a dzTves ves tu re" . Ir apskatTts j a u t a j u m s . 
kapec "krieviski runajosie", si j auna identitates kategori ja . kas izveidojusies tuvajas 
arzemes, nav kluvusi par ga lveno vai p n m a r o identitati Nujorkas vide. Tiek aplukota 
an masve id lga ebreju izce lsmes amer ikanu identitates parad l sanas starp t iem, kuri 
padomju pasu "p iekta ja a i l e " t ikusi identificeti ka ebrej i . Sie a tk la jumi iztirzati 
sasaiste ar autora "identi tates izveles" mode l i . ka ari ar " g a l o t n e s " [tipping] model i . 
Nosleguma tiek izdariti secinajumi par Latvija realizeto pol i t iku attiecTba uz krieviski 
runajosajiem iedzlvotajiem. 
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Identity Change in the Baltics: 
EU-zation, Diversification, or Both? 
Identitates parmainas Baltija: 
ESizacija, dazadlba vai abi veidi? 
Prut Jarve 
European Centre for Minor i ty Issues , G e rman y 
e-mail: j a e r v e @ y a h o o . c o m 
The paper hypothesizes about long-term implications of EU membership for the identities 
of Baltic inhabitants (EU-zation) by referring to some identity-related trends in old and 
new member countries of the EU and in Russia. It is noted that young Estonians, Latvians, 
Lithuanians, Russians, and representatives of other ethnic communities seem to embrace more 
eagerly the new options provided by European integration and globalization than the older 
generations. The paper assumes that both the EU-zation and diversification (or fragmentation) 
of identities in the Baltic States are likely to occur, while in some ethnic communities and in 
some age groups the changes might take place more quickly and extensively than in others. 
Key words: identity, European integration., Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Baltic Russians. 
The membersh ip of Estonia, Latvia and Li thuania in the European Union (EU) is 
a very recent development. But it has changed the legal status of the Baltic inhabitants; 
it has already given them some addi t ional r ights . T h e ques t ion is h o w do the Baltic 
inhabitants adapt to this new si tuat ion. D o they feel m o r e European after having 
become citizens of the E U ? Will they be p roud to be ci t izens of the EU, or would 
they prefer to be jus t Estonians . Latv ians , L i thuanians , Russ ians , etc.? 
European identity remains a highly debatable concept . The p rob lem is that such 
an identity cannot be promoted by using na t ional i sm that created nat ions and national 
identity. Apparently, European identity will not replace nat ional identity; rather it will 
put nat ional identity on a broader civic and territorial basis , which will eventually 
add new dimensions to national identi ty and modify it by creat ing a sense of a shared 
communi ty . This sense of a shared Europe is an important source of mot ivat ion for 
people to get involved in the affairs of the cont inent th rough a democra t ic process . 
By the preservation of the language-based cultural identity, ethnic communi t ies in 
the Baltic States fall into two main ca tegor ies . The first ca tegory includes Estonians , 
Latvians and Li thuanians who live in their his tor ical h o m e l a n d s , Balt ic Russians , 
and Poles of Li thuania . These c o m m u n i t i e s have o v e r w h e l m i n g l y preserved their 
native languages as mothe r tongues , m a n y up to 98 per cent. They can benefit from 
a whole set of educat ional , cultural and re l igious inst i tut ions, and mass media outlets 
that operate in their respect ive mother tongues . This ca tegory encompasses almost 
93 per cent of the current populat ion of the Balt ic States. 
The second category, around seven per cent of the Balt ic populat ion, includes 
other non-titular groups of the Baltic States , such as Ukra in ians , Byeloruss ians , Jews, 
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Roma, etc., that, due to l imited educational opportuni t ies in their native language, 
have largely abandoned the lat ter as mother tongue. In this w a y they have already 
undergone a considerable change in their identit ies. Some individuals be longing to 
this ca tegory have changed their cultural identi ty through ass imila t ion into titular 
Baltic nat ions; some others have chosen educat ion in the Russ ian language and are 
now often treated as be long ing to the Russian speaking popula t ion. 
Below. I wil l focus on the groups be long ing to the first ca tegory wh ich are 
going to face a new cha l l enge of European iza t ion (in the form of EU-za t ion) to 
their identities that have so far remained relat ively intact due to their mother tongue 
environments and l imited contacts with cul tures , languages and business s tyles of 
other European nations. 
It is difficult, if not imposs ib le altogether, to tell today what will be the long-term 
implications of EU m e m b e r s h i p for the identities of Baltic inhabi tants . Therefore , in 
what follows, I can only hypothes ize about possible long- te rm implicat ions of EU 
membersh ip for the ident i t ies of Balt ic inhabi tants by refer r ing to some identi ty-
related trends in old and n e w m e m b e r countr ies of the EU and in Russia. 
Promotion and rejection of identities in the Baltic States 
After independence , the identit ies of different popula t ion groups in the Balt ic 
States were exposed to a h ighly charged poli t ical a tmosphe re . At the state level , 
Estonia, La tv ia and Ui thuania sought to max imal ly d is tance themse lves from the 
Soviet past and strongly rec la imed their e thnic identities wi th demands to redress 
injustice done to them under the Soviet rule, which was proc la imed illegal. Actually, 
they went further, trying to prescr ibe to the rest of the wor ld h o w they should be 
perceived. First and foremost , there was a wish to ban the designat ion of 'a former 
Soviet r epub l i c ' . Then Li thuania c ame up with a concept of its Cent ra l -European 
identity, whe rea s Es tonia s tar ted to p r o m o t e actively its n e w l y cons t rued Nordic 
identity. In bo th cases this w a s done to dissociate themselves from the concept of 
the Balt ic States, which was considered as a hindrance to their poli t ical aspirat ions to 
join Europe as quickly as possible . The results of these init iatives were l imited and 
partly counterproduct ive . The terms ' a former Soviet republ ic ' and ' the Balt ic Sta tes ' 
continue to b e used. T h e Nord ic countries finally embraced all three Baltic States into 
the newly formed regional interstate structure Nordic-Bal t ic-8 despite the a t tempts 
of Estonia to get the exclus ive rights of admit tance; and Li thuania did not b e c o m e a 
part of the Cent ra l -European r eg ion—the so-called Vyshegrad initiative. 
The identi ty formation of Baltic Russ ians has been even m o r e complicated. This 
process was influenced by the nat ionalizing Balt ic States, by Russia and by the major 
international organisat ions such as the United Nat ions , the Counci l of Europe, O S C E , 
NATO and the European Union. 
Estonia and Uatvia were imposing their official v iews on the group identity of 
local Russ ians . Analys is of the battles over definitions and discourses in Estonia and 
Latvia reveal that certain definitions of Russian-speakers, such as 'illegal i rnmigrants ' . 
were preferred by local po l icy makers whi le the others, such as 'nat ional minor i ty ' , 
were suppressed (Pettai 2001) . 
Internat ional o rgan iza t ions have not sided with the t e rmino logy preferred by 
Estonia and Latvia . Instead, they use such terms as 'na t iona l minor i ty ' , 'Russ ian 
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minor i ty ' and 'Russ ian-speaking popu la t ion ' , or 'Rus s i an - speake r s ' w h e n referring 
to Baltic Russians in n u m e r o u s reports and other documen t s . Estonia and Latvia had 
no other option but to use the international minor i ty rights terminology, especially 
during the accession process to the EU and N A T O . 
However , having obtained membersh ip in these organizat ions , Estonia and Latvia 
may now be reconsider ing their former acqu iescence . As repor ted by Latvijas Avize 
on 28 July 2 0 0 4 , : several p rominen t m e m b e r s of La tv ian Par l iament have worked 
out a Draft declaration " O n the condemnat ion of c r imes of communis t total i tarianism 
and Soviet occupa t i on" to be cons idered by the Pa r l i amen t . The draft inc ludes a 
conclusion that "The ci t izens of the U S S R brought to Latv ia dur ing the mil i tary and 
political occupat ion by the USSR should not be cons idered as a nat ional minori ty 
but as a consequence of the Soviet co lonia l i sm" . The draft calls to decolonize Latvia 
and repatriate these former Soviet ci t izens from Latvia. 
The Russian Federat ion has in t roduced a ca tegory o f ' compa t r i o t s ' , wh ich is not 
confined to ethnic Russians only but has a b roader appeal to all former Soviet citizens 
w h o feel affiliated to Russ ian culture and the Russ ian state . This seems to be related 
to an ongoing debate in Russ ia over the e thnic and civic identity of its inhabitants. 
Think tanks in Russia p ropose that the unifying idea for the inhabitants of the Russian 
Federat ion, i.e. the point of reference for their identity, should not be based on ethnic 
but on territorial pr inc ip le—it should not be Russkaya ideya (a 'Russ ian idea ' ) , which 
has ethnic connotat ions and cannot be embraced by all peoples inhabi t ing Russia, 
but Rossiiskaja ideya (an ' idea of Russ i a ' ) . Professor Tishkov. the leading Russian 
scholar on nationali ty issues and an ardent p romote r of the civic-terri torial approach 
has often suggested that in English the w o r d 'Rus s i a ' in the sense o f territory and 
state should be replaced by 'Ross i ja ' . 
In Russ i a , the official p re fe rence o f c iv ic ( t e r r i to r i a l ) p r i nc ip l e has a l ready 
r emoved ethnic identif ication from the n e w passpor t s of the Russ ian Federa t ion. 
Several peoples in the Russ ian Federat ion have protes ted against such official policy 
which could endanger their ethnic identi t ies . Radica l Russ ian nat ionalis ts ("Russia 
for Russians!") are also not satisfied wi th the official suppor t for civic identity. It 
all tends to be a pro longat ion of the old S lavophi le -Weste rn izers debate that sends 
mixed signals to Russ ians ab road—both c ivic and nat ional i s t aspirat ions seem to be 
endorsed. 
Defensive nationalism and identities of the Baltic peoples 
The ident i t ies of Es ton ians . L a t v i a n s and L i t h u a n i a n s have b e e n very m u c h 
determined by ethnic considerat ions in the process o f na t ion-bui ld ing which started 
in the 19 t h century. It led to the es tabl i shment of na t ion states in the w a k e of W W 1, 
which were frozen after W W II for half a century by the Soviet rule under which the 
three Balt ic States b e c a m e increasingly concerned abou t the sustainabil i ty of their 
languages and cul tures because of ex tens ive immigra t ion from the Soviet Union. 
This has brought s t rong e lements of defensive na t iona l i sm into the process of nation 
building and identi ty deve lopment of the Bal t ic t i tular na t ions . 
The restorat ion of i ndependence in the beg inn ing of the 1990s, reinforced in 
2004 by the m e m b e r s h i p in NATO and the EU, crea ted n e w condi t ions for nation 
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building and identi ty deve lopment of the Baltic nationali t ies and other ethnic groups 
which inhabit Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Whi l e Li thuanians m a y now feel much 
more confident about their identity (the census of 2001 revealed the highest share 
of Li thuanians ever in the whole populat ion of the country) . Latv ians and Estonians 
are still very m u c h in the defensive, afraid of aggression from Russia and suspect ing 
that local Russians may act as M o s c o w ' s fifth co lumn. 
The Estonian debate before the referendum of 2003 on EU membersh ip once 
again showed that defensive nat ional ism is still omnipresent ; bo th the supporters and 
opponents of EU membersh ip justified their s tance by the need to protect the country 
against the Russ ian threat in order to preserve culture and language. The supporters 
of the EU advocated immedia te membersh ip in order to get more protection against 
Russian influence, while the opponents warned that such a membersh ip could backfire 
in a longer perspect ive if Russ ia becomes a m e m b e r of the EU. 
It is unders tandable that the smaller the nation, the more watchful and defensive it 
tends to be concerning its identity. In this sense membersh ip in the EU may be a real 
test for the Balt ic nationali t ies. It is true that they have a lways regarded themselves , 
and w e r e r ega rded by m a n y o thers , as E u r o p e a n s . But this ' b e i n g a E u r o p e a n ' 
remained for a long t ime a declarat ion without much substance. 
EU-zat ion, in contrast , means something real , such as free movemen t of labour-
force, cap i ta l and in fo rma t ion . This o p e n s up new o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the Bal t i c 
inhabitants in other EU m e m b e r states, but it also exposes the Balt ic States to various 
outside influences which relate to intensified compet i t ion in the labour market , new 
immigrants , mult icul tural ism, a growing l inguist ic diversity, etc. all of which have 
bearing on local identities. EU-zat ion will depr ive 'being a European ' of its abstract 
nature by affecting the everyday life of mi l l ions in the Balt ic States. It is bound to 
make people feel different about themselves . A quest ion remains how many of them 
will like it and how m a n y will dislike it. For some people the batt le for nat ional 
and cultural survival , known too well from the recent past, m a y have started again. 
Therefore, their react ion in regard to their identity might well b e very conservat ive . 
At the same t ime, anecdotal evidence suggests that some younge r cohorts of Balt ic 
peoples, especial ly after having moved to the West, are rather indifferent toward their 
' inher i ted ' identity and, in stark contrast to the emigrants of prev ious genera t ions , 
are even t rying to escape from it. 
A study of European identi ty in the old EU countries has revealed an interest ing 
phenomenon—the more non-nat ionals there are in a country the less European the 
nationals feel as compared with all residents (van der Veen 2002) . Taking into account 
the cons iderable number s of non-ci t izens in Estonia and Latvia , this p h e n o m e n o n 
might inhibit the Europeaniza t ion of the identit ies of Estonians and Latvians. 
Identity of Baltic Russians 
Ethnic identi ty has not been a very prominent issue for Russ ians . Russ ia has 
never been fully occupied by a foreign power , nei ther h a v e the Russian language 
and culture faced the danger of extinction. The state and the dominant religion have 
existed for more than a thousand years. As a result. Russ ian nat ional ism has been 
relatively weak , confined to radical and marginal political movemen t s . 
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Russian identity was not p romoted by Soviet p ropaganda . Instead, the a im of 
the Soviet nationality pol icy was to create a " n e w histor ic c o m m u n i t y " - the Soviet 
people . The Soviet cul ture and the cor responding identi ty were to be based on the 
Russian language. This m a d e it relat ively convenien t for m a n y Russ ians to identify 
with Soviet culture and consider themselves as be longing to Soviet people . As a result, 
42 per cent (in 1992) and 59 per cent (in 1993) of Russ i ans in Estonia indicated that 
Soviet cul ture was part of their identity. But many m o r e Russ ians , 85 and 96 per 
cent respectively, indicated that Russ ian cul ture was part of their identity (Geist l inger 
and Kirch 1995: 74). 
After Baltic independence, people with 'Sovie t ' and/or Russian identity, and other 
Soviet era immigrants d iscovered that they were l iving in smal l states that gradually 
consti tuted themselves as countries in which the Russ ian language had b e c o m e lingua 
non grata and in which they, at best , cou ld be t rea ted as minor i t ies , but could be 
also perceived as former occupants , or a l iens , even if b o m in these countr ies . This 
introduced new opt ions into the deve lopmen t of the identi ty of Russ ian-speakers in 
the Baltic States (Laitin 1998). 
A recent overview of minor i ty pol ic ies in Estonia notes that Russ ians in Estonia 
have m o v e d a long w a y from reject ing the des igna t ion 'na t iona l minor i ty ' to making 
such claims for their group. More recently they have started to articulate their minority 
rights not as group r ights but in t e rms of h u m a n r ights for the m e m b e r s of the group 
(Poleshchuk and He lemae 2004) . 
V iha l emm and M a s s o s tud ied soc io log i ca l l y the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of ident i ty 
of Russ ians in Estonia (however , wi thout touching the issue of European identity) 
and arrived at four different groups of Es tonian Russ ians : 1) local poli t ical identity 
(Estonian citizens); 2) wider civic identity (member s o f Es tonian society); 3) beached 
(stranded) diaspora group (torn be tween a civic a t t achment towards Estonia and a 
cultural a t tachment towards Russia) ; and 4) minor i ty identi ty (member s of Russian 
communi ty ; the strongest a t tachment to Russ ia a m o n g Estonian Russians) (Vihalemm 
and M a s s o 2002: 194-196) . Thus , the ident i ty of Russ ians in Estonia appears already 
quite diversified. 
C o m m o n to these groups of Russ i ans in Es tonia is that they all feel a certain 
tension, because their cu l ture and l a n g u a g e are different and do not fit we l l into 
Estonian political and cultural f r ameworks . This p laces them s o m e w h e r e be tween 
Estonians in Estonia and Russ ians in Russ ia . Differently from Estonia, the EU has 
recognised cultural diversi ty as its const i tut ional pr inciple . It can be hypothes ized that 
the EU, wi th cultural diversi ty as one of its major va lues , might ease this culture-
related tension of Estonian Russians. At this point it is wor th noting that during almost 
the whole period of the access ion of Es ton ia and Latv ia to the E U , opin ion polls 
showed that Russians in those countr ies w e r e m o r e suppor t ive of E U membersh ip 
than were Estonians and Latvians . 
Research on the identity of Russ ian you th in M o s c o w has shown that the basis 
of their identity includes the fol lowing character is t ics : l anguage , history, and culture 
( O m e l c h e n k o 2004 : 29) . This par t ly exp la ins the p a s s i o n s a r o u n d the re fo rm of 
minori ty educat ion in Latvia - the change of the l anguage of instruction is affecting 
the core e lements of the identity of Latv ian Russ ians , let a lone the fears of a lower 
quality o f education and reduced compet i t iveness in the j o b market . 
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As established by Rose and Maley in the early 1990s, the European dimension 
played a modest role in how the representatives of Baltic nationalities and Baltic Russians 
described their identity. Only one per cent of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and 
three per cent of Baltic Russians indicated that "European" describes best how they 
usually think of themselves. W h e n asked of which other group they sometimes think 
of themselves as a member , five per cent of the representatives of Baltic nationalities 
and six per cent of Baltic Russians indicated "European". According to Rose and Maley 
"Soviet' identity scored lower than 'European ' not only among Baltic nationalities but 
also among Baltic Russians. Moreover, 50 per cent of Baltic Russians considered city 
and locality as the best description of identity, whi le nationali ty (Russians) was the 
best description only for 29 per cent of them (the corresponding percentages for Baltic 
nationalities were 22 and 68) (Rose and Maley 1994: 51). 
Thus , the identity of Baltic Russians was more de-nat ional ized and de-ethnicized 
in compar ison with Estonians , Latvians and Li thuanians for w h o m ethnic origin was 
predominant ly the best descr ipt ion of their identity. This might he lp Baltic Russ ians 
adapt to other non-e thnic componen t s of identity which relate to Europe in general 
and to the EU in particular. 
Meanwh i l e , the European identity is ga in ing ground in Russ ia as well . A recent 
c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y of t h r ee r e g i o n s ( P r i m o r y e , Ki rov and K a l i n i n g r a d ) by the 
Central Russ ian Consul t ing Cent re at the request of the Ebert Foundat ion , Germany , 
established that from 43 to 57 pe r cent of the people define themselves as inhabitants 
of the region. In addit ion, from 25 to 45 per cent of those ques t ioned in each region 
and age group see themselves as Russ ians , and 13 per cent of the residents of the 
Kaliningrad region consider themselves to be Europeans (Rosbal t 2003). 
It was reported with a reference to a wel l -known Russian sociologist. Juri Levada, 
that 55 per cent of Russ ians do not feel and do no t want to be Europeans {Tenezpaqb, 
14 September 2004) . This n u m b e r is h igher but quite comparab le with the share of 
Euroskeptics in Estonia and Latvia as revealed by the E U referenda of 2 0 0 3 . 
Laitin (1998) used t ipping and cascade mode ls to analyze the Russ ian-speakers ' 
possible identity change in Estonia and Latvia. He theorized that at some point in 
time Russians might find it increasingly beneficial to ass imilate linguistically, which 
would bring about a major change of their identity. Laitin referred to 19"1 century New 
York, where his grandparents decided upon arrival not to pass Yiddish to the next 
generation, and the descendents assimilated choosing English. This remote si tuation 
is, however , quite different from the 2 1 5 1 century Baltic States , where employmen t 
ads often d e m a n d that appl icants know three ' loca l ' l anguages : titular, Engl i sh and 
Russian; whe re mass med ia , books , mov ie s , e tc . . are eas i ly avai lable in all these 
languages; whe re people travel extensively, s tudy and work abroad. 
A more recent survey by Laitin in Estonia has depicted precisely the intentions of 
those w h o seem to real ize how to cope successfully with the chal lenges o f European 
integration and globalizat ion. T h e survey indicated that up to 40 per cent of Estonian 
and 50 per cent of Russ ian parents wished to educate their chi ldren in three languages 
(in Es tonian , Russ ian and Engl i sh) , wh ich hints that the next genera t ion m a y be 
moving increasingly towards mult i l ingual ism and more diverse identities by adding 
new language repertoires, instead of giving up one language and replacing it with 
another (Lait in 2003) . 
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Concluding remarks 
The identity of Russ ians in the Baltic States is undergo ing more radical changes 
than that of the titular nat ions . Whi le the titular nat ions seek to consol idate and fortify 
their previous national and ethnic identi t ies , Russ ians need to develop new identities 
in which polit ical , civic and territorial e l ements play an important role. 
The EU membersh ip of Estonia, Latvia a n d Lithuania poses additional challenges 
to the identities of different ethnic communi t i e s l iving in these countr ies , especially 
to the identities of titular nat ions w h o m a y feel reluctant to open up to significant 
influences from outs ide after a somewha t s imi lar pe r iod of Soviet impact has just 
ended. 
At the s a m e t i m e y o u n g E s t o n i a n s , L a t v i a n s . L i t h u a n i a n s , R u s s i a n s , and 
r ep resen ta t ives of o the r e thn ic c o m m u n i t i e s s e e m to e m b r a c e m o r e eager ly the 
new options provided by European integrat ion and global izat ion. Thei r eagerness is 
somet imes watched with concern by older genera t ions w h o regard it as i r responsible 
negl igence towards the identi ty wh ich they have nour i shed and preserved for many 
decades. 
In short, the ev idence avai lable so far seems to indica te that both the EU-zat ion 
and diversification (or f ragmentat ion) of ident i t ies in the Baltic States will occur, 
whi le in some ethnic communi t i e s and in some age g roups the changes will take 
place more quickly and extensively than in others. 
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NOTES 
For example, the Resolution on National Minorities adopted at the 13'° annual session of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in Edinburgh. 5 to 9 July 2004. uses the term 
'national minority' when it calls upon Latvia and Estonia to take necessary measures, such 
as "excluding decision-making directed towards assimilation of national minorities" www. 
oscepa.org (16 July 2004), 
: http:. ,/www'.latvijasavize.lv/'index.php?la=286&li=2081413 (5 August 2004). 
: http://www.regnum.nl/allnews/282301.hnril 
: Analysis of the Russian press in Estonia since 1947 shows that propaganda of "Soviet" 
identity was constantly on the rise between 1969 and 1987 even at the expense of 'Soviet 
Estonian' identity (Jakobson 2002: 176). 
5 This support must have been largely encouraged by the attention that various European 
organizations, including the EU. paid to the unresolved problems of national minorities in 
Estonia and Latvia. However, this support declined sharply just before the EU referendums 
in Estonia and Latvia after the representatives of the EU declared that the situation of 
national minorities is in agreement with the EU requirements. 
Kopsavilkums 
Raksta tiek izvirzlta h ipoteze par ES ilgterrnina ietekmi uz Baltijas iedzlvotaj iem 
(ESizacija), atsaucoties uz dazam, ar identitati saisfitam t endencem ES vecajas un 
jaunajas dallbvalstls un Krievija. Japiezlme, ka gados jauni igauni , lietuviesi. krievi un 
citu etnisko kopienu parstavji daudz labpratak p ienem j aunas iespejas, kuras p iedava 
integracija Ei ropas Sav iemba un globalizacija, neka to dara vecakas paaudzes . Sa 
raksta autors uzskata, ka ir sagaidama gan ES ietekmeta identitasu vienveidosanas, gan 
dazadosanas (jeb fragmentarizacija) Baltijas valst ts , turklat dazas etniskajas kopienas 
un vecuma grupas sis pa rmainas var notikt atrak un visaptverosak neka citas. 
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Identity Changes and Interaction in Latvia: 
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e-mail: j u r i s . rozenva lds@lu . lv 
The aim of this article is to analyze the impact of Latvia's integration in the European Union 
to the changes of identities of the main ethnic groups of society of Latvia. In this connection 
the distinction is made between "EU-ization" as transformation of legal norms and political 
institutions in accordance with Copenhagen criteria, on the one hand, and "Europeanization as 
transformation of the very basic attitudes and patterns of political behaviour. These different 
aspects of "return to Europe" differ with respect to their "vectors" and "speed", therefore 
temporal contradictions between them may emerge within popular consciousness, which, in 
its turn, become an important factor of transformation of ethnic identity in its interaction with 
European identity. Within this context the distinction between three different meanings of 
"normality" as well as the importance of "normalization" of society as the establishment of a 
set of basic principles recognized by the main segments of society is pointed out. 
Key words: Europeanization, EU-ization, identity, normality, normalization, democratization. 
About eight years ago I travelled from Riga to O s l o via Tallin a n d Stockholm. 
In order to save m o n e y I dec ided n o t to u s e an e x p e n s i v e S A S flight and chose 
the ferry (boa t ) f rom Tall inn to S t o c k h o l m . A tha t t ime t h e Tallink t e rmina l in 
Fr ihammen harbour was under reconst ruct ion; therefore there were only two lines 
for passport control - one for Swedish ci t izens and ci t izens o f the European Union, 
and the second one - for all o thers . For qu i t e unde r s t andab l e r easons the second 
line was m u c h longer, and after a shor t t ime it remained the only one . A Swedish 
pol iceman started to circulate a long the line and inv i ted those who were amis s to 
stand in the wrong l ine with the fol lowing message : "Sve r ige . Europeans . . . . " ' . After 
his third appearance near the place were I w a s s tanding, I t r ied to tell him that my 
understanding of "European i sm" differs from his , that Europe ends somewhere around 
the Ural mounta ins or. at least, on the Eastern shore of the Balt ic Sea , that all my 
conscient ious life I used to feel myse l f European, but he was no t inclined to proceed 
wi th this discussion. 
Since historical events of the end of the eighties - beginning of the nineties, the 
break-up of the Soviet Union and of "real socialism", one of the main goals for the former 
"socialist" countries and a great part o f the former Soviet republics was the "return to 
Europe". The question may be stated in this connection, what does "return to Europe" 
mean, what does "Europe" mean. It has to b e pointed out that European identity is a 
highly debatable concept. One can speak about Europe in different senses - geographical, 
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historical, cultural, economical, political, the common destiny of the European nations 
may be mentioned, and last but not least - creation of the European public space. These 
multiple visions of European reality coexist, but relations between them is a matter of 
debate a m o n g academics, politicians, and the general public. European identity raises 
the question of the borders of Europe. How can one draw the line between Europe and 
non-Europe? Is Russia, Ukraine or Byelorussia a part of Europe?? Samuel Huntington 
pointed out that Europe finishes where Eastern Orthodox Christendom and Islam start. 
This understanding raises a question about Greece as a member state of the EU or Bulgaria 
as a candidate state. What about Turkey as a hard case of EU enlargement? What about 
muslims in many member states of the European Union? On the other hand, looking 
from the Western side of Huntington 's line, Rokas Bemotas, Permanent Representative 
of Lithuania to the OSCE, stated during the colloquy "Europe tomorrow: shared fate 
or common political future" held in Strasbourg April 1 8 t h - 19th, 2002, " t he idea of 
Europe is still too often linked to Western Europe only, or to the European U n i o n " 1 . As 
he sees it, closer attention to the regional components of the continent, with a variety of 
complementary entities such as "northern Europe" and the "Bal t ic countries", will also 
help to boost European identity. 
T h e S w e d i s h p o l i c e m a n w a s r igh t s t r e t c h i n g the p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t o f the 
"Europeanness" , which n o w a d a y s together with economical considerat ions dominates 
over all o thers m e n t i o n e d above . C o m i n g closer to the pol i t ica l aspect , one may 
remember Jurgen Habe rmass , w h o pointed out that in a liberal democracy, ci t izens 
should not be identified wi th a c o m m o n cultural identity, but with some constitutional 
principles that fully guarantee their rights and freedoms and p romote their involvement 
in democrat ic del iberat ion on essential social issues. In this connect ion it has to be 
pointed out that a longside with the cultural plurality of Europe . Article 2 of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty adopted by the European Convention sets out as the main values 
of the U n i o n political relevant ones : human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the 
rule of l aw and respect for h u m a n rights2 
In o rde r to decr ibe changes in pol i t ics and society o f European count r ies as 
well as t ransformation o f international poli t ics in connect ion with the deve lopment 
of the European Union, the term "Europeaniza t ion" b e c a m e often used dur ing the 
last yea r s 3 . As Kevin Fea thers tone points out, " 'European iza t ion ' . . . is not a s imple 
synonym for European reg iona l in tegra t ion or even conve rgence , though it does 
overlap with aspects of both. As a term for the social sc iences , it can r ange over 
history, cul ture, polit ics, society, and economics . It is a p rocess of structural change, 
variously affecting actors and insti tutions, ideas and in teres ts" 4 . F o u r general trends 
in the l i terature on "European iza t ion" are pointed out 3 : 
"Europeanization" as an export of cultural norms and patterns alongside with 
the expansion of European great powers; 
diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities, and patterns of behaviour on a 
cross-national basis within Europe; 
domestic institutional adaptation to the pressures, emanatingdirectly or indirectly 
from EU membership; 
public policies and policy processes impacts of EU membership 
Feathers tone dist inguishes also between "maximal is t" and "minimal is t" senses of 
"Europeaniza t ion" . He wr i tes : " In a maximal is t sense, the structural change . . . . Must 
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beof a phenomenon exhibi t ing similar a t t r ibutes to those that p redomina te in, or are 
closely identified wi th , ' E u r o p e ' . Minimal ly , 'Eu ropean i za t i on ' involves a response 
to the policies of the European Union (EU) . " f 
Asking the question what did "return to Eu rope" wi th respect to its political aspect 
mean for Eastern European societies as an idea and as a goal, the dist inction be tween 
"min imal i s t " and " m a x i m a l i s t " unders tanding of "European iza t ion" as proposed by 
Fethersone, seems no to be fully sufficient. It seems necessary to dist inguish between 
two interconnected, but nevertheless different m o m e n t s wh ich deserves conceptual 
distinction..First of all , the t ransformation of legal n o r m s and polit ical inst i tut ions in 
accordance with criteria formulated by The European Counci l mee t ing in Copenhagen 
on 22 June 1993 has to be ment ioned. Cand ida te states were required to develop what 
may be cal led legal and insti tutional f ramework of d e m o c r a c y , respect for human 
r ights , develop a viable marke t economy and the abi l i ty to face up to the pressure 
of compet i t ion and the marke t forces wi th in the Un ion , and under take obligations 
in connec t ion with m o v e m e n t t o w a r d s po l i t i ca l , e c o n o m i c and m o n e t a r y union. 
This process will be referred to in this paper as "EU- iza t ion" . At the same t ime , as 
Roland Ingelhardt poin ts out, cultural changes are of crucial importance for stabilizing 
democracy. Whether or not democratic institutions survive through good times and bad 
depends on whether they have built up deep-rooted cultural attachments among the citizens, 
and among them interpersonal trust is one o f the mos t impor tant i s sues 7 
Therefore a deeper level of t ransformat ion may b e po in ted out. He re one may 
speak about "European iza t ion" as a t ransformat ion o f the very basic at t i tudes toward 
the outer wor ld and other m e m b e r s o f society, and as pa t te rns of poli t ical behaviour 
to b e compat ib le w i t h humanis t i c t rad i t ions of E u r o p e . It is hard to be l i eve that 
"Europeaniza t ion" in this sense may b e imposed by a n y outer authori ty, it is a matter 
of self understanding for individuals and social groups. P robab ly in this sense Thomas 
M a n n , after his return to Ge rmany after World War II f rom exi le in the United States, 
called on Germans to s t ruggle no longer for a G e r m a n E u r o p e but for a European 
Germany *. 
These different aspects o f "return to E u r o p e " differ with respect to their "veloci ty" 
and "vec tors" . Taking into account that, at least in La tv ia , m o v e m e n t toward the 
European Union for a long t ime w a s clearty an elite project , the " E U - i z a t i o n " was 
mainly directed from the top downward , whereas "European iza t ion" o f society seems 
to be main ly directed from the bo t tom upward . 
In exp la in ing re l a t ions b e t w e e n " E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n " and " E U - i za t i o n " , an the 
analogy wi th the idea of doub le s tandard influential in Med ieva l scholas t ic i sm may 
be useful.. In accordance wi th the concept o f double truth, faith and reason h a v e the 
s ame goal, but they achieve this goal using different m e a n s , therefore in each concrete 
point there are poss ib le cont rad ic t ions b e t w e e n t hem. S imi la r conclusions m a y be 
m a d e about relations be tween "European iza t ion" and "EU- iza t ion" , which justifies 
dis t inct ion be tween " E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n " and " E U - i z a t i o n " v is -a-v is Fea the r s tone ' s 
d is t inct ion be tween " m a x i m a l i s t " and " m i n i m a l i s t " senses of "European iza t i on" . 
O n e may speak no t only about t w o consecu t ive p h a s e s o f the s a m e p rocess , but 
a lso about relatively independent p rocesses o f t ransformat ion. The ul t imate goals of 
"Europeaniza t ion" a n d "EU- iza t i on" are the same bu t uneven "ve loc i ty" may create 
contradict ions, wh ich in their turn m a y be a cons iderab le factor of identi ty dynamics 
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in societies of the new m e m b e r states of the European Union in general , and Latvia 
in particular. 
It has to b e pointed out that not only changes of identi t ies, bu t also interaction 
between changing identities of the main groups of society has to be taken in account. For 
this purpose I propose to use concept of "normal i ty" and its counterpar t - "minor i ty" . 
Three possible unders tandings o f the term "normal i ty" may be dist inguished: 
The first possibility presupposes that something may be described as "normal" 
on the basis of its conformity to more or less universal criteria, like "human 
nature", "legal norms", "rules of economy" etc. 
The second way of understanding "normality" is to define it on the basis of 
belonging to the dominant culture. 
Last but not least, the third possibility of understanding "normality" is connected 
with emphasis on the question whether there is a set of basic conventions in 
society as a basis for its stability and sustainable development. 
T h e first a p p r o a c h of u n d e r s t a n d i n g " n o r m a l i t y " in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h pos t -
C o m m u n i s t La tv ia is d e v e l o p e d by D a i n a S tuku ls Egli t is" . S h e unde r s t ands the 
concept of "normal i ty" not as replacement , but as supplement for the explanatory 
concept of nationalism, and links the concept of "normal i ty" to quest ions of elevat ion 
and salvation o f a nat ion on the basis of " n o r m a l " polit ical , legal and economica l 
condit ions. Within this unders tanding ".. .part of the process of change has been a 
struggle be tween different g roups to define and redefine what is socially "na tu ra l " 
and " n o r m a l " 1 0 . Four ideal types of normali ty in pos t -Communis t society of Latvia 
are poin ted out as follows: 
Revolutionary Conservative 
Progress Spatial / Modem West Evolutionary , Immediate Past 
Return Temporal / Distant Past Reactionary / Immediate Past 
T h e spatial type of normal i ty takes as its pr imary mode l of t ransformation the 
m o d e m West, the temporal type of normali ty focuses not on modernizat ion but on 
restoration and re-creation of the institutions, norms and va lues of the interwar period 
of independence , and bo th of t hem are based on the convict ion that fifty years of 
Soviet power were a deviation from the normal path of political, economic and cultural 
development o f Latvia. T h e evolutionary type of normality, in accordance wi th Daina 
Stukuls Eglitis, highl ights an evolut ionary transformation of Soviet structures such 
as the socialist economy and cit izenship regime, whereas the react ionary narrat ive 
is concerned wi th the legacy of the immediate past in order to return to the heri tage 
of the "real soc i a l i sm"" , but bo th cases prescr ibe to the Soviet t ime some degree 
of normality. T h e Pos t -Communis t development of Latvia may b e character ized by 
fluctuations be tween spatial and temporal types o f normality. 
The second understanding of "normali ty" is based on the belonging to the dominant 
culture. In this sense the "normal i ty - m i n o r i t y " dis t inct ion is c losely connec t ed 
with the structure of identity. Within " n o r m a l " identity the role of ethnic ques t ions , 
such as survival of language, education in the native language etc. . usually play a 
less important role compared to social and economical quest ions , identification with 
the state, community, region or religion. This separates "normal i ty" from "minor i t i es" 
(or "abnormal i t ies" ) - o ther ethnic and cultural groups c la iming for their l anguage . 
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cultural, somet imes also - political and economica l rights and recogni t ion. It has to 
be pointed out that the status of " m i n o r i t y " is not direct ly dependent on a group ' s 
specific weight in the whole of the popula t ion . 
T h e h i s to r ica l e x p e r i e n c e of L a t v i a n s is that o f a c e n t u r i e s - l o n g m i n o r i t y 
exper ience . It was , on the one hand , the real bas i s for the ex t r eme ly h igh level 
of the mass part ic ipat ion dur ing the years of the " s ing ing revolut ion" , and, on the 
other hand, it p roduced various stable everyday s tereotypes that even in the present 
situation retain their impact upon d iscourse in the social-pol i t ical sphere. The mos t 
important of them are: 
First of all, the main ly retrospect ive approach to socie ty and its relations with the 
outer world, the intention to unders tand the solut ion of the current political and social 
problems mainly in terms of ove rcoming the injustices per formed in the past. 
Secondly, the bel ief about the un iquenes s of La tv i a ' s si tuation that in its turn 
interrelated with the idea about Latvians as nega t ive ly m a r k e d chosen people , that 
they had suffered m o r e than any other na t ion in the 20 th century m a y be pointed out. 
Consequent ly , the assumpt ion was w idesp read that the Western countr ies had some 
specific obligations with regard to Latvians and Latvia, a n d in the name of overcoming 
the injustice of the past , Latvians have n o obl igat ion to act only in conformity with 
the standards of poli t ical behav iour accepted in the Wes te rn wor ld . 
On the basis of these popular a t t i tudes, a specific k ind of poli t ical culture, one 
may call it a mono logue culture, emerged. O n e of its impor tant features may be called 
"moral antipoli t ics". In my unders tanding of ant ipol i t ics I fol low ideas of Andreas 
Schedler, who defines moral antipoli t ics as a t tempts to radical ly reduce the sphere 
of political debates by juxtaposi t ion o f the mater ia l (e .g. , mora l ) to the procedural 
(political). Moral antipoli t ics p roc la ims certain values (mora l , cultural , ethnic etc.) to 
exist outside any form of d i scuss ion . 1 2 In p o s t c o m m u n i s t societ ies in general and in 
Latvia in particular such a t tempts often b e c o m e a w a y to cast poli t ics into the shade 
in situations which d e m a n d invo lvemen t of all interested par t ies in order to achieve 
compromise necessary for sus ta inable d e v e l o p m e n t o f society. In this connect ion 
it wou ld be useful to ment ion the idea of the irony of democracy formulated in the 
middle of the last century by so-called democrat ic revisionism, which asked the question 
why democratic regimes worked quite well w h e n a l a rge par t o f the electorate did 
not support basic democra t i c values and n o r m s . T h e a n s w e r was that despi te the 
famous assertion that democracy is gove rnmen t "by the people" , the responsibili ty 
for the survival of democracy rests on the shoulders of the elite. The problems with 
the Latvian case are connected with the fact that "antipolitical" attitudes are widespread 
among representatives of the political elite, and it becomes clear in connection with debates 
about Russian school reform, that the level of confrontation between Russian-speaking and 
Latvian-speaking part of the political elite is higher than in society in general. 
The ident i ty of R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g i n h a b i t a n t s o f La tv ia in the last yea r s of 
Soviet power may be character ized, unl ike the identi ty of Latvians , as an example 
of " n o r m a l " identi ty, part ly due to the h is tor ica l t radi t ion o f p r e v a l e n c e of self-
identification with the state ( "empi re" ) over e thnic c o m p o n e n t s of identity, part ly 
due to objective social preferences of Russ ian - speakers in any c o m e r of the former 
Soviet Union, and in Latvia in particular. Therefore the quest ions which domina ted in 
self-understanding of Russian-speakers were not ethnic, but social and economic ones, 
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and att i tudes of the majori ty of the Russian - speaking popula t ion were on a different 
" level" in compar ison with the demands of Latvians for the preservat ion of Latvian 
language and culture as well as the independence of Latvia or, at least, were not in 
direct contradict ion with them. This avoided the emergence of ethnic conflict in the 
beginning of the n inet ies and p roduced (so to speak) ' m o m e n t u m of normal i ty" , 
which p l ayed an impor tan t role in ensur ing the peaceful na ture of the renewal of 
independence of Latvia. 
Still in the middle of the nineties there were substantial differences in the identity 
structure of Latvians and Russians in Latvia. As data of the N e w Balt ic Barometer 
shows, La tv ians identified themselves first of all with e thnic be longing , whe rea s 
Russians of Latvia, contrary to Latvians , as their first choice ment ioned a t tachment 
to city/locality. It has to be ment ioned that three surveys - in 1993, 1995. a n d 1996 
showed a t endency of s low decrease in the n u m b e r of La tv i ans w h o m e n t i o n e d 
ethnicity as their first choice ( 6 3 % in 1995, and 5 7 % in 1996) and an increase in 
the number of Latvians w h o ment ioned be longing to the ci ty/locali ty as their first 
choice ( 1 7 % in 1993, 2 7 % in 1995. and 3 2 % in 1996). Unfortunately, in the 2001 
New Balt ic Barometer survey, the option of ethnicity was replaced by the opt ion of 
at tachment to the country/state, therefore it is hard to judge if this tendency cont inued 
to manifes t itself. The s t rong sense of ethnic identity a m o n g Latvian intel lectuals and 
artists was expressed in b road discussion which took place in N o v e m b e r 1997 - April 
1998 in the newspaper "Diena" after publ icat ion of an article by sociologis t Talis 
Tisenkopfs , where he under l ined the necessi ty to analyse mult ipl ici ty of individual 
identities, where ethnic identity is only one of several identi t ies. A Great majori ty of 
Tisenkopfs ' opponents underl ined that any attempt to devalue ethnic identity threatens 
the very foundations of the state and the Latvian na t ion 1 3 . 
Russians of Latvia, contrary to Latvians, as their first choice ment ioned attachment 
to city/locality ( 4 7 % as the first choice in 1993, 5 9 % - in 1995, and 5 3 % in 1996). 
Ethnicity is the first choice of approx. 3 0 % of Russians in Latvia ( 3 0 % in 1993. 2 2 % 
in 1995, and 2 9 % in 1996) . as well as the second choice for 31 % of Russians in 
1993. 3 3 % in 1995, and 3 6 % of Russians in 1996. Unfortunately, in the 2001 survey, 
the quest ion of ethnic identi ty was replaced by the question of at tachment to Russian/ 
Soviet, where it is not clear, what does Russian mean — ethnici ty of a t tachment to 
the country. 
Changes of identities of Latvia ' s main ethnic groups dur ing the years of r enewed 
independence of Latvia m a y be described as the mixture of two processes . O n the one 
hand, one may speak about t ransformation of Russian identi ty from "norma l i t y" to 
"minor i ty" , somet imes a ra ther painful process of recogni t ion of a n e w nonprivi l iged 
social si tuation, that, in its turn, s trengthens the ethnic identi ty of the Russ ians . On 
the other hand, there are changes of Latvian identity from "mino r i t y " to "normal i ty" . 
These changes were s lowed down by various subjective and objective factors. Here 
two of t hem may be ment ioned: first of all, reaction to "EU- iza t ion" efforts, especially 
because the argument o f "Europe ' s p ressure" was widely used by the polit ical elite 
in the ninet ies in order to justify somet imes rather painful consequences of adopted 
policies, as well as a lack of clear understanding of the prospects for distinctive Latvian 
culture within the European Union, and, last but not least, react ion to s t renghthening 
of the ethnic identity of the Russ ian-speaking part of populat ion. 
48 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
What about a t tachment to Europe , men t ioned in the beginning of this article? 
Marju Lauristin points out in his we l l -known book "Re tu rn to the Western World", 
"the mos t decisive role in the col lapse of the Soviet U n i o n was p layed not by ethnic 
na t iona l i sm. . . but precise ly by the civi l izat ional conflict be tween the Russ ian-Sovie t 
Empi re , the " N e w B y z a n t i u m " of the 20 th century, and the Baltic and Eas t -European 
nat ions, represent ing the Western t r ad i t ion" 1 4 . O n e m a y say that this be long ing to 
the Western world, b e i n g European r ema ined for the genera l publ ic for a long t ime 
a declaration wi thout m u c h substance. Never the less this drive to come back where 
Latvians had been m o r e than fifty years before ("return to Europe") was an important 
driving force for ove rcoming the stress o f social and economic reforms. 
O n the other hand, the t ransformation of the vision of Europe from an abstract 
hope towards a more concrete and contradic t ional unders tand ing of real European 
ins t i tu t ions a n d ob l iga t i ons c o n n e c t e d wi th t h e m subs t an t i a l l y c h a n g e d popu la r 
atti tudes. As a survey " O n the Road to Civil Soc ie ty" conduc t ed by the Baltic Social 
Science Institute shows , be tween 1995 and 1997 the n u m b e r of those w h o identified 
themse lves with E u r o p e decreased f rom 3 0 % to 1 3 % percen t a m o n g ci t izens of 
Latvia and to 10% a m o n g non-c i t i zens 1 5 . In 2000 these numbers decreased to 1 1 % 
and 7 % accord ing ly 1 6 . 
It is a wel l k n o w n fact that La tv ia , t oge the r w i t h Es tonia , was a m o n g those 
candidate states with the highest percent of euroscept ics . It is widely recognized that 
one o f the main sources of the euroscept ic ism in Latvia (probably the s ame is true for 
Estonia) is defensive na t ional i sm, fear that e thnic identi ty will b e endangered within 
the European Union . As focus group d iscuss ions organized by the Balt ic Institute 
of Social Sciences in June - September , 2003 showed . Latvians expressed concern 
about intervention of E U institutions in l anguage usage quest ions , that the role of the 
Latvian language wi th in the Russian c o m m u n i t y will d e c r e a s e ' . On the other hand , 
immeaditely after the referendum on m e m b e r s h i p in the European Union the negative 
vote of the Russian-speaking citizens o f Latvia was a mat ter of broad discussion in the 
med ia and society. C o m p a r e d to 5 7 % of posi t ive votes a m o n g Latvians , only 2 0 % of 
Russians voted for m e m b e r s h i p in the European Un ion , 4 4 % voted against (compare 
with 1 8 % of Latv ians) , and 3 6 % of Russ ians did not take part in the referendum 
(compare wi th 2 4 % of Latvians) (see graph. N o . l ) . 
Attempts to explain the negative vote of Russians - citizens of Latvia on the basis of 
their at tachment to Russ ia and nostalgia for the Soviet pas t comes in contradiction with 
the fact that as far back as in 2002, Russians in Latvia expressed a more positive attitude 
towards membership in the European Union than Latvians (see graph. N o . 2). 
The most plausible explanation of this fact may b e based on the tendency towards 
strengthening of the ethnic identity of Russians in Latvia and their dissatisfaction with 
official policies of Latvian authori t ies , especial ly in connec t ion with the reform of 
Russ ian schools. In this connect ion there were certain hopes that pressure on Latvia 
as a candidate state f rom EU inst i tut ions will soften re fo rm requi rements or will lead 
to its pos tponement . These hopes failed and the reac t ion wasanega t ive vote in the 
referendum. One of the main sources of euroscep t ic i sm a m o n g Latvians were fears 
that ethnic identity wil l be endangered within the European Union. 
On the other hand , immead i t e ly after the r e f e rendum o n m e m b e r s h i p in the 
European Union the negat ive vote of the Russ ian-speaking citizens of Latvia was a 
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matter of broad discussion in media and society. Compared to 5 7 % of posi t ive votes 
a m o n g La tv i ans , only 20 % of Russ ians vo ted for m e m b e r s h i p in the E u r o p e a n 
Union, 4 4 % voted against (Latvians - 18%). and 3 6 % of Russ ians did not t ake part 
in re fe rendum ( 2 4 % of Latvians) . 
Graph No. 1. Ethnic dimension of Referendum on Membership in the European 
Union Source: Post-Referendum Survey. Citizens of Republic of Latvia. N=675, age 18-74. 
Baltic Social Science Institute, 2003 
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Attempts to explain negat ive vote of Russ ians - ci t izens of Latvia on the basis 
of their a t tachment to Russ ia and nostalgia for the Soviet pas t comes in contradict ion 
with the fact that as far back as in 2002, Russ ians in Latvia expressed more posi t ive 
attitude towards membership in the European Union than Latvians. Here the concept of 
EU-izat ion may be useful again. Strengthening of ethnic identity of Russians in Latvia 
and their dissatisfaction wi th official pol ic ies of Latvian authori t ies , especial ly in 
connection with education and language issues produced certain hopes within Russian 
communi ty that pressure towards Latvia as candidate state from EU insti tutions will 
soften reform requi rements or will lead to its pos tponement . These hopes failed and 
the react ion was negat ive vote in referendum. 
Graph No. 2. Changes in attitudes toward EU accession Source: Baltic Social science 
Institute 2001-2003. Baltic Data House, 1995-1998 
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The stability of society in Latvia m a y be chal lenged by the uneven "ve loc i ty" of 
identi ty changes wi th in the ma in l inguis t ic g roups . Rus s i an - speake r s m o v e from 
"normal i ty" to "minor i ty" faster than Latv ians are able to " n o r m a l i z e " their identity. 
Therefore the possibility of the collision of minor i ty feelings exists, and the conclusion 
may be m a d e that n o w a d a y s in Latvia the probabi l i ty o f e thnic conflict is h igher than 
it was in the beginning of the ninet ies . 
The prevention of ethnic conflict is at the same t ime an important part of the 
" n o r m a l i z a t i o n " of soc ie ty in the th i rd s ense m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , n a m e l y , as the 
establ ishment of the set of basic conven t ions in society as a basis for its stability and 
sustainable development . In this connect ion it is clear that possibi l i t ies of external 
p ressure with respec t to minor i t i e s , l a n g u a g e e tc . i s sues d imin i shed after La tv ia 
b e c a m e a member state of the European Union . O n the other hand, as h u m a n rights 
expert and member of the Latvian Sae ima Boris Tsi levich correct ly states, " the broad 
diversity of practices in ' o ld ' democrac ies - all of wh ich used to be recognized as 
legit imate and corresponding to l iberal - democra t ic s tandards - creates confusion 
for those diligently work ing to bui ld e thnic pol ic ies in accordance wi th 'civi l ized 
Western pat terns '" 1 1 1 . Therefore the ar t iculat ion of a set o f basic pr inciples recognized 
by all important segments of society of Latv ia more and more b e c o m e s an internal 
p rob lem. Fur ther pol i t ical d e v e l o p m e n t , especia l ly deba te s on implemen ta t ion of 
school reform, will show to what extent EU-iza t ion o f polit ical pract ices in Latvia 
will be followed by their Europeaniza t ion . 
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Kopsavi lkums 
Raksta merkis ir analizet Uatvijas sabiedrlbas galveno etnisko grupu identi tates 
izmainas , ko radljusi Latvi jas integracija Eiropas Savienlba . Saja sakara raksta ir 
i zman to t s n o s k l r u m s s ta rp " E S i z a c i j u " un " e i r o p e i z a c i j u " . Ar " E S i z a c i j u " t iek 
saprasta l ikumdosanas , e k o n o m i s k a s dzlves un pol i t isko instituciju transformacija 
a tb i l s tos i t. s. K o p e n h a g e n a s kr i t e r i j i em. " E i r o p e i z a c i j a " savukar t ir po l i t i skas 
ku l tu ras un po l i t i skas u z v e d l b a s p a m a t r a k s t u r o j u m u t r ans fo rmac i j a s a s k a n a ar 
Eiropas humanis t i skas kul turas tradlcijam. "ESizaci ja" un "eiropeizaci ja" ir dazadi 
"atgr iesanas Ei ropa" aspekt i . kas virziti uz vienu un to pasu strategtsko merk i , tacu 
atsk^iras p e c to " v e k t o r i e m " un norisu Struma. LIdz ar to a t sev iskos sab iedr lbas 
attlstlbas p o s m o s tie var nonakt savstarpeja pretruna, kas klust par butisku faktoru 
sabiedrisko grupu identitates transformacija. it Ipasi etniskas un eiropeiskas identitates 
mij iedarblbas konteksta. Saja sakara raksta tiek aplukotas latviesu un Latvijas krievu 
identitates transformacija un tas ietekme uz attieksmi pret Eiropas Savienlbu sakara ar 
ba lsojumu 2003 . gada septembra referenduma par ies tasanos Eiropas Savienlba . Par 
pamatu etniskas identitates transformacijas ap lukojumam tiek izmantots nosk l rums 
starp "no rma l i t a t i " un "minor i ta t i " , noskir tas trTs dazadas "norma l i t a t e s " noz lmes 
un uzsver ta svar igako sabiedrlbas grupu atzlto savstarpejo att ieclbu pamatpr inc ipu 
nozlme sabiedr lbas "normalizaci ja" . 
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We may explore the historic changes and transitional culture on the basis of public texts (ie 
artifacts), but we may also explore how individuals "process the culture". The premise of the 
paper is that self-identification is an important form of individually "re-worked" culture as 
subjects" response to the changes. Both old and new meanings, ideologies and relevant symbols 
"circulating"' in the public sphere are embedded in identities (Castells 1997). 
The article focuses on the question - is there potential for the formation of a new civic identity 
among Estonian Russians shared with ethnic Estonians. 
On the basis of representative survey data from 2003. I will analyse how Estonian Russians, 
in comparison with Estonians, place in their mind the identification categories connected with 
recent political processes: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rapid rise of national ideology 
and the extension of the Estonian geo-cultura! space. 
The data reveal that the dominating identity among Estonians is the national identity in which 
civic, ethnic as well as territorial dimensions are represented. Among the Estonian Russians 
the dominating collective identity is territorial-ethnic. 
There exists a certain basis for formation of civic identity in the wider sense among Estonian 
Russians, but there also exists a tension between particularistic (ethno-cultural) and civic-
territorial allegiances. Thus there are good grounds for the formation of a defensive communal 
identity among Estonian Russians as a reaction to the mixed process of transition, globalisation 
and EU-integration. 
Key words: collective identity, self-categorisation. Estonian Russians. 
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s : The data is col lected a n d ana lysed wi th in the fol lowing 
research grants and programs: 
Grant No 5845 by Estonian Scientific Foundation "Changing Collective Identities In The 
Context Of Estonian Movement Into The Global Space". 
Governmental Scientific Research Support Scheme "Formation of the 21st Century Media 
Society in Estonia" financed by the Governmental Scientific Research Support Scheme". 
Theoretical basis 
In order to discuss the potential for the format ion o f a new civic identi ty a m o n g 
Estonian Russians (1) , w e have to define the te rm ' c iv ic ident i ty ' and explore the 
context of Estonia more precisely. 
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We may dist inguish different approaches to the civic identity concept. O n e we 
may call the centric approach , taking poli t ical ci t izenship as a central point from 
where all o ther d imens ions proceed. For Barber (cited in Page 1997). civic identify is 
a genuine adherence to the political communi ty , which, in spite of dist inctive identity 
references, unites everyone in preoccupat ions which affect all. 
The majority of authors point out that the concept of ci t izenship is widening in the 
course of a general social change: a shift from m o d e m to pos t -modem- type (network) 
societies (Mil ler 1995). Dav id Miller sees ci t izenship as pract ised in several modes : 
right to association, civil right to relative freedom, social right to a min imum standard 
of l iving guaranteed by the welfare state, and a p o s t - m o d e m guarantee of access to 
the technologies of communica t ion (Mil ler 1995). Bryan Turner defines ci t izenship 
as a set of pract ices within civil society (Turner 1993: 131-133) . 
We agree wi th the wider unders tanding that civic identity embraces one ' s feeling 
of be ing included in the social agreement within the society (see ie Ahluwal ia 1999. 
Page 1997). Derek Heater (1999) explains that political and communi ty affiliations do 
not exc lude each other on the individual level. He argues that this situation can lead 
to a mult iple- ident i ty: one can be at the s ame t ime a m e m b e r of the state ( through 
cit izenship) and a m e m b e r of civil society. 
Two approaches can be dist inguished in political theory in relation to cultural and 
civic identity. The so-called homogeny / h e g e m o n y (2) approach sees the cultural and 
civic (cit izen / poli t ical) identi ty in super-and subordinate re la t ionship, a s suming that 
one cannot be salient without oppress ing the other. Empir ical research has supported 
this thesis w h e n the elite ( spokesmen) of an ethnic minori ty are considered, but does 
not reveal the same result about the "o rd ina ry" minority group member s (Tismenau 
& Turner 1995, Laperr iere, cited from Page 1997). This approach supports the thesis 
that in the in the pr ivate sphere , the different cultural pract ices are welcome, whereas 
in the public sphere, the civic (political) c o m m o n values should dominate . I.e. Donald 
states that: "s ta tus of ci t izenship is cont ingent on an operat ive symbol ic order that 
needs to be dis t inguished from any claims to a cultural identity for a c i t izen" (Donald 
1996:175). 
The other, so called pluralist ic approach is based on the idea that civil and civic 
part icipation can link the cit izenry and the ethno-cultural or other diversi ty of the 
society. The notion of civic identity embraces one ' s awareness of being a m e m b e r of 
a part icular social g roup , one of many in the political c o m m u n i t y (see i.e. Page 1997. 
Ahluwal ia 1999). The awareness about the others is impor tant in this approach , as 
the civic consciousness is assumed to be achieved in the process of everyday practice 
and negot ia t ion be tween the different groups . It is rather a process than a certain 
end state. If the part ic ipat ion is oppressed, the c o m m o n cit izen identity s t rengthens 
in other forms of identification, for example , ethnic, re l igious or other aspects may 
become predominant , and the values arousing from this membersh ip m a y become 
nonnegot iable with the "ma ins t r eam" society (Mouffe, ci ted from Page 1997). The 
key concept here is pluralist ic (multicultural) ci t izenship educat ion. Bhikhu Parekh 
dist inguishes be tween several models here , e.g., the procedural model of a formal 
state, with minimal regulat ion of the civic and cultural life of the member s of society, 
and the millet model, where the pr imary loyalty belongs to one ' s cultural communi ty , 
and whe re the state is instead a loose federation of cultural communi t i e s , a basic 
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framework of e n g a g e m e n t of necessa ry pol i t ical and e c o n o m i c in terac t ions . This 
model bases a lot on the collective rights o f communi ty m e m b e r s and assumes that the 
state should create the framing inst i tut ions to suppor t the cul tural ly non-mains t ream 
groupings . The bearers o f those col lec t ive rights thus h a v e addit ional ly a cultural 
citizenship (Parekh 2000) . 
Many authors w h o have ana lysed the pos t -Sovie t t ransi t ion h a v e regarded the 
bui lding up of a civic society the b igges t cha l lenge , and the ethnic p rob lems the most 
problemat ic in solving this task (ie Szpor luk 1998, Shabad & Slomczynsk i 1999). 
Schopflin has pointed out that w h e n self- ident i f icat ions o f majori ty and minor i ty 
derived from historical exper ience have m e t a conflict or crisis , then the stability of 
the political communi ty depends on the degree it is poss ib le to ove rcome the division 
between them (Schopflin 2000: 239) . Accord ing to Roger Brubaker (1996) the national 
question in pos t -communis t Europe represents a tr iadic d y n a m i c re la t ionship between 
new 'na t ional iz ing 1 s tates, nat ional minor i t ies in these s ta tes and the ' h o m e l a n d ' of 
national minori t ies. 
Brubaker has seen three possible ways for alternatives of a new nationalizing state: 
(1) civic state, that is independent of e thnici ty of the c i t izens ; (2) bi or multinational 
state, where there exist two or m o r e pub l i c ly a c k n o w l e d g e d and inst i tut ional ised 
main nationali t ies; (3) hybr id model of minor i t i es rights, where the state is treated as 
national but not as nat ional izing and that does not guaran tee equal rights to minori t ies 
not only as being ci t izens, but g ives t h e m as minor i t ies s o m e specific r ights , above 
all in the field of educat ion and l anguage (Brubaker 1996: 104-205) . Brubaker points 
out that in the previous ly e thno-cul tural ly defined societ ies it is difficult to imagine a 
civic self-understanding. H e also cons iders as improbab le a mult inat ional state model . 
Better prospects are given, accord ing to B r u b a k e r ' s m o d e l of minor i t i e s ' rights, to 
integration models such as those formed by wes te rn democrac ies . 
On the other hand, the concep t s o f k n o w l e d g e soc ie ty (Stehr 1992), ne twork 
society (Castells 1997), and risk socie ty ( B e c k l 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 2 ) in s o m e sense counter-
argue against the above-referred poli t ical theorists . Desp i te different arguments , many 
social theorists say that Western count r ies face a n e w per iod of societal deve lopment 
characterized by the emancipa t ion of ac tors ; decl ine of authori ty and p o w e r of state 
and social inst i tut ions; loss of l eg i t imacy of r a t iona l p l ann ing and cont ro l . Thus 
we may ask whe the r the bu i ld ing up o f civic socie ty in pos t -Sovie t s tates should 
follow the Western, ' c l a s s i ca l ' pa t te rn o f civic soc i e ty? M a y b e they canno t ever 
'catch this train' but have to adapt their policy to the n e w historical chal lenges of 
high moderni ty? In the d iscuss ion h o w wel l peop le in the pos tcommunis t societies 
are equipped with the social capaci t ies for " m a n a g i n g " the changed reality, the lack 
of refiexivity, h igher threat of a tomisa t ion and "cul tura l b i a s " towards the private 
world, low trust in inst i tut ions and in terpersonal trust in everyday life (Sz tompka 
1999) is often men t ioned (Korts for thcoming) . 
In ana lys ing the p r o b l e m s c o n n e c t e d wi th the fo rma t ion o f civic identi ty of 
Estonian Russians, we approach civic a n d cultural identi ty from the pluralist ic view, 
based on the idea that civic par t ic ipat ion can link the roles of ci t izens and members 
of an e thno- cul tural g roup , and the t w o ident i t ies m a y re inforce each other, not 
compete . We unders tand within this paper the civic identity as a feeling of at tachment 
to the state and society, shared interests with all c o - m e m b e r s of society ( including 
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political ci t izenship). Thus we assume that the quest ions of civic part icipation, beliefs 
and trust should be inc luded in the discussion about the perspect ives of format ion of 
civic identi ty in a larger sense. 
The case of Estonia: factors that shape the formation 
of civic identity 
Studies have ind ica ted that feel ings and cogni t ion in Es ton ia are a m b i g u o u s 
within the framework, of regional , historical, l inguistic, and other symbolic references 
(see eg Kirch et al 1995; 1997. Kruusvall 1998. Valk et al 1997, Viha lemm 1999). 
In ana lys ing the ques t ions related to the civic ident i ty o f Es tonian Russ ians 
and perspect ives of the formation of civic society in the post -Sovie t Estonia , there 
are severa l factors w h i c h shou ld be cons ide red : a) p o s t - S o v i e t a tomisa t ion and 
(new) differentiation of Es tonian society; b) the compl ica ted ci t izenship si tuat ion 
in Estonia and compet ing nat ional iz ing ideologies target ing Estonian Russ ians ; c) 
different historic patterns of formation of collective identity of Estonians and Estonian 
Russians. He re we are going to analyse briefly all three factors. 
The post-Soviet t ransi t ion process , especial ly the shock therapy in the economic 
sphere - the sharp changes in the pens ion system, labour marke t etc - has caused in-
depth social t rauma in Es tonian society (see Neal 1998, Sz tompka 2002 , 2004) . The 
consequences are a tomisat ion and (new) differentiation of Estonian society. Estonia 
has gained financial stability etc from the quick adoption of free market l iberal ism, but 
the intense market isat ion has also caused the formation of new transitional hierarchies 
(winners and losers) and hindered the development of social solidarity (see ie Ruutsoo 
1998, Laur is t in 2004 a.b). T h e Soviet state, with the cent ra l ized Par ty and State 
regulation of all spheres of life, created (artificial) social cohesion which dissolved 
together wi th Soviet Union . The narra t ive o f loss of the social cohesion has also 
become a part of the transit ion culture (Kennedy 2000) . 
Thus w e have included not only the structural, but also the mental indicators , 
such as att i tudes toward social changes in Estonia dur ing the last 10 years , liberal 
and social orientation etc. into our analysis . 
The second compl i ca t ing factor conce rns c i t izenship po l icy and ' c o m p e t i n g ' 
nationalising ideologies. 
A m o n g the e thn ic R u s s i a n s in Es ton ia . 141907 h a v e E s t o n i a n c i t i z e n s h i p . 
73379Russ ian ci t izenship, 1048 have ci t izenship of s o m e o ther state, and 133346 
do not have any ci t izenship (a l iens ' passpor ts) . Thereby m a n y authors have regarded 
the mobi l isa t ion of Es tonian Russians, related to political c i t izenship, to be likely 
(ie Szporluk 1992, L inz & Stepan 1996, G. Smith & Wilson 1997, P o n a n n 2000) . 
However , Estonia is character ised by a much greater degree o f social stability' than 
some other post-Soviet states that granted cit izenship to all their Russ ian-speaking 
residents (G . Smith et a l .1998) . One reason for this might be the fact that the social 
citizenship (Marshal l , ci ted in Heater, 1999) is guaranteed for Estonian Russ ians . 
Authors h a v e also pointed to the ' form of civil rights which , whilst falling short of 
full poli t ical ci t izenship, never theless conferred basic polit ical freedoms, including 
the right to vote in local e lec t ions ' (D. Smith, 1998: 10). 
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Thus there exists a minimal basis for the format ion of a t tachment to the state 
and society among Estonian Russ ians . However , the nat ional is ing ideology of the 
Estonian state makes the choices of Estonian Russ ians s o m e w h a t m o r e complicated. 
Launched in the m i d - 9 0 ' s , the Es tonian Sta te In tegra t ion P rog ram does not offer 
simply ' r ep l acemen t ' for the prev ious Soviet state identity, but pr incipal ly claims 
for individual accul turat ion, especial ly the acquis i t ion of the Estonian language (the 
language requi rement wil l be d iscussed further) . T h e d i scourse of the Integrat ion 
Program, as well as its legal basis , is individual is t ic- l iberal . 
An alternative for the restoration of one ' s se l f -es teem is offered by the Russian 
Federat ion. Albeit be ing more v a g u e and unsys t ema t i c c o m p a r e d to the Estonian 
Integration Program, this supports the format ion of a d iaspora identity by offering 
Russian citizenship and the newly invented "Russ i annes s " as a unifying ideology (e.g. 
Chirm & Kaiser 1996, Kolsto 1999). This ideology constructs all Russians as one group 
(Kosmarskaya 2003) and offers r ights and protect ion on the group basis . In general , 
the Diaspora Ideology promotes col lect ive strategies, the Integrat ion P rog ramme vice 
versa, p romotes individual choices . The t w o state- led ideologies paradoxical ly help 
to maintain each other. They st imulate mutua l recons t ruc t ion serving as opposi tes to 
each other. They are in ter twined wi th the basic choice be tween the individual and 
collective strategies of adaptat ion with societal changes . 
Research (Viha lemm and M a s s o 2002a ) shows that both state-led ideologies -
Integration ideology by Estonian Repub l i c s and d iaspora ideology by the Russian 
Federat ion - are uti l ized in individual identi ty cons t ruc t ion pat terns only by one part 
of the Estonian Russ ians . The two main al ternat ive pat terns are regional and ethno-
cultural patterns wh ich have a qui te specific historical background . 
Soviet policy manifested itself in order to follow the civic assimilationist model, 
according to the terms of Bhikhu Parekh. expressing the belief that no state can be stable 
and cohesive unless its members share a c o m m o n national culture, including common 
values, ideals of excel lence, moral beliefs, and social pract ices (Parekh 2000: 197). 
Surveys conducted at the end of the Soviet period showed that the Estonian communi ty 
did not accept the state identity but retained its ethnic identity. Marju Lauristin and 
Peeter Vihalemm argue that 'efforts to preserve the Estonian language in education, 
science, literature and journal i sm, and the fight against the forcible Russification of 
public life and culture formed the most important areas of cultural resistance to the 
Soviet regime ' (Lauristin and P. Viha lemm, 1997: 74—75). We proceed from the premise 
that the power context in the Soviet era favoured the formation of an Estonian identity 
as a resistant type of identity according to Castells (1997) . Researchers agree that, in 
the Soviet era, the vast majority of Russ ians identified themselves as 'Soviet people"; 
the pr imary al legiance be longed to the Soviet state. T h e basis of this civic identity 
was wiped out with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Research has shown that there 
is little possibility that the earlier civic affiliation will be ' r ep laced ' in corpore with 
the new civic identity offered by the Estonian Republ ic (ie Viha lemm & Masso 2002 
a.b). Rather, there are prerequisites that one part of Estonian Russians m a y ' take over ' 
from Estonians a minori ty resistant pattern in the form of ethno-cultural or political 
particularism (ie Viha lemm 1999, Viha lemm & Masso 2002 a,b). 
Fol lowing the a rgumenta t ion of s o m e authors (ie Melv in 1995), we m a y suppose 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union, wh ich w iped away the basis of (civic) identity 
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of E s t o n i a n R u s s i a n s , d id no t leave an ' e m p t y p l a c e ' but m a i n t a i n e d at least a 
territorial mean ing . Melv in says that: ' " R u s s i a n speake r s ' appea ls for recogni t ion 
as a c o m m u n i t y have been based pr imari ly on human r ights ra ther than on group 
consciousness. Their calls for participation stress their a t tachment to Estonia as people 
who s imply l ive and work there. It is an identity with a m o r p h o u s boundar ies , and is 
generally tolerant and inclusive in its a t t i tudes" . (Melvin 1995: 55). This scenar io is 
in concordance with the global trends of individualisat ion and atomisat ion discussed 
above. T h a n k s to the spread of electronic med ia and the genera l polit ical-cultural 
opening of Estonia to the West , the Es tonian popula t ion ' s opportuni t ies to (virtually) 
participate in the global is ing p o s t - m o d e m cultural context are becoming wide r and 
may crea te a n e w pub l i c d i scourse , shaped by pos t -mode rn d ev e l o p men t s wh ich 
embrace mu l t i p l e ind iv idua l ident i t ies and bo th sepa ra t e a n d ove r l ap co l lec t ive 
identities. W e do a s sume that the heterogenisation of the genera l cultural and power 
context shape the pat terns of construct ion of collective poli t ical and cultural identities 
in Estonia and the formation of certain civic solidarity. 
Proceeding from the above-ment ioned broader unders tanding of civic identity, 
the focus of the study presented in the fol lowing chapters is the quest ion of possible 
prerequisites for the formation of civic identity among Es ton ian Russ ians ei ther on 
the public or individual level. This formation of a civic identi ty is discussed in terms 
of the whole Russian popula t ion of Estonia , without l imit ing it to only those who 
have poli t ical c i t izenship, albeit this is a s sumed to be an influential factor. 
The dissolut ion of the Soviet Un ion and the re -es tab l i shment of the Estonian 
Republ ic g a v e r ise to the re la t ive ly diffuse a s s e m b l a g e o f Russ i an s p e a k e r s in 
today 's Estonia . Mos t local and Western social researchers agree that Russ ians are 
differentiated by their future a ims, social capital , and cultural and political allegiances 
(e.g. Hall ik 1997, Kirch et al 1997, Lai tm 1998, Kols to 2000 , Valk & Karu 1997, 
Vihalemm 1999, Viha lemm & Masso 2002a) . Also the Russian speakers in other post-
Soviet republics tend to fol low rather different paths of their polit ical and cultural 
allegiances than to one g roup consciousness (Kosmarskaya in print) . 
About the possible future developments authors have different opinions. The main 
principal d imens ions can be dist inguished: a) the rise of poli t ical or ethno-cul tural 
part icular ism, b) further fragmentation of the Estonian Russ ians , which can also lead 
to c) format ion of certain c o m m o n solidarity in the longer t ime horizon. 
Earl ier surveys reveal that there exists some cogni t ive basis for civic identity 
defined in this context as a bond created be tween people by the feeling of be longing 
to a single inclusive communi ty but there seem to be best g rounds for deve lopment of 
in-group solidarity wi th Es tonian Russians as a bond created b y the shared language 
and civic framework (Viha lemm & M a s s o 2002a) . 
The ment ioned survey w a s conducted a m o n g 15-40 year old Russ ian-speaking 
city dwel le rs in 1999. The quest ion was asked, which at t r ibutes are sensed by the 
respondents to conjoin, unite them personally with Estonians , Estonian Russ ians , and 
Russians in Russia. In the s ame manner it was asked which attributes are sensed to 
dissociate, separate them personal ly from Estonians, Estonian Russians, and Russians 
in Russia . The analysis s h o w s that the attr ibutes like home land , (daily) economic 
interests, state, laws; rights & obligat ions are sensed by most of the respondents in 
all the groups as to conjoin, unite them with Estonians and Estonian Russ ians . Those 
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attributes are not sensed to be shared wi th Russ ians in Russia . By the s ame token, 
the attributes like language , lifestyle and manne r s , and cul ture (interests) are sensed 
by most of the respondents in all the g roups as to conjoin , unite them with Estonian 
Russians and Russians in Russia, but separa te them from Estonians . However , the 
cultural and civic a t t achment of Es ton ian Russ i ans s e e m s to be or iented towards 
different poles: the civic a t t achment t owards Es ton ia and the cul tural a t t achment 
towards Russia. Thus , there seem to be best g rounds for deve lopment of in-group 
solidarity with Estonian Russ ians as a b o n d created by the shared language and civic 
framework. (Vihalemm & Masso 2002a) . 
In this paper I will analyze Estonian R u s s i a n s ' e thno-cul tura l , civic and regional 
col lect ive self-identification, m o r e p rec i se ly on the p resen t -day and re t rospect ive 
se l f - ca tegor iza t ion . T h e p r e m i s e o f t he a n a l y s i s is that d u r i n g the p o s t - S o v i e t 
transformation certain, ' e m b r y o n i c ' identification pa t te rns start to form. I will discuss 
how the construct ion o f identi ty on the indiv idual level does echo , in its specific 
way, the process of interaction of marke t -d r iven l iberal ism with historically formed 
cultural patterns of minori ty-major i ty relat ions, and open ing up of the geo-polit ical 
and cultural space of post-Soviet Estonia . 
Methodological considerations and data sources 
It is general ly a rgued that the p r o c e s s of ident i f icat ion invo lves the publ ic ly 
offered external definition, called social categorization, and the internal p rocess or 
the (partial) acquisition or rejection of identit ies, cal led internalisation (Jenkins 1996, 
2000) . Thus , one possibi l i ty of exp lor ing ident i ty is v ia self-categorizat ion, which 
has fed several empir ical studies of poli t ical and cultural identi ty of minori ty groups 
and is also utilized in the study (3). 
There are diverse groups and communi t i e s , but this d y n a m i s m and mul t i layered 
nature of social relations may give rise to the need for certain hierarchies - emergence 
of dominan t and per iphera l sol idar i t ies (Yadov & D a n i l o v a 1997) . S o m e groups 
and communi t ies domina te and are ' c ross - s i tua t ionaF , whi le others are peripheral . 
C o n s t r u c t i o n s in g r o u p so l ida r i t i e s v a r y in t he i r d e g r e e of r ig id i ty . T h u s I do 
assume that the categories more frequently selected are more rigid and, vice versa, 
the identification categories that carry symbo l s that are not s trong enough are not 
internalized. I assume that when peop le start to give a m e a n i n g to what has happened 
to their group solidari t ies, the society is no longer as turbulent and the process of 
'crystal l izat ion ' of certain identity pa t te rns and trajectories has begun. 
Internalization of var ious identification ca tegor ies was utilized in the empirical 
research. Some of the identification ca tegor ies were first analysed in the course of 
prior qualitative in-depth interviews (Masso 1999). T h e wi l l ingness of individuals 
to use a specific category for self-designat ion today and 15 years ago was measured 
in the ques t ionnai re : 
Two questions were asked of the respondents : 
/. There are various ways of answering the question 'Wlio you are?'. With which 
groups do you identity yourself? Responden t s had to indicate if they felt 
themselves to be a part of a particular category "certainly", "at times, partly" 
or "not at all" 
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2. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the regaining of independence, 
the Estonian Republic has witnessed many societal changes. Please try to recall 
how you used to feel, and describe yourself 15 years ago, at the time of the 
Soviet Estonian Republic? Respondents had to indicate if they felt a member 
of a particular category "certainly", "at times, partly" or "not at all" Also the 
variable "don't know, don't remember" was available. 
T h e fo l lowing ca t ego r i e s were p r e sen t ed to r e s p o n d e n t s : Estonian/Russian, 
Estonian-speaking/ Russian- speaking person, inhabitant of (previous) Soviet Estonian 
Republic, citizen of Estonian Republic, inhabitant of Estonia, Baltic inhabitant, Soviet 
person, northerner, European, world citizen. 
Empir ical analysis was based on the representat ive survey " M e , the M e d i a and 
the Wor ld" , carr ied out by the Depar tment of Journa l i sm and C o m m u n i c a t i o n of 
the Univers i ty of Tartu in co-operat ion with the research c o m p a n y Fak tum during 
December 2002 and January 2 0 0 3 . The survey covered the use of media, interests, 
values and identity, at t i tudes towards the changes in Estonia dur ing the past 10-15 
years, l ife-style and life condi t ions . The sample was c o m p o s e d of 15-74 year-old 
inhabitants, according to a territorially representat ive popula t ion model of Estonia. 
The sample w a s compr i sed of 1470 persons , with 940 answer ing in Es ton ian and 
509 in Russ ian . 
Different age groups in the sample were also proportional to the whole populat ion. 
The sample structure of Russ ians is given in Table 1. Demograph ic variables (gender, 
age, educat ion, and place of res idence) are given here mere ly as a description of the 
sample s t ructure of the survey. The ques t ion about se l f -des ignat ion 15 years ago 
was not asked of respondents w h o were under 30. Thus the analysis including past 
self des ignat ions and strategies of combining the self-identification in the past with 
present-day self-identification, is done on the sub-sample of persons aged 30-74. 
Results 
I will c o m p a r e the answers to the quest ion about today ' s self-identification with 
retrospective self-designations 15 years ago, thus prior to dissolut ion of the Soviet 
Union and the t ransformat ion . Respondents aged 30 to 74 form the total sample 
here. I do no t a s sume that the respondents really felt so 15 years ago . Rather , I 
intend to measu re h o w peop le now see ( interpret) the deve lopmen t pa ths of their 
self-identification. 
1 am going to analyse how extensively the aforementioned identification categories 
are utilized in the self-identification of Estonians and Estonian Russians today and 
retrospectively 15 years ago , and h o w heterogeneous or h o m o g e n e o u s the perceived 
identi ty-structure is. The overv iew about the changes in the internalisat ion of various 
identification categories is given in F igure 1. 
In a more detailed manner , the frequencies of re t rospect ive self-categorisations 
of Estonians and Estonian Russ ians are given in Appendix 1 and the frequencies 
of t o d a y ' s se l f - ca tegor i sa t ions of Es ton ians and Es ton ian Russ i ans are g iven in 
Appendix 2. 
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Changes in identification categories among Estonian Russians. Per cent of those who 
answered '"certainly" or "sometimes" 
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Figure 1. Perceived changes in identification categories among Estonian Russians and 
Russians during the transiotion period 
National categories are clearly d o m i n a t i n g in self-identification o f the Estonians 
t oday : " E s t o n i a n " ( 9 3 % defini te ly feel that they a r e E s t o n i a n s ) , " c i t i z e n o f the 
Estonian Repub l i c" ( 8 8 % definitely feel that they are Es ton ians and inhabi tants of 
Estonia ( 8 6 % definitely feel that they are inhabi tants o f Es tonia) . Thus civic, e thnic as 
well as territorial componen t s are represented in the col lec t ive nat ional identification 
of the Estonians. 
Trim Vihalemm. (Re(construction of Collective Identities among Estonian Russians 61 
Also, the linguistic identification category "Es ton ian- speak ing" ( 6 6 % definitely 
feel that they are Es tonian-speaking people ) is used quite often, yet this category 
is less dominan t than the others . Based on the p remise that the historical identity 
construction pat tern of the Estonians has been the defensive minor i ty pattern around 
language and culture, it m a y be interpreted as a shift of the col lect ive identity of the 
Estonians towards the nat ion wi th s ta tehood. However , it m a y also be interpreted 
differently - as the category "Es ton ian" inc ludes , due to the historical deve lopment 
of group consciousness , implicit ly more componen t s of cul ture and language than 
those related to a state then mere ly linguistic identification m a y seem for an Estonian 
to be too " p o o r " and unimpor tant , and therefore has not achieved general legi t imacy 
at the grass-roots level. 
Ret rospec t ive components dominat ing in the identities of the Estonians are in 
principle the s ame : ethnic ( 8 8 % definitely felt that they w e r e Estonians) , territorial 
(77% definitely felt that they were inhabi tants of Estonia) , l inguist ic ( 6 7 % definitely 
felt that they were speakers of the Estonian language) , civic ( 6 4 % definitely felt that 
they w e r e inhabitants of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republ ic) . 
Thus , the ma in change in the dominant categories of the identity of the Estonians 
has occurred in the civic d imens ion - the Republ ic of Es tonia and civic identity have 
become clearly more dominant than the Estonian SSR. 
The componen t s domina t ing in self-identification of the Estonian Russians today 
are terri torial-ethnic categories: " inhabitant of Es ton ia" ( 8 4 % definitely feel that they 
are inhabitants o f Estonia) , "Russ ian" ( 7 9 % definitely feel that they are Russ ians) , 
" R u s s i a n - s p e a k e r " ( 7 4 % def in i te ly feel that t h e y are s p e a k e r s of the R u s s i a n 
language) . Thus the territorial and ethno-l inguist ic componen t s are represented in 
collective identification o f the Estonian Russ ians . Compared to the Estonians , ethnic 
identification is not so domina t ing in the case of the Russ ians . This is expla ined by 
the fact that no t all Russ ian-speaking respondents are Russ ians - among those w h o 
responded to the Russ ian- language quest ionnaire were Ukra in ians , Byeloruss ians and 
representat ives of other nationali t ies. 
Ret rospect ive components dominat ing in the identities o f the Estonian Russians 
are main ly civic ( 7 8 % felt that they were inhabitants of the Es tonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic , 7 3 % felt that they were Soviet persons) , ethnic ( 7 6 % definitely felt that 
they w e r e Russ ians) , terri torial ( 6 1 % definitely felt that they were inhabi tants of 
Estonia). Thus , contrary to the dynamics of the identification of the Estonians , the 
" s e l f representa t ions of the Russians are l imited to the c ivic dimension. 
Taking into account a theoretical (4) thesis that the domina t ing identity of the 
R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g popu l a t i on dur ing the Sovie t era w a s the Sovie t ident i ty , the 
territorial-ethnic identity dominat ing in the present collect ive identification indicates 
quite clearly to the ethno-terri torial minori t izat ion process. 
The civic category "ci t izen of the Republ ic o f Es tonia" has been firmly accepted 
by 4 8 % of the Estonian Russ ians , a little more than the share of the Russians who 
actually have the Estonian cit izenship (36%) . Consider ing that 17% of the Estonian 
Russians feel that they a re cit izens of the Republ ic of Estonia , we may say that civic 
identity at the subjective level is not determinist ical ly related to political c i t izenship. 
Previous empir ical studies have shown that, when identifying onesel f as an Estonian 
citizen, the prevai l ing reasons are territorial (being b o m in Estonia, living in Estonia). 
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Thus , many Estonian Russ ians pe rce ive this ca tegory to be cogn i t ive ra ther than 
institutional. However not having ci t izenship was the ma in reason why the category 
was considered unacceptable (Viha lemm and M a s s o 2002b) . 
Regional ca tegor ies are in t oday ' s identi ty space o f the Es ton ians si tuat ional 
rather than dominant identification references . For example , the categories "Bal t ic 
inhabitant '", " E u r o p e a n " , and " N o r t h e n e r " a re a ccep t ed by ab o u t 1/3 and firmly 
rejected by about 1/5 of the Estonians. 
Compared with the retrospect ive identification, the ca tegor ies " E u r o p e a n " and 
"Nor thener" have m o v e d from the zone of rejection in the past ( 4 2 % felt that they 
were definitely not Europeans , 3 6 % felt that they were definitely not Nor theners) into 
today ' s zone of situational identification (about 4 0 % admi t that some t imes they feel 
that they are partially Bal t ic . Eu ropean or Nor thener) . 
Regional ca tegor ies are more d i spe r sed in the ident i ty space of the Estonian 
Russ ians . Fo r example the ca tegory "Ba l t i c i nhab i t an t " is perce ived as dominant 
by a large part of the Estonian Russ ians - 5 2 % feel that they are 'definitely Baltic 
inhabi tan ts ' . "Ba l t i c" as an identity re ference is m o r e impor tan t for the Russ ians 
than for the Estonians. Thus we m a y sugges t a hypo thes i s that in addit ion to logical 
territorial connection, "Ba l t i c" also connotes for the Russ ians socio-cultural meanings . 
The media have probably he lped to create these connota t ions (for example , there is a 
special television channel Pervoi Baltjiski R a n a l for the Russ ian-speak ing audience 
in the Baltic countries) and the image o f Pr ibal t ika as t he most western region of the 
Soviet Union, which h a d a higher s tandard of l iving than the rest of the country, has 
been preserved in the m e m o r y of people . 
The categories " E u r o p e a n " and "Nor thene r " , which have b e c a m e more important 
along with the geo-cultural extension o f Estonia , are in the identi ty s tructure of the 
Estonian Russians m o r e often placed in the z o n e of re ject ion ( w h e n th inking about 
both the past and the present 4 0 - 5 0 % o f the Russ ians definitely do not feel that they 
are Europeans or Nor theners ) . Also, these categories are more often perce ived by the 
Russians as situational ra ther than dominan t . Thus w e m a y say that the opening of 
the geo-cultural space of Estonia has inf luenced the self-identification of the Russians 
less than it has influences the self-identif ication of the Es tonians . 
In general , shifts in the se l f - image of the Es tonian popu la t ion related to the geo-
cultural opening up o f Estonia may b e character ised as gradual rather than sudden, 
and they are differentiating (e.g. there is an opinion that Es ton ia ' s access ion to the 
EU is a project of the elite) ra ther than universal . 
The global category - "ci t izen of the w o r l d " - is c rea t ing m o r e opposi t ion than 
other regional categories . As many as 4 0 % of the Es tonians and 4 7 % of the Russians 
find that they definitely do not feel that they a re c i t izens of the wor ld and 2 3 % and 
14% respectively feel that they are definitely ci t izens o f the wor ld . Thus , global self-
determinat ion is rather unfamil iar for the inhabi tants o f Es tonia despite the spread of 
global media and m a s s culture. 
Categories related to the past and history - "Sov ie t pe r son" and " inhabi tant of 
the (former) Estonian S S R " have been expe l led from the self- image of some people . 
The category "inhabitant of the ( former) Es tonian S S R " is rejected firmly by 4 8 % 
and accepted as an impor tan t category (feel that I definitely w a s . . . ) by 19% of the 
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Estonians. Thus the local vers ion of the Soviet identity ( E S S R identity) is used by 
part of the Es ton ians to interpret the post-Soviet cultural space . The identity "Soviet 
person" has been complete ly expelled from the identity reper toire of the Estonians . 
In the identi ty space o f the Estonian Russ ians , both categories are represented 
equally - one fourth of the Estonian Russ ians feel definitely or from t ime to t ime 
that they are Soviet people or inhabitants o f the Estonian SSR. 
In general , the domina t ing identity a m o n g the Estonians is the national identity 
in which civic, ethnic as wel l as territorial d imens ions are represented . A m o n g the 
Estonian Russ ians , the domina t ing collect ive identity is terri torial-ethnic. 
The geo-cu l tu ra l o p e n i n g of Estonia is reflected in the ident i ty space o f the 
Es tonians (it m u s t be t aken into account that i n t e rv i ews w e r e c o n d u c t e d at the 
beginning of 2 0 0 3 , before Es tonia jo ined the EU) more clear ly than in the identity 
space of the Estonian Russ ians - the Estonians use relevant categories as a bas is for 
situational self-identification more often than the Estonian Russians , who consider 
these ca tegor ies as unsui tab le references o f self-identification. Identi ty ca tegor ies 
related to the Soviet Union have not entirely disappeared - part of the Estonians and 
the Russians cont inue to use these categories in si tuational self-identification. The 
only difference is that for the Estonians, a legi t imate symbol of identification is the 
Estonian S S R ra ther than the Soviet Union. 
Conclusions 
We m a y c o n c l u d e f rom this s tudy that societal con tex t is ra ther a m b i g u o u s 
and enables different d imens ions of identity development . Th i s pape r discussed the 
potential o f bui ld ing up the civic society in post -Sovie t Estonia from one aspect - the 
perspective formation of a n e w civic identity among Estonian Russians in compar ison 
with Estonians and considering the various global and local social, cultural and historic 
factors wh ich m a y shape this process . The paper proceeds from the wider sense of 
civic identi ty - one ' s feeling of being included in the social agreement wi th in the 
society, awareness of be ing a m e m b e r of a par t icular social g roup and one of many 
in the polit ical communi ty . 
The data reveal that national categories are clearly dominat ing in self-identification 
of the Es tonians today. Civ ic , ethnic as well as territorial componen t s are represented 
in the col lect ive national identification of the Estonians. Ret rospec t ive componen t s 
d o m i n a t i n g in the ident i t i es of the E s t o n i a n s are in p r inc ip l e the s a m e : e thn ic , 
territorial, l inguis t ic , c iv ic . T h u s , the m a i n change in the d o m i n a n t ca tegor ies of 
the identity of the Estonians has occurred in the civic d imens ion - the Republ ic of 
Estonia and civic identity have become clear ly m o r e dominan t than the Es tonian 
SSR had been. 
The components dominat ing in self-identification of the Estonian Russians today 
are territorial-ethnic categories: "inhabitant of Estonia", "Russian", "Russian-speaker". 
Retrospective components dominat ing in the identities of the Estonian Russians are 
mainly civic, ethnic, territorial. Thus, contrary to the dynamics of the identification of 
the Estonians, the " s e l f representations of the Russians are limited to the civic dimension. 
Taking into account a theoretical thesis that the dominat ing identity of the Russian-
speaking populat ion during the Soviet era w a s the Soviet identity, the territorial-ethnic 
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identity dominat ing in the present col lect ive identification indicates quite clearly the 
ethno-territorial minori t izat ion process . 
Regional ca tegor ies are in t oday ' s ident i ty space of the Es ton ians si tuat ional 
ra ther than dominan t ident i f icat ion r e fe rences . C o m p a r e d wi th the r e t rospec t ive 
identification, the categories "Eu ropean" and "Nor thene r " have m o v e d from the zone 
of rejection in the past into today ' s zone o f si tuational identification. 
Regional ca tegor ies are more d i spersed in the ident i ty space of the Es tonian 
Russians. "Bal t i c" as an identity reference is more important for the Russ ians than 
for the Estonians . Categor ies "Eu ropean" and "Nor thene r " which have b e c a m e more 
important along with the geo-cultural extension of Estonia are , in the identity structure 
of the Estonian Russians , more often p laced in the zone o f rejection. 
Thus we m a y say that the o p e n i n g o f the geo -cu l tu ra l space of Es ton ia has 
influenced the self-identification of the Russ ians less than it has influences the self-
identification of the Estonians . 
In general , in further analysis of the civic identity of Estonian Russ ians and the 
civic society in Estonia, there are three main factors wh ich should be considered: 
1. Different historic patterns of construction of collective identity of Estonians and 
Estonian Russians. 
2. Post-Soviet atomization and (new) differentiation of Estonian society in the course 
of intense marketization which hinders the development of social solidarity. 
3. Global geo-cultural flows of high modernity, the new period of societal development 
characterized by emancipation of actors; decline of authority and power of state 
and social institutions: loss of legitimacy of rational planning and control. 
In genera l , the p e r s p e c t i v e s of f o rma t ion o f c iv ic ident i ty a m o n g E s t o n i a n 
Russians are rather modes t . In ana lys ing the men ta l w o r l d of Es ton ian Russ ians , 
there exists a certain basis for format ion of civic identi ty in the wide r sense among 
Estonian Russians , but there a lso exists a t ens ion b e t w e e n par t icu lar i s t ic (e thno-
cultural) and civic-territorial a l legiances. 
Thus there are good grounds for formation of defensive communal identity among 
Estonian Russians as a react ion to the m i x e d process of t ransi t ion, globalisat ion and 
EU-integration. 
Notes 
1. By the term 'Es ton ian Russ ians ' I do not only refer to people with a Russ ian 
e thnic or l inguis t ic o r ig in , but a l so to t he U k r a i n i a n s , B y e l o r u s s i a n s and o the r 
ethnicities whose m o t h e r tongue or eve ryday l anguage is Russian. I seek to avoid 
the negat ive connota t ions of the term ' n o n - E s t o n i a n s ' . Russ ian-speakers form about 
one third of the whole Es tonian popula t ion - about 351 000 Russ ians and about 46 
3000 Ukrainians, Byeloruss ians and o ther ethnici t ies . 
2. The term is " b o r r o w e d " from Fr i edman (1994) . 
3. 1 do not assume that the re t rospect ive categories echo the si tuation prior to the 
transformation process . Nei ther do I a s s u m e that this m e t h o d covers fully the identity 
topic. The study of identifying ca tegor ies is only one w a y to address the problem 
that can at best ' s c ra tch the su r face ' . T h e f indings are in terpre ted by k e e p i n g in 
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mind that the respondents migh t share the category but not necessar i ly its meaning . 
However, we assume that a general overview of the recept ion of the most c o m m o n l y 
used categories will br ing out the mos t general lines for further e thnographic and 
other types of research on identi ty deve lopment . The self-categorizat ion concept is 
discussed b y Abrams & H o g g 1990, Hopkins & Reicher 1996, Brady 2000 , Has lam 
et al 2000 , etc . 
4. Unfortunately, studies on ethnic issues, which were conduc ted before 1991, 
are not a very reliable source of compar ison. 
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Appendix 1. Retrospective internalization and rejection of identification categories 
among Estonians (N=680) and Estonian Russians (N=358) aged 30 to 74 
1 fell 15 years ago, 
that I was. . . certainly 
sometimes, 
partly not at all don't remember No answer 
...an inhabitant of 
the Estonian Soviet 
Republic 
Estonians 64 17 8 5 7 
Estonian 
Russians 78 7 4 3 6 
.. .an Estonian a 
Russian 
Estonians 88 4 2 2 5 
Estonian 
Russians 76 10 6 3 5 
....a Soviet person 
Estonians 32 23 34 S 7 
Estonian 
Russians 73 8 5 
5 8 
...an inhabitant of 
Estonia 
Estonians 77 10 3 3 7 
Estonian 
Russians 61 11 9 8 11 
.. .a Russian > an 
Estonian language 
speaker 
Estonians 67 12 8 6 7 
Estonian 
Russians 58 12 16 6 9 
...a Baltic inhabitant 
Estonians 45 31 11 5 8 
Estonian 
Russians 53 18 9 9 10 
...a citizen of the 
Republic of Estonia 
Estonians 19 13 49 10 9 
Estonian 
Russians 14 
fi 51 16 14 
....a European 
Estonians 16 24 42 11 7 
Estonian 
Russians 13 14 46 15 13 
....a world citizen 
Estonians 12 16 52 13 7 
Estonian 
Russians 13 11 47 17 12 
...a northerner 
Estonians 16 29 36 11 8 
Estonian 
Russians 11 16 46 15 12 
Source: Survey "Me. the Media and the World". December 2002- January 2003. Dept. of 
Journalism and Communication. University of Tartu. 
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Appendix 2. Present-day internalization and rejection of identification categories 
among Estonians and Estonian Russians in 2003 
Today 1 feel that 1 am.. . certainly sometimes, partly not at all non-answer 
...an inhabitant of Estonia 
Estonians 86 6 2 1 
Estonian 
Russians 84 7 3 6 
...an Estonian / a Russian 
Estonians 93 1 1 4 
Estonian 
Russians 79 II 6 4 
...an Estonian' a Russian 
language speaker 
Estonians 66 13 13 8 
Estonian 
Russians 74 14 6 6 
...a Baltic inhabitant 
Estonians 39 40 14 7 
Estonian 
Russians 52 27 15 6 
...a citizen of the 
Republic of Estonia 
Estonians 88 6 1 4 
Estonian 
Russians 48 17 26 8 
.. .a European 
Estonians 34 41 18 7 
Estonian 
Russians 22 30 39 8 
.. .a northerner 
Estonians 28 44 21 8 
Estonian 
Russians 20 24 50 6 
...a world citizen 
Estonians 23 30 40 7 
Estonian 
Russians 14 23 54 8 
...an inhabitant of the 
Estonian Soviet Republic 
Estonians 19 24 48 9 
Estonian 
Russians 13 12 62 13 
...a Soviet person 
Estonians 1 7 83 10 
Estonian 
Russians S 15 66 11 
Source: Survey "Me. the Media and the World", December 2002- January 2003, Dept. of 
Journalism and Communication, University of Tartu 
K.opsavilkurns 
Mes v a r a m petit ves tu r i skas izmainas un parejas la ika ku l tu ru , ba ls to t ies uz 
sabiedrlbas ve ikumu (t. i., artefaktiem), tacu mes va ram petit ar l to , ka indivldi virza 
kulturas "procesu" . Sis raksts pamato ts uz p i enemumu, ka pasidentifikacija ir svariga 
individuali "pars t rada tas" kul turas forma - ka subjekta reakcija uz pa rmainam. Gan 
vecas, gan j aunas j edz ienu noz lmes , ideologijas un attieclgie s imbol i , kas "c i rku le" 
atklatlba. ir saknoti identi tates (Kastells 1997). 
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Mans uzdevums ir ap luko t j a u t a j u m u , vai Igauni jas k r i evu vidu pas tav kads 
po tenc ia l s , kas varetu ve idot j a u n u - ar e tn i ska j i em i g a u n i e m kop lgu p i l sonisku 
identitati. 
Bals to t ies uz r e p r e z e n t a t l v i e m 2 0 0 3 . gada aptauju d a t i e m , e s m u anal izejus i 
j au ta jumu, ka Igaunijas kr ievi sa l ldz ina juma ar i gaun i em ve ido tas identifikacijas 
ka t egor i j a s , ku ra s ir saistTtas ar n e s e n a j i e m p o l i t i s k a j i e m p r o c e s i e m : P a d o m j u 
Savienlbas sabrukumu, atru nacionalas ideologijas iz\'LrzTsanos un igaunu geokulturalas 
telpas izplatlbu. Sie dati atklaj , ka starp igaun iem domine josa identitate ir nacionala 
ident i ta te , kuras i e tva ros t iek r e p r e z e n t e t a s p i l s o n i s k a s , e t n i s k a s un te r i tor ia las 
d imensi jas . Starp Igauni jas k r iev iem d o m i n e j o s a ko lek t iva ident i ta te ir teri toriali 
etniska. Igaunijas krievu vidu pas tav noteikt i p r i eksno te ikumi pi lsoniskas identi tates 
izveidei plasa noz lme , tacu tapat ir ve ro j ama spr iedze s ta rp par t iku la ram (etniski 
kul turalam) tendencem un pilsoniski ter i tor ialo lojalitati . T a p e c pastav vera nemami 
iemesli defenslvas kop ienas identi tates izveidei Igauni jas kr ievu vidu - ka reakcija 
uz parejas , globalizacijas un ES integracijas p rocesu sa jaukumu. 
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The Changing Discourse of Minority Identities: Latvia 
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Latvijas gadljums 
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The article is written from the perspective of social constructivism, by applying critical 
discourse analysis (R.Wodak. Discursive Construction of National Identities). The critical 
discourse analysis attempts to comprise all possible information on historical and socio-
economic conditions that are integrated in the process of discourse construction. 
Discourse analysis is performed through group discussions prior to the EU accession. Two 
interlinked dimensions are singled out during the process of analysis: first, themes related to 
national identity; second, strategies involved in the discursive construction. 
The article uses quantitative data as well characterizing the changes of the social identification 
of inhabitants of Latvia from 1990 to 2004. 
Key words: Social identity, social constructivism, critical discourse analysis. 
The issue of minority identities has been intriguing to Baltic researchers ever since 
the early 1990s. Karkhns , in s tudying nat ional identity, has stressed l inks be tween 
ethnic, state and reg ime ident i t ies . ' Kark l ins and Zepa have accen ted c h a n g e s in 
state-based identity in the context of the state 's status and of changes in the polit ical 
regime. 2 Tabuns , Tabuna and Broks have focused the minori ty identi ty problem on the 
fact that nat ional identity emerges against the background of mul t i -e thnic identit ies, 
providing empirical evidence about that which Latvia 's largest e thnic groups (Latvians 
and Russians) have in c o m m o n and that which separates them. 3 Ki rch and Kirch have 
focused at tention on the w a y in which the identity of Es tonia ' s Russ ians has changed 
in the context of integration in society.' 1 
In his w o r k "Ident i ty in F o r m a t i o n " 3 , Lai t in has looked at the w a y in w h i c h 
the identi ty of Russian speakers is deve lop ing in four p o s t - C o m m u n i s t count r ies , 
including Es tonia and Latvia, thinking about the strategies that the minor i t ies are 
choosing: " A s Russ ians in the near abroad decide whether to ass imila te , to organise 
politically as Russ ians , or to return to their puta t ive h o m e l a n d , the basic identi ty 
categories that gu ided ' them in the past become eroded. Russ ians in all four republ ics 
are, with varying degrees of self-consciousness , inventing new categories of identity 
to help them make sense of w h o they a re . " 6 
For empir ical i l lustrations, authors have c o m m o n l y turned to data from quant i -
tative surveys . Leit ins also employs content analysis of the mass media , as wel l as 
exper iments . Tabuns , Tabuna and Broks also have engaged in content ana lys is of 
newspapers in addit ion to their survey work. 
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Changes in identity: the 1990s and the start of the 21 s t century 
In the early 1990s, Karkl ins and Z e p a found that there was a visible change in 
identities among Latvia 's residents. Data from October 1990 and Apri l 1991 indicated 
that even over the course of just half a year, the n u m b e r of peop le who thought of 
themselves as residents o f Latvia had increased significantly. There were fewer people 
who counted themselves among the res idents of the U S S R , fewer people w h o linked 
their p lace of residence first and foremost to their ne ighbourhood or their city. Ln other 
words , the restoration o f Latvia 's independence s t reng thened the sense of be long ing 
to Latvia among minori t ies . 
Tabic 1 
Territorial identity: Latvians and minorities (1990-1991) Percentage of respondents 
who defined themselves as residents of ... 
October 1990 April 1991 
Latvians Others Latvians Others 
Resident of: 
An area or city 37 44 23 31 
Latvia 55 31 65 43 
The USSR 1 15 0 10 
Europe 0 2 1 
The world 1 3 1 5 
Hard to say 3 3 1 8 
No answer 3 2 9 1 
Source: Latvian Social Research Centre, 1990, 1991. 
M o r e than 10 years later, another s tudy was conduc ted - "Ethn ic Tolerance and 
Integration of the La tv ian Socie ty" ( B I S S , 2004) . Data from that survey show that 
among Latvia 's minori t ies , and part icularly a m o n g Russ ians , people often feel a sense 
of belonging not only to Latvia, but a l so to Russ i a ( 2 5 % ) . The sense of belonging 
to Eu rope is m u c h less c o m m o n a m o n g minor i t ies in Latv ia than is the sense of 
be long ing to Russia ( 5 % ) . Tha t m a y b e one r eason w h y La tv ia ' s Russ ians were 
somewhat doubtful about the count ry ' s access ion to the European Union. 
Table 2 
Territorial identity: Latvians and minorities, 2004 
How closely linked do you feel you are to ... (% shows 
those answering "very closely" and "closely") Latvians Russians Others 
... your area 66 67 64 
... your city 76 79 82 
... your region 57 48 40 
... Latvia 82 74 74 
.. . Russia 3 25 18 
... the Baltic States 15 8 15 
... Europe 12 5 7 
Source: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2004. 
In the more than 10 years since the restorat ion of La tv ia ' s independence , a new 
generat ion has grown up . one in which people have shaped their identities against the 
background of shifting identities a m o n g their paren ts . T h e issue of identity a m o n g 
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minority young people attracted particular attention once it was found that the greatest 
number of Euro-scept ics could be found specifically in this g r o u p when it c ame t ime 
for the re ferendum on jo in ing the EU. 
In a pos t - referendum study (BISS, 2003) , it was found that there were qui te a 
few more Euro-scept ics a m o n g young peop le than in the popula t ion at large, and 
this was par t icular ly true a m o n g minori ty y o u n g people - a m o n g them, only 10% 
had voted in favour of jo in ing the EU, whi le 4 5 % did vote in the referendum at all. 
Among y o u n g peop le who are cit izens of Latvia , 4 0 % voted " y e s " , and 3 0 % did not 
participate. A m o n g all ci t izens, 5 0 % voted " y e s " , and 2 5 % absta ined: a m o n g citizens 
who part ic ipated in referenda, 6 7 % voted " y e s " . 
Table 3 
The vote on joining the EU 
Voted "yes" Did not vote at all 
Minority young people 10% 4 5 % 
All young people 40% 30% 
All citizens 50% 27% 
Citizens, participated in referenda 67% -
Source: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2003. 
Constructing identity 
The pr imary purpose in wri t ing this article is to gain an unders tanding of the way 
in which identities among Latv ia ' s minori t ies are establ ished and how they change , 
taking a par t icular look at that which hides behind the quant i ta t ive survey da ta in 
this area. Discourse analysis is used as a me thod here, us ing it to look at the w a y in 
which minori t ies construct their identities through everyday discourse. 
The basic study of identi ty here is based on the approach o f Er ikson - one that is 
used by m a n y other researchers , too: "Ident i ty formation [is] a process . . . by which 
the individual j udges h imsel f in the light of w h a t he perce ives to be the way in which 
others j u d g e h im in compar i son to themselves and to typology significant to them; 
while he j u d g e s their w a y o f j udg ing h im in the light of how h e perceives h imse l f in 
comparison to them and to types that have b e c o m e relevant to h im." 7 
Other authors , too, have stressed the dual nature of h o w ethnic identities emerge : 
"Ethnic identi ty is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external 
opinions and processes , as wel l as the ind iv idua ls ' self-identification and outs iders ' 
ethnic designat ions- that is, wha t you think is your ethnicity, versus what they think 
is your ethnicity".* 
In this article, I will use the results of focus group d iscuss ions . The goals o f these 
groups have been different. S o m e have looked at att i tudes vis-q-vis accession to the 
EU - someth ing which p rovoked the revelat ion of one ' s identity in a b roader context. 
Others have dealt wi th a t t i tudes toward minor i ty school r e fo rms , which p rovoked 
people into ta lking more abou t the d iscourse of power . Ques t i ons wh ich touched 
directly upon identity were not particularly detai led in this case , but the benefit is 
that the focus g roup discuss ions were held wi th various kinds of people: 
1) Young people who are non-citizens 
2) Non-citizens who are older than 40 
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3) Students in minority schools 
4) Parents of students in minority schools 
5) Teachers in minority schools 
This article is based on the approach which D e Cillia, Reisigl and Vodak have 
used in analys ing focus g r o u p resul t s , as reflected in the article " T h e Discurs ive 
Const ruct ion of Nat ional Ident i t ies" . 9 
The following are the assumptions on which analysis of focus group texts is based: 
1) National identity' is not an inborn aspect of identity such as race, one that is 
explained through "primordialism". It is socially constructed through interaction 
among family, school, the mass media and the influence of others. 
2) Identity is a malleable phenomenon, particularly at t imes when there have been 
changes in the status of the state, the political regime or the economic system. 
3) The construction of identity involves interaction between the personal and the 
public space, because the construction of an identity represents both an evaluation 
of oneself and the evaluation of "o thers" about " m e " and about the group to 
which " I " belong. 
4) The construction of identity is based on emphasising one's own unique nature, 
separating one's identity from others who are different in one way or another. 
As d id De Cillia, Reigl and Vodak ." 1 1 wi l l conduc t an analysis which separates 
ou t three interrelated d imens ions : conten ts / top ics , s t ra tegies , and l inguist ic means 
and forms of their realisation. 
Subjects which part icipants in focus g r o u p d i scuss ions decide to deba te allow 
us to look at the aspects which par t ic ipants in the d i scuss ion find to b e meaningful . 
This a l lows researchers to classify subjects in acco rdance to their mean ing and to 
get a sense of h o w the researched p h e n o m e n o n is cons t ruc ted : "Through discourse , 
social ac tors constitute knowledge , s i tuat ions , social roles, as well as identi t ies and 
interpersonal relations be tween var ious interact ing social g r o u p s . " " 
Major topics of discussion when talking about one's sense of 
belonging to Latvia 
If w e look at the major topics which appea red in focus group discuss ions , we 
find that discourses via w h i c h part ic ipants expressed their be long ing to Latvia were 
expressed through compar i son and contrast . The cons t ruc t ion of an identity discourse 
is a complicated p rocess , one that is i m b u e d wi th internal conflict. These are the 
contrasts which w e r e used most often: 
1) Latvia vs. Russia (the Soviet Union) 
2) The past vs. the present day 
3) The private vs. the public space 
4) The land vs. the state 
5) Positive things that attract vs. negative things that repel 
In search for a minority identity: Latvia compared to Russia 
The construction of a minori ty identity is based on what the individual says about 
his or her belonging to Latvia and on w h a t his or he r s ta tements repeat from things 
that "o the r s" have said about Latvia. 
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Bo th in the things that par t ic ipants said and in the th ings that " o t h e r s " h a v e 
said about Latv ia , there is of ten a c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n La tv ia and Russ ia , wi th 
people speak ing about factors such as economics , social securi ty and geopoli t ical 
considerat ions (proximity to Europe) . T h e v iews of "o the r s " w h o reside in Russ ia are 
ment ioned m o s t often, and a great deal of impor tance is a t tached to these s ta tements . 
It is precisely with Russ ia that Latvia ' s minorit ies have the closest links. Many people 
have friends and relat ives w h o m they visit in the ne ighbour ing country, and w h e n 
they talk, one hears the v iews of "o thers" about Latvia. 
There were many situations like that. I used to live in the East, during Soviet 
times, and Latvia was seen very much as a foreign country there. When I said that 
I was from Riga, everyone fell silent for a long time. (A teacher) 
/ have relatives in Russia, and they believe that Latvia is a part of Europe. Then 
I feel a true sense of pride in relation to them. (A teacher) 
Some respondents compared Latvia and Russia on the basis of their own experience, 
and that has a l lowed t h e m to develop a posi t ive discourse about Latvia: 
When I travelled around, I came to understand that we are quite a bit ahead of 
them [Russia]. (A teacher) 
It's even worse there [in Russia]. Salaries also aren't paid there, but for longer 
periods of time. Here in Latvia, if it s a state-owned company, the salary is paid every 
month, but not over there. You don't even get child support subsidies for a long period 
of time, while here something is paid out every month. I wouldn't want to return to 
Russia. (A y o u n g non-ci t izen) 
The discourse of a new identity: Latvia's Russians are "different 
from Russia's Russians" 
L a t v i a ' s R u s s i a n s are fond of s t r e s s ing the fact that as far as " o t h e r s " are 
concerned, they differ from Russ ia ' s Russ ians in language , behaviour and cul ture. 
This serves as an emot ional foundat ion for a n e w identity. 
We had been there for a while, perhaps for a week, and then they said that we 
really were different in outer terms. We spoke in some special way. Perhaps we don't 
feel that here, but when we find ourselves amidst real Russians, those who live in 
Russia, they say that we are completely different people. Perhaps we are a bit more 
cultured, more unique, and then we are always proud that we are from Latvia. (A 
parent) 
Comparing the past and the present 
In talking about their sense of belonging to Latvia, m a n y respondents spoke about 
the past , abou t the 'e ra of the Soviet Union: 
When I served in the army, it was international. When they found out that we 
were from the Baltic republics, from Latvia and Estonia, they treated us like people 
from the West. There was a period of that kind. (A teacher) 
R e s p o n d e n t s w e r e p l e a s e d to ca l l up m e m o r i e s ab o u t t h e uni f ied c o u n t r y 
that was the Soviet Un ion a n d about the popular i ty of p roduc t s from the Latv ian 
SSR there in . This can be seen as a "nos ta lg ic d i s cou r se" of identity, one w h i c h 
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s imul taneously covers a sense of be long ing to the ent i re U S S R and to Latvia as one 
of its components : 
Everywhere we went along Latvia s borders (St Petersburg, Brest), when people 
found out that we were from Latvia, from Riga ... of course, we brought along 
souvenirs, our famous chocolates. We were immediately recognised because of the 
chocolates, the Laima company and so forth. The Uzvara company was still operating 
back then. (A teacher) 
W h e n compar ing the past to the presen t , r e sponden t s stress no t only Latv ia ' s 
economic ach ievements dur ing the Soviet per iod, bu t a lso the Sovie t ideo logy of 
internat ional ism, one which respondents prefer over the na t ion state ideology that is 
implemented by independen t Latvia: 
In Soviet times I was really proud, 1 thought that ethnic relationships here were 
more acceptable, more harmonic, more tolerant, patient and calm. Recently, if you 
assign a grade to ethnic relations, then the grade for the state (the government) is 
negative. (A teacher) 
During Soviet t imes, the assessment wh ich "o the r s " - those who lived in Russ ia -
produced about Latv ia ' s Russians tended to be pos i t ive . T h e y were seen as different, 
but attractive. When Latvia regained its i n d e p e n d e n c e , at t i tudes shifted toward the 
negat ive. As far as " o t h e r s " in Latv ia are conce rned , their evaluat ion is perceived 
by minori t ies as be ing negat ive . Often th is represen t s b i t te rness ove r the fact that 
the sense of be longing to Russia and to Latv ia a l ike is u n d e r threat. This could be 
defined as a "crisis d i scourse" for the ident i ty of La tv ia ' s minor i t ies . 
Attitudes have been changing recently. A while ago I spent one year working in 
Russia. Attitudes were very different toward me. a Russian, a person who had come 
from Latvia. We are treated poorly here, now we are also treated poorly there. It was 
with sadness that I returned. (A teacher) 
In St Petersburg they say; 'You are not one of ours, you speak differently [..] 
You are no longer one of us.' (A parent ) 
People in Moscow get tired when they listen to me, they say, 'You speak so slowly 
that it is impossible to listen to you!' (A parent ) 
The ideas of minor i t ies vis-^-vis their be long ing to Russ ia are a lso changing, one 
notices al ienation from Russia, but also a sense o f difference from ethnic Latvians. 
This indicates that a search is afoot for a n e w identity. We are dea l ing with a group 
that might be called "Latv ia ' s Russ ians" , these are nei ther " R u s s i a n s " nor "Latv ians" . 
One senses an emot ional desire to demons t ra t e a n e w identity. 
/ went to visit my parents in Russia. [..] For a long time now, I have not been 
needed there, I differ from Russians who live there, and I differ from Latvians who 
live there. I think that I have to be proud of [belonging to Latvia]. (A parent ) 
By moni tor ing the discourses which se rve to construct the minor i ty identity, we 
can p roduce a s u m m a r i s i n g matr ix which c o m p a r e s the "pas t vs. p resen t " d iscourses , 
as well as what minor i t ies think " o t h e r s " are saying about them, and what they feel 
about themse lves . We can see that if there was a "pos i t ive d i s cou r se" about the past, 
then the discourse about the present differs both b y vir tue of the nega t ive posi t ion of 
"o the r s " and by virtue of the fact that on ly the sel f -evaluat ion d iscourse is posi t ive 
in nature. 
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The matrix of Latvia's minority identity: "Past vs. present", "Others vs. us" 
"Others" in Russia "Others in Latvia" Self-evaluation 
Soviet times + 0 
Now - - + 
A new identity: State-based, ethnic or another ... 
Minor i t ies today are facing a d i lemma. Should their n e w identity be based on 
the state, on ethnicity or on s o m e other factor? The evaluat ion by "o the r s" differs 
in foreign countr ies and in Latvia . W h e n they are abroad, minor i t ies find that the 
evaluation of "o the r s" a l lows t hem to feel a sense of be longing to Latvia, i.e., to feel a 
state-based identity. Here in Latvia, however , the evaluations of "o thers" tend to stress 
that wh ich is different - e thnic identity, as wel l as differing ci t izenship status: 
Whenever we are abroad, then we are from Latvia. When we are here, then each 
of us has a separate nationality - we are Russians or Latvians. (A parent) 
The search for a new identi ty is a lso evidenced by efforts to separate oneself 
from Russia , the desire to rece ive confirmation from " o t h e r s " of one 's be long ing to 
Latvia. At the same t ime, however , the new identi ty is still fragile - the evaluat ion 
of the " o t h e r s " does not meet expectat ions: 
Once our group travelled to Poland, and the Poles looked at us peculiarly, why 
had we gone there in the first place? When our people started to speak Polish, then it 
turned out that the Poles had thought that we were Russians. That was offensive — why 
Russians? Latvia, that is where we were from. No, right away we're Russians. Not 
that Latvia is a separate country, no - we 're immediately Russians. They know very 
little about our country. It's humiliating. (A student) 
In the sea rch for ident i ty , minor i t i e s a l so repeat the " l a b e l s " w h i c h rad ica l 
nationalist pol i t icians attach to them - the word "occupant" , for instance: 
/ am an occupant. My mother had a profession which meant that in Soviet times, 
she travelled all around the Union. It turned out that in the last few years we lived 
in Jekabpils. 
Minor i t ies do not wish to link their identi ty to the status of citizen or non-ci t izen, 
because they consider the s i tuat ion to b e unfair. As coun te r - a rgumen t s , they use 
discourses that have often been presented in the Russian language media: "Automat i c 
granting of c i t izenship" , " l iv ing in this country for several genera t ions" , "work ing 
on behal f of the state", etc. 
First of all, there is the fact that I am a non-citizen, and in some way 1 feel that 
I am not needed. (A non-ci t izen) 
The fact that they won't give citizenship to people who have lived here for their 
whole life or half their life is a direct indication that we are nothing here. We are 
not Latvia s residents, we simply populate this territory. That is not too good either. 
(A non-c i t izen) 
So why cannot we automatically receive citizenship in this country in which we 
live? We work for the state, our children are bom here, but we still have to go and 
fight to get citizenship. I don't know - that doesn't seem right. (A non-ci t izen) 
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Young people from e thnic minor i t i es find the d i scourses which prevail in the 
Latvian public space to be alien and incomprehens ib l e - the idea that ci t izenship is 
a confirmation of loyalty, that loyal ty is mani fes ted th rough the natural isat ion oath. 
Things which minori ty y o u n g people said in the focus g r o u p discuss ions suggested 
that they have very poor unders tanding of the inst i tut ion o f c i t izenship as such. The 
word "d iscr iminat ion" that is often used in the Russ ian l anguage mass media is used 
in an absurd sense - "d iscr iminat ion in under tak ing responsibi l i ty" : 
The point is neither the money nor the effort. The point is that you have to take 
an oath when you go to be naturalised. Latvians who are our peers do not have 
to take this oath before the state. They are automatically citizens of the state. We 
have to take the oath. That means that we have to undertake a certain amount of 
responsibility. We face discrimination in undertaking responsibility by swearing an 
oath before this country. (A student) 
In t e rms of feeling a sense of be long ing to E u r o p e , too , minor i t ies feel quite 
distanced, and that is basically for two reasons - one is the h ighly different standard of 
living in Western Europe as opposed to Latvia, and the second is the fact that democracy 
has not yet fully developed in Latvia . On ly in geographic te rms to minori t ies feel a 
sense of belonging to Europe . It is o f impor tance here that in d iscuss ing their attitudes 
vis-a-vis Europe. Russ ian speak ing minor i t i es use c o m p a r i s o n s wi th Russia: 
This place [Latvia] has nothing to do with Europe. In 15 or 20 years, no sooner, 
we will be able to feel that we really live in Europe. If you compare us to Russia, 
then we are living in Europe. Over there you get the feeling that you've gone back in 
history -15 years if not more. Here, however, we are far from feeling like Europeans 
who have the rights of Europeans. (Young non-c i t izen) 
/ think that given that everything that is happening here, all of the different 
kinds of discrimination — well, we are far from Europe, very far indeed. (Young 
non-cit izen). 
Europeans. To me, a European is someone who is normal and rich ... well, not quite 
rich, but a normal person who makes a good living. There aren't many such people in 
Latvia. It's just in geographic terms that I say "yes". (Young non-citizen) 
Belonging to Latvia as a land and as a state 
Survey da ta ( B I S S , 2 0 0 4 ) s h o w tha t 7 4 % of R u s s i a n s and o the r m i n o r i t y 
r ep re sen t a t i ve s in L a t v i a dec l a r e a s e n s e of b e l o n g i n g to La tv ia . T h a t c lea r ly 
demonstra tes the close l inks of minor i t i es to Latvia. T h e survey does not, however , 
allow us to understand clearly what the minor i ty p e o p l e think when they say that they 
feel a sense of be longing to Latvia. Qual i ta t ive research and focus g roup text analysis 
reveals the fact that minor i t ies under s t and this sense of be long ing in two different 
ways . Minori t ies m a y stress their sense o f be long ing to Latvia , but they differentiate 
be tween Latvia as a land and Latvia as a state. R e s p o n d e n t s speak of Latvia as an 
attractive land, one which differs from Russ i a wi th its Western w a y s . 
/ still feel proud of Latvia as a land. Wlien I travel to Russia, I understand that 
Latvia is closer to Western culture, the spirit is free here. (A teacher) 
W h e n the Soviet U n i o n broke up . minor i t ies lost their s ta te-based identity vis-a_-
vis the U S S R and Russia , but a n e w s ta te-based ident i ty that emerged in the period 
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before Latv ia ' s restoration of independence has not developed into an identity vis-aj-
vis Latvia as a state in the later years of independence: 
I feel nostalgia for the late 1980s, when there was a very great sense of freedom, 
of pride in the state. There was no division between the concepts of 'strana' ("land" 
in the Russian language) and 'gosudarstvo' (state). (A teacher) 
The public vs. the private space - positive vs. negative 
W h e n talking about their be longing to Latvia , par t ic ipants in the focus group 
discussion qui te strictly differentiated b e t w e e n discourses that descr ibe Latvia as 
a publ ic space and those which describe Latvia as a space for personal life. W h e n 
talking about Latvia as a publ ic space, mos t respondents strictly divided up those 
subject areas in which they had posit ive things to say about Latvia and those in which 
evaluations of Latvia were most ly negative. Posi t ive statements most ly had to do with 
achievements in sports or in international competi t ions. Focus group participants were 
happy and p r o u d to speak about such things: 
In the Eurovision Song Contest, we always support our performers. (A 
teacher) 
Recently awards were given to students from Latvia, at the embassy right here 
in Riga. These were students who won prizes in the Russian language Olympiad in 
Russia. They said that students from the Baltic States, from the former republics of 
the Soviet Union, were among the best when it comes to Russian language skills. Of 
course, I feel pride in Latvia. (A teacher) 
Responden t s a lso like it w h e n gues ts have pos i t ive th ings to say about Riga , 
Latvia, peop le in Latv ia and their cul ture , w h e n they c o m p a r e Riga to P rague or 
Paris: 
777ei' always say that people from Latx'ia are always very accurate. For instance, 
in the hotels, in dormitories where we stayed at school, we always left everything in 
good order when we departed. (A teacher) 
They say that our drivers are veiy disciplined. I know how they drive in Russia, 
with no rules at all. (A teacher) 
th 
I had relatives who came from abroad when Riga celebrated its 800 anniversary. 
It was a fairy tale, of course. I felt such great pride of living in this country:. It was 
very nice for everyone. (A teacher) 
Nega t ive subjects vis-a_-vis the political space in Latvia mos t ly have to do wi th 
politics. Part icular cri t icism is waged against pol i t ic ians for the decisions that they 
take, the reforms that they insti tute and the selfish goals that they pursue: 
/ guess that I feel ashamed not about the state as such, because the state is not 
to blame, but about specific people who run our country, about their thoughtless 
actions as manifested in concrete laws - the law on education, the decision to close 
down children's homes, Latvia s participation in the war in Iraq. (A student) 
I criticise the government for the way in which it pursues its selfish interests. 
The government's primary job should be to facilitate the economy and to care for the 
people, but they forget that, they plm political games. The goal that is being pursued 
bv the politicians is to divide up our society into two strata. (A student) 
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/ think that certain politicians turn this into a political farce, they use it for their 
own purposes, they don't have any noble or fine goals. (A student) 
/ don't know if anyone who is elected to the Saeima [the Latvian parliament] 
from a political party continues to think about problems instead of starting to grab 
benefits for himself. Greed starts to appear - this for you, this for me, but no thought 
for everyone else. (A student) 
/ found it very unpleasant, J was very ashamed when a few weeks ago, an MP 
from PCTVL [the left wing For Human Rights in a United Latvia party] left and 
joined a different party. (A student) 
In stressing the selfish interests of pol i t ic ians , focus g roup part ic ipants conclude 
that their o w n interests are not be ing defended by anyone . It is unders tandable that 
a m o n g minori t ies , this creates more of a sense of a l ienat ion than of be longing when 
it comes to society in Latvia: 
/ cannot name a single concrete individual who specifically defends our interests. 
At meetings, PCTVL, Pliners [a well known left wing politician] and other politicians 
defend our interests, but what is the goal — to defend us or to achieve the political 
goals of their parties? (A student) 
Even as they criticise Latvia 's pol i t ic ians , however , minor i ty respondents do not 
want "o the r s " to speak negat ively about Latvia : 
/ don't like it when people say bad things about Latvia, when Russian Television, 
for instance, displays Latvia in a bad light, when it produces a ver\' negative evaluation 
of the actions of politicians. (A student) 
I don't like it that Russia s central television channels have recently been showing 
only negative things about Latvia. If they show a demonstration, something negative, 
then there is a lack of any counter-weight, something light (A student) 
A differing interpretation of history 
One reason for nega t ive att i tudes toward Latvian pol i t ics and poli t icians and for 
the delay in the s t rengthening of a s ta te-based ident i ty a m o n g La tv ia ' s minori t ies 
is that there are different v iews about history. This mos t often has to do wi th the 
w a y in wh ich Latv ia ended up a part of the Soviet Un ion . Minor i ty peop le have 
all learned the Soviet version of history, one that w a s backed up by the totalitarian 
ideology of Soviet t imes. These are peop le w h o are disgusted w h e n they hear the 
" n e w " interpretat ion of his tory - that the Soviet U n i o n occupied Latvia in 1940 in 
accordance with the infamous Molo tov -R ibben t rop Pact be tween the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany: 
I don't like it when Latvian politicians often accuse Russia of things that are the 
fault of the Soviet Union. Latvia was in the Union, after all. Why should Russia be 
held responsible for this? (A student) 
I felt uncomfortable when I read my child's 5'h grade textbook about Latvian 
history. They: force the child to learn all of these things. It's so incompetent. We lived 
in the era which that book describes, and we perceived it differently. (A parent) 
If I compare Russian and Latvian schoolbooks, I become confused. I read that 
Latvia was occupied. As far as I have lived, as far as I know, then Latvia was a part 
Brigita Zepa. The Changing Discourse of Minority Identities: Latvia 81 
of the Soviet Union, part of a big country. Now I read in books that it was occupied. 
I know from my own experience that this is not true, but the next generations will 
read this and think so, too. History is supposed to make people learn from their 
mistakes. Then let s do that, let s not rewrite history on behalf of some goal of our 
own. (A student) 
A m o n g minori t ies , there is the very widespread view that the Soviet Un ion m a d e 
a great contr ibut ion toward the deve lopment of Latvia ' s e c o n o m y and cul ture. Here 
is an excerpt from the focus g roup discussion a m o n g parents : 
What S more, the Soviet Union invested a great deal in Latvia. 
Yes, indeed - a great deal. 
This was the gate to Europe. 
Discourses in these minor i ty discussions h a v e not only been influenced by the 
Russian language press in Latvia , they also serve as mult ipl iers for the discourses of 
the m a s s med ia in Russ ia proper: 
Why should Latvia not take positive aspects from Russia? In addition to the 
state, Putin also understands education. Each country tires to politicise history in its 
schoolbooks, to reflect itself as positively as possible. As far as Putin is concerned, I've 
heard that he has ordered the publishing of schoolbooks without politics, reflecting 
only facts. As far as I know, the Latvian government has said that it does not need 
such schoolbooks. It is provoking a split. (A student) 
A fragment from the s tudent discussion: 
/ think that we should have a nationally elected president, like in Russia. 
I agree. Russia sets an example for me as a country in which the president 
understands his country:. Latvians should step back from the West and take a look at 
Russia, at how the state system is organised there, they should borrow a few ideas 
for themselves. There is real experience, and we can learn from Russia's mistakes. 
Content analysis of the La tv ian and Russ ian language p ress , as conducted by 
Broks, Tabuns , T a b u n a , 1 2 s h o w e d that the two offer a differing reflection o f Latv ia ' s 
history, not least of the even t s of 1940. With the med ia t ion o f the m e d i a and of 
parents, therefore, m a n y y o u n g people reproduce differing k n o w l e d g e about history. 
As a result, the history that is taught at school does not conv ince minor i ty y o u n g 
people. 
Latvia as a private space: "Biographic identity" 
People feel the closest links to Latvia via their memor ies from childhood, the t ime 
that they have spent in Latvia and its accus tomed envi ronment and culture. W h e n 
thinking about the possibil i ty o f leaving Latvia, m a n y focus g roup part icipants talked 
about family m e m b e r s and friends w h o m they would not l ike to leave. This kind of 
sense o f be long ing can b e called a "b iograph ic" identity: 
When I was in New York, in this great global metropolis, I looked at the city 
and wanted Old Riga. I was being pidled back toward Riga, not toward Moscow or 
Russia. In foreign countries, you sit around and feel sad for the places that you know. 
I cannot explain this. (A s tudent) 
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It's internal belonging. I was born here. When I was little, I was taken to the 
park. I remember lots of different things. This internal belonging is there, and I can't 
do anything about it. In foreign countries you sit around and feel sad for the places 
that you know. That is something that cannot be explained. (A student) 
777/5 is the land of our birth, we have lived here all our lives. That is something 
that is our own. In other countries, we feel as if we are not in our own skin. Different 
cultures, we don't know how to behave, what's happening there. I went to visit my 
grandma for a week. 1 talked to people, I went out into the street and understood 
that it was not mine. I've lived here for so many years, I feel that everything is mine. 
(A student) 
First of all, this is the land of my birth. I respect the people who live here, J 
respect their interests. If I live in another country, I will worry about Latvia, I will 
be pulled back toward these streets. Inescapably, this is the land of my birth. (A 
student) 
/ will be sad, for instance, to leave people, mv friends in particular. I will feel 
most sorry for leaving Latvia, not the state, but the land- the nature, the specific 
places. This is Latvia, after all. Riga is the city of my birth, and I link so many things 
to it. (A student) 
Riga is the city of my birth, I have lived here all my life. I walk down the street 
and remember - here there used to be this, over there — something else. Memories are 
precious. If you go somewhere else, there are alien circumstances, unknown people, 
and you think, my God, where am I now? (A student) 
It is very hard to gain the trust of people, very hard to find work and, by extension, 
to find your place in society - only a few people achieve that. It's much simpler here. 
You were born here, you are accustomed to everything to a greater degree. If you 
find yourself in trouble, then you know that literally a few kilometres away there are 
close people whom you will be able to ring and say what you 're feeling. You can go 
visit those people and gain real support. (A student) 
Here there are my friends, my parents, people who are close to me, but I guess 
I could go away to earn some money. (A student) 
/ intend to stay here, because I understand that no one really needs me over 
there. (A student) 
The search for a desirable identity 
Seemingly in contrast to the ethnic divis ions in socie ty that are forced upon them 
by "others" , young people want to stress that which young Russians a n d Latvians have 
in c o m m o n , thus cons t ruc t ing an identi ty that s tands above ethnic differences, one 
which can unify the two groups . Here is a f ragment from the s tudent discussion: 
/ think that Russians and Latvians have similar problems, and we should not be 
divided up. Politicians are the ones who divide us up and position us against one 
another. 
1 have friends who are Latvians. In our group, there is no thought about going 
out to fight. Politicians are the ones who are firing us up. 
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/ read Russian and Latvian magazines which contain completely different views. 
That's a matter of politics. 
The interpretation o f the minori ty identity here is c losely l inked to the desire to 
avoid conflicts in Latvia. This could be called a "strategy of adapta t ion" , as p roposed 
by the minor i ty young people: 
In Bolderaj a [a neighbourhood of Riga],we have a pact. The Russians don't touch 
the Latvians, the Latvians don't touch the Russians. Someone new moved into the 
neighbourhood. One evening, a Russian was beaten up, his gold chain, his mobile 
telephone and other valuable property were taken away from him. Immediately a 
Latvian was beaten up. Everyone paid for that. After all, we can all live in peace. 
Why shouldn't we be able to live in peace in a big city? (A s tudent ) 
Don't touch us. Don't sow the seed of hatred, because aggression will not emerge 
from nothing, no physical aggression, no aggression at all. Knowing the Russian 
people, aggression will be manifested as self-defence. Seeking a compromise, I believe 
that it is possible to co-exist peacefully, to have friendship. I don't understand why 
the politicians are trying to get us to hate one another! (A s tudent ) 
W h e n asked what minor i ty young people would wish for Latvia, they first and 
foremost t a lked about the subject of ethnic harmony, and they also expressed the 
desire to see Latvia as an economical ly deve loped country: 
The state must seek to ensure that people - Russians and Latvians alike -
understand one another to a greater degree, that they are not split, that there is no 
mutual aggression. Then there would be fewer problems. If people feel happy, they 
do not want to do anything bad. (A student) 
/ would wish Latvia consolidation and unity, so that people aren't divided up 
between Latvians and Russians, so that everyone understands that we have one 
country and that we are a force when we stand together. Then we Tl achieve the 
economic flourishing and democracy about which people in Latvia are so very 
worried. (A student) 
/ would like the energy that is devoted to disputes and to reforms that cannot be 
understood instead to be devoted to truly serious issues - manufacturing, economic 
development. We shouldn't have this cyclical running in place, this effort to explain 
who is right and who is wrong. (A student) 
/ would like to wish economic progress for Latvia so that it reaches the American 
and German level. Many problems emerge not only because of not knowing the 
language, but also from the economy. That s no secret to anyone. (A student) 
Conclusion 
If w e moni tor the w a y in wh ich the identities of Russian speaking minorit ies have 
changed over the last 10 years , we find that this has been a per iod during wh ich the 
lives of minori ty people have involved a great search and a lot of emotion. This is true 
because there has been a need to study the contradict ions that have emerged in the 
construction o f a n e w identi ty as a result of historical events in Latvia. If we assume 
that the es tabl ishment of an identity is a process in which of equal impor tance is the 
way in which someone views himself or herself and the w a y in which that person 
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thinks about the views of "o the r s " with respec t to h imse l f or herself, then we must 
r emember that over the last 15 years, there h a v e been radical changes in the lives 
of minor i t ies and "o the rs" , as well . In m a n y cases , fo rmer majori t ies have turned 
into minor i t ies , while the "o thers" , w h o in Soviet t imes were all the residents o f a 
very big country, have n o w b e c o m e the res idents of a var ie ty o f different countr ies , 
Latvia included. 
Analysis of the d iscourse wh ich underp ins the const ruct ion of minor i ty identities 
shows that over the last decade , the v iew of " o t h e r s " vis-3-vis minori t ies h a s become 
radically negat ive. Latvia ' s minori t ies are aliens in Russ ia ' s eyes , and they have faced 
negat ive att i tudes even in their own " l a n d " - Latvia . Th i s cou ld b e called an identity 
crisis for minori t ies , or pe rhaps the " ind iv idua l i sa t ion" o f identi t ies . The fact is that 
this identity was mos t s t rongly rooted in the emot iona l l inks o f an individual with 
his or her land and b iog raphy — family, f r iends, years spent in Latvia. This is an 
identity which lacks a posi t ive "external v i ew" . In the event , the external view leads 
to dissatisfaction, cr i t ic ism and protests (e.g., the par t ic ipat ion of young people in 
protests against educat ion reforms). 
We could also t a lk of an ident i ty crisis for o ther r e a s o n s . On the one hand , 
minorit ies wish to feel a sense of be long ing in Latvia , bu t on the other hand, they 
do not want there to b e an ethnic d ivis ion in this p roces s - Latv ians , Russ ians , etc. 
Neither do they want any emphas is on the divis ion be tween ci t izens and non-ci t izens. 
It is, however , exact ly these " iden t i ty b o u n d a r i e s " that are put into p lace by the 
majority. 
It is also true that minor i ty people wish to feel a specific identity which al lows 
them to feel different bo th from Russ ian speaker s in Russ i a and from the majori ty in 
Latvia. This is a process of searching out a n e w identity for Latvia ' s Russ ian speakers. 
For the time being, there is no clear a n s w e r to the ques t ion o f what the identity of 
Latvia 's minori t ies m i g h t be. 
If we seek to reveal the strategies wh ich Russ ian speak ing minor i t ies use in the 
construction of their identity, the most impor tan t ones , it appears , are "oppos ing any 
identity that is forced upon m e from the ou t s ide" - a s t ra tegy which manifes ts itself 
in an at tempt to emphas i se that which minor i t i es have in c o m m o n with the majority 
(the s ame country, unified s t rength, the s a m e interes ts) - and also the s t ra tegy of 
"adaptat ion" , which is seen through a t t empts to seek ou t c o m p r o m i s e and to reach 
"ag reemen t " on condi t ions for co-exis tence . A part o f this second s t ra tegy is also 
the "b iographic s t ra tegy" or the " s t and ing apart s t ra tegy" - one that is manifested 
through a sense of b e l o n g i n g to Latvia b e c a u s e of o n e ' s o w n biogTaphy - life in 
Latvia, family and friends. 
K o p s a v i l k u m s 
Sis raksts ir ve ido t s socia la k o n s t r u k t l v i s m a perspektTva, i zmanto jo t kr i t i sko 
diskursa analizi (R. Wodak. Discursive Construction of National Identities). Krit iska 
diskursa analTze meg ina aptver t visu i espe jamo informaciju p a r t iem vesturiskajiem 
un socia lekonomiskaj iem nosac l jumiem, kas rod izpausmi diskursa konst ruesana . 
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D i s k u r s a ana l l ze ir I s t eno t a , ba l s to t i es uz g r u p u d i s k u s i j a m p i n n s La tv i j a s 
pievienosanas ES. Anallzes procesa tiek izdalltas divas, sava siarpa saistltas dirnensijas: 
pirmkart, t emas . kuras att iecas uz nacionalo identitati , otrkart, d iskursa konstruesanas 
gaita izmantotas strategijas. 
PerTjuma tiek lietoti an kvantitatTvi dati. kuri raksturo izmainas Latvijas iedzTvotaju 
socialaja identifikacija no 1990. l ldz 2004. g a d a m . 
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This paper presents a study that analyzes the adaptation strategies among various ethnic groups 
in Lithuania. The four variants - assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization - are 
seen as the specific outcome of status, social relationships, and ethnic identity. The context of 
the four strategies is conceptualized through discussion of ethnic factors, the importance of 
status groups, and adaptation challenges. The specific contents of the four are analyzed on the 
basis of survey and interview materials that cover the topics of identification, social distance, 
closure of social networks, and civic activity. The specific sampling approach was worked 
out in order to achieve a reliable cross-group comparison of five ethnic samples (Lithuanian, 
Russian, Polish, Jewish, and Tatar). 
The paper relies on a broader study (Kasatkina and Leoncikas 2003) and aims to demonstrate 
how the focus on adaptation helps to understand the specific situations where ethnic differences 
seem apparent. This endeavour seeks to overcome the tendency to see minority integration as 
an issue that can and has been solved politically and to reveal the contents of ethnic relations 
and remaining social challenges through sociological analysis. The text below discusses various 
research findings and presents the assessment of adaptation. 
Key words: ethnic group, ethnic minority, adaptation, social distance. 
For m a n y peop le in Li thuania today, "e thn ic r e l a t i ons " do not seem to be an 
important issue. The re are n o evident e thnic c lashes or mass ive tensions. Ethnici ty 
is. metaphorical ly speak ing , mollif ied and ca lm. D o e s this m e a n it has lost all social 
impact? A closer look reveals that e thnic i ty r emains quiet ly present in social life, 
influences interpersonal relat ions, a n d is reflected in opin ions about var ious groups 
in society. Obvious or less visible, e thnici ty remains in everyday life. Ironically, often 
it does so without a n y efforts from cultural act ivists . 
I. Adaptation: concept and methodological assumptions 
We understand social adaptat ion as a process of the combinat ion of an individual 's 
a sp i r a t ions and e x p e c t a t i o n s wi th h i s / h e r pos s ib i l i t i e s a n d expec t a t i ons a n d the 
requirements of society. W h y is adaptat ion so central for researching ethnic processes? 
It has to b e noted that it used to be very popu la r to d iscuss so-cal led ethnic relat ions 
in pos t -communis t count r ies , and espec ia l ly the Bal t ic States, in te rms of ci t izenship 
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and minori ty rights. Unders tanding adaptat ion in broader t e rms is important because 
an individual m a y have no t only more , but a lso quite different a ims than acquir ing a 
particular civil or national identity. The expecta t ions of mos t traditional and liberal 
nationalists that minori t ies should follow the majori ty and learn its culture prevents 
them from see ing what rea l ly mat te rs to minor i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s . A non -dominan t 
populat ion may h a v e wishes other what than the majority w a n t s to see: for instance, 
instead o f active loyalty to the state, a minori ty may only wish to have social security. 
Civil vi r tues m a y be of secondary impor tance - that is w h y debate concern ing civil 
society does not help to unders tand what the goals and percep t ions of the adapt ing 
minority m e m b e r s are. Legal formalities related to civil s ta tus , p lace of res idence, or 
property can be handled as formalities - wi thout greater effect on identity, at t i tudes, 
or loyalt ies. Formal ly granted rights and order ly civil status does not tell m u c h about 
civic vir tues or the civic skills to use the rights and fulfil t he duties. To extend the 
frame in which ethnic g r o u p adaptat ion can be bet ter g rasped , w e shall p resent a 
theoretical scheme. 
We are mos t ly interested in socio-cultural adaptat ion, wh ich encompasses both 
"ex te rna l" social condi t ions and individual skills to par t ic ipate in the surrounding 
society. For represent ing the l inks be tween cultural ident i ty and social adapta t ion 
we turn to the typo logy o f J.W. Berry ( 1 9 9 2 ; 1997), w h o w o r k e d in the field of 
cross-cultural psychology and has dis t inguished four variants of accul turat ion. His 
scheme concent ra tes on individual att i tudes along two lines: whe the r an individual 
wishes to sustain his/her cultural identity and whether contacts with groups of another 
culture a re free and regular. Accord ing to the specific combina t ion of the above two, 
assimilation, integration, separat ion, and marginal izat ion emerge as specific strategies. 
Our study bui lds on the former typology, but extends it to the social sphere , rather 
than mere ly discussing persona l attitudes. 
What matters for adaptat ion is not mere ly accul turat ion at t i tudes, but a lso how 
the sur rounding social env i ronment reacts. W h e n there are informal obstacles to an 
individual ' s advancemen t , acculturat ion d o e s not necessar i ly guarantee successful 
adaptat ion. The opposi te is also true. If there are large g roups that do not acquire 
the necessary skills (i.e. accul turat ion is l imited) for main ta in ing their welfare and 
par t ic ipa t ing in the larger society, their adap ta t ion canno t be cons idered ent i rely 
successful. Both on an individual and a group level, the success of adaptation depends 
on expectat ions and aims and on whether a person finds a w a y to realize t hem in 
his/her society. If an individual has any par t icular ethnic features , implementa t ion 
of his/her a ims in social life has an extra d imens ion . The re is the encounter with 
majority at t i tudes, and there is the quest ion of mainta ining (or not) the background 
identity - via family t rad i t ions , v ia choos ing a school for ch i ld ren , via choos ing 
friends, etc. 
Types of adaptation 
Ber ry ' s s chem e concentra tes on individual att i tudes and assumes that they are 
consciously chosen - therefore it is quite legi t imate for psycho log ica l research to 
consider the acculturat ion variants as strategies. In this study w e emphas ize the social 
context: not everything is up to individual ; the type of adapta t ion is therefore more 
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than a strategy of individual behaviour. W h a t can be cons idered a strategy is a bid for 
status: Everyone seeks success according to one ' s unders tanding . But the results of 
this a t tempt can vary: the desired status is e i ther ach ieved or not, it gives satisfaction 
or not, ethnic identity e i ther changes or not . The result of adapta t ion is the complex 
ou tcome of the pursuit of status and the social env i ronmen t . In other w o r d s , when 
an individual strives for status and society reacts to his behaviour , the ou tcome is 
a result, or a type, of adaptat ion. And this result can be aptly grasped with Berry 's 
concepts : integration, ass imilat ion, margfnal izat ion, and separat ion, as long as their 
contents include the social d imension. T h e adjusted s c h e m e of adaptat ion types: 
Adaptation type Satisfaction with the achieved status Maintained ethnic identity 
Integration + + 
Assimilianon + -
Marginalization - -
Separation + 
Having the above considera t ions on status and adapta t ion in mind , w e c o m e to 
des igning the me thodo logy for adap ta t ion research . T h e assessment of adapta t ion 
is based on a c o m p a r a t i v e analys is o f r e s p o n s e s g iven by five s a m p l e s , each of 
which w a s d rawn from a par t icu lar e thn ic g r o u p . T h e m a i n topics of the survey 
covered quest ions on identity, social ties, and se l f -assessment of one ' s social posit ion. 
Identification tendencies were regis tered via a sugges ted list of categories and via 
the Twenty Statements Test. The charac ter of social ties w a s analyzed by compar ing 
the e thnic composi t ion of the circle of fr iends, re la t ives , and j o b col leagues . Besides 
that, the degree of c ivic act ivi ty was a s ses sed by a n s w e r s about m e m b e r s h i p in 
organizat ions, par t ic ipat ion in publ ic even t s , interest in pol i t ics , and trust in public 
institutions. The att i tudes of tolerance w e r e measu red wi th the he lp of the Bogardus 
scale. The percept ion of how one ' s social pos i t ion has changed during the last 10 
years was dis t inguished as one of the central indicators of adaptat ion success . The 
aforement ioned theoret ical s cheme of adap ta t ion types is a m e a n s to see what all 
those differences on a number of d imens ions actual ly m e a n . 
II. DIMENSIONS OF ADAPTATION 
II.1. The ethnic composition of Lithuania 
Population structure and migratory processes are objective elements in the context 
of adaptat ion. In compar i son to the census of 1989, w h i c h was carried out on the 
eve of the great t ransformations related to the col lapse o f the Soviet b lock and the 
reemergence o f an independen t state o f Li thuania , the 2001 census regis tered the 
highest rate of ethnic Li thuanians in the terri tory of con tempora ry Li thuania ever. In 
that sense , there is a small m o v e towards ethnic homogen iza t ion . The n u m b e r s and 
often the rates of other groups, most no tab ly Russ ians , have decreased. Poles have 
replaced Russians as the second b igges t e thnic g roup in the country. T h e reasons 
behind the ethnic changes have not yet been studied systemat ical ly , yet emigrat ion 
and decreas ing fertility are considered to be a m o n g the m a i n factors; we also assume 
that s o m e assimilat ion may h a v e taken p lace as well . 
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Table 1 
Population of Lithuania by ethnicity, 1923-2001 (per cent) 
Ethnicity / 
year 
1923 1959 1969 1979 1989 2001 
Pcrc. thousands 
Lithuanians 69,2 79.3 80,1 80,0 79,6 83.45 2907.3 
Poles 15,3 8,5 7,7 7.3 7.0 6.74 235.0 
Russians 2.5 8.5 8.6 8.9 9.4 6.31 219.8 
Belorussians 0.4 1.1 1,5 1.7 1.7 1,23 42.9 
Ukrainians 0.0 0,7 0.8 0.9 1.2 0,65 22.5 
Jews 8.3 0,9 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.12 4,0 
Latvians 0,6 0.2 0,1 0,1 0.1 0,08 3.0 
Tatars 0,1 0.1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0.09 3,2 
Roma 0.0 0,1 0.1 0,1 0.1 0.07 2,6 
Germans 3,4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.09 3,2 
Armenians - - - - - 0,04 1,5 
Others 0,2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0,18 6,1 
Not indicated - - - - - 0,94 32,9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 3483,9 
Sources: Population Censuses in Lithuania. Statistics Lithuania. Vilnius, 1999. 
Data for 2001 from: Population by Sex, Age. Ethnicity and Religion. Statistics Lithuania, 
Vilnius 2002. 
Ethnic diversity has a regional dimension. Whi le mos t counties have 90 percent or 
more Lithuanians, some are different. A few areas have a significant Polish populat ion; 
this prevai ls in the Salcininkai district (89.5 percent non-Li thuanians) , the Vilnius 
district (77.6 percent non-Li thuanians) , and some other areas. T h e most diverse city 
is Vilnius, w h i l e the second mos t diverse is Kla ipeda; Visaginas , the town next to the 
atomic p o w e r plant, is 85 percen t non-Li thuanian (Russians m a k e up 52.4 percent 
of its populat ion) . Ethnic diversi ty was a cr i ter ion in choos ing the locations for our 
survey (see Methodologica l note at the end of the paper) . 
A short look through the types of ethnic groups enables one to realize that there 
are indeed differing e thnic segmen t s in Li thuania . The flows of migrat ion dur ing 
the Soviet pe r iod are impor tant factors that account not only for ethnic diversity, 
but also for diversity within ethnic groups . Russ ians consist of people w h o c a m e to 
the country at different t imes and because of var ious c i rcumstances , with differing 
flows, to different places - yet often related to labor migra t ion . Al though processes 
of migra t ion in Lithuania were part of flows throughout the ent i re Soviet Union , the 
position of the Russians in this country had s o m e specific features. In compar i son to 
the other Sovie t republics , Li thuanian Russians had a lmost the smallest percentage 
of intell igentsia. Broadly speaking , Li thuanian nat ional ism in Soviet t imes was in a 
way successful in keeping the dominant social roles for ethnic Li thuanians . Russians , 
on the o ther hand , appear to have been less l ikely to be e x p e c t e d to have good 
precondit ions for adaptat ion and self-organization at a t ime o f t ransformations than 
could be inferred from their general ly dominant role in the Soviet system. 
Ethnic groups included in the adaptat ion survey have s o m e specific typological 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s that b e c o m e a p p a r e n t w h e n c o n s i d e r i n g e t h n i c c o m p o s i t i o n and 
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classification schemes . Russ ians and Russ ian-speakers are main ly postcolonial and 
labour migrants . The Pol ish communi ty has a c lear regional d imension, they have the 
legacy of being the border minori ty, and they are cha l l enged by the processes of elite 
formation. Tatars are an old territorial minor i ty that h a v e integrated m a n y varying 
elements in their identity (the dominant l anguage has changed several t imes over the 
years) . A n interesting re la t ionship is connec ted wi th the so called ' K a z a n ' Tatars that 
are largely Soviet migran ts and are usual ly cons ide red to be ' ano the r t ype ' of Tatars 
than 'Li thuanian Tatars ' . Jews are the g roup that has undergone various aspects of 
diaspora existence. However , the Holocaus t des t royed the evolut ion and the existence 
of Lithuanian Jewry; a large part of con tempora ry Li thuanian Jews are migrants from 
the territory of the former U S S R . R o m a (not inc luded in the survey) exhibit one of 
the mos t typical characterist ics o f a d iaspora : due to deep social exclusion, the social 
mobil i ty of an individual depends on the mobi l i ty of the entire group. 
Al though one e thnic g roup m a y often fall into a few ca tegor ies , m a y consist 
of differing parts etc. , even a schemat ic accoun t of soc ia l or mig ra to ry segments 
allows one to better g rasp the precondi t ions and context o f adaptat ion. The adaptat ion 
challenges intensively emerged in the mil ieu of the chang ing polit ical r eg ime and 
social structure in the early 1990s. 
II.2. Measuring adaptation (research findings) 
The main empir ica l findings c o m e from survey da t a and in te rv iew mater ia l s 
collected in 2001-2 1 f rom Li thuanians , Russ i ans , Poles , J ews , and Tatars. 
Identification tendencies 
The strongest identification in all the a fo rement ioned ethnic groups is with the 
social categories such as co-workers or people o f the s a m e profession. Yet differences 
appear when the respondents evaluate the ethnic ca tegor ies . W h e n asked to ment ion 
the single most important ca tegory from the sugges ted list. L i thuanians , Poles , and 
Russians indicated o n e of the social ca tegor ies whi le the Jews and Tatars m o r e often 
mentioned an ethnic one (such as coethnics in Li thuania , d iaspora m e m b e r s , or people 
who speak the same language) . The his tor ical d iasporas have a lso declared a more 
intensive activity in N G O s . 
T h e largest n o n - d o m i n a n t e thn ic g r o u p s , Po le s a n d R u s s i a n s , exh ib i t qu i t e 
different tendencies o f territorial identif icat ion. Po les , as wel l as Tatars , are m o r e 
s t rongly a t tached to va r ious d i m e n s i o n s of L i t h u a n i a n terr i tory, and in this way 
are quite s imilar to the majori ty ethnic g roup . In contrast , Russians and Jews have 
lesser at tachments to the terri tory of the country. However , as far as Russ ians are 
concerned, the low impor tance of terr i tory cannot be immedia te ly thought to mean 
the diasporization of the Russ ians , s ince identification wi th co-ethnics l iving abroad 
is qui te low (a little h igher in Visaginas) . 
Addit ional data o n how ethnici ty is current ly verbal ized c o m e s from interview 
materials . Often ethnici ty is pe rce ived in banal and schemat ic terms, wh ich proves 
that it is a clear and usual par t of everyday life. In some cases it is verbal ized clearly 
and extensively - and we call it ' a mobi l ized e thn ic i ty ' , and in some cases - vaguely 
and as-if-unwillingly, and we call it a dec l in ing ethnicity. 
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Ethnic toleration and social distance 
Lithuanians proved to b e more "select ive" in their relationships with others than 
Russians or Poles did. There is a higher rate of Lithuanians w h o say that they can 
always recognize a person of different ethnicity, whi le a large port ion of Russians 
and Poles declare they do not notice a person 's ethnicity. Other surveys, such as the 
European Value Survey (EVS), have also revealed that Lithuanians exhibit higher ethnic 
closure by declaring (43 percent) that ethnicity of spouses mat ters for the happiness of 
marital life (51 percent think it is not important) , while 70-74 percent of Russians and 
Poles think it does not matter (Leoncikas 2000) . On the one hand , we notice certain 
differences in the levels of closure or tolerance, but the hierarchy of disliked groups is 
very similar for all of the ethnic groups. Selective intolerance "unifies" all the groups 
against the mos t disliked categories such as Gypsies . Musl ims , and Jews. 
Accord ing to the E V S , the categories of identity that w e r e disl iked remained 
stable dur ing the last decade (data from 1990 and 1999). T h e negat ive react ion to 
other disl iked categories such as drug-addicts or former cr iminals has changed, but 
the i tems of disl iked identi ty remained on the same level and in the s ame order. We 
link the h igh level of intolerance for the identi ty categories t o the high prevalence 
of recogniz ing ethnicity that exists on a regular basis . In this ins tance , one can recall 
an essay on ant i -Semit ism by J.P. Sartre whe re he aptly grasped the consequences 
of r e c o g n i z i n g e thnic i ty . Sa r t r e de sc r ibed the s i tua t ion d u r i n g the N a z i - p e r i o d , 
when s t rangers would encounter J ews who were already marked with a yel low star 
Willingly or not, wi th compass ion or with despise , the passers-by were looking at 
the v ic t ims , and their looks were inevi tably r emind ing the others that they were 
Jews - wi thou t any choice. 
Ethnic insularity or exclusion? 
A look at the data on social ties reveals the ethnic isolat ion of certain social 
segments . In spite of the present precondi t ions for structural ass imilat ion (i.e. equal 
rights), there are groups in the sphere of e m p l o y m e n t that a re ethnical ly isolated 
( separa ted) . A l t h o u g h th is is p r imar i ly a fea ture o f smal l sca le bus ines s tha t is 
organized a long family t ies , a lmost one h a l f of the su rveyed Poles and Russ ians 
work in a monoe thn ic envi ronment . A certain portion of respondents (13 percent of 
Poles and Russ ians , 17 percent of Tatars, and 21 percent of J ews ) have also indicated 
that they d o not have Li thuanians among their personal friends. 
Social part icipat ion is one of the key factors in adaptat ion of minor i ty groups 
on a broad scale. Russ ians exhibit a striking difference with regard to part icipation 
in public life and are the m o s t pass ive g roup . Lack of par t ic ipat ion m a y result in 
marginalization of a considerable portion of the population. T h e satisfactory economic 
situation o f a number, of individuals does not tell everything about their percept ion 
of social life: their percept ion may be greatly influenced by symbol ic interact ion and 
by lack of recogni t ion, wh ich results in wi thdrawal from publ ic life. 
It is interesting to note that one fifth of the respondents indicate that it is important 
to be Li thuanian if one wishes to get a good j o b . Moreover, those who men t ioned that 
they have encountered s o m e kind of violation of their rights as minori ty m e m b e r s , 
tend to indicate that it happened in the sphere of employment . It all raises concerns 
about unequa l chances for minori t ies during the process of adaptat ion. 
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Changes in social status 
The central piece of data to assess adap ta t ion succes s is a clear difference in 
the percept ion of how one ' s social s tatus h a s changed . Rega rd le s s of equal rights 
for all Lithuanian ci t izens, one ' s own pe rcep t ion of change in status is not the s ame 
in different ethnic groups (Graph 1). T h e largest share of Li thuanians thinks their 
personal situation has improved. Russians h a v e the opposi te opinion: in fact, Russians 
and Tatars exhibit the mos t negat ive eva lua t ions , wh ich at the s ame t ime are the 
mos t different from the evaluat ions of the major i ty g roup (Li thuanians) . This opinion 
a m o n g Russians is not iceable in all of the t owns and a l lows us to conc lude that social 
status and the issue of recogni t ion rather than formal pol i t ical rights is a barr ier to 
the successful adaptat ion of the Russ ians . Moreover , there is a not iceable opinion 
a m o n g Russians and Poles that there is a constant danger for some of their family 
m e m b e r s to lose their j o b s . T h e preva i l ing sense of social insecuri ty m a y be one of 
the basic indicators of the s tumbl ing integrat ion of minor i t ies . 
However, the negat ive evaluat ions are no t exhibi ted in the place where they might 
be most ly expected. Peop le in Visaginas h a v e not indica ted that their s i tuat ion has 
worsened more often than respondents e l sewhere have. Th i s m e a n s that Russ ians see 
their situation as problemat ic in b road contex ts , not only in the area of for thcoming 
industrial restructuring due to the c losure o f the a tomic p o w e r plant. 
Lithuanians Russians Poles Jews Tatars 
Gone up No change from where I was 10 y. ago | Gone down 
Graph 1. Evaluation of the change in social status. 
Question: Have you personally gone up or gone down on the ladder of social hierarchy during 
the last 10 years? 
N o n e t h e l e s s , m o r e r ecen t s t a t i s t i c s ( f rom 2 0 0 2 a n d 2 0 0 3 ) c o m p l e m e n t the 
subjective evaluat ion of o w n ' s si tuation wi th object ive data: in fact, unemploymen t 
amongs t nat ional minor i t i e s is h i g h e r than the na t iona l ave rage . Fo r ins tance , in 
2 0 0 3 . whi le u n e m p l o y m e n t amongs t L i t h u a n i a n s s t ood at 11 .7%, u n e m p l o y m e n t 
levels amongst the Russ ian and Pol i sh minor i t i e s w e r e 18.7 and 13.9 respectively. 
Unemploymen t amongs t o ther minor i t ies (Be la russ ians , Ukra in ians , etc.) was also 
higher than average, at 1 5 . 3 % (Depar tmen t o f Statist ics 2 0 0 3 ; 2004) . Whi le caution 
should be exercised in mak ing specula t ive asser t ions w i t h respec t to these disparit ies 
between the Lithuanian majority and national minori t ies , this m a y be indirect evidence 
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of adaptat ion problems faced by minori t ies in the labour market . Mult i faceted factors 
such as s t ruc tura l e c o n o m i c c h a n g e , r eg iona l differences and di f ferences in age 
structure somewha t help to explain var iance, yet h igher unemploymen t levels of the 
Russians still s tand in contrast to generally h igher educat ional a t ta inment rates of the 
Russian minority. This issue has never been the focus of governmenta l policy and has 
only recently been the subject of research (see C S E S and P P M I 2004) . 
Moreover , according to Kasa tk ina and Beresnevic iu te (2004) , individuals wi th a 
p resumed minor i ty background tend to occupy lower and low-qualif icat ion posi t ions 
in the publ ic sector (namely, amongs t minis t ry personnel , i.e., technical staff). Some 
exceptions - i.e. instances of greater ethnic variety of the staff such as in the Ministry 
of the Interior - m a y in fact be partially inher i ted from the Soviet period. 
Ethnicity m a y become a status element in subtle ways. The outcomes of adaptation 
are compl ica ted when the statuses in minor i ty and major i ty groups do not cor respond 
or contradict each other; the mismatch ing statuses m a y result in certain marginal i ty of 
such an individual . However , keep ing both statuses can be a consc ious decision by an 
individual, e.g. a local ethnic communi ty leader w h o otherwise is k n o w n as an average 
schoolteacher. The contradiction of statuses b e c o m e s a p roblem if an individual wishes 
to ove rcome it, but cannot do so. The social env i ronment m a y s t rengthen certain 
status contradict ions , e.g. w h e n an ethnic par ty leader (say, char ismat ic leader of the 
minority communi ty ) is no t a l lowed to take certain public ro les (that are cons idered 
important by the majori ty) . A minor i ty can also punish a coe thnic individual for a 
perceived venal i ty or lack of suppor t . Can s tatuses wi th in minor i ty and major i ty 
correspond? The exemplary case of status ma tch are Li thuanian Karai ts . Leader s of 
their t iny communi ty are wel l k n o w n and respec ted by the majority. An example is 
H. Kobeckai te , w h o has led the Minor i ty Depar tment , has been a representat ive to the 
Council of Europe , and w h o currently works as an ambassador . However , the Karai ts 
are more an except ion than an il lustration of minor i ty roles in Li thuanian society. 
II.3. Contents of ethnicity: 'group portraits' 
The data on identification, percept ions of social dis tance and change of social 
status reveal that ethnicity has different contents in different g roups . We combine 
various pieces of data to p roduce the brief sketches of wha t cou ld be a 'por t ra i t ' of 
each of the surveyed groups . 
Lithuanians. Given the var ious data that reflect the resul ts of adaptat ion directly 
or indirectly, the higher rate of Li thuanians (in compar ison to non-dominan t ethnic 
groups) w h o acknowledge an improvement in their social status seems understandable. 
Also, there is a higher share of Li thuanians (and, by the way, Poles) that ascr ibe 
positive persona l character is t ics to themse lves . As a majori ty, L i thuanians do not 
encounter ethnic obstacles in the process o f adaptat ion to the social envi ronment . 
W h e n compar ing the data on se l f -evaluat ion and p e r c e i v e d change in s tatus 
be tween L i t h u a n i a n s a n d o the r e thnic g r o u p s ( w h e r e the s a m p l e s h a v e s i m i l a r 
social characterist ics) , w e can m a k e initial assumpt ions about the ethnic d imens ion 
of adaptat ion problems . These assumpt ions are s t rengthened by da ta that show the 
higher e thnic c loseness of Li thuanians both in the field of p r imary re la t ionships and 
in the groups o f h igher social status. Moreover , Li thuanians are m o r e aware of ethnic 
stratification (admit that they recognize persons of another ethnici ty) . 
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Russians. Russians exhibi t the convent ional features of an ethnic group less than 
others: They identify less s trongly with ca tegor ies such as territory, coethnics in the 
country, and co-bel ievers . Confessional or re l igious identi ty barely appears a m o n g 
the self-declared identit ies and is rarely g iven any impor t ance on the list of suggested 
identity categories. At the beginning of the last decade there was a wave of rel igious 
revival, and it was ant ic ipated that the O r t h o d o x y could b e c o m e the unifying factor 
for the Russ ian communi ty . However , this expec ta t ion did not c o m e true, unl ike in 
pre-war Lithuania. 
The opinion about worsened social s tatus and the overal l civic passivi ty a m o n g 
Russians suggest that there are more genera l p r o b l e m s o f adaptat ion rather than a 
mere identity crisis. M o r e specifically, there are great differences of opinion in the 
segments of differing social status. The greates t contrasts (of all the surveyed groups) 
in compar ison to the major i ty opinions are no t iceable in the Russ ian groups of low 
status and low educa t ion . This m e a n s that the in tegra t ion of the Russ ians (social 
similarity to the majori ty) in Li thuania is re lated to their social status. 
Poles. Poles exper ience smaller obs tac les in their adapta t ion and/or feel certain 
about the backing of their e thnic g roup . S t rong identif icat ion wi th o n e ' s t own or 
region testifies to the firm consol idat ion of this ethnic g roup . In some of the answers 
of the Poles , one can even see the s igns of a t radi t ional communi ty . Apar t from their 
relatively s trong rel igious identity, Poles give a smal le r s ignif icance to educat ion and 
rather emphas ize social background and ties w i th coe thn ics (in finding a good job) . 
It was a m o n g the Poles that w e saw the h ighes t rate of e thnic Li thuanians a m o n g the 
relatives. This clearly contradicts a popu la r op in ion about the prevai l ing separat ion of 
the Poles. On the other hand, the Poles w h o considered themse lves typical did express 
an att i tude of separat ion, yet their share in the overal l s ample is negl igible . 
Tatars. Tatars h a v e the h ighes t ra te o f i nd iv idua l s w h o are cer ta in that they 
are typical representat ives o f their e thnic g roup . Genera l ly Tatars (as well as Jews) 
are relatively more act ive in their e thnic o rgan iza t ions , however , their at t i tudes are 
not a lways the same: for ins tance, there is a difference be tween respondents from 
Visaginas and those from Aly tus and Vi ln ius . R e s p o n d e n t s from the latter towns , 
who are more often the descendants of a historical d iaspora , exhibi t a h igher rate of 
accommodat ion (assimilat ionist at t i tude) to L i thuan ians . 
Jews. A m o n g the major categories of self-identif ication, the Jews surveyed did 
not ment ion rel igious identity. Also , identification wi th the territorial aspects of the 
country is relatively weak . These features , at least at first g lance , m a k e the answers 
of the Jews and the Russ ians similar. It is poss ib le that the similari ty relates to the 
exper ience of both Russ ians and Jews as mig ran t s o f the Soviet pe r iod (which is 
a c o m m o n trait a m o n g a share of R u s s i a n s and a grea t por t ion o f con tempora ry 
Li thuanian Jews) . The re is also a h igh p r eva l ence of profess ional identity a m o n g the 
Jews that may have to do with a h ighe r level of educa t ion in their sample . 
To sum up. the major differences a m o n g larger ethnic groups such as Lithuanians, 
Russians , and Poles versus historical d iasporas are no t iceab le mainly in the strength 
of ethnic ties with o ther group m e m b e r s . Apar t from that , data confirm that Russians 
still exper ience an identity crisis and are l ikely to b e c o m e a minor i ty in a sociological 
sense. A m o n g the surpr is ing findings is that on m a n y issues Poles tend to have the 
most s imilar opinions to those of L i thuan ians . In the backg round of our study, we 
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are led to conc lude that Poles are likely to b e c o m e the mos t successfully integrated 
group (in contrast to popu la r opinions) . 
Identification: ethnic dimensions (mean) 
0 - "dont't feel any attachment"; 1 - "feel somewhat attached"; 2 - strongly attached" 
People People of the People of my People of my Non-
speaking the same faith ethnicity ethnicity in governmental 
same language Lithuania organisation 
I Lithuanians [H Russians §|j Poles l|§ Jews | Tatars 
Graph 2. Identification: ethnic dimensions. 
Roma. Li thuanian Roma, in compar ison to other ethnic g roups , stand out due to 
especially deep deprivat ion on a number of d imens ions . Cer ta in segments of R o m a 
suffer exc lus ion from publ ic life and the labour market and exper ience par t icu lar 
housing and health p rob lems . However , a l though Roma had no t been a part of the 
survey quo ted above , e v i d e n c e on the a t t i tudes of R o m a con t rad ic t s the p o p u l a r 
opinion that R o m a themse lves do not want integration or that the poverty of R o m a 
should no t be singled out in the background of overall pover ty in a country. Data 
suggest that isolationist a t t i tudes clearly do not prevail , but there are clear r isks for 
the deprivat ion of R o m a to increase because of their marginal izat ion. 
The dividing line be tween ethnic groups , such as in case of R o m a and the rest 
of society, is especial ly p rob lemat ic if it p rec ludes social mobil i ty. The measurement 
of both mobi l i ty and separat ion is a lways compl ica ted , but it is reasonable to a s sume 
that in tolerance, such as it is with regard to Roma , compl ica tes the w a y out of the 
social margins . In such cases it is quite obvious that the efforts of one ethnic group 
may not b e enough. 
III. Successes and failures of social adaptation 
The focus on adaptat ion helps one to unders tand the social mean ing of ethnic 
processes in a con temporary society such as Li thuania n o w a d a y s , as we have tried 
to demonst ra te . Al though this society is relatively calm and free of ethnic conflicts, 
ethnicity has not d isappeared and is effectively present w h e n an individual solves 
problems regard ing his/her status, social aspirat ions, and identity. The empir ical data 
and considera t ions presented lead to a conclus ion about the impor tance of the social 
(rather than political and legal) d imension in the contemporary adaptat ion of differing 
ethnic groups . In the beg inn ing of the 1990s, the majority had great uncer ta inty about 
the political loyalty of the minori t ies and was concerned about potent ial c la ims of 
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separat ism. Li thuania ' s decis ion to grant c i t izenship to all pe rmanen t residents of the 
country truly brought polit ical revenues at an early s tage of independence , however , 
the adaptat ion of ethnic groups remains a social cha l lenge for a democra t ic society. 
Obviously, processes of integration, assimilation, separat ion, or marginalization are 
mult idimensional . Nonetheless , the types are dis t inguishable even though - somet imes 
surprisingly, somet imes not - all of them exist next to each other: somet imes in one 
family. In case of a par t icular individual , it m a y be compl ica ted to unambiguous ly 
' a ss ign ' a person to one type of adaptat ion. It confirms, though , that the choice of one 
or another type of adaptat ion is very condi t ional . It is dependen t on the peculiari t ies 
of an individual 's s tatus and social t ies. To rei terate , the type of adapta t ion is less a 
wel l -planned strategy of behavior than it is an ou tcome of h o w an individual combines 
his/her social status and e thnic identity. 
An analysis of the content of types of adaptat ion leads one to a critical assessment 
of the stereotypical evaluat ions a t tached to not ions o f " in tegra t ion" , "ass imi la t ion" , 
"separa t ion" , or "marginal iza t ion" . 
Prec ise ly b e c a u s e adap ta t ion is not a l w a y s a p r e - p l a n n e d and consequen t i a l 
s trategy and significantly depends on the social m i l i eu , the re canno t be a s imple 
recipe for adaptat ion - be it adaptat ion of an individual or a g roup . Nei ther is there a 
universal solution for the minor i ty- re la ted pol ic ies . E v e n an opt ion of integrat ion has 
to be viewed critically and should not be fetishized. O f course , integrat ion, w h e n an 
individual can achieve a desired status and still sustain h is /her identity, is an opt imal 
social scenar io for a democra t ic society. Yet what a lso has to be taken into account 
is the pr ice paid for integration, i.e. the individual efforts. A s a rule , the majori ty 
expects loyalty and active per formance of civic dut ies by m e m b e r s o f the minority. 
Also , the majority often controls h o w minori t ies internal ize its culture. In this c o n t e x t 
it is important to see that minori t ies are not a lways able to easily comply wi th the 
expecta t ions of the majority. Therefore , there should b e m e a n s by which the majority 
recognizes , appreciates , or supports the efforts of minor i t i es to adapt. 
Moreover , integrat ion is not a lways an express ion of social success and is not 
necessarily an outcome of free choice. It does not by itself help to escape the social niche 
prescribed for a diaspora. T h e historical d iasporas of Li thuania , such as Tatars, are in a 
way deemed to ' in tegrate ' : Their m e m b e r s are often recognized and asked or reminded 
about their ethnicity; therefore they could no t so easily opt, for instance, to assimilate. 
For a s s e s s i n g the s u c c e s s o f a d a p t a t i o n in m i n o r i t y g r o u p s on the b road 
scale, it is important not to over look the p r o b l e m of social part ic ipat ion. Lack of 
participation may result in the marginal izat ion of a cons iderable part o f the population. 
Marginal i ty is apparent ly widely spread in t imes of in tens ive social change : however , 
marginal izat ion has more express ions than mere ly social exclus ion in its economic 
sense. T h e satisfactory economic si tuat ion of a n u m b e r of individuals does not tell 
eve ry th ing about their pe rcep t ion o f soc ia l life: The i r pe rcep t ion m a y be greatly 
influenced by symbol ic interact ion and lack of recogni t ion , which can be a cause 
of wi thdrawal from pub l i c life. F r a g m e n t e d identi ty, d issat isfact ion with lowered 
social s tatus, and limited social ne tworks m a y happen to be character is t ic not only of 
part icular social layers , bu t of entire ethnic groups . In such a case, w e encounter not 
only m a n y personal p rob lems of var ious indiv iduals , but a l so a social entity whose 
behaviour is hard to predict. 
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Those w h o do not take part in societal p rocesses and w h o do not identify wi th 
the sur rounding society can no t be cons idered ' in tegra ted ' . Spread ing marginal i ty 
among minor i ty m e m b e r s m a y strengthen the process of an e thnic group becoming 
a minority. Minori t ies that are pass ive , indifferent, and infantile in publ ic life are first 
of all vulnerable . However , marginal i ty creates p recondi t ions for deviant behaviour ; 
marginal g roups can b e no t only vulnerable but also b e c o m e an object of political 
manipulation. 
Marginal i ty can turn into assimilat ion or separat ion. Ass imi la t ion , however , is 
not an easy solut ion for a minor i ty m e m b e r even if it is some t imes assumed to be. 
Individuals w h o lose the i r ident i ty and the suppor t of one g r o u p do not a l w a y s 
acquire recogni t ion and ident i ty in another g roup . Aga in , marg ina l i ty is neve r far 
away. Therefore we emphas i ze that par t ic ipat ion rather than ass imila t ion should be a 
focus of the state 's integrat ive policies. On the other hand, ass imilat ion should a lways 
remain an open option for individuals , and all the ethnic communi t i e s should nur ture 
toleration for individual choice . 
Nonethe less , assimilat ion is not a lways as dramat ic as minor i ty member s often 
imagine it. On an individual level it may go smoothly and unnot iced - as long as both 
groups recognize the convers ion and recognize the right of an individual to change 
groups and decide one 's identity individually. Thus , the right to assimilate can also be 
considered an expression of democracy. In theoretical discussion though, we should be 
aware of the difference between cultural and ethnic assimilation. Cultural approximation 
does not necessarily have to result in the loss of ethnic identity. But again, it has to be 
seen whether identity is preserved because one wishes to do so or because one is forced 
to. When ethnic boundaries are emphasized, it m a y result in separat ism. Recognizing 
ethnicity is a major form of reproducing ethnic boundaries in everyday life. 
A m o n g the crucial f indings is the e thnic isolat ion of cer ta in social segments . 
In spite of the present p recond i t ions for s t ructural ass imi la t ion (i.e. equal r ights) , 
there are groups in the sphere of employmen t that are ethnical ly isolated (separated) . 
Although this is pr imari ly a feature of smal l -scale businesses that are organized along 
family t ies, a lmost a hal f of the surveyed Poles and Russ ians w o r k in a monoe thn ic 
environment. Apparent ly , par tnersh ips across ethnic lines do not emerge easily. 
Ethnic separation m a y somet imes appear as a regret table state of affairs, because 
it limits the social choices o f an individual to a minori ty group. However , research has 
revealed that separat ion can be a wel l -calcula ted strategy for a social career. F r o m an 
individual 's point of view, it could be a rat ional and satisfactory w a y to live. T h a t is 
probably why w e see it present among larger minor i ty groups regardless of the fact 
that there is no tangible ghet to . Separat ion can provide an individual full satisfaction 
with h imse l f and his social envi ronment . A n ethnical ly mixed circle of clients w a s 
considered by some service-providers as p roof that ' th ings are go ing right' wi thout 
assuming for a m o m e n t that peop le of differing ethnicit ies can be partners rather than 
clients to each other. Separat ion provides comfort ; that is w h y it r emains a chal lenge 
for a society that wishes to have its ethnic groups interrelated on equal g rounds . Low 
civic act ivism prec ludes counter-separat is t mechan i sms from emerg ing . Surprisingly, 
even N G O s somet imes h a v e a dubious role: rather than prov id ing l inks with the state 
and a m o n g var ious ci t izens, they function as a shelter for minor i ty m e m b e r s both 
from the state and from other citizens. 
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The successes and failures of adaptat ion is one of the w a y s to develop ethnicity 
studies. It is significant to real ize that e thnic p rocesses r ema in a part of contemporary 
life in a d e m o c r a t i c soc ie ty . In L i t h u a n i a , the c h a l l e n g e is to o p t i m i z e e thn i c 
relat ionships: quite often minor i t ies are not invo lved in the considerat ion of issues of 
c o m m o n concern. They are not encouraged to take the role of active and responsible 
citizens. Unequal part ic ipat ion in civic life can result in marginal i ty and separat ion, 
which in turn can lead to ethnic mobi l iza t ion . Moreover , ignoring pass ive citizens, 
such as minor i ty m e m b e r s often are, raises the risk that they will not only lose civic 
par t ic ipatory skills but a lso the channe l s for inc lus ion . T h i s could cause the old 
problems of ethnic mobi l iza t ion and undefined loyalty to reappear. 
Methodological note 
A specific sampl ing approach was w o r k e d out in o r d e r to ach ieve a re l iable 
cross-group comparison of five ethnic samples (Li thuanian . Russian, Polish, Jewish, 
and Tatar). 
Sampling was one of the major cha l lenges for the empir ica l part of this project, 
and we hope to have found a successful m o d e l for this research that enabled a valid 
comparison of the ethnic groups . A m o d e l of d ispropor t ional stratified sample was 
applied (non-probabil i ty sampl ing) ; the stratification cr i ter ion was ethnicity (as self-
declared). Five ethnic g roups were pre-se lec ted , and approximate ly the same number 
of respondents was chosen for each of them. This mode l a l lowed the assessment of 
how the same variables (adaptat ion aspects) differed in different samples (in our case, 
in different ethnic groups) . Sampl ing took sex . age , and concentra t ion in part icular 
towns of a given communi ty into account, but the central emphas is in the logical model 
of this research was on the status groups . Exper t g roups w e r e used for foreseeing and 
assigning particular individuals to a par t icular s tatus g roup ; in some cases, locations 
rather than individuals were specified (e .g. for finding the unemployed) . 
Sampling phases. F o r territorial sampl ing , sites of different ethnic composi t ion 
were selected (Vilnius as the centre and a case of e thnic variety; Visaginas , Alytus, 
Salcininkai. and Klaipeda as locat ions wi th h igher concent ra t ion of Russ ians . Tatars, 
Poles , and Jews; K a u n a s as a case w h e r e the e thnic major i ty prevai ls . Nex t there 
was a selection of individuals from the status groups. W e concentra ted on the social 
posit ions which have a cul tura l -symbol ic m e a n i n g in socie ty and are considered to 
mean different social success (or success of adapta t ion) in the current social situation. 
We constructed the fol lowing status ca tegor ies that bear ' c o d e d ' names : 
1) "Tuxedos": extraordinary social advancement and income level; the establishment: 
2) "Mobile phones": middle range managers mainly in the private sector; 
3) "Conference participants": people of science and culture (as a likely case of clear 
and strong cultural-ethnic identity): 
4) "Uniforms": policemen and military; 
5) "Hairdresser's": personnel of small enterprises (up to 10-15) that often tend to be 
monoethnic; the case of adaptation in the local social environment - hairdressing 
salon, car-repair, kiosk, etc. 
6) "Marketplace": self-employed, relying on active individual effort, non-adapted 
to the institutionalized labour market; 
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7) "Unemployed": socially critical layer, especially in a t ime of transition; 
8) "Dormitory": residents of the dormitories that used to be built next to the great 
industrial plants for the migrant labour force; these building settings still remain 
ethnic and social enclaves: 
9) "Pensioners": pensioners as a category of people who are at the end of their 
trajectory of social mobility and do not have another (stronger) social identity. 
Table 2 
The size and structure of the actual sample 
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Lithuanians 38 35 36 19 1 129 
Russians 32 36 36 1 105 
Poles 39 8 34 1 82 
Jews 34 34 1 31 100 
Tatars 31 1 33 32 97 
Others 11 34 1 46 
Total 185 114 140 54 32 31 3 559 
The samples are not representa t ive of the entire ethnic g roups they c o m e from. 
Instead, everyth ing possible w a s done to m a k e all of the five samples similar in terms 
of social character is t ics such as status, income, and educat ion. This mode l permi t s 
the assessment o f how the same variables (var ious indicators of adapta t ion) contrast 
in different samples (in our case , in different ethnic groups) . In other words , w h e n 
social differences are control led, it is m o r e likely that the differences be tween the 
samples are due to the e thnic i ty factor (i.e. the effect of e thnic i ty is m a x i m i z e d ) . 
Whether and h o w the ethnic g roups differ in their adaptat ion has been the main issue 
of this research project. 
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K o p s a v i l k u m s 
Raks ta ir ana l i ze tas adap tac i j as s t ra teg i jas s ta rp d a z a d a m e t n i s k a m g r u p a m 
Lietuva. Cetri varianti - asimilacija, integracija, noda l l sanas un marginal izaci ja tiek 
aplukoti ka specifisks statusa, socialo at t iectbu un e tniskas identi tates rezul tats . Cetru 
strategiju konteksts apskatlts piesaiste diskusijai par e tniskiem faktoriem. statusa grupu 
nozTmTgumu un p ie lagosanas iza ic ina jumiem. Strategiju Ipasais saturs ir anal izets , 
ba ls to t ies uz aptauju un intervi ju m a t e r i a d e m , k u r o s t iek skar tas ident i f ikaci jas . 
socialas d is tances , soc ia lo t lk lojumu n o s l e g s a n a s un p i l son i sko akt iv i tasu t emas . 
Pec Tpasi izs t radatas a t lases m e t o d e s sn ieg ts kva l i t a t lvs s ta rpgrupu sa l ldz inajums 
starp p i ecam etniskajam p a r a u g g r u p a m ( l i e tuv ies iem, k r i ev i em, po l t em, ebre j iem 
un tatariem). Sis raksts pamatojas uz p l a saku petTjumu, un ta merk is ir paradi t , ka 
adaptacijai pieversta uzman lba pa l tdz izprast tas specifiskas si tuacijas, kuras etniskas 
atskinbas skiet acunredzamas . Ar to t iek megina ts parvaret tendenci aplukot rndnoritasu 
integraciju ka jau ta jumu, kas var tikt r is inats poli t iski , ka ar i atklat e tnisko attiectbu 
un citu socialo izaic inajumu saturu ar soc io logiskas anal izes palldzTbu. 
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"Latvians" and "Latvia's residents": Representation of 
National Identity in Public and Private Discourse 
"Latviesi" un "Latvijas iedzlvotaji": nacionalas identitates 
veidosana publiskaja un privataja diskursa 
Sergei Kruk 
Universi ty of Latvia 
e-mail : sergejs.kxuks@lu.lv 
In post-soviet years the discourse of the ethnocultural nation dominated Latvian public political 
discourse. Discursive construction of the Latvian nation in ethnocultural terms inhibited 
inclusion of others. However, in commonplace private settings individuals have to deal with 
the situation where ethnic categorisation is irrelevant to the purpose of social encounter here 
and now. Ethnic Latvians have to co-operate with neighbours of non-Latvian ethnic origin, 
although the private discourse lacks discursive tools permitting the social categorisation across 
ethnic boundaries. Analysis of banal conversation about Olympic Games in Internet forums 
demonstrates that individuals do not perceive the relevance of non-Latvian ethnicity of Latvia's 
medal-winners. Nevertheless ordinary citizens themselves have to invent inclusive social 
categories and to define such criteria of the nation that would surpass restricted ethnocultural 
identification. 
Key words: identity discourse, ethnocultural nation, political nation, social categorisation, 
Internet conversation. 
Analysis of identity is analysis of language use. French linguist Oswald Ducrot 
contends that language includes the catalogue of all human interrelations, all roles, that 
the speaker can choose for h imsel f and to impose on the addressee (Ducrot 1972). W e 
define our identities as we speak about ourselves choosing verbal formulas offered 
by public discourse, which helps us to describe individuals in shared group terms. 
In different social circumstances we formulate different identities, highlighting those 
characteristics which we judge being relevant in the context of a certain social encounter 
with others. In this article I analyse how individuals define Latvian nationality in a banal 
social context talking about the Olympic Games in Internet forums. 
Public discourse on Latvian national identity, according to sociologist Peteris Lakis 
(1998), is entrapped into a d i lemma o f ' e thnona t iona l romant ic i sm ' vs. 'un iversa l i sm' . 
Hans Kohn (1945) defined these opposi tes as Eastern e thnocul tura l roman t i c and 
Western legal and rational concepts of ci t izenship. Renewal of independent s tatehood 
in 1991 requi red that Latvians define themselves as the na t ion-bear ing collectivity, 
which had to differentiate itself from the sur rounding cultural env i ronment and to 
provide a descript ion of difference. The popular Latvian poet Imants Ziedonis (1991) 
appealed to m a k e an ' i nven to ry ' of Latvian culture in order to set up a list of ' t r u e ' 
signs of col lect ive identity. Possess ion of a dist inctive culture is conce ived as the 
raison d'etre of a dist inctive poli t ical entity, whi le the col lect ive identity is defined 
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in terms of e thnocul tural tradit ion. Min i s t e r of Cul ture He lena D e m a k o v a (2004) 
recently declared: "The substantiation of La tv ia ' s exis tence as a nat ion-state is the 
Latvian language, history and culture". A s tudent of e thnic relat ions historian Leo 
Dribins (2004) put: 
There is no doubt that every nation ... has to defend and develop its own identity. The state 
must guarantee this possibility. However, the most powerful guarantor of the identity is the 
ethnic community's care about its own cultural life and multiplication of its cultural values. 
In 2 0 0 0 a group o f La tv ian sc ient i s t s dec l a r ed in the s t ra tegic d e v e l o p m e n t 
programme: "Culture and language are carriers of national identity. . . . The state must 
support the highest cultural values and ensure inheri tance of the Latvian culture by 
future generations" (Lahija 2000). For traditionalists the ethnocultural bond is a natural 
protection from dysfunctional effects of the initial phase of Latvian capitalism (see 
Dribins 1994, Zarins 1996). and the western mass culture (Cakare 1998). Integrity and 
solidarity of the ethnic in-group is secured by particular experience of the shared past, 
which is the main component of national identity (Fnttnins 1997). Traditionalists contend 
that only folk culture generates social representat ions fostering social cohesion. This 
view influences the dominant political discourse. For example , the National Programme 
for the Integration of Society in Latvia - the government document on minority policy -
in its section on public communicat ion states that the main task of mass media is the 
provision of information about ethnic cultures (Valsts 2001) . 
Sociologists Talis Tisenkopfs (1997a, 1997b) and Aivars Tabuns (1998) advanced 
a rguments against the essent tal is t e thnocu l tu ra l ident i ty , s t ress ing that col lect ive 
identity represents the percept ion of chang ing t ime and therefore it could not remain 
unchanged. Tabuns et al. (2001) conc luded that e thnic values failed to consol idate 
the nat ion despite the fact that the major i ty of La tv ians perce ived them as the only 
guarantee of statehood. 
Mass communica t ion research demons t ra tes that Latv ian and Russ ian- language 
med ia cons t ruc t different r ep re sen t a t i ons of socia l rea l i ty ( S u l m a n e 2 0 0 2 ) . The 
Latvian press misrepresents the Russ ian-speaking popula t ion , whi le the local Russian-
language press creates a negative image of the independent Latvian state (Sulmane, 
Kruks 2002) . Despi te the apparent b ias of m e d i a representa t ions , a recent survey 
by the Baltic Institute of Social Sc iences indicated that Latvians and non-Latvians 
evaluated interethnic relat ions in posi t ive terms (Zepa et al. 2004a) . Talking privately 
about their personal exper ience , individuals apply their own discurs ive strategies, 
which differ from the public media d iscourse . Resul ts of in-depth in terviews al lowed 
sociologists to argue that sustained re la t ions wi th other ethnic groups l iving in Latvia 
have crea ted a marg in of to le rance w h i c h funct ions as an invis ible gua ran tee of 
social cohabitation. "However , on the level of in te rgroup communca t ion individuals 
construct ethnic relat ions through the pr i sm of his tor ical and poli t ical condi t ions" 
(Zepa et al. 2004b) . 
Private discourse on sport exemplif ies the d iscrepancy with publ ic discourse. 
Media ted sport is genera l ly access ib le due to the prol i fera t ion of commun ica t i on 
channels. Being open to interpretat ion by peop le of different backgrounds - ethnic, 
cultural, polit ical, e tc . - media ted sport is a resource of shared exper ience and social 
representations. Televised sport events function as a ritual s t rengthening the national 
identity (Dayan, Katz 1992). 
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In the O lympic Games 2 0 0 4 . Latvia 's team won four silver meda ls - all by ethnic 
non-Latv ians . I have ana lysed eight d i scuss ions in Latvian and Russ i an - l anguage 
Internet forum Delfi evoked by the news about these sport ive victories . 1 
No medal-winner lang. news posted end of discussion posts censored 
1 Sapronenko LV Mo 23 August 20:31 24August 23:39 459 NA 
2 Sapronenko RU Mo 23 August 20:46 25 August 21:49 113 NA 
3 Scherbatykh LV We 25 August 20:28 NA NA NA 
4 Scherbatykh RU Th 26 August 08:52 NA 365 NA 
5 Rublevskaya LV Fr 27 August 13:29 28 August 17:31 1070 61 
6 Rublevskaya RU Fr 27 August 18:47 28 August 15:56 64 NA 
7 Vasilevskii LV Sa 28 August 10:52 30 August 17:00 486 31 
8 Vasilevskii RL Su 29 August 11:12 30 August 11:05 79 N A 
(NA - data is not available. Texts of the 3 r J and 4 t h discussions were lost on-line due to 
technical problems.) 
Delfi is the most popular news webpage . The weekly aud ience of Latvian Delfi 
is 12 percent of Latvians and 5 percent of non-La tv ians ; 2 percent of Latvians and 6 
percent of non-La tv ians aged 15-74 visit the Russ ian- language portal . 
All available censored posts are included into discourse analysis of two discussions. 
Since the censored comments are posted during some minutes and several hours (especially 
during late evenings and week-ends) the voices had an opportunity to react on it. 
Marks of o therness . Even the a th le tes ' n a m e s m a k e ev iden t their o therness : 
Viktor S h c h e r b a t y k h , Y e l e n a R u b l e v s k a y a , Y e v g e n i y S a p r o n e n k o , and V a d i m 
Vasilevskii. Never the less it was the Latvian flag which was raised in Athens and seen 
by mill ions T V viewers wor ldwide . Finally, ab road nobody cares about the ethnici ty 
of the athletes, nei ther names no r surnames are evident markers of otherness for the 
foreigners. Commen ta to r s of the Russ ian- language Eurosport T V channel used to 
pronounce these names as they are spelled in Latvian, and they did not care about 
the 'Russ i anness ' of Latvia ' s athletes. 
Things in Latv ia went the other way a round . A b s e n c e o f d iscurs ive tools of 
classification h indered the discussion. Latvians needed these meda l s in order to draw 
profit from internat ional fame and boast their self-identity vis-a-vis. for ins tance , 
Lithuanians w h o send numerous congratulat ions to 'brothers La tv ians ' . Or, on the 
contrary, Latvians had to protect their honour against bold Li thuanians w h o boas ted 
their sport a c h i e v e m e n t s . E thn ic i ty of the a th le tes had to b e d o w n p l a y e d in the 
discourse, as the honour of the state was at s take. Par t ic ipants of all d i scuss ions 
actively pos t ed a rguments on ethnici ty and nationali ty. The scenar io and threads 
developed in Latv ian- language discussions are summar i sed below. 
Jubilation of 'our ' medal , no references to the ethnic origins of the athlete. 
A Russian provocateur posts a comment underlining that the athlete is an ethnic 
Russian. 
A Latvian provocateur posts a comment in favour of Latvian ethnicity, denying 
the medal was won by a Russian athlete. 
Some posts silence provocateurs (disqualifying personal assault, irony, appeal to 
the web-master to censor their posts). 
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Voices recategorise the Latvian nationality and include the athlete in the 'Latvian' 
in-group by means of: 
o territorial definition of nationality, 
o deconstruction of the concept of ' pure ' ethnicity, 
o creation of the non-ethnocultural nomenclature of 'Latvianness ' : language 
proficiency, citizenship, patriotism. 
Posts insist that the athlete should be judged by his/her individual achievements 
rather than ascriptive factors: 
o stressing the personal effort of the athlete, he/she is isolated from the 'Russian' 
out-group, 
o private acquaintance of a Latvian voice with the athlete (training together) 
allows his/her inclusion in the 'Latvian ' in-group. 
Russian voices point out that Latvians judge ethnic others inconsistently. 
Latvian and Russian posts create a 'community of destiny' underlying common 
social gr ievances ( individuals vs . 'bad g o v e r n m e n t ' ; ' bad s tate ' vs. 'good 
country'). 
Latvian and Russian posts create a global inclusive identity: 
o common religious background (opposed to a Musl im rival in weightliftmg). 
o common racial background ("Oliyar finished fourth, but he was the first white 
athlete"). 
Denomination. Joy of the Latvian forum w a s d iscouraged by the bureaucrat ic 
nomencla ture of categorisat ions under l in ing difference: ' a l i en ' , ' new-c i t i zen ' , ' non-
c i t izen ' , ' non -La tv i an ' , ' R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g ' , ' o n e of an other na t ion ' (cittautietis). 
The Latv ian language does not p rov ide r e a d y - m a d e a n d shared definitions of the 
nation that would include individuals wi th different e thnocul tural backgrounds . The 
Latvian word latvietis - 'La tv ian ' - connotes ethnic be longing . The Russian language 
disposes two words that perfectly dist inguish be tween e thnic - latysh - and territorial 
belonging - latviyets (resident of Latvia). In order to differentiate the two concepts 
in Engl ish I will use accordingly 'La tv i an ' and the possess ive form 'La tv i a ' s ' . 
Latvian has no adequate word equal to the Engl ish term 'na t iona l i ty ' . Usually 
peop le are ca tegor ised by tautiba ( ana logous to the G e r m a n Volk). wh ich b lends 
ethnici ty and nat ional i ty. Only recent ly l inguis ts b o r r o w e d two Engl i sh w o r d s to 
differentiate ethnicity (etnicitate) from nat ional i ty (nacionalitate). These new Latvian 
words are not yet in consistent use. 
Voices in Delfi had to create a n e w procedure of categorisat ion and fix it verbally: 
the ' a l i en ' (cittautietis) medal winners were to b e inc luded in ' o u r ' g roup (tautietis). 
It is loudly that Latvians do not use the word latvietis in discussions. However , in 
response to provocateurs , those w h o denied the meda l , togetherness was s t rengthened 
by usage of this word. Part icipants consc ious ly a t t empted to m a k e of it an inclusive 
definition of the nat ion: "In Latvia ' s t e am all are L a t v i a n s " [7] . 2 
W h e r e a s La tv i ans tend to d i s r e g a r d e t h n o c u l t u r a l na t iona l i ty . n o n - L a t v i a n s 
capture the dominant Latvian polit ical d i scourse and increasingly express , somet imes 
ironically, their awareness of e thnocul tura l difference. Russ ian voices use the ethnic 
identification 'La tv ian ' (latish) i ronical ly in inverted c o m m a s . They point at ethnic 
diversity and boast their ethnic identi ty: "A Russian h a s helped y o u " [3], "Without 
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Russians you are 0 (zero) ! ! !" [3] . A voice " m o n o " with a symbol ica l ly significant 
address "moscow@russia.lv" ironically conc luded in Latvian: " S o wel l , Latvia has just 
a usual k ind of "La tv i an" O l y m p i a n ? " [3]. Russ i an pos t s s t ressed a th le tes ' Slavic 
names and under l ined that they were ' O U R S ' : "Aga in Russ ian n a m e s save Latv ia ' s 
honour!! Hur rah! ! ! " [6] ; " O U R people have w o n 4 si lvers for La tv ia !" [8]. 
Both forums encountered l imitation of the e thnic i ty-based categorizat ion. The 
winner of the fourth silver m e d a l , j ave l in t h rower Vadim Vasi levski i , is the mos t 
interesting case of failed ethnocul tural categorizat ion [7 and 8]. This athlete possesses 
multiple identi t ies: he is an ethnic Pole , born in a R u s s o p h o n e family, and at tended 
La tv ian- language school . H o w e v e r , the e thnocul tura l d i scourse cannot cope wi th 
cross-identities. Both forums advanced the mos t important criteria of categorisat ion 
in order to include the athlete in their ethnic g roup . S o m e posts ment ioned his perfect 
Latvian and offered, as proof, to listen to his in terview in the evening newscas t : 
"Vasilevskii speaks Russian wi th an accent and only wi th a d ic t ionary" , " H e is not a 
Russian!!! He poorly yaps Russ ian" . A voice in Russian Delfi reported that Vasilevskii 
graduated from La tv ian- language secondary school . Several pos t s ment ioned he was 
Polish by origin. "If Vadim is a Russ ian , than I ' m a ballet d a n c e r . . . His grandfather 
is Pole. That is why his su rname" . N o agreement on Vasilevskii"s ethnic background 
was reached, however . 
Redefinition of the nationality concept. La tv ian voices do not share a c o m m o n 
approach to the nationali ty concept . Suppor ters of the inclusive definition act ively 
defended their opinion and redefined nomenc la tu re of nat ional i ty in order to include 
ethnic others. Three ma in a rguments were outl ined: 
political definition of the nation (they are Latvia's, not Russia 's athletes); 
citizenship as a criterion of nationhood (they have acquired citizenship through 
naturalization); 
language proficiency (athletes speak Latvian). 
Latvian nat ional is ts w e r e overt ly isolated. As an example I offer this nat ional i ty 
thread deve loped in the fifth discuss ion in response to Latv ian provocateur A and 
Russian p rovoca teur Semen. 
A: Look at names - who wins medals for Estonians and Lithuanians. Only Estonians and 
Lithuanians. I envy them. 
Gacha, to A: Nationality is not important... Important is attitude towards the state. I 
respect those who represent Latvia in the international arena, because they are loyal to 
OUR STATE! 
Shakis, 2 A: Shut up 
AdatuGalva: Of course! Especially Zadneprovskii [Lithuania's athlete of Russian origin]! 
Name does not matter?! Some Ivanov [a common Russian surname] is a bigger Latvian 
patriot then a typical Berzins [a common Latvian surname]! 
Zirgs, A: Nationality is not important! Ours have not come from other national teams.. . 
Ours usually were ours. May be Andrijus Zadneprovskis sounds Lithuanian? Forget these 
stupid discussions on nationality! 
AdatuGalva: Hey. idiots! Have you heard what Zhenya [Sapronenko] said on his return 
back home?! Like this - happy to come back ... to Fatherland! 
brother: Let 's stop heating the nationality problem. We know that Shcherbarykh. 
Sapronenko, Rublevskaya are not Latvians by national origin, but they represent the 
Latvian state in the Olympic games, if asked Who are you, you would hear a proud 
106 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
answer, that we are Latvians!!! We must be proud of such people who have done much 
more for Latvia than some criers! 
Pecis: ... Viva Latvian Olympians!... 
[censored] Semen: they are not Latvian olympians!!! They are Russian!!! olympians 
from Latvia! 
Nu nu, to Semen: They all have Latvia 's citizenship, therefore they are Latvian 
Olympians... 
mikus: Latvia's athletes arc Latvia's citizens. Such honour and proud!!! 
The fourth meda l in a row w o n by a n o n - L a t v i a n ac t ivated nat ional is t s , they 
intensively part icipated in the seventh discussion. 
[censored] Daina: Again a Russian????? 9 ? 9 ???????? 9 ???????? Shame! 
Fuj, atkal [Pshaw, again]: What a disgust! No wonder abroad they think that only Russians 
live in Latvia. "Thanks" for advertising :(. . . . 
PretTga Latvijas reklama [Abhorrent advertising for Latvia]: I agree. Russian muzzles 
shouldn't advertise Latvia. 
bij'a: Well, folks, enough?? 9???'??!!!!!!!! Stop this babyish talking!! Rejoice the big time, 
don't mix up with politics!!! Disgust! 
idiotiem un atpalikusajiem [to idiots and slowcoaches]: 1 explain to you: only citizens may 
represent Latvia in the Olympics. These winners themselves wanted to represent Latvia, 
vikings: I repeat again... Olympians are Latvia's patriots and ALL speak the Latvian 
language despite their names and surnames , and they are proud of their s tate. . . 
dusma [ire]: Oh, God. how long we can continue this. I am sick of all those, who still 
agonize in inferiority complexes, unable to find their identity. Ethnicity is insignificant, 
after all athletes are citizens of Latvia and they represent Latvia with honour! End of 
story. Congratulations!!! 
latviete [Latvian]: Well, stop this quarrel, compatriots!!! These our (yes. yes OUR!) 
medalists are even more Latvians that many of you, because while you "true Latvians" 
wag your tongues they carefully work at the stadium... Yes, they speak Latvian with minor 
accent, but they SPEAK GOOD! One shouldn't colour life either black or white, then 
life will be more colourful!!! These Latvia's citizens of Russian ethnicity make me feel 
proud as a Latvian! I am grateful to them for this!!!!! 
Tauta [Nation]: RUSSIANS - FOREVER!!! 
Nu nu [Well well]: This is an article on Latvians, who have won four medals already, but you 
are fan of Russians. Americans or somebody else... Haven't you confused the forums? 
Tauta: Here we are talking about Latvia's not Latvian Olympians. You shouldn't mix 
up SUCH things. 
Nu nu: Latvia's and Latvian Olympians are the same. All Latvia's citizens are Latvians. 
All citizens of USA are Americans. All citizens of France are French. CLEAR??? 
Nei ther Russians in their forum shared the s ame opin ion on ethnicity and Latvia 's 
nationali ty, many posts demanded to stop d iscuss ing this topic and isolate Russ ian 
nationalist voices. 
[6] Matrio: You are f.... dead asses. Everywhere you tuck politics in. I am a Russian, but 
psychology of some compatriots surprises me. You folks are crazy with ethnicity. There 
are some cretin Latvians, but you are not better. We all live in the same country, so let us 
rejoice success of our athletes, regardless their ethnicity. If somebody dislikes something, 
nobody holds you here!!! Sorry for rudeness. I am enraged. 
[8] fishbox: Are you cretin? He is citizen of Latvia and therefore he represents Latvia. 
In the world NOWHERE except Latvia there is such a notion as ethnicity. There is 
citizenship... : /1 HATE NATIONALISM. 
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The d iscourse d o w n p l a y s the role of ascr ipt ive factors (l ike be long ing to the 
alien e thnocul tura l t radi t ion) in favour of individual ach i evemen t s (acquis i t ion of 
full-fledged political rights through natural isa t ion) . Latv ians argue that Russians have 
no ground to boast their col lect ive ethnic identi ty - individuals should be evaluated 
according to their personal ach ievements . In response to this thesis Russ ian-speaking 
non-c i t izens have to invent a rguments jus t i fy ing their pa s s ive polit ical behaviour . 
They say they feel offended by the poli t ics of independent Latvia and be t rayed by 
Latvians: dur ingperes t ro ika they suppor ted Latv ia ' s independence , never theless they 
were depr ived of c i t izenship rights in 1991 . 
[8] www: Haven't you heard about naturalisation... I think it's an easy way to get rid of 
inferiority complexes! 
the tiger to www: don't mix the doctor with the patient. 1 was born here and I have lived 
here all my life. Why somebody was given citizenship, somebody not? Why should I go 
through naturalisation, but others not? 
L a n g u a g e prof ic iency is very impor t an t for L a t v i a n s as they r ep re sen t it as 
the visible marker of in -g roup identity. L a n g u a g e use is one of the basic conflicts 
between Latvians and non-Latv ians (Zepa et al. 2004a: 15). it is true for the Internet 
discussions also. 
[3] Unikis: ...May be Vadims has a fraction of Slavic blood, but he speaks perfect Latvian 
and he was bom and grew up here. 
[3] Putras Daukis: there is a big difference between a Russian who speaks Latvian and 
respects this state (like Scherbatikh or my neighbour Victor) and a Russian who doesn't 
speak or doesn't want to speak Latvian. ... 
[8] mr.Cepels: Medals to those who speak Latvian !!!!! You should learn language!!!! 
then you'll be champions.... 
' L o c a l i s m ' and pe r sona l acqua in tance - ' a l r eady b e i n g - a m o n g - L a t v i a n s ' - is 
another criteria of inclusion. 
[3] Yole: He is not a Russian. Bom in Dobele [a provincial town in Latvia]. Grown up 
in Latvia. He has Latvia's citizenship. 
[3] Unikis: Scherbatikh speaks good Latvian, I perceive him as a chum from Dobele. 
[6] Megafox: BTW I'm familiar with Lena Rublevskaya - she even speaks Latvian 
perfectly. 
Russ ians use to r idicule such criteria, poin t ing out that Latvians ce lebra te the 
a th le te ' s l anguage prof ic iency, ra ther then spor t ive a c h i e v e m e n t . T h e y po in t that 
Latvians app ly universa l cr i ter ia incons is ten t ly . " R a d j a " [3] n o t ed that vo ices of 
Latvian Delfi underl ined ethnicity of others discussing deviant behaviour and criminal 
news . " S p e c " [censored in 5 ] , probably h imse l f a Latvian, put : 
After the Olympics again every discussion in this forum inevitably will turn to interethnic 
relations and 2 of 3 voices will blame "occupants" and their descendants for all possible and 
impossible Latvia's problems. Damned duplicity of Latvians :( 
Opinion poll manifests shared racial and religious prejudices a m o n g Latvians and 
Russians (Zepa et al. 2004a ) . Internet d iscuss ions cons t ruc ted the inc lus ive group 
opposing ' o u r ' Christian background to the Iranian gold-medal winner in weightlift ing 
[3]. A racial boundary was drawn in pos ts on the fourth p l ace of Stanis lav Ol iyar 
in 110 m hurdl ing: " F r o m Latvia comes the only one whi t e athlete w h o reached the 
finals of the second most important O lympic d isc ip l ine" [5]. 
108 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
A n o t h e r binary oppos i t ion that o v e r c o m e s e thn ic d iv i s ion is the social one. 
' U s ' the o rd ina ry p e o p l e (bo th c i t i z e n s a n d n o n - c i t i z e n s ) are o p p o s e d to ' b a d 
gove rnmen t ' . Internet voices construct a c o m m u n i t y of dest iny stressing c o m m o n 
social grievances. 
Conclusion. The two language discourses in Internet forums share some c o m m o n 
concerns . Both tend to highl ight personal exper ience of interethnic encounters and 
express readiness to hear out the partner. Still La tv ians and Russ ians lack a symbol ic 
definition o f toge therness . T h e dominan t e thnocu l tu ra l pub l i c d i scourse failed to 
provide verbal formulas of social ca tegor isa t ion fitting the trivial posi t ive experience 
of individuals . Athlet ic contests - as p ragmat i c c o m m o n goals - have the potential 
to provide discursive tools for construct ion o f self-assertive nat ional identity across 
ethnocultural boundaries . 
NOTES 
1 "Jevgenijs Sapronenko izcina olimpisko spelu sudraba godalgu vingrosana atbalsta leciena", 
August 23, 2004. See http://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=8891589&ndate=10932084 
00&categoryID=85 52400; 
"CartpoHeHKO npHHec JlaTBmr nepnyro Meaanb" , 23 aBrycTa 2004. See http://rus.delfi.lv' 
archi ve/article.php?id=8891602&ndate= 1093 208400&categoryID=8601017; 
"Viktors Scerbatihs izcina olimpisko sudraba meda]u svarcelsana", August 25. 2004. See 
http://www.delfi.lv7archive/article.php?id=8909880&ndate=l 093381200&categoryID=6485 
306; 
"IHepoaTbix: BTopoe cepe6po JlaTBHu". August 26, 2004. See http://nis.delfi.lv/archive/ 
article.php?id=8911486&ndate=l 093467600&categoryID=8601017; 
"Rubjevska izcina olimpisko sudraba medaju", August 27, 2004. See http://www.delfi.lv/ 
archive/article.php?id=8924656&ndate=1093554000&categoryrD=8552400; 
"PyoJieBCKas Bbrnrpana TpeTbe ' 'cepeopo'"', 27 aBrycrra 2004. See http://rus.delfi.lv/news/ 
daily/olympicgames2004/article.php?id=8929605; 
''Skepmetejs Vasijevskis ar sudrabu nosledz Latvijas olimpiesu startu Atenas", August 28, 
2004. See hu^://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=8931823&ndate=1093640400&catego 
ryID=6485306; 
"BacHJieBCKHH: neTBepToe "cepe6po" UaTBHH". 29 aBrycTa 2004. See http://rus.delfi.lv/ 
archive/article.php?id=893 5220&ndate= 1093726800&categoryID=8601017 
: Figures in brackets indicate discussions as they are listed in the table above. 
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Kopsavi lkums 
Latvi jas publ i ska ja d i sku r sa d o m i n e j o s a nac i jas ka e t n o k u l t u r a s v e i d o j u m a 
definlcija ir kavejus i iekjaujosos ko l ek t l vo iden t i t asu v e i d o s a n u . Trad ic iona l i s t i 
uzska ta , ka , b u d a m a d a b i s k a , e tn iska kult i i ra nod ros ina s t ingru p a m a t u socia la i 
sa l iede t lba i . Tacu i kd i enas dzTve d a z a d u e tn i sko g r u p u pars tav j i ir sp ies t i m i j -
iedarbot ies , un v in iem p a s i e m ir j a v e i d o c i tas kop lbas iden t i ta tes . D i skus i j a par 
2 0 0 4 . g a d a O l i m p i s k a j a m spe l em i n t e m e t a por ta la Delfi tas da l lbn iek i m e k l e j a 
universalo Latvijas nacionalo identi t l t i , lai ieklautu "savejo" vidu etniskos nelatviesus. 
Oficiala identitasu nomenk la tu ra iesaka sadus a t sk inbas un izs legsanas definejumus: 
"cit tautiesi", "nelatviesi" , "krieviski runajosie" , " jaunpi lsoni" . Komente ta j i interneta 
forurna apzinati lietoja e tnisko apz imejumu " la tvie t is" ka nacional i ta tes apz lme jumu 
un pat past ipr inaja sadu l ie tojumu, lai izoletu p rovoka to ru ba l su nac iona l i s t i skos 
zinojumus. 
Delfit kr ievu foruma dallbnieki ir parnemusi dominejosa latviesu publiska diskursa 
rupes par e tnokul turas identi tat i . F o r u m a bija izteikta t e n d e n c e akcente t sport is tu 
piedeiibu savai etniskajai un/vai lingvistiskajai grupai. 
Definejot nacional i ta tes koncepci ju , latviesi ka i ek lausanas kriteri jus izvirzlja 
Latvijas pilsonTbu un larviesu valodas prasmi . Latviesu foruma dal lbnieki mazinaja 
askr ip t lvo faktoru n o z l m i (p i ede r lba ku l tu ras t radlci jai) p a r labu i n d i v i d u a l i e m 
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s a s n i e g u m i e m . Savukar t k r ievu fo ruma t ika a i z rad l t s , ka la tvies i n e k o n s e k v e n t i 
p i e m e r o ci tus ve r t e sanas kr i ter i jus : i gnore e tn i sko i zce l smi tad, kad ir runa pa r 
"vajadzTgiem" indivTdiem, tacu pasvi t ro to, runajot par neve lamiem. 
Abi fonimi veido ieklaujoso identitati uz koplgas re l igiskas un rases pieder ibas 
pamata . Tapat interaeta forumu balsis ve ido " m e s " identi tat i , pretstatot "v ienkarsos 
c i lvekus" un "sl ikto valdlbu" . 
Interaeta diskusijas par ikdieniskiem no t ikumiem, kas skar kop lguma merkt is . 
centieni veidot ieklaujoso nac iona lo ident i ta t i ir d a u d z ak t lvaki neka publ i ska ja 
politiskaja un mediju diskursa. 
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This article investigates the topic of collective identity in liberal theory and society in light 
of the challenge posed by the history of ideas of hatred in Leonidas Donskis's book Forms of 
Hatred, The Troubled Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature (2003). More precisely, 
the challenge is whether it is possible today for modernist individualism to create identity, 
which is strong enough to serve as a basis for societal existence and is not built on hatred. 
Liberal tradition has seen no need for a notion of collective identity, resulting in problems in 
explaining collective authority, rationality, and responsibility. In contemporary liberal theory 
there are attempts to develop a workable notion of collective agents with characteristic rights, 
duties and responsibilities. Such a theory by Philip Pettit is discussed briefly. 
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Odi ergo sum. I hate therefore I am. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries may well be 
described as the era of organized collective hatred.' 
These are the opening words of Leon idas Donsk i s ' wonderful book Forms of 
Hatred, The Troubled Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature, pub l i shed 
last year. Donskis is a Li thuanian phi losopher from Vytautas Magnus Univers i ty in 
Kaunas , and it was actually this book that p rovoked me to invest igate the topic of 
collective identity in liberal theory and society. Donsk is ' s b o o k concentrates on the 
history of ideas of hatred dur ing the past two centuries, in part icular in areas we do 
not usual ly associate wi th narrow, dogmat is t nat ionalism: 
[Hatred] proliferates its forms in the modern troubled imagination assuming such 
sophisticated forms of interpretation of the human world and of self-comprehension as 
the philosophies of history and culture, the comparative study of civilizations, literary 
scholarship, and fiction. Hatred of the modern world is manifest in myriad abuses of 
religion, spirituality, scholarship, and humanity". 
The nineteenth and twent ie th centuries may well have been the era of organized 
collective hatred, but at the same t ime they have also been the era of the t r iumph 
of liberal democrat ic societ ies . Yet it seems that increasingly often these societ ies , 
boas t ing of open -mindednes s and tolerance, impartial and egal i tar ian ins t i tu t ions , 
stressing that rights be long to individuals , not groups , never the less consent , allow 
or even app rove of na t iona l identi t ies w h i c h are racist , sexis t or d e g r a d i n g , and 
involve bigotry, inequality and oppression. This same point is noted by Donskis : "It is 
assumed that hatred can be successfully generated only in isolation or in what w e call 
"closed soc ie t i e s"—which is true as far as religious and m o d e m secular ideocracies 
are concerned—but it can flourish in a liberal democracy as wel l . " 2 
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This is the chal lenge that interests m e in D o n s k i s ' book ; those instances where 
apparent ly enl ightened and educated p e o p l e purposeful ly, on their own init iative, 
categorise others on bases that seem unfair and degrad ing and w h o end up treating 
others unequal ly and degradingly. Such behav iou r is apparen t ly justified by what 
and w h o they are; they m a y see it as their duty or obl igat ion as representat ives of 
the collect ive identity in quest ion. It m a y even be that such att i tudes are an essential 
componen t of the substance of the col lect ive identity. In such cases hat ing becomes 
the basis for identity, wi thout which the col lect ive identi ty does not exist. H o w then 
are w e to react to such behaviour , because of its impor tance to collective identi ty? If 
we do not tolerate such behaviour from individuals , how would things be different 
or justified if a group or a collective opted to act that way? 
Collective identity, as long as it is s o m e h o w seen as "au thent ic" , 3 is n o w often 
theorised as safe, reliable and posi t ive. It indicates a group of people w h o are thought 
to be rel iable, t rustworthy and dependable , but w h o m a y just as wel l be quite the 
contrary, particularly towards outsiders. Often such t rustworthiness is achieved at the 
high pr ice of isolation, as history has shown us. Collective identities may then become 
narrow, dehumanis ing and dangerous . All this has then the potential to become the 
culture of hatred, as Donsk i s describes it: 
Ultimately, hatred implies that human individuality has no value, since good and evil are 
once and for all attached to some groups. It creates a kind of point-of-no-retum situation: 
once we cross the line separating 'us" from 'them' or once we happen to belong to a group 
target, we cannot escape hatred. Neither our personality nor our individual history matters. 
Our moral choices, dreams and passions, remembrances and little secrets, confessions and 
discoveries, victories and failures - the whole content of our personality - can be instantly 
reduced to a single code word which designates our group or background. And that single 
word can be warrant for hatred. J 
Donskis ' s claim seems to be precise ly that col lect ive identit ies are increasingly 
often built on the foundation of hat ing the other. Since the quest ion here is why and 
how could free and rational people a l low their col lect ive identity to be built on such 
a basis , my purpose here is to evaluate the chal lenges col lect ive identit ies in general 
and identities of hatred in part icular p o s e to the liberal theory and society. 
For these reasons, theories about personal as well as col lect ive identity seem to 
have a bearing firstly on what it means to be a rat ional agent , and secondly on the 
way we treat other people and behave towards t hem; that is, mora l issues. Needless 
to say, these are bound to have effects on society as well . 
Of the concept and the research 
There is n o unan imous ly agreed definition of "col lect ive identi ty". The concept, 
however , goes back to sociological ly or iented thinkers such as M a r x and Durkhe im, 
and E r ik E r i ckson a n d E r v i n g G o f f m a n . It is g r o u n d e d in c l a ss i c soc io log i ca l 
constructs such as Durkhe im ' s "col lect ive consc ience ," M a r x ' s "class consciousness ," 
Max Weber ' s "Vers tehen" . and Ferd inand Tonn ies ' "Gemeinschaf t " . M o r e general 
interest in the concept , however , only a rose dur ing the last coup le of decades of 
the 2 0 t h century, with rapidly expand ing l i terature on the topic and references m a d e 
"indirectly through the l inkage of var ious col lect ivi t ies and their identity interests 
via such concepts as identi ty poli t ics, ident i ty projects , contes ted identit ies, insurgent 
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identities, nat ional ism, imag ined communi t i e s , identity m o v e m e n t s and even social 
movemen t s more genera l ly" . 5 Since then, extensive, mainly sociological s tudies have 
been conducted in these areas. 
In the construction of collective identit ies, self-reference or self-image, " o n e n e s s " 
and "we-nes s " is based on some "origin" or basis which is c o m m o n to all its members . 
It may for instance be a c o m m o n compe tence or task - the same language , similar 
work, a part icular educat ion or a specific insight - or holding certain values . Thus the 
notion addresses the " w e - n e s s " of a group , stressing s imilar i t ies or shared attr ibutes 
of its m e m b e r s . People are seen as commi t t ed by social a n d historical c i rcumstances 
to par t icular peop le in a n e t w o r k of re la t ionships , expec ta t ions , r equ i rement s and 
affections, but also to a par t icular range and order ing of va lues . 
These shared attributes were traditionally characterised as "natura l" or "essential" , 
as s o m e t h i n g w h i c h p e r m a n e n t fea tures of the co l l ec t ive d i scussed . T h e y were 
thought to b e pers i s ten t ly assoc ia ted wi th the phys io log i ca l trai ts , p sycho log i ca l 
predisposi t ions , regional features, or the like of the col lect ive. W h e n the romant ic 
seekers of the national identi ty of F inns at the end of the nineteenth century were 
t ravel l ing through the coun t rys ide obse rv ing peasants and their habi ts , co l lec t ing 
poems , songs and ancestra l s tories, it w a s such traits they were looking for: " the 
collective 's members were bel ieved to internalize these quali t ies, suggesting a unified, 
singular social exper ience , a single canvas against which social actors const ructed 
a sense of self." 6 
This essentialist and naturalist character of collect ive at t r ibutes has s ince been 
contested by a number of approaches . T h e main al ternat ive con temporary account 
depicts co l lec t ive ident i ty as b e i n g socia l ly cons t ruc ted ; 7 o ther a p p r o a c h e s l isted 
include structuralist , pos tmodern is t , pr imordia l is t and relat ivist postula t ions . 
Theoret ical or conceptua l work is of vital impor tance here , s ince it is b o u n d to 
affect the validity and qual i ty of studies o f collective identity. As said, the concept 
of collect ive identity is far from clear or settled, and the analyt ical implicat ions of 
the var ious charac te r i sa t ions used in r e sea rch should b e cons ide red careful ly. 8 In 
this paper 1 will concent ra te on the k inds of difficulties that emerge in pers is t ing 
with par t icular methodolog ica l , ontological or epis temologica l as well as normat ive 
presupposi t ions in analytical mora l and pol i t ical phi losophy. It is necessary for the 
researcher to recognise their under ly ing as sumpt ions and pos tu la t ions , wh ich m a k e a 
world of difference in evaluat ing the plausibil i ty of the impl ica t ions and conclus ions 
drawn from the theor ies . Sociologis ts u s e d to mak ing subt le d is t inct ions , such as 
"social" , "cul tural" , and "pe r sona l " identity, in part icular for empirical use, yet one 
should a lso clearly unders tand what the bases and criteria for these dis t inct ions are . 9 
Particularly social ontology is of great impor tance here; that is, wha t are these entities 
we refer to as collectives l ike; do they real ly exist and, if they do. wha t fol lows from 
their ex i s tence? To what extent are they "cons t ruc ted" or crea ted as ar tefacts for 
political purposes ; is col lect ive identity imposed on groups or does it evo lve within 
the group; w h y do peop le j o in in col lect ives , to further their o w n interests or for 
some other reason; how far and how strongly do they mot iva t e peop le ; are col lect ive 
identities ideologies ; and . m o s t importantly, wha t consequences does internal is ing 
collective identi ty have on individual rationali ty and mora l i ty? I be l ieve the need for 
analytical ph i losophis ing in this field lies in the clarification of such quest ions . 
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Liberal theory and identity 
The chal lenge of Donsk i s is, to re i terate , w h e t h e r it is poss ible for modern is t 
individualism to create identity which is s t rong enough and not built on hatred. He 
writes that individualism is too weak and p rob lemat i c to serve as a basis for societal 
existence. Liberal -democrat ic societies run into t rouble because they ignore the fact 
that the societ ies are fundamenta l ly ho l i s t i c or h i e r a r ch i c by na tu re . As a result , 
modern individualism m a k e s our present Western condi t ion and consequendy identity 
extremely vulnerable and fragile. It deva lues old certaint ies , forces peop le into a state 
of root lessness and uncertainty, and has crea ted "a ready m a r k e t " for any movement , 
religious or any other, " to prov ide or to r enew c e r t a i n t y " . 1 0 
In order to evaluate this claim, we n e e d to go deeper into the potent ial liberal 
theory creates for mee t ing this chal lenge. The fact that compl ica tes this examinat ion 
is that liberal theory is basical ly a normat ive theory of the w a y individuals should be 
treated, but which contains empirical e lements . In l iberal ism descriptions - the w a y of 
the world - intermingle with j u d g m e n t s - the w a y the w o r l d should be. It is ideology 
in pract ice , ideals embedded in a l imited n u m b e r o f empir ica l general isa t ions . 
Personal identity is based on the se l f - image of the individual . Col lect ive identity 
is similarly based on the self- image of the m e m b e r s of a collect ivi ty as its m e m b e r s . 
They are both based on observat ions and reflections of the wor ld around us , constantly 
compar ing ourselves wi th others , our society. In do ing this w e evaluate , interpret and 
try to unders tand what w e see, feel and exper i ence and h o w it fits our conceptual 
f rameworks and world visions. It wou ld b e w r o n g to th ink that w e first observe and 
investigate what the facts of this s i tuat ion are, and only then del iberately and freely 
choose how we are to work with them. Qui te the contrary, w e perce ive the wor ld not 
only through our own bel iefs and hopes , but also th rough the habi ts and cus toms w e 
have learned throughout our lives. 
All this means that our identity - be it personal or collect ive - is a curious mixture 
of real c i rcumstances and high hopes ; of w h a t w e are and what w e wish to be in 
our own ci rcumstances . And it is here that w e find the l ink to i d e o l o g i e s " . They are 
similarly curious mixtures of facts and ideals : first of all, they contain some sort of 
empirical-scientific explanat ion of wha t m a n is like; of the society we live in as well as 
what the laws or pr inciples that m a k e us tick are; and of the empir ical c i rcumstances 
and necessi t ies that constrain us . However , they also inc lude no rma t ive j udgemen t s 
of the very same things: wha t is good or b a d in h u m a n na ture , wha t act ions or states 
of affairs are p ra i sewor thy or b l a m e w o r t h y ; wha t the wor thwhi l e goals of human 
life are, what a good society is like or h o w we should ra ise our chi ldren. T h e central 
p rob lem is that we have no s imple m e t h o d of d is t inguish ing be tween wha t the facts 
of the wor ld are in the sense that there is no th ing w e can do about them, and what 
the mora l j udgmen t s or normat ive constra ints and h u m a n goals are which m a y vary 
and which we m a y shape or choose . Very often no rma t ive goals b e c o m e facts where 
they are bel ieved to be facts. For h u m a n beings , as social scientists well know, there 
are very few things that count as hard facts in this sense. 
This lies at the heart of D o n s k i s ' cha l lenge : by be l iev ing that the wor ld is the 
way liberal theory cla ims it should be , and ac t ing accordingly , we have also m a d e the 
world a liberal one in pract ice . This is the w a y ideals , pr inc ip les and n o rms become 
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facts and are t ransformed into actual reasons for or constraints on individual action. 
But does this then lead us to a dead end in regard to the quest ion of this essay? Is 
there no way out; do w e have to resort to the idea that hatred has become the lynchpin 
of modernis t col lect ive ident i ty? If w e have started to bel ieve that the wor ld and its 
people are m o v e d to think, feel and act the way liberal theory describes, what can 
we do to change this? 
Libera l ism differs from most other ideologies in that it avoids mak ing substantial 
recommendat ions concerning m a n and society. This is the essence of the individualism 
of l iberal ism: it aspires to leave choice to the individual . Indiv idual goals are a matter 
of private taste and del iberat ion as long other individuals are not harmed, wh ich is 
why l iberal ism advocates neutrali ty. Here in a lso lie the roo ts for the w e a k n e s s of 
individualism in provid ing social roots. 
But h o w are w e to deal wi th i d e o l o g i c a l i s sues? To s tar t w i th , the l ibera l 
postulations concerning human nature, action, sociability and the like ("facts") that are 
constructed somehow incorrectly surely need to be corrected. Unfortunately, however , 
we have neve r really agreed on any of these ques t ions . T h e major ph i losoph ica l 
debates s ince Socrates have been about wha t the true na ture of being h u m a n is like. 
Part of the liberal re luctance to define what is universal ly h u m a n good ar ises , those 
substantial r e commenda t i ons for man and society, arises from such failures. 
Normat ive pr inciples also need to be justified and one w a y of doing so is with a 
coherence me thod cal led "reflective equi l ibr ium". The theoret ical exposi t ion of this 
method is that we are to start by reflecting on our "cons idered mora l j u d g m e n t s " ; that 
is, j u d g m e n t s that w e have thoroughly and conscient iously examined and approved 
as our basic convic t ions , such as "re l igious intolerance and racial d iscr iminat ion are 
unjust". F r o m these j u d g m e n t s we are to construct mora l pr inciples . Then , conjoined 
with our beliefs about the c i rcumstances w e find ourselves in, these pr inciples should 
entail our j u d g m e n t s . This is a p rocess of w o r k i n g back and forth until w e reach 
the equi l ibr ium at wh ich our principles and j u d g m e n t s cohere . This is the point of 
reflective equi l ibr ium. 1 2 
In this vein, I am compar ing norma t ive liberal pr inciples to the moral j u d g m e n t s 
of peop le against the empir ica l background of history and l i terature. D o n s k i s has 
provided us wi th an interpretation of the latter part, and the pr ior part is to be provided 
by liberal theorists . It is the interplay be tween normat ive prescr ipt ions and facts of 
human life that are at p lay here. 
Let us then m o v e on to see h o w the poli t ical theory of analyt ical ph i losophy has 
dealt with the concept of identity. Liberal society wi th its enti t ies and actors is usually 
conceptual ised in this framework, which has dominated this theoris ing for the past 
four decades . It seems that even communi ta r i an i sm, its central critical opponen t , is 
really only a part of liberal theorising. '" 
Analytical methodology and the notion of identity 
The analytical method means assessing complex ideas and thoughts such as identity 
by analysing them and reducing them into s impler e lements w h o s e re la t ionships are 
then scrutinised. This me thod has been one of the central e lements of con temporary 
social sc iences , as Jon Elster puts it in his Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences'4: 
116 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The basic unit of research in social sciences is individual human action (this 
also includes corporate or collective actors , such as groups, companies and 
states). 
To explain social institutions and social change means showing how they arise 
as results of individual action and interaction. 
This general tendency has resulted in var ious sorts of individual ism, part icularly 
in analytic political and social theory. This I bel ieve has resul ted in analytical political 
theory not really having a plausible not ion of col lect ive ident i ty 1 5 . 
Ontological and/or methodological individual ism is a central element of analytical 
political theorising, and as such a source of a n u m b e r of p rob lems in research. The 
ontological ques t ion of this paper is w h e t h e r co l l ec t ive subjec ts such as g roups , 
ne tworks , and nat ions really exist and, if they do . wha t they are like; that is, whe ther 
we can p roper ly asc r ibe j u d g e m e n t s , i n t en t ions , goa l s and the l ike to t h e m . A n 
ontological individualist claims that only p e o p l e act and choose and can have such 
mental propert ies or that collectives const i tute subjects only in a summat ive summary 
and metaphorical s ense . 1 6 A number of l iberals are also methodologica l individualists, 
and claim that the only genuinely scientific p ropos i t ions are reducible to individual 
actions, disposit ions or wil ls . We m a y art iculate meaningfu l proposi t ions concerning 
collect ives; it is only that they are supposed to be logical or menta l reconstruct ions 
of individual action. 
W h e n such stances are further t ranslated into te rms of mora l responsibil i ty, the 
result is mora l or polit ical individual ism, accord ing to which col lect ives like groups , 
institutions and states have no rights that their individual m e m b e r s do not already 
have . As Rober t N o z i c k famously put it: " Ind iv idua l s h a v e rights, and the re are 
things no person or g roup may do to them (wi thout v iola t ing their rights)."17 Since 
the individual takes pr ior i ty over the col lect ive at the ontological as well as moral 
and polit ical levels, it is n o wonde r that the ques t ion of identi ty in analyt ical poli t ical 
theory has focused exclusively on individual identity. 
In l iberal pol i t ical theory, individual ident i ty is fur ther l inked to civil l iberty 
and pol i t ical l ibera l i sm, which i nc lude r e l ig ious to le ra t ion , the ru le of law, and 
ind iv idua l i sm. A c c o r d i n g to D o n s k i s , the k e y w o r d s h e r e a re r eason , consc i ence , 
j u s t i ce , and to le rance , w h i c h j u x t a p o s e h i s to r ica l p h e n o m e n a such as he red i t a ry 
monarchy, papacy, spirituality, and social order . 1 8 It is t rue that the liberal tradit ion 
has a lways stressed the impor tance of r e m o v i n g obs tac les from individual choice 
and action, such as oppress ive insti tutions and t radi t ions and the arbitrary p o w e r of 
the state. Its purpose has been to emanc ipa te the individual from the b o n d s of the 
col lect ives with w h i c h she has not vo lunta r i ly compl i ed . A s free ind iv idua ls , we 
have the right to choose our bonds and c o m m i t m e n t s and those col lect ives w e wish 
to jo in or resign from. 
All this obviously results in people hav ing a mul t ip le reper toi re of freely chosen 
identit ies. To put it bluntly, for a l iberal individual is t , ident i ty is pr imari ly a matter 
of choosing the mos t p leas ing. The marke t of identi t ies is all set out: jus t p ick the 
one most appropriate for your present purposes . 
But the logic and dynamics of act ion beh ind the emergence of identity in real life 
is of course far m o r e compl ica ted than mere ly choos ing where one wants to be long 
and w h o one wants to be. It is not at all c lear h o w far w e can even m a k e such choices. 
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We are born and tied to part icular families, communi t ies and social envi ronments , 
and in m a n y cases it is not even possible to raise the quest ion of whether they have 
been voluntari ly compl ied with. This rather self-evident fact has often been advanced 
by the var ious critics of l iberalism, part icularly the communi ta r i ans . 
It is a lso true that a number of crucial quest ions r emain unanswered : w h a t would 
"co l lec t ive iden t i ty" m e a n under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? W h i c h of these ident i t ies 
becomes dominant and w h y ? How does a "contextual ly dr iven activation of one of 
the e lements in the repertoire [become] dominan t" , to b o r ro w from David Lait in 's 
opening speech at this conference. In addit ion to these ques t ions , a number of others 
can be answered properly only by appeal ing to concepts such as col lect ive action, 
collective identity, or collect ive responsibili ty. 
But h o w far do these facts affect l iberal theory? Which parts of it are in need 
of redefining or correct ing? We need to be careful here in wha t the liberals actually 
assert and believe; what they think are facts and what the goals they maintain are. The 
crucial point is that their theory of the individual and her identi ty is a characteristically 
a normat ive theory; that is, a justificatory theory which tries to give the individual 
a normat ive s ta tus 1 9 instead of describing what she is l ike, and how and accord ing 
to what mot ives she acts in real life. In particular, liberal theory considers h o w she 
may or m a y not be treated, wha t she is at liberty or has a r ight to do , and what she 
may or m a y not do to others . That fact that she may not b e like that in real life, or 
is not t reated or does not treat others as the liberal theory dictates, will not refute 
the theory. Qui te the contrary, it s imply proves that we h a v e even more reason to 
demand these things, s ince they are clearly miss ing from her life. 
Libera ls are in fact commi t t ed to a be l i e f in the fundamenta l mora l equal i ty 
of the individual , and are universal is ts in the sense that l iberal ideals apply to all 
human be ings and can be shared by all. Thus the object of liberal identification, our 
primary collective identity, is that of the human race. W h a t l iberalism in fact says 
is be wha teve r you like as long as you are l iberals. Paradoxical ly , however , such 
an identity seems empty, a negat ive descr ipt ion of a h u m a n be ing , d ic ta t ing only 
c o m m o n rules of conduct , l imit ing act ions which cause h a r m to other peop le , but 
say nothing about the content of life or of h u m a n goals . The c o m m o n liberal identity-
seems indeed to be , as Donsk i s says, weak and vague. 
Such considerat ions produce tension w h e n the quest ion o f what it is to possess 
a h u m a n identi ty is today increasingly often asked from ano ther perspec t ive . It is 
suggested that individuals should define themselves in te rms proper to the peop le or 
communi ty to which they be long. In fact it seems that ' b e l o n g i n g ' has b e c o m e the 
precondit ion of full human adulthood, the pr imary relat ionship of human be ings . It is 
only w h e n w e acknowledge what group w e be long to that w e can discover w h o we 
are and what be ing h u m a n truly means . There is no universal human identi ty then, 
or if there is, it is t ranscended by local identity. 
Contrary to this notion of particularistic human identity concentrating on "belonging", 
liberals have always stressed voluntary undertaking, free jo in ing and resigning. The 
paradigmatic notion of collectives is free association, which is the ideal of social action 
in liberal theory. Nothing , however, is said about the subs tance of the associat ions. 
These are then some of the central tensions inherent in the concept of identi ty -
one be tween the individual and the collect ive, and others b e t w e e n the par t icular and 
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the universal . 2 " But are s t ronger and more subs tan t ia l col lect ive identi t ies then a 
threat to liberal society? 
A liberal notion of collective identity? 
It seems to me that the central p rob lems o f liberal theory in this context are that 
wi thout a workab le not ion o f col lect ive identi ty, it is unab le to explain p rob lems 
of collective authority (who has p o w e r over a group of peop le and h o w it can be 
justified; the extent to which an individual m a y voluntar i ly rel inquish his freedom of 
choice and action); col lect ive rationali ty (as failures of individual reason, such as in 
the paradigmatic case of the Pr i soner ' s d i l emma) , and col lect ive responsibil i ty (who 
are w e to b l ame for genocide ; who bears the responsibi l i ty for corporate wrongdoing; 
w h o are w e to praise when society survives a ferocious w a r ? ) . These deficiencies 
h a v e , however , been recogn ised in c o n t e m p o r a r y l iberal theory w i t h a t t empts to 
develop a feasible notion of collect ive agents with character is t ic rights, duties and 
responsibil i t ies. It is worth not ing, for ins tance , that a " l iberal-nat ional is t" t rend has 
appeared, in which it is be l ieved that a shared national identity is necessary to protect 
l iberal va lues . 2 1 
Towards the end of this essay, I will briefly deal wi th one liberal wr i ter w h o does 
indeed pay serious attention to collectives, and their identi t ies and responsibi l i t ies . 
Th i s is the Austral ian phi losopher Phil ip Pettit , w h o explici t ly distances h imsel f from 
the reduct ionism of analyt ical ph i losophy in his A Theory of Freedom. From the 
Psychology to the Politics of Agency (2001) . 
A central assumpt ion o f Per th 's theory is his ontological stance, which departs 
from the usual l iberal individual is t ic ontology. For Pett i t , co l lec t ives are genuine 
subjec ts o r agents and d i sp lay in t e l l ec tua l p r o p e r t i e s in the i r o w n right . These 
propert ies are not mere project ions of those of their m e m b e r s . In our social realm 
there are individual as wel l as p roper col lect ive sub jec t s . 2 2 Col lect ive subjects are 
capable of being held responsible, and of ho ld ing others responsible in turn. Collective 
subjects are , however,^?/ to be held responsible so far and only so far as they enjoy 
discursive control. 
The discursive dilemma 
Petti t a rgues for the e x i s t e n c e of c o l l e c t i v e s on the bas is o f the so -ca l l ed 
discursive dilemma (in j u r i sp rudence k n o w n as the 'doc t r ina l pa radox ' ) . Th i s is a 
d i l emma collect ives often face whe re the r e sponses invo lve either individual is ing 
reason or collectivising it. Only collect ives that col lect ivise reason are true collective 
subjects. The discursive problem arises b e c a u s e it " is not t ied to the acceptance of 
c o m m o n doctr ine, only to the enterprise o f m a k i n g group j u d g m e n t s on the basis 
of r eason" . 2 ' 
Pett i t 's central claim is that every g roup that embraces a common purpose will 
face this sort of d i l emma. H e summar i ses this a rgument in three s teps: 
1. Since the pursuit of a common goal requires reasoning and judgment, any group 
will generate a history of judgments (a ' track record ') . 
2. These past judgments constrain present judgments; only one current judgment 
in each case will be consistent or coherent with the past judgments. 
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3. The group will thus be confronted with the discursive di lemma, whether to 
individualise or collectivise reason. 
Pettit argues further that such a collectivity will inevitably be forced to collectivise 
reason (again involving three steps): 
4. The group cannot efficiently or credibly promote its common goal if it tolerates 
inconsistency or incoherence in its judgments over time. 
5. If it cannot do this, it will lose any hold over its members and any respect among 
outsiders. 
6. Every purposive group is thus bound to try to collectivise reason, achieving and 
acting on collective judgments that pass reason-related tests like consistency. 
T h e g r o u p wi l l b e d i s p o s e d to co l l ec t i v i s e r e a s o n u s i n g a p r e m i s e - d r i v e n 
procedure : 
7. In order to be an efficient promoter of the common good the group cannot 
renounce its past judgment on a regular basis, otherwise one cannot take such 
an inconsistent entity seriously. 
8. The group must avoid automatic recourse to the revision of past judgments 
and must generally make those judgments that are required in consistency or 
coherence by the past judgments. 
These are the requ i rements that collect ives need to satisfy in order to b e genuine 
agents or subjects for Pettit: 
Groups or groupings that collectivize reason may be usefully described as integrations 
of people, or integrated collectives, or perhaps social integrates. This way of speaking 
emphasizes the fact that the collectivity involved integrates members into collective 
patterns of judgment and decision that respect the demands of reason at the collective 
level. It sounds a contrast with those groups and groupings that do not reason at all or that 
individualize the use of reason. These we naturally describe as aggregations of people, or 
as aggregated collectivity, or just aggregates. 2 4 
Let m e summar i se Pet t i t ' s posit ion: groups often face the hard choice of whether 
to individual ise or col lect ivise reason; and integrated col lect ives are p rone to choose 
the latter. M o r e specifically, they will usually opt for the sort o f collect ivisat ion by 
which they treat exis t ing commi tmen t s as premises from which conclusions on some 
new issue wil l be derived. 
As a result , genuine (that is, integrated) collectives display intellectual proper t ies 
that are not mere ly project ions of the proper t ies of their individual m e m b e r s . The 
intentions a n d j udgmen t s of such groups m a y differ radica l ly from those of their 
member s . T h e y may m a k e j udgmen t s that none of the individual member s endorse , 
and they m a y form intent ions to act that no m e m b e r intends. 
The personhood of collectives 
Accord ing to Pettit , a free agent is s imply an agent fit to b e held responsible . 
More specifically, a free agent is so because of the w a y her act ions mater ia l ise , her 
self or psychology operates , a n d her person relates to other p e o p l e . 2 5 In o ther w o r d s , 
an agent wil l be a candidate for freedom if she is a centre of personhood , selfhood 
and action. B u t how do col lect ive agents satisfy these requi rements? 
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As Pet t i t quite r ight ly notes , there is a long t radi t ion in his tory of ascr ib ing 
personal i ty to certain collect ives, and that this is the p roper w a y to address genuine 
(that is, ' in tegra ted ' ) g roups . Integrated g roups are ' conversab le in ter locutors ' just 
like individuals: they can speak for themse lves and th ink of themselves as T , ' m e ' 
and ' m i n e ' ; they have beliefs , intent ions and desires , and are able to express these 
states in signs or words . 
Moreover , if persons are acting sincerely, they can be "expected to live up to the 
words in the things they bel ieve and desire and do" . The s a m e goes for collectives: 
To the extent that integrated collectives bind themselves to the discipline of reason at 
the collective level - to the extent that they endorse a norm of living up to reason - they 
must be expected to live up to the words they authorize, and the deeds they perform, in 
the other things that they say and do. They must count as conversable interlocutors, and 
as subjects who can be held responsible for the things they accept and bring about. 2 6 
For these reasons in tegra ted co l l ec t ives a lso h a v e a p e r s o n a l po in t of view. 
Previous commi tmen t s are of vital impor tance to the m e m b e r s of the collect ive, "the 
words defended in the pas t . . . will s tand out from any words emana t ing e lsewhere as 
words that bind and c o m m i t t h e m " 2 7 . It is these words that s tand out for the member s 
of the collective as "our voice" . The col lect ive is a plural subject - the atti tudes of 
groups are their at t i tudes. 
Integrated collectives are persons in their own right since they have a first-person 
point of v iew which w e normal ly associate wi th pe r sonhood ; they are subjects which 
can enter into a dia logue with other peop le and other col lect ives; they can be held 
responsible for their commi tmen t s ; and finally, their m e m b e r s mink of them in the 
first person plural, as w e w h o judge , intend and act. 
From personal to collective identity 
According to Pettit, "anyone w h o enjoys discursive control must count as a person 
and a s e l f and "will deserve to b e regarded as the s ame person and the same self 
over var ious stretches of t ime . . . N o pe r son wi thout personal identity, we might say, 
and no self wi thout self- ident i ty." 2 8 
I n s t e a d of b u i l d i n g iden t i t y in to t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n a t u r a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l or 
physiological connect ion over t ime, Pettit bui lds it into discurs ive control , which 
... involves being expected over time to be able to square what one does or claims or feels 
on any occasion with what one did or claimed or felt at earlier times. That is to say, being 
capable of discursive control involves being situated on an intertemporal trajectory such 
that one is expected to bring the doings and sayings and thoughts that occur earlier on that 
trajectory to every discursive tribunal. One's current claims can be questioned for their 
consistency with earlier claims on the trajectory, for example, in a way that they cannot 
be questioned for their consistency with any other claims: with anyone else's claims, as 
we will say. One's current actions can be questioned for their consistency with earlier 
intentions on the trajectory, in a way that they cannot be questioned for their consistency 
with any other intentions: that is, with anyone else's intentions. And so on. But if this 
is so, then we can say that someone at a later time is the same person as someone at an 
earlier, just so far as they are bound under discursive practice to answer for, or answer 
to, the earlier person in this distinctive fashion. The later agent is the same person as the 
earlier just so far as they are related in the manner - whatever this is - that makes such 
inter-temporal answerability possible. 2'' 
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The thing that m a k e s one a person with a personal identi ty is ' in ter - temporal 
answerabi l i ty ' , or to put it m o r e soberly, ' responsibi l i ty over t ime ' . W h a t m a k e s two 
people the same person at different t imes is that "under exis t ing discursive pract ice 
the later [person] can be held respons ib le for and to the ear l i e r" 3 0 . Responsibi l i ty 
over t ime m e a n s here that the claims or intentions I have already expressed mus t be 
consistent with m y current disposi t ions , or that their incons is tency must force m e to 
change these disposi t ions. 
The t w o centra l n o t i o n s of p e r s o n h o o d for Pet t i t are (1) per sona l ident i ty: 
" someone at a later t ime is the same person as s o m e o n e at an earlier t ime if and 
only if they relate across t i m e in such a way that the later can be called upon , under 
discursive pract ice, to answer for or to the earl ier" and (2) self- identity: "a person at 
a later t ime can be regarded as the s ame self as that person at an earlier to the degree 
to which the later does not d isown the at t i tudes and act ions o f the ear l ier" . 1 1 These 
not ions apply to col lect ive agents jus t as they apply to individual agents . 
A collectivity at one t ime will b e the s a m e inst i tut ional person as a collectivity 
at an ear l ier stage as far as the later col lect ivi ty can be he ld answerab l e for the 
j udgmen t s , intentions and act ions of the earlier collectivity under discurs ive pract ice . 
Conce rn ing self-identi ty, a col lect ivi ty will be the s a m e ins t i tu t ional self as that 
collectivity at an earl ier t ime to the degree that it o w n s or endorses the j udgmen t s , 
intentions and actions of the earlier one. 
Pettit lists a n u m b e r o f character is t ics in which col lec t ive agents differ from 
human agents . Collect ive agents have n o percept ions or m e m o r y or sent ience the way 
humans have ; they form collect ive minds and intentions only on those mat ters they 
are organised to advance . S ince they are artificial creat ions , their responses m a y be 
governed by reason, a l though "only in a pa ins taking fashion," since it is extremely 
complicated. 
Col lec t ives are "a re p e r s o n s and se lves of a b lood less , b o u n d e d and crudely 
robotic variety", and therefore we should think of them "as agents to which individuals 
give life by suspending their own projects , n o w on this occas ion, n o w on that , in 
order to serve the collect ive point of v i e w " . 3 2 A s such they represent only an artificial 
form of life and remain dependent on whe the r the individual member s (voluntari ly) 
comply wi th them. 
Conclusion: what is collective responsibility? 
Towards the end of his account of col lect ive identity Pettit also d iscusses the 
quest ion of col lect ive respons ib i l i ty , 3 3 the quest ion wh ich is of p r ime impor tance 
when discuss ing col lect ive identity. This discussion, h o w e v e r leaves very little to 
talk about. 
He starts by stating that w e may now distinguish between the actions of individuals 
in group roles (when they represent the group or cast a vote in group del iberat ions) , 
and the act ions of the col lect ive itself. This m e a n s in te rms of responsibi l i ty that 
... it will often be appropriate to hold a group responsible for what is done by the 
agency of an individual or individuals, and yet not appropriate to hold those individuals 
themselves responsible; they will be fit to be held responsible only for their individual 
contributions. 
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Pettit goes on to say that 
... in exploring matters of responsibility...we need to allow for a possible bifurcation 
between individual and collective responsibility. We need to be ready to admit that there 
are two streams of action along which to trace lines of responsibility, one at the collective 
level, and the other at the individual. The group may be fit to be held responsible for a 
given action, the individuals fit to be held responsible for their particular contributions, 
and yet it may make no sense to parcel out responsibility for the group action among 
those individuals 
As a matter of fact Pettit is saying no th ing here that w e would not k n o w already 
from our ord inary l a n g u a g e . This is p r o b a b l y a ref lect ion of the ind iv idua l i s t i c 
m e t h o d o l o g y domina t ing this a cademic field, a n d w h i c h on occas ions like these 
clashes with everyday mora l thinking. 
I fully apprec ia te the difficulties i n v o l v e d in d e t e r m i n i n g respons ib i l i t i e s of 
collective institutions and member s of col lec t ives ; it has been notor iously difficult 
even to designate legally responsible pe r sons in enterpr ises and newspapers . Mora l 
responsibil i ty is even m o r e difficult to de te rmine . 
What does it mean to "ho ld a group respons ib le for wha t is done"? W h o is held 
respons ib le? It is here that the bas ic ind iv idua l i s t i c na tu re of our mora l th inking 
and theor iz ing b e c o m e s apparent . W e w o u l d th ink it unjus t and unfair to b l ame 
all m e m b e r s of a col lect ive for a par t icu lar decis ion, such as m a k i n g all Russ ians 
guilty of what the communis t s did; or all M u s l i m s of w h a t al Q a e d a does . But as we 
have wi tnessed full wel l in the course of h u m a n history, this also leaves the guilty 
the opportuni ty to evade their real responsib i l i ty by b l a m i n g it on social pressure , 
collective demands or obey ing orders . Bu t w h o then are w e to b l ame or praise? 
W h a t is c u r i o u s in P e t t i t ' s e x p o s i t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e iden t i ty , f r e e d o m and 
responsibil i ty is that he never even deals w i th the possibi l i ty of a col lect ive identity 
becoming one of hat red (oppress ive , degrad ing , racist , etc ,) . It seems to m e that, in a 
typically liberal fashion, he postulates h u m a n nature to be if not outright good, at least 
not bad, and merely self-interested. Since Pet t i t does no t m i n k it necessary to impose 
any restraints on what peop le m a y c o n t e m p l a t e do ing in " in tegra ted co l lec t ives" , 
he evidently does not see it as poss ib le that a free and rational person would want 
to h a r m others for any reason; the ex i s tence of pu re evi l is apparent ly out of the 
question. In liberal theory the individual acts only for self-interested reasons ; and if 
someone harms someone else, we s imply need to m a k e such behav iour dysfunctional 
or too expensive for her self-interest through the use of pol ice and the law. Suicide 
bombers , patr iots , re l igious bel ievers as well as saints and beneficiaries are all jus t 
i rregular deviat ions from normal h u m a n behaviour . 
But the r e m a i n i n g ques t ion is w h e t h e r ident i t i es o f ha t r ed a re a con t ingen t 
or inherent feature o f l iberal soc ie t i es ; w h e t h e r the re is s o m e t h i n g about l iberal 
indiv idual i sm that w o u l d entail the e m e r g e n c e of such ident i t ies . In the end , the 
issue is the extent to wh ich h u m a n s real ly need s t rong communi t i e s , and whether 
"societ ies are fundamenta l ly hol is t ic or h ie rarch ic b y na tu re" , as Donsk i s c la ims . 
This is the chal lenge liberal theory and l iberal democra t i c societ ies mus t face, as 
some liberal nat ionalis ts have real ised. Pett i t 's account of col lect ive responsibi l i ty 
is a much-needed initial analysis , but w e remain in dire need of unders tanding and 
art iculating what col lect ives and their responsibi l i t ies are really about . 
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NOTES 
1 Donskis 2003, p. 1. 
: Op cit. 2. 
! The obverse of this notion is collective political identities built on propaganda, demagoguery. 
one-sided information or the like. "Authentic" identity, in contrast, is something seen to 
124 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
evolve voluntarily, peacefully, and most importantly, "naturally". Needless to say, whatever 
these notions refer to would need to be thoroughly and carefully analysed. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See for instance Snow 2001. 
h Ibid. See also Loukola & Mustala 1997. 
7 See Cerulo 1997 and Snow 2001. 
K As Snow puts it in "Dimensions, Layers, and Types of Collective Identity" 2001: "Although 
there is an extensive literature on collective identity, with considerable discussion regarding 
its conceptualization and sources, this literature has been relatively mute regarding variation 
in its form. The concept most often is invoked as if it is an invariant, uniform collective 
phenomenon. This is not the case, however, as collective identities can be multidimensional 
and be multi-layered within a specific locus, and they may also vary by type. The multi-
dimensionality of collective identity is indicated by reference to its cognitive, emotional, and 
moral dimensions... The relative importance of each of these dimensions to the vitality and 
motivational force of a collective identity has not been elaborated, however. Presumably the 
presence of each of these dimensions yields a more robust and vital collective identity." 
' See also Polletta & Jasper 2001. 
'" Donskis 2003, p. 7. 
" This account of ideologies owes much to Gauthier 1977. 
1 2 The method was originally presented in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. 1972. See also 
Haslet 1987. pp. 305"-6. 
1 3 See for instance Walzer 1990, p. 6, where he writes that "no communitarian critique [of 
liberalism] ... will ever be anything more than an inconstant feature of liberalism". 
1 4 Elster 1989. 
1 5 See also Welch 1989. 
1 6 Pettit 2001, p. 105. 
'" Nozick 1975, p. ix. 
I s Donskis 2003, p. 1. 
1 9 See for instance Carse 1994, pp. 187-8. 
211 The idea behind modernism is that Western philosophy is somehow foundational to what it 
means to be human. Rationality is the key factor here: the task of science is to provide us the 
facts on the framework within which we are to aim for our goals, purposes and "further our 
plans of life. Behind this notion we find the universal human nature, 'universal humanity", 
which includes man's personal quest for truth and goodness, development of human virtue 
and characteristic human functions such as understanding, benevolence, compassion, and 
mercy. See also Trainor 1998. 
2 1 See for instance Mason 1999, and Cronin 2003. 
2 2 Pettit 2001, p. 105. 
2 3 Op cit. 106. 
2 4 Op. cit. 113. 
2 : See also op. cit. 82-7. 
2 6 Op. cit. 96-7. Aggregate collectives will "not be answerable in the same way to words 
previously authorized or deeds previously performed. It will always be possible for such 
an aggregate to vote in favour of a judgment or an intention that is out of kilter with earlier 
commitments, and to do so without recognising any embarrassment." 
r Ibid. 
2 > Op. cit. 82. 
2 ' Ibid. 
511 Op. cit. 83. 
Olli Loukola. The Concept of Collective Identity and Liberal Theory 125 
3 1 Op. cit. 118. 
3 2 Op. cit. 118-9. 
3 3 Op. cit. 121-3. 
Kopsavi lkums 
Raks ta ir aplukota kolekt lvas ident i ta tes t ema l iberalaja teorija un sabiedr iba 
ta i za ic ina juma perspekf iva . kuru sava g r a m a t a Forms of Hatred, The Troubled 
Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature (2003) anal ize Leonids Donskis . 
Preclzak, sis izaicinajums slepjas jautajuma, vai sodien modernis t iskais individual isms 
spej veidot identitati, kas bu tu p ie t iekami speclga, lai balst l tu sabiedr isko eksis tenci , 
na idu. Liberala ja i t radlci jai nav bijusi n e p i e c i e s a m l b a p e c ko lek t lvas ident i ta tes 
jedziena, un tadejadi ir radusas problemas, skaidrojot kolekt lvo autoritati, r ac ionabsmu 
un atbildTbu. Musd ienu l iberalaja teorija ir veikt i m e g i n a j u m i radit i zman to j amu 
pr iekss ta tu par ko lek t rva j iem agen t i em ar attiecTgam tiesTbam, p i e n a k u m i e m un 
atbildTbu. Sai sakara tiek aplukota Fil ipa Peti ta teorija. 
II 
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The Same Civil Society? Moral Identity and Perception 
of Politics Before and After 1991 
Ta pati pilsoniska sabiedrTba? Morala identitate un 
politikas uztvere pirms 1991. gada un pec ta 
Ivars Ijabs 
University of Latvia 
e-mail: ijabs@lanet.lv 
The concept of civil society has a double role in the democratic transformations in Central 
and Eastern Europe: the rebirth of the concept in political theory is mainly due to citizens' 
movements and anti-authoritarian activities in this region. On the other hand, the weak or absent 
civil society is regarded today also as one of the main problems of democratic consolidation 
there. In this paper I argue that certain continuities between these processes can be identified 
by referring to a specific kind of moral identity of civil actors. For this purpose 1(1) analyze 
the main elements of the moral self-understanding of civil actors during the 'singing revolution' 
of 1988-1991, and (2) make a few suggestions about its lasting impact on today's civil society 
of Latvia and its perception of democratic political life. 
Key words: civil society, moral identity, post-communism, democratization. 
T h e rebir th of the concep t of civil socie ty in polit ical theory and democra t i c 
t ransformations in Central and Eastern Europe seem to have m a n y c o m m o n points 
in t he i r o r i g i n s . B e s i d e s t he N e w soc ia l m o v e m e n t s in W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , the 
democrat izat ion movements a n d their anti-totalitarian polit ical activities in this region 
in the 1980s h a v e contr ibuted t o the present actual i ty of this ostensibly old-fashioned 
concept. H o w e v e r at the same t ime deve lopment of civil society h a s c o m m o n l y been 
regarded also as one o f the m a i n p rob lems of the democra t ic consol ida t ion in the last 
fifteen years - also in Latvia civil society is seen as notoriously weak . So the quest ion 
arises, whe the r the term 'civil socie ty ' in both per iods , that of transition and that of 
consolidation, means the same thing, whe the r there are any cont inui t ies , and h o w 
are the conceptual differences to be explained. In this pape r I a m going to argue that 
these differences are part ly explainable by referring to the specific kind of moral self-
understanding o f actors of civil society, as wel l a s to their percept ion of themse lves 
as polit ical ac tors . For this pu rpose I a m going (I) to sort out a few most impor tant 
elements of th is moral se l f -unders tanding of La tv ian democra t iza t ion m o v e m e n t s in 
the years before the regaining o f national independence , and (II) to connect them to a 
particular percept ion o f pol i t ics , as well as to m a k e a few sugges t ions about relat ions 
between this "go lden a g e " of Latv ian civil socie ty and its present weakness . 
I 
T h e status of 'civil socie ty ' in Central and Eas t - European democra t ic transfor-
mations has b e e n eagerly discussed recently. The range of op in ions is wide : there are 
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authors who suggest that the usage of the term in democra t ic deve lopments of Central 
and Eastern Europe have been seminal for its later interpretat ions in con temporary 
political thought. There are also more skept ical voices saying that the usage of this 
concept in the transformation processes w a s ma in ly due to the fact that the concept 
of democracy was already inflicted with Marxis t - Leninist connotat ions and therefore 
unusable 1 , or that to talk about the rebir th of poli t ical society in the Tocquevi l lean 
sense rather than that of civil society w o u l d b e far more appropr ia te in this context 2 . 
These controversies are mainly due to t he unc lea r boundar ies and many d imens ions 
of the concept . In mos t cases it is clear that civil society involves non-s ta te , self-
organized and au tonomous activities of ci t izens in m o d e r n societ ies , but there is no 
consensus about its relat ions to economic act ivi t ies and associat ions , about its role 
in the political life, as wel l as about its no rma t ive underp inn ing . This diffusion also 
creates difficulties in mak ing explicit re la t ions be tween Latvian civil society before 
and after 1991, which c o m m o n l y lead to overs impli f icat ions - e.g., by regard ing the 
civil activities of the eighties as some ' p r im i t i ve ' and underdeve loped form of civil 
society, which will later develop by itself, or by connec t ing them closely to economic 
l iberalization. The n e e d for civil socie ty is often seen as the task to fol low some 
' s tandard ' Western vers ion of it, without any relat ion to the recent civil exper ience 
and its legacy. These simplifications can be at least par t ly avo ided by referring to 
moral self-understanding of civil society, which also he lps to interpret the democrat ic 
life of present-day Latv ia in the light of the symbol i c cons t i tu t ion of its n e w political 
identity during the ' s inging revolu t ion ' . 
By m o r a l s e l f -unde r s t and ing of civi l soc i e ty I m e a n all these motives and 
orientations, which organize the life of civil society- on the basis of mutual solidarity 
and non-instrumentally grounded assumptions, and which can be at least analytically 
separatedfrom equally important dimensions of economic liberation and national self-
determination. These mot ives can be sought out in the publ ica t ions of this per iod — in 
polit ical manifestos and speeches , in j o u r n a l i s m , po lemica l art icles and m e m o i r s -
which can serve as a mi r ror of the civil socie ty of th i s t ime, of its concept ion of 
itself, as well as of its percept ion of good and bad pol i t ics . 
The moral dimension of civil society in Central and Eastern - European democratic 
t ransformations has not been h o m o g e n o u s th roughout all the countr ies of this region. 
For example , as Ansgar Klein shows , in Central E u r o p e a n states the moral d imension 
of civil society has b e e n especial ly accen tua t ed in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ( A c c o r d i n g to 
Klein, in Poland its political self—detennination has p layed a central role, in Hunga ry -
economic l iberal izat ion 3 ) . Never the less , the mora l d imens ion to a different extent has 
been present in all the democrat ic m o v e m e n t s in S o v i e t - d o m i n a t e d Europe . A s such 
it a l so demands explorat ion in the context of Latvia . 
It shou ld be n o t e d that d u e to L a t v i a ' s specif ic s i tua t ion there h a s b e e n no 
systematic and elaborated reflection on the ro le and goa ls of the civil activit ies in 
the post-totalitarian communi s t state from the par t ic ipant ' s perspect ive , as represented 
by Vaclav Have l in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , A d a m M i c h n i k in P o l a n d and o the r s . The 
incorporation into the Soviet Union s eems to h a v e ex t ingu ished not only possibil i t ies 
of organized political resistance, but a lso those o f literary and theoretical self-reflection 
of would-be civil agents . Never the less , in the second ha l f of the 1980 ' s , due to the 
C o m m u n i s t pa r ty ' s loosen ing control of the pub l i c sphe re , there h a s been a vast 
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amount of a t tempts m a d e by different au thors to expose the identi ty of the n e w civil 
society, which in non-sys temat ic way show m a n y similar mot ives to the countr ies 
with more profound dissident and theoretical traditions. Of course , economic , national , 
moral and other mot ives in these accounts are closely in ter twined there, and mot ives 
of nat ional self-determinat ion for obv ious reasons are in La tv ia more prominent than 
in European countr ies no t incorporated into the Soviet U n i o n . However , exact ly the 
moral d imens ion of this se l f -unders tanding can highlight s o m e important m o m e n t s in 
the percept ion of poli t ical activity, which have influenced impor tan t aspects o f civic 
life in t oday ' s Latvia. H e r e I wtil concentra te on three cons tant ly recurr ing aspec ts of 
this discourse , which cou ld to some extent il lustrate this m o r a l identity. These are: (1) 
'authenticity' as the need for 'existent ial ly t rue ' poli t ics: (2) 'spirituality (gar igums) 
and vertical integration — in ter twinement of t ranscendent ( re l ig ious , myst ic ) mot ives 
and communica t ive search for identity in civil life of this pe r iod ; and (3) 'conscience 
and substantiality of evil'- mora l opposi t ions perce ived in a b inary and fundamental 
way, as wel l as specific ' i n w a r d n e s s ' of soc io-mora l intuit ions. 
Authenticity' or existentially true politics. It has b e e n of ten r e m a r k e d that 
democrat ic movemen t s in Central and Eas tern E u r o p e have no t perceived themse lves 
only as the m e a n s of pol i t ical and social l iberation. The s t rong personal d imens ion 
has a lways been present. O n the level with other countries, a l so in the Latvian context 
the main signifier for this t endency has been ' t ru th ' , which constant ly occurs in the 
publications of this per iod: 
"Official ideology and your own conscience. Violent ideology and apparatus that realizes 
it as an unchangeable divine force opposed to your freedom, to your creative spirit, to the 
sum of your personal experience. [..] Truth is a crime."" 
Thus states wri ter G u n d e g a Repse in the year 1989. A n o t h e r example : the people 
of Jekabpils district Zasa vil lage remember ing their activities in the t ime of awakening . 
The author retells her d ia logue wi th the local communis t authori t ies: 
"- Do you live badly in Zasa? You have food and security enough [..]. We will soon 
abolish this Popular Front of yours! 
- Man doesn't live from bread alone. [..] What we need is truth, freedom of conscience 
and justice!" 5 
What is mean t by truth in these quotat ions is by no m e a n s pure cor respondence 
with states of affairs past or present . Truth is regarded as the main existential value, 
as the only possibil i ty for the individual to chal lenge the e labora ted sys tem of lies 
and manipula t ion , and to rega in her own deeply personal identity. It a lways involves 
the d imens ion of revelat ion, wh ich can comple te ly change the lives of those w h o live 
and act truthfully. It is a m e t a p h o r of authent ic humani ty a n d ethical responsibil i ty. 
Vaclav Have l has convincingly e laborated this concept of t ruth and its ro le in the 
mentality of post- total i tar ian society. His 'ant i-poli t ical po l i t i cs ' refer to the form of 
social act ivi ty which involves opposi t ion to the man ipu la t ive sys tem by b reak ing 
the rules of the hypocri t ical g a m e of loyalty. This is a revolut ion, which takes place 
"not on the level of real , inst i tut ional ized, quantifiable p o w e r wh ich relies on the 
various ins t ruments of power , but on a different level al together: the level o f h u m a n 
consciousness and conscience , the existential l eve l . " 6 
Havel ' s reflections on authentici ty as a polit ical virtue a n d those of the au thors of 
the third Latvian reawakening, besides many obvious parallels, also show one important 
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difference. In Havel ' s account individual ' au thent ic i ty ' and ' t ru th ' are directed to all 
systems of what he calls 'b l ind au toma t i sm ' 7 - not only to repressive systems of really 
exist ing social ism, but also to the sys tems of Western consumer is t society which 
are similarly manipulated by the sys tems of market e c o n o m y and professional , elite 
poli t ics. N o such mot ive can b e found in the d iscourse of Latv ian civil society o f the 
1 9 8 0 ' s - probably because of the lack of exper ience wi th Western societ ies, which 
was more accessible to Polish, Czechoslovak and other Central European intellectuals 
than they w e r e to those of the Balt ic countr ies . Never the less , Have l ' s reflections help 
us to clear the conceptual background of this d imens ion of ' t ru th ' and 'authent ic i ty ' 
of the Latvian nat ional r eawaken ing . This d i m e n s i o n is m o r e compl ica ted than a 
s imple demand for free speech and accessible information. A s a link be tween publ ic 
activity and private normat ive intuit ions, it represents an important segment of civil 
society 's mora l identity. It also locates this d imens ion in the broader context of the 
history of European moral thought - here Havel and his commenta to r s refer to the 
concept ion of truth of G e r m a n phi losopher Mar t in He idegge r and other sources . It 
a l lows seeing that these mot ives are not some backward form of ' socia l is t ' morali ty 
or a pure ly strategic s logan, demand ing freely access ible informat ion. 'T ru th ' and 
' au thent ic i ty ' refer here to specific no rma t ive intui t ions, wh ich have been present in 
society at the beginning of its democra t iza t ion process . 
'Spirituality' and vertical integration. T h e h a r d t r a n s l a t a b l e L a t v i a n w o r d 
' g a r i g u m s ' (Spirituality) has been widely used th roughout the civil activit ies from 
the mid-1980 ' s and is also still in use in some poli t ical contexts . C o m m o n l y it refers 
to cultural activities in the broad sense, with strong connota t ions of var ious k inds of 
collective religious or mys t ic exper ience: 
"If we should identify the main force of this Renewal, the onJv possible answer would 
be: the idea is becoming more evident in all of society, that we will be able to improve 
our life only by retrieving our lost spirituality."* 
The popular term ' s ing ing revolu t ion ' des igna tes not on ly that the democrat ic 
t ransi t ion most ly w a s no t violent . It also says that in this pe r iod free and publ ic 
col lect ive cultural ac t iv i t ies were pe r ce ived as a pol i t ical force, w h i c h uni te and 
emanc ipa te people as ac t ive actors of civil society. It s eems that this concept has 
two equally important d imens ions in this context - c o m m u n i c a t i v e and t ranscendent . 
T h e communica t ive d imens ion of free and publ ic cultural activity has been closely 
connected with the explos ive interest in re l igious, ph i losophica l and literary mat ters 
that can b e observed as para l le l to g r o w i n g pol i t ica l e n g a g e m e n t . This g r o w i n g 
interest cannot be regarded as divine revelat ion or natural enti ty - it has its roots in 
social activit ies, and can b e regarded as a sphere of identity bui ld ing for individuals 
as well as for groups. In this context ' t r anscendent ' e lements of spirituality have been 
important exactly as a newly opened field for free and equal communica t ion about 
intellectual or existential p rob lems , which p rev ious ly was sys temat ica l ly dis torted 
by ideological suspicions. 
One o f the few au tho r s w h o h a v e m a d e a sys temat i c a t tempt to ana lyze the 
' sp i r i tua l i ty ' of the Latvian third awaken ing is ph i losopher Peter is Lakis". Al though 
many of his observations are very interesting, his explanat ion o f this 'spiri tual r enewal ' 
as an expression of the long-preserved Latvian cultural identi ty cannot be regarded as 
fully adequate . Lakis seems to ignore the specific ro le this ' sp i r i tua l i ty ' has p l ayed in 
the mobi l izat ion o f civil associa t ions and groups . In this sense spirituality has in no 
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way been a pure ly ' sp i r i tua l ' p h e n o m e n o n - it has been a polit ically effective aspect 
of the civil socie ty 's search for its new identity. It has been conceived wide ly enough 
to incorporate very different identities, wh ich have not been Latvian in the nar row 
sense. Today it seems somewha t strange that in pictures of this period, in the forefront 
of manifestat ions of the Latvian Peop le ' s Front , there are t w o banners - the present 
national flag and the flag o f Nikolai Rer ih ' s society, which represents the specific kind 
of Oriental myst ic ism and actually has noth ing to do wi th strictly Latv ian identity. 
Then it was not perceived as something strange, as it is now - all these manifestat ions 
of ' spir i tual i ty ' have been accepted as far as they could he lp to act ivate peop le . This 
need for communica t ive spirituality has been similarly perce ived in other branches 
of the ' sp i r i tua l ' communi ty . Artists a lso began to pe rce ive their work as socially 
important: poets discuss the perspectives of political poe t ry 1 0 , the Union of Composers 
contemplates its o w n mis s ion by saying that "Mus ic mus t uni te p e o p l e " " . 
On the other hand , the link to t ranscendence is not less const i tut ive for the self-
unders tanding of Latvian civil m o v e m e n t s of this per iod - no t only in the explicit 
sense of traditional Chris t ian mot ives but a lso as other, pantheis t ic or pagan themes. 
One can recall the speech given by Da in i s Ivans in M e z a p a r k s 7 O c t o b e r 1988, 
where he asked for forgiveness to ' m o t h e r Latvia ' as to some personified deity. It 
is important to see that bo th these d imens ions - communica t i ve and t ranscendent -
can be seen as essential ly in terwoven. It is relation to t ranscendence wh ich enables 
authent ic c o m m u n i c a t i o n and m u t u a l respons ib i l i ty a m o n g the m e m b e r s of civil 
society. Mar t in J. Matus t ik makes an interest ing contr ibut ion here by showing how 
close this mentali ty, as represented by Have l , is to the ethical thought of Li thuania 
b o m Jewish thinker E m m a n u e l Lev inas 1 2 . T h e identity of a civil actor is consti tuted 
not by s o m e self-sufficient, rational ego, bu t by her p r imary responsibi l i ty to the 
Other. T h e ethical r e l a t i on to the Other is seen at the s a m e t ime as the re la t ion 
to t ranscendence, so the de-centred ethical individual is capable of communica t ion 
only if she recognizes that her own identi ty needs some 'ver t i ca l ' d imens ion of her 
original responsibUity. 
Conscience and 'substantiality of evil'. Bo th elements of the self-understanding of 
Latvian civil society during the democratic transition descr ibed above have found their 
expression in the percep t ion of the nature of polit ical activity. At first, a constant ly 
recurring e lement here is the traditional Protestant not ion o f individual consc ience 
in political life. One of m o s t popular ' sp i r i tua l ' ideologues of this per iod, Lutheran 
priest Modr i s Plate, says: 
"We are seeking the way out of the total crisis of society; for this purpose we are returning 
to morality and ethics, to universal values. We begin to admit that the key to resolving 
economic and other problems is to be found in the human being itself, in her inner 
harmony, enlightenment and strength." 1 5 
What is interest ing a n d tell ing in this quota t ion is the s t rong conv ic t ion that 
all social p rob lems are to b e solved by m e a n s of fol lowing one ' s o w n conscience , 
so the good poli t ical act ivi ty depends pr imar i ly on pe rce iv ing of wha t o n e ' s own 
conscience says. Also , as seen from this quota t ion, the source of universa l values 
and orientat ions is this specific inwardness - and the real exper ience of other people 
is seen as only secondary. These mot ives are very impor tan t for the r eawaken ing 
political consciousness of Latvian civil society: morali ty in poli t ics is seen as coming 
from individual and inward relation to some universal source , not from the poli t ical 
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communi ty itself. There is no trace of the idea that peop le ' s own moral intuit ions 
could change by exper iencing other people . 
This inwardness of mora l intuitions also leads to a dualistic percept ion of political 
actors and to an implicit assumpt ion of ' substant ia l i ty of ev i l ' . It can be illustrated 
by biblical metaphors constant ly used to expose the sel f -unders tanding of Latvian 
democrat izat ion m o v e m e n t s . The Last Judgment and the w a y of the Israelites to the 
Promised Land are constant ly reappear ing themes . Austr is Ozo l s writes: 
LThis is the time for reevaluation of all values. Gold is gold, seeds are seeds, and chaff 
is chaff. [..] Everything will find its own place. It will not be possible anymore to hide 
behind euphonic words an empty, hypocritical soul."1'1 
Or Dainis Ivans about his feelings being the leader of Latv ian People ' s Front: 
"The way of the Israelites from Egyptian serfdom to the Promised Land has been also 
the Latvian way of suffering. [We were] followed by pursuers, in front of us was raised 
the sea of torture, which opened itself in the eclipse of pain, saving us from burning in 
the darkly glowing hell of nations." 1 5 
W h a t can be seen in t he se a p o c a l y p t i c e x p r e s s i o n s is the e x t e n t to w h i c h 
democrat izat ion movemen t s have perceived themselves as a k ind of moral crusade. 
Agents perceive themselves as the only representa t ives of light in a fully dark world , 
and the evil is clearly identif iable and ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' . T h e r e a s o n w h y p e o p l e are 
supposed to represent it is not that they avoid fol lowing certain norms or commonly 
accepted principles. They represent the 'dark forces ' accord ing to some metaphysical 
division of the world, which does not come from the poli t ical s t ruggle , but only finds 
its expression in it. 
II 
Of course , it is hard to avoid the tempta t ion to interpret these or ientat ions as 
revolut ionary ideals, which have helped to mobi l i ze people in the transit ion period 
but have little re levance after the es tabl ishment of nat ional sovereignty and liberal 
democrat ic institutions. Never theless , such an approach wou ld be mis leading not only 
because this mental i ty in s o m e aspects is still qui te present in Latvian society and its 
percept ion of polit ics. These aspects can also show w h y it is so difficult to mobi l ize 
peop le for civic activities now, a l though they very often pe rce ive themselves as no 
less manipulated and humil ia ted as they did in the Soviet per iod. 
Processes of societal modernizat ion - liberalization of economy, professionalization 
of pol i t ics , commerc i a l i z a t i on of cu l ture a n d the pub l i c sphe re - in m a n y cases 
have led to the atomizat ion of society, to ins t rumenta l concep t ion of polit ics and to 
specific civil resentment - especial ly because of the poli t ical eli te 's unwi l l ingness to 
provide the amortizat ion for these inevi table p rob l ems of modern iza t ion . Everyday 
social praxis and intuit ions of civil solidari ty have b e c o m e separated by ostensibly 
impersona l and au tomat i c societa l t r ans format ions . At the s a m e t ime , dur ing the 
processes of democratic consolidation, the need for act ive and politically engaged civil 
society is perceived with increasing strength. This need would also require redefinition 
of the moral dimension of civil society - from negat ive terms of ant icommunis t denial 
to positive terms of au tonomous self-assert ion. In this context the civil exper ience of 
the 1980's can still be instructive. 
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The symbo l i c d imens ion of authenticity and truth undoub ted ly has p l a y e d a 
very important role in the mobi l izat ion of civil society in the period of democra t ic 
transition. At the s ame t ime it is not hard to see w h y this accentuated authentici ty 
could also lead to pol i t ical indifference and r e sen tmen t in civil socie ty after the 
es tabl ishment of liberal democra t ic inst i tut ions. Dur ing the transition phase truth in 
poli t ics has been pe rce ived as someth ing clearly visible for every ra t ional person 
w h o lives in accordance wi th her o w n conscience . The poli t ical elite fo rmed itself in 
the beginning of the 1990 ' s , the ' t ru th ' as immedia te and authentic t ransparence of 
polit ical decisions w h e n w a s lost from publ ic perception. For civil actors it has been 
really hard to accept the fact that dec is ion-making in poli t ics is n o m o r e based on 
' the Tru th ' , but p redominan t ly on the ba lance of powers and on conflicting interests. 
Therefore poli t ics has to a great extent been perceived as 'unauthent ic ' and ' un t rue ' 
as they were in Soviet t imes. At the same t ime the popular bel ief that what w e need 
to harmonize processes in our society is the redeeming force of " the Tru th" is still 
obviously dominant . The broad and uncondi t ional support for opening of the secret 
files of the K G B can b e a good example of that. 
The role of truth in m o d e m democracies has been widely discussed. Is it necessary 
to assume some substant ia l truth as a g round for good pol i t ics , or m a y b e there is 
nothing m o r e in truth than true or false l inguistic s ta tements , wh ich can be subjected 
to democra t ic d ia logue, as Richard Rorty sees i t 1 6 ? Wha teve r the right a n s w e r was , 
there is a s trong n e e d for transi t ion from a metaphys ica l ly to a communica t ive ly 
grounded percept ion of truth in Latvian pol i t ics . 'T ru th ' in the latter sense wou ld be 
the express ion of the idea that symmetr ic dialogue a m o n g different civil actors is 
more important for society than our strong convict ions about wha t the u l t imate truth 
is. Such t ransformation could also lead to a n e w 'au thent ic i ty ' of civil society - as its 
moral autonomy. T h e e lement of Fiavelian ' l iv ing in t ruth ' - opposi t ion to any kind 
of manipula t ive sys tem, a lso to economic and poli t ical sys tems of m o d e r n liberal 
democrac ies - could be revived here as a self-assertion of civil society by preserving 
its right to the pr ivate and cultural self-determination. 
N o n - c o m m u n i c a t i v e , t r a n s c e n d e n t d i m e n s i o n s of 'spirituality', a s w e l l as 
emphas ized impor tance of individual consc ience also show traditionalistic polit ical 
intuit ions, which inevi tably lead to d isappointment in civil life after the democra t ic 
transit ion. With increas ing commerc ia l iza t ion and 'Wes te rn iza t ion ' of the cul tutal 
sphere , ' sp i r i tua l i ty ' loses its ties with the communica t i ve praxis of civil society, 
gets almost exclusively rel igious connota t ions and becomes a slogan for short- l ived 
political part ies . 'Spi r i tua l i ty ' is n o more the place for the search of individual and 
g roup ident i ty in the r ecen t ly opened p u b l i c sphere - n o w it s imp ly des igna te s 
conserva t ive , t radi t ional is t ic poli t ical or ientat ion. C o m m o n cultural act ivi t ies still 
have their integrat ive force, but they are no more perceived as politically significant 
by their par t ic ipants as they were dur ing the ' s inging revolu t ion ' . This also clearly 
correlates with the unders tanding of civil society observable a m o n g m e m b e r s of the 
political elite. In this understanding, civil society and minori ty groups are a good thing 
only so far as they are occupied wi th the ' cu l tura l ' mat ters in the narrow, apolit ical 
sense and do not try to influence political decisions. 
The ro le of morality in Western democrac ies has been discussed very wide ly in 
poli t ical theory. There are authors , like Niklas Luhmann , w h o argue that in m o d e m , 
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functionally differentiated societies, moral i ty ma in ly creates conflicts, not unanimity, 
therefore democrat ic poli t ics mus t p roceed on the level "of h igher amora l i ty" 1 7 . If 
ex t r eme , never the less this app roach s h o w s o n e impor tan t d i m e n s i o n of m o d e m 
politics. The excessive moralizat ion of political controversies creates a distorted image 
of m o d e m political communica t ion , wh ich is rather based on the code 'powerful / 
power l e s s ' , than on ' m o r a l / i m m o r a l ' or ' good /ev i l ' . By cal l ing somebody an evil 
or a corrupt scoundrel one renders this pe r son or party pr incipal ly incommunicab le 
and unelec table - wh ich cannot be regarded as a democra t ic approach to political 
process . In this context one could recall the m a n y at tempts to present one ' s political 
opponents as moral ly evil pe rsons - as the representa t ives of "da rk forces", as agents 
of s o m e Stalinist conspiracy, or as mal ic ious egois ts , w h o let children and old people 
starve on the street. This overmoralizing of political rhetoric, clearly hav ing its roots 
in the period of democra t ic transit ion, could be potent ial ly dangerous for Latv ian 
pol i t ics , wh ich is still influenced by in tu i t ions of p re -1991 pol i t ical menta l i ty . It 
distorts the percept ion of polit ical life and creates the il lusion that m a k i n g political 
decisions is a dualistic s t ruggle be tween good and evil individuals , wh ich is hardly 
the case . Bes ides this overmoral iz ing provides great oppor tuni t ies to create n e w ad-
hoc poli t ical actors - all they need to do is to posi t ion themse lves as the new. moral ly 
impeccab le mess iahs against previous ly rul ing evil bas ta rds . P rev ious exper ience 
and sober evaluation can be only secondary. This percept ion of substantially mora l 
pol i t ics has found its express ion in the start l ing statistics about the trust in public 
institutions - people trust mass media, but do not trust pol i t ic ians and political part ies. 
This could b e at least partly expla inable by s o m e kind of mora l self-understanding. 
M a s s media reproduces public moral i ty and constant ly w o r k s wi th the images of the 
good and the evil, the honest and the d ishones t etc. Rea l pol i t ic ians, on the contrary, 
usually seem to correspond to the intuit ions o f popu la r moral i ty only once - w h e n 
they have jus t appeared on the polit ical stage. 
O n the other hand , it wou ld be too easy to deny the popu la r moral intuit ions of 
any role in political life. At least from the age o f Machiavel l i , political theory has been 
haunted by visions of morali ty-free and pure ly technologica l pol i t ics . Never the less , 
morality has always c o m e back - as quest ioning for jus t ice , for liberation and equality. 
But with the emerging of the modern world whe re there is n o last mora l instance 
as some supernatural authori ty; this mora l d imens ion has t ransformed itself. Mora l 
quest ions are no more th inkable in t ranscendent and tradi t ional terms - moral i ty is 
created here on Ear th , a m o n g human be ings . In this sense , the moral competence 
of a citizen cannot b e evaluated according to her individual consc ience as to some 
div ine voice speak ing in he r - as it w a s genera l ly p e r c e i v e d dur ing the ' s ing ing 
revolu t ion ' . Rather, the n e w civil mora l i ty wou ld d e m a n d her ability to relat ivize 
her own concept ion of good life versus those of o ther people . 
In this context, the p rob lem of c o m m o n identi ty is c losely connected to moral 
self-perception. Wha t kind o f communi ty w e want to be - this quest ion is closely 
l inked with another: wha t are the c o m m o n n o r m s we wan t to fol low? In this context 
interesting suggest ions have been m a d e by Jiirgen H a b e r m a s . w h o defend the view 
that only the dialogue on normat ive ques t ions can p rese rve the rat ional group and 
individual identity in the fragmentary, post- t radi t ional society, which is increasingly 
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regulated b y money and power . If Haberrnas is right, mora l inmit ions of Latv ian civil 
society, inher i ted from democra t ic t ransformat ion, should not be e l imina ted . They 
have to b e t ransformed accord ing ly to La tv ia ' s s t ra tegic or ienta t ion to b e c o m i n g 
a m o d e m democra t ic society. This wou ld include the restr ic t ion of tradit ionalist ic 
mora l rhetor ic about 'da rk forces ' and 'br ight forces ' , ' cor rupt bandi t s ' and 'unselfish 
pa t r io t s ' be ing abused by the polit ical elite. Also a symmet r i c and s ta te-supported 
dia logue about normat ive p rob lems in civil society is needed , whereby civil society 
could once more perce ive itself as be ing a subject, and not only an object of Latvian 
polit ics. 
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K o p s a v i l k u m s 
Saja raksta , balstot ies uz l i teraru un publ ic is t i sku avotu anallzi , t iek aplukota 
Latvijas "dz iesmotas revoluci jas" dal ibnieku pol i t iska pas izpra tne , ka a n tas ie tekme 
uz velakajiem poli t ikas p roces iem atjaunotas demokra t i jas apstakjos. Raksta p inna ja 
dala tiek apskatTti tris nozTmTgi elementi , kas raks turo so pi lsoniskas sabiedrlbas "zelta 
pe r iodu" : au ten t i skums j e b n e p i e c i e s a m l b a p e c "eks i s tenc ia l i p a t i e s a s " pol i t ikas , 
ga r igums ka kopsaucejs indivTdu un grupu ident i ta tes m e k l e j u m i e m un " l a u n u m a 
substancia l i ta te" j eb po l i t i sko p re t runu b inara , man ihe i s t i ska moral izaci ja . Raks ta 
otraja dala tiek izvirzlta teze: lai gan mineta jam orientacijam bija liela noz ime Latvijas 
demokra t i skas parejas aps tak los , to i e t e k m e uz pol i t i sk i ie in te rese tas p i l son iskas 
sabiedrlbas ve idosanos liberali demokra t i skas iekartas aps taklos nepav i sam nav tikai 
pozit lva. Pi lsoniska pasivi ta te . kas liela m e r a ir raksturojusi at jaunotas demokrat i jas 
po l i t i sko dz lv i , bu tu p a r v a r a m a ar p a k a p e n i s k u a t b r i v o s a n o s no t rad ic iona la jam 
moralajam orientacijam par labu p i l sonu komunikatTvai iesaistei pol i t isko l emumu 
izvertesana. 
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As an independent Latvia emerged from a fast collapsing Soviet Union in August 1991, the 
Latvian Peoples Front (Latvijas Tautas Fronte), the political umbrella organization uniting 
nationalists, reform communists, dissidents, greens and numerous other political groups in the 
battle for independence, began to fragment, and new political parties formed in preparation 
for the first free post-communist elections. Since then, around a hundred parties and electoral 
coalitions have competed in four parliamentary elections, although only eighteen have actually 
succeeded in winning parliamentary seats. 
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In these thir teen yea r s of democra t ic activity, a c lear mode l of La tv ian par ty 
organizat ion has emerged . Essentially, part ies can be descr ibed as ' th ick ' and ' th in ' . 
' T h i c k ' in t e rms of par ty finances, benefi t ing from generous polit ical par ty financing 
r e g u l a t i o n s c o u p l e d w i t h lax r e g u l a t i o n : 1 ' t h i n ' in t e r m s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n , wi th 
small m e m b e r s h i p s , s t rong char ismat ic party leaders and centra l ized, profess ional 
managemen t . In te rms of party mode ls , they resemble ' ca t ch -a l l ' part ies that have 
abandoned "at tempts at the intel lectual and mora l e n c a d r e m e n t of the m a s s e s ' in 
exchange for seek ing ' a w ide r aud ience and more i m m e d i a t e electoral s u c c e s s ' 2 ; 
or the ' e lec tora l -profess ional ' party that mobi l izes only for elect ions and rel ies on 
a ' char i smat ic l eader ' to attract vo ters . 3 Both mode ls reject ideology as a form of 
political identification, ho ld ing it to be ou tmoded , i r re levant , and cons t ra in ing the 
ability of a party to appeal to the largest possible part of the electorate . As a result , 
La tv ian par t ies could b e expec ted to h a v e neg lec ted the ideologica l cons t ruc t ion 
aspect of party. However , this has not been the case. 
Latvian parties have deve loped poli t ical identit ies b a s e d on establ ished poli t ical 
ideologies . Part ies p roc la iming a soc ia l -democra t ic or conserva t ive ideo logy have 
been elected to every par l iament . Greens and agrar ians are in the current gove rnmen t 
coalit ion. Indeed, all the major democra t ic polit ical ideologies have been represented 
in the par l iament . At the s a m e t ime, it should be recogn ized that these ideologies 
ope ra t e in a par ty s y s t e m w h e r e the p e r v a s i v e d i v i d i n g fac tor is e thn ic i ty . Put 
simply, e thnic Latvians overwhe lming ly vote for ' L a t v i a n ' par t ies , whi le Russ ian-
speakers overwhe lming ly vote for ' R u s s i a n ' par t ies . 4 Part ies with similar p r o g r a m s 
140 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
and ideologies do not openly cooperate in the Latvian parliament if they represent 
different ethnic communities. Perhaps it is best to visualize two party systems in 
Latvia - one Russian-speaking, and one Latvian. While the Russian-speaking system 
contains parties clustered around the centre and left wing of the political spectrum, the 
Latvian system contains a full spectrum of ideologically left to right parties. However, 
how far does ideology actually shape policy-making, and how far is it simply used 
for external identification or as a faeade of 'respectability'? 
This paper seeks to partly answer this question by looking at the most successful 
party in modem Latvian political history, Latvia's Way (Latvijas Cejs - LC). This is 
done for two reasons.- First, being in every coalition government between 1993-2002 
(see annex 1), LC had the opportunity to at least partly execute its policies. Second, 
it has been argued that the long-term success of LC led to other Latvian parties, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, modeling themselves after LC. 6 
The paper is structured in the following way. First, it will briefly consider how 
parties use political ideology. It will then turn to look at Latvia's Way and the liberal 
ideology it adopted in more detail before moving on to look at three policy areas 
(minorities, economics and foreign affairs) in which LC has played a key role. Finally, 
the paper will consider how LC has used liberalism in forging its political identity, and 
argue that ideology plays a more important role in party identity than is commonly 
accepted. 
Political Ideology and Liberalism 
Political ideology is a set of constantly evolving political ideas that make general 
assumptions about the way in which human beings act, and form specific, cohesive 
policy proposals. Political parties have traditionally used ideology for three main 
reasons: First, to provide a comprehensible framework for programs of political action. 
Second, as a vote-catching device, particularly when a particular ideology has wide 
support at a specific period of time (as with social democracy in twentieth century 
Sweden). Third, it provides both internal and external sources of identity by locating 
a party in the political spectrum - occasionally even as a faeade of respectability 
e.g. the 'Liberal Democratic Party' in present day Russia or the 'National Socialist 
German Workers Party' in inter-war Germany. 
Political ideology was largely discredited in post-1991 Latvia. As one LC 
parliamentarian explained in 2002: 'The term ideology in Latvia has a very dark 
meaning, because in the previous regime political parties were actually very 
repressive. So we are still scared to use this term - ideology'. Nevertheless, by 
the 1993 parliamentary election, political parties were identifying themselves with 
concrete political ideologies in their pre-electoral programs. For some parties this 
ideological identification came automatically, as the leading parties of the inter-war 
era were 'restored' - the Latvian Social Democrat Workers Party, the Latvian Farmers 
Union, the Democratic Center and so on. In contrast. LC was one of the 'new' parties 
that had no previous ideological baggage, yet still chose to identify itself on the 
ideological scale - as a liberal party. 
Before discussing why LC chose a liberal identity, the paper will turn to briefly 
define liberalism. However, liberalism, as one of the oldest political ideologies, 
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tracing its origins back to the seventeenth century, does not naturally lend itself to 
a pi thy definition, 8 It has been constant ly evolving for a lmost four hundred years, 
mean ing different things at different t imes , in different par ts of the wor ld , the only 
constant be ing that it is tradit ionally associated wi th mode ra t e reform or progress , 
and the political center ground. In order to avoid a d ivers ion into a lengthy debate 
on l iberal ism, pe rhaps the mos t appropria te definition can be taken from the 'Liberal 
Mani fes to ' of the Liberal International , the organization uni t ing global liberal part ies, 
and of wh ich LC has been a m e m b e r since 1993. This defines l iberalism as ' f reedom, 
responsibdi ty , tolerance, social jus t ice and equality of oppor tun i ty . . . these pr inciples 
require a careful balance of strong civil societies, democratic government , free markets , 
and international coope ra t ion ' . 9 This also identifies three pol icy areas with a distinct 
liberal agenda: (i) minor i ty policy (the mos t chal lenging aspect of deve lop ing 'civil 
socie ty ' and 'democra t ic gove rnmen t ' in modern Latvia) ; (ii) economic po l icy ('free 
marke t ' ) ; and (iii) foreign pol icy ( ' internat ional coopera t ion ' ) . But before the paper 
turns to look at the extent to which L C has fol lowed ideological ly liberal pol ic ies in 
these areas, the fol lowing section will look at LC in ra ther more detail. 
Latvia's Way - A Political 'Bouillabaisse' 
'Latvia ' s Way ' was the dominant party of Latvian polit ics from 1993-2002. It was 
the only party represented in each of the eight government coalitions in this per iod and 
it a lso provided four of the eight Pr ime Ministers and significantly m o r e ministerial 
portfolios than any other par ty (see annex 1). A tired and lackluster c a m p a i g n saw 
it finish be low the 5 % threshold in the 2 0 0 2 par l iamentary election. Never the less , 
following a change of leadership and cadre turnover, it successfully c ame back in the 
2004 European Par l iamentary elections, p icking up one of the eight Latvian mandates . 
Its single M e m b e r of European Parl iament sits in the liberal bloc (Alliance of Liberals 
and Democra t s for Europe - A L D E ) . 
Table 1 
LC's Performance in Parliamentary Elections: 1993-2002 
Year of Election 1993 1995 1998 2002 
% of votes 32.41% 14.65% 18.05% 4.9% 
f= of seats (/100) 36 17 21 0 
Source: www.cvk.lv (Latvian central election commission) 
LC w a s founded on 1 3 t h February 1993 by m e m b e r s o f the elite ' C l u b 21 ' ' ° 
and emigre Latvians represent ing the World Federa t ion of F ree Latvians ( W F F L ) . 1 1 
They decided to invite a n u m b e r of leading ex-communis t s to jo in the par ty because 
some, especial ly former speaker of the Supreme Counci l , Anatol i js G o r b u n o v s . were 
riding high in con temporary opinion polls . Thus , from its very beginning L C served 
as an umbrel la organiza t ion for three diverse groups (i) emigre Latv ians (largely 
politically conservat ive and nationalist); (ii) Soviet era nomenc la tu re and (iii) C lub 21 
(representing the n e w political and economic nomenclature) . It differed quite radically 
from the other part ies of the early 1990's , which contained small , h o m o g e n o u s groups 
of l ike-minded individuals . In contrast , LC was a d iverse poli t ical ' bou i l l aba i s se ' 
from its very beg inn ing . 1 2 
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This diversity a l lowed LC to draw on a greater pool of h u m a n resources than 
other par t ies and LC c a m e be k n o w n to as the ' d r e a m t e a m ' of Latvian pol i t ics . 
Indeed, right up until its electoral demise in 2002 , it cont inued to have a seemingly 
bo t tomless pool of pol i t ic ians from w h i c h to d r e d g e P r i m e Minis te rs , min i s te r s , 
parl iamentarians, local authority leaders, and pa t ronage representatives in a whole host 
of state institutions. At the same t ime, this diversi ty could also have led to difficulties 
in developing a cohesive political identity. This p rob lem was tackled by the rapid 
adopt ion of a liberal ideology. Indeed, at its first par ty Congress in 1994, the LC 
leadership announced that it had filed for m e m b e r s h i p in the Liberal Internat ional . 1 3 
But h o w did LC define l ibera l ism? In te rv iews wi th par ty elite m a d e it c lear that 
liberalism was interpreted as individualism: 'no-one can actually call L C and order the 
party to do someth ing ' , because there was n o central unified idea or plan of ac t ion . 1 4 
Thus l iberalism was used to explain away conflicts and differences that arose from 
the diversi ty of its member s . Indeed, ' the rat ional reason for the formation of L C was 
not l iberalism but p o w e r . . . ideology w a s not important - l iberal ism was the same 
as c o m m u n i s m or f a s c i s m ' . " Indeed, s o m e m e m b e r s of the party did not hide their 
lack of support for liberal values . W h e n one founding m e m b e r was asked in 1995 
whether he identified h imse l f as l iberal or conserva t ive , h e answered: ' conservat ive . 
I bel ieve in tested, tradit ional values. '"" 
Thus LC chose liberalism specifically because of its flexibility and potentially many 
different interpretations: ' from the very beginning the LC ideology has been to adopt the 
best features of these [UK. Canada and the U S A ] different sy s t ems . ' 1 7 Also, L C was 
formed at a time that Francis Fukuyama captured as the 'End of History' (the ideological 
victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over c o m m u n i s m and other - i s m s ) , when it 
was believed that l iberalism was popular wi th the e lectorate . 1 8 Finally, the ascendancy 
of liberal ideology meant that it attracted young cadres to the party. One senior long-
term party functionary described how she 'was a 4 t h or 5 t h ' year student of phi losophy 
in 1993, and in ideological terms I had b e c o m e a liberal. L C claimed to be liberals, so 
I decided to go and see what liberals look like close u p . ' 1 9 
Thus LC initially adopted liberalism as a vote-catching, recruitment and identity 
device, but not specifically for policy framing purposes . So have L C policies been 
liberal? The paper will n o w turn to look at the role of L C in three key policy areas. 
Minority Policy 
Minority policy has been the most contentious policy area for Latvian governments 
since the renewal of independence in 1991 . It has centered around two major issues: 
ci t izenship and language. In terms of ci t izenship, the issue initially polar ized be tween 
the ' z e r o op t ion ' of g r an t ing c i t i zensh ip to the ent i re p o p u l a t i o n of the La tv ian 
territory, or a more l imi ted interpretation based on Latvian ' e thnic i ty ' and the legal 
cont inui ty of the p r e -1940 Latvian state. L a n g u a g e policy, on the other hand , has 
been divided a round the extent to which the Russian language should be used in the 
public sector . 2 0 
A classical liberal posi t ion on minor i ty pol icy would emphas ize the equali ty of 
all peop le before the law, the duty of the democra t ic major i ty to care for the interests 
of the minority, as wel l as individual freedoms suppor t ing mass par t ic ipat ion in the 
democrat ic process , the eradicat ion of barr iers to e m p l o y m e n t and full part icipat ion 
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in the civic life of the country. At first g lance , it appears that Latvia fol lowed a very 
different track. 
The ci t izenship law adopted in 1994 was very different from that adopted during 
the first independence era. Whi le the pr inciple behind the 1919 law was one of jus 
solis where ci t izenship w a s based on the place of bir th, the 1994 law was based on 
the pr inciple of jus sanguine where nat ional i ty is acquired through descent from the 
parents . Ci t izenship w a s automatical ly granted only to those individuals w h o were 
citizens before the Soviet occupat ion of 11^ July 1940, and their direct descendants . 
Those peop le w h o m o v e d to Latv ia in the Soviet era ( o v e r w h e l m i n g l y Russ ian-
speakers) were den ied au tomat i c c i t izenship . The law on the renewal o f Latv ian 
ci t izenship was passed in October 1 9 9 1 . 2 1 but it was a gove rnmen t coal i t ion led by 
L C that adopted the c i t izenship law laying out the s teps to natura l iza t ion in July 
1994. It was deeply controversial , d ividing potential ci t izens into quota g roups based 
on age and length of res idency in Latvia, rather than v iewing potential ci t izens as 
individuals . The law w a s only l iberalized, put t ing the emphas i s on individuals rather 
than groups , in Oc tober 1998 after a nat ional referendum on the issue. 
The two key p ieces o f language legislat ion actually c a m e before LC w a s formed 
as a pol i t ical unit . T h e 1989 language law declared La tv ian as the jo in t nat ional 
language of the Latvian Republ ic (with Russian) , but the 1992 law, and a series of 
addit ional laws and regula t ions in the same year, essential ly made Latvian the sole 
state l anguage . As a resul t , civil se rvants and o ther s ta te e m p l o y e e s m u s t speak 
Latvian at a certain graded level, and a language test is part of the process o f gaining 
citizenship. At the same t ime, however, the state has continued to fund schools teaching 
in Russian and other minor i ty languages, minority cultural organizat ions, and there are 
no restrictions on the use o f Russian in commerce . The aim of language pol icy appears 
to have been integrat ion o f the popula t ion through the Latvian language - mot ivat ing 
Russian speakers to b e c o m e bi l ingual . It could be argued that a more liberal course 
would have been to main ta in Russian as a state language after 1992. However , in 
the long- term this wou ld have probably exacerbated ethnic relations by main ta in ing 
a cultural division b e t w e e n Russian speakers and Latvians (which still exis ts , to a 
large extent , through paral le l newspapers , electronic med ia etc.). Moreover , Latvian 
poli t icians feared that Russ ian would eventual ly s w a m p the Latvian language , the 
key identi ty point of the Latvian nation. 
Both the cabinet g o v e r n m e n t s of Valdis Bi rkavs and Mar i s Gai l is , L C Pr ime 
Ministers be tween 1993 and 1995, were 100% ethnic-Latvian, and LC has pr imari ly 
appealed to ethnic Latv ian voters . Indeed, LC is a party m a d e up almost who l ly of 
ethnic Latvians . 2 2 Nevertheless, L C initially adopted a moderate tone. LCs first electoral 
p rogram in 1993 p roposed grant ing ci t izenship to Russian speakers gradually, based 
upon individual merit e.g. Latvian language fluency. 2 3 M a r k Jubulis has argued that 
this makes LC radical ly different from other part ies because 'La tv ia ' s Way followed 
a cultural form of na t iona l i sm, which m a d e cit izenship pr imar i ly cont ingent upon 
integrat ion into Latvian society through the acquisi t ion of l anguage skills, and has 
also been more p ragmat i c and wi l l ing to reach c o m p r o m i s e s . . . in short , La tv ia ' s 
Way v iewed non-ci t izens as potential c i t izens, capable of be ing integrated, whi le the 
radical r ight v iewed the non-ci t izens as "occup ie r s " w h o should be barred from ever 
acquir ing Latvian ci t izenship ' . 2 ' 4 
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Certainly, L C adop ted a l iberal po l i cy in the La tv ian contex t - ho ld ing the 
political middle ground be tween the ' ze ro op t ion ' and deny ing Russ ian-speakers the 
opportuni ty to b e c o m e cit izens. Moreover , L C s support o f individual , ra ther than 
collect ive rights in te rms of acquir ing c i t izenship , is a c lassical ly liberal posi t ion. 
Essentially, L C has acted as a restraining influence on the more nationalist forces 
found in government coalit ion part ies. 
Economic Policy 
Latvia ' s accession to the European Union , as wel l as membersh ip in the World 
Trade Organizat ion and a host of other international organizat ions, has proven that the 
Latvian economy has been reconst ructed from the central ized Soviet-type to an open 
market economy. Economic g rowth in recent years has been among the highest in 
Europe (GDP growth of 6 . 1 % in 2002 and 7 .4% in 2 0 0 3 2 5 ) . At the same t ime, Latvia 
is the poorest m e m b e r state of the European U n i o n and has occupied 5 0 t h posi t ion in 
the United Nat ions Deve lopmen t P rogram H u m a n Deve lopment Index for four years , 
well behind the other two Balt ic States (Li thuania was 4 1 s t and Estonia 3 6 t h in the 
2004 rankings) . Moreover . Latvia has consis tent ly been ranked well beh ind its Baltic 
ne ighbors in the Transparency International rankings on percept ions of corruption. 
Indeed, a 2001 World B a n k report on ' Ant icorrupt ion in Transi t ion ' argued that Latvia 
suffered from a part icularly h igh degree of ' s ta te capture ' corruption ( 5 t h a m o n g the 
20 pos t -communis t countr ies surveyed, and the highest a m o n g those countr ies that 
have since j o i n e d the European Union) - defined as individuals, groups or firms from 
the publ ic sector illicitly influencing state insti tutions to m a k e favorable decisions 
on their behal f . 2 6 Cor rup t ion has a nega t ive impac t on the nat ional economy, by 
frightening (or confusing) potential foreign investors and denying the state taxat ion 
or o ther income through the misal locat ion of resources. Moreover , corruption eats 
away at support for the democrat ic sys tem - publ ic support for political part ies and 
poli t icians in Latvia is the lowest a m o n g the n e w EU m e m b e r s ta tes . 2 7 
Table 2 
Latvia and the UNDP HDI 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
HDI Ranking 55 92 92 74 63 50 50 50 50 
Source: www.undp.org 
Economic pol icy is one o f the defining features o f l iberal ism. Class ic liberal 
economic theory emphas izes l imited governmen t and laissez-faire economics guided 
by the invisible hand of the market . Liberals in the twent ie th century have , however , 
advocated s t ronger g o v e r n m e n t intervention in the economy, al though the last fifteen 
years have seen a renewed debate on the extent o f government influence. Nevertheless , 
it is clear that a liberal approach to economics would support a radical overhaul of 
the Latvian economy from the Soviet c o m m a n d - d r i v e n sys tem to a m o r e market 
oriented mode l . This wou ld entail economic l iberal izat ion, privat izat ion and so on. 
At the same t ime, m o d e m liberalism would a lso advoca te soc io-economic policies 
defending the disadvantaged. 
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The first e conomic pol icy s ta tements from L C were blatant ly popul is t , p romis ing 
that, if elected to gove rnmen t , LC wou ld double the income of every family in Latvia 
every twelve m o n t h s . 2 8 L C ' s 1993 pre-elect ion manifesto cont inued this theme, calling 
for pens ions to be radical ly raised and the provis ion of universal heal th-care through 
the introduct ion of obl igatory health insurance , as well as rapid l iberal izat ion and 
privat izat ion. 2 9 LC had a comprehensive economics p rog ram based around the 'Latvia-
2 0 0 0 ' paper e laborated in 1992 by a g roup of Latvian economis t s w h o had studied 
economics at Geo rge town universi ty under the gu idance of the La tv ian-Amer ican 
economics professor, Juris Viksnins. 'La tv ia 2 0 0 0 ' called for the creation of a market 
economy with a s t rong social safety net . cuts in subsidies to Latvian industry, and 
the eradicat ion of protect ionis t import measures . Marju Nis s inen has c o m p a r e d it 
to the Ge rman soziale Marktwirtschaft e conomic m o d e l . 3 0 La tv ia -2000 also called 
for a rapid p rogram of privat izat ion, setting the target of pr ivat iz ing 7 5 % of state-
owned enterprises by 1996. LC certainly had the oppor tuni ty of real izing these a ims, 
control l ing the Minis t ry of F inance portfol io from 1993-1995 , the years w h e n the 
f ramework for pr ivat izat ion and l iberal izat ion was pu t in p lace . Of course , Latvian 
pol icy-makers were also constrained by the Washington consensus policies of the IMF 
and World Bank that p layed a key role in reforming e c o n o m i c pol icies all across the 
east-central European region. However , the details of, for ins tance, how to privatize 
were left in the hands of nat ional pol icy make r s , and L C can c la im at least par t of the 
plaudits for the m a c r o e c o n o m i c reforms. The success of the other side of economic 
reform - soc ioeconomic pol icies — is open to interpretation. 
The most controvers ia l aspect of L C s role in economic reform has been in terms 
of corruption. Party wal le ts are ' th ick ' because of the generosi ty of par ty benefactors . 
Interviewees did not hide that over the course of its history, L C had been sponsored by 
a n u m b e r of economic groupings (or ' o l iga rchs ' ) that in turn gained some economic 
good from gove rnmen t pol ic ies . Specifically, L C control led the Privat izat ion Agency 
from its inception, and through its most productive years. Whi le accusations of political 
corruption have been difficult to prove, the lack of t ransparency in the pr ivat izat ion of 
huge chunks of Latv ian real-estate and profitable s ta te -owned businesses are difficult 
to explain in a liberal context . Moreover , the dis i l lus ionment of the popu la t ion with 
the state of economic reform and the poli t ical es tabl ishment cont inues to play a key 
role in the instabdi ty of the Latvian par ty system. 
Foreign Policy 
The fore ign p o l i c y o f La tv i a h a s b e e n s t rong ly o r i e n t e d t o w a r d s t he west . 
In tegra t ion wi th the E u r o p e a n U n i o n and N A T O as wel l as o the r i n t e rna t iona l 
o rgan iza t ions , has b e e n the pr ior i ty of all La tv ian g o v e r n m e n t s s ince 1 9 9 1 , and 
was achieved by the midd le of 2004 . At the same t ime, Latvia has had a difficult 
relationship with Russ ia largely because of the ci t izenship and language pol icy issues. 
For example , there is still n o Latvia-Russia border treaty. 
A liberal foreign pol icy is traditionally internationalist , support ing international 
institutions (from the inter-war League of Nations to the great number of post-second 
world war institutions) and active engagement with the international community. In the 
m o d e m era, there has been an emphasis on respect for international law and international 
institutions, and for national foreign policies that encourage international development. 
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There can be little doubt that L C has pursued jus t such an agenda. Moreover . 
LCs role in this process is qui te clear because it monopo l i zed the Fore ign Minis te r ' s 
portfolio from 1993 to 2002 , as well as a n u m b e r of o ther impor tant foreign policy 
pos ts . 3 1 L C has consistently reoriented Latv ian foreign pol icy from the east to the 
west. As a former Pr ime Minis ter rather colorfully said: 'Russ i a is like a big vacuum 
cleaner and we mus t a lways run forward to b e rooted in wes te rn society. If w e stop 
running, w e will be sucked i n . ' 3 2 
Pursuing a western-or iented foreign po l icy has also had a knock-on effect in a 
number of other foreign pol icy areas. The deregula t ion of the Latvian economy, the 
lowering of tariffs and opening the nat ional e c o n o m y to increased compet i t ion , as 
wel l as the increased personal freedom to w o r k and travel in the European Union 
are certainly liberal pol ic ies . Moreover , the ' c o n d i t i o n a l l y ' of accession to the EU. 
whereby Latvia had to fulfill certain human rights, democracy , and economic criteria, 
we re important in shaping domes t ic policy. Indeed , an or ientat ion away from Russia 
and the other post-Soviet states, with their ra ther dubious h u m a n rights and democrat ic 
records , could also be cons t rued as a liberal step. 
Conclusion 
What does this br ief survey of three key L C pol icy areas reveal? Certainly, LC 
has held consistent pol icy posi t ions in minori ty , e conomic and foreign policy areas. 
Moreover , economic l iberal izat ion and integrat ion wi th internat ional organizat ions 
can certainly be seen as p romot ing liberal va lues . However , L C s s tance on minori ty 
policy is less clear cut, a l though in the polar ized context of Latvian poli t ics, it can 
be said to have played a modera t ing role. 
LC has clearly used l iberalism to attract votes , m e m b e r s and build an identity and 
place in the Latvian poli t ical spectrum. It has also adopted largely l iberal pol ic ies , at 
least in the three areas reviewed. Whi le not all in terviewees agree ( ' the party program 
is an ideological ly eclect ic cocktail . If you look at the par ty ' s poli t ical behavior , or its 
p rogram in office, then y o u can see that it has not really been very l ibe ra l . ' 3 3 ) it does 
appear that LC followed a liberal manifes to . Of course , this w a s also the advantage 
of adopt ing l iberalism - i t can be difficult to pin down . 
Thus polit ical identi ty has p layed an impor tan t role for LC. Moreover , in the 
pos t -communis t era. w h e n there were few solid social bases on wh ich to structure 
parties, and society was fluid, polit ical ideo logy w a s an anchor to which the party 
could at tach itself, and even give voters s o m e clari ty in the party sys tem. Perhaps it 
is no coinc idence that the longest surviving par t ies in pos t - commun i s t Latvia - LC, 
the Latvian Social Democra t i c Workers Party, Fo r Fa ther land and F reedom / Latvian 
Nat ional Independence M o v e m e n t , Latvian Farmers Un ion and the Green Party, all 
claim a s trong ideological l inkage. N o doubt , these par t ies have accen tua ted their 
charismatic leaders as m u c h as their poli t ical ideology. Never the less , it s eems that 
ideology has played an important role in defining par ty identi ty both inwardly and 
outwardly. 
But was this del ibera te? After all, l iberal ism w a s init ial ly adopted by LC largely 
because it was the ascendant ideology in 1993. It s eems that as t ime wen t by LC 
became const ra ined by its ideology. F r o m be ing a source o f ou tward identity, it also 
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became a source of internal identity and cohes ion. M o r e compara t ive research must 
be under taken in order to consider the wid er use of ideology by parties in Latvia 
and e lsewhere in the east-central Eu ropean states. But in the case of L C , it seems 
that the impor tance of ideological identi ty has been underes t imated . 
A n n e x 1: Compos i t ion of Latvian G o v e r n m e n t s 1993-2002 . List of Latvia 's Way 
Ministers and P r i m e Minis ters 
1993-1994: 
1. Valdis Birkavs - Prime Minister 
2. Georgs Andrejevs - Foreign Minister 
3. Ojars Kehris - Economics Minister 
4. Uldis Osis - Finance Minister 
5. Andris Gutmanis - Transport Minister 
6. Janis Vaivads - Education, Science and Culture Minister 
7. Egils Levits - Justice Minister 
8. Maris Gailis - State Reform Minister 
9. Valdis Pavlovskis - Defence Minister 
10. G ' t s Kristovskis - Interior Minister 
11. EdvTns Inkens - Special Tasks Minister 
12. Janis Platais - Budget Minister 
13. OJgerts Pavlovskis - European Union and External Trade Minister 
14. Gunars Meierovics- Baltic and Nordic States Affairs Minister 
15. Andris Berzins - Labour Minister 
16. Druvis Skulte - Privatization Minister 
17. Vilis Kristopans - State Income Minister 
18. Normunds Zemvaldis - Health Minister 
1994-1995 (September 1994 - December 1995): 
1. Maris Gailis - Prime Minister 
2. Valdis Birkavs - Foreign Minister 
3. Andris Piebalgs (later Indra Samite) - Finance Minister 
4. Girts Kristovskis (later Janis Adamsons) - Interior Minister 
5. Janis Vaivads (later Janis Gaigals) - Education and Science Minister 
6. Andris Gutmanis - Transport Minister 
7. Andris Berzins - Social Security Minister 
8. Romans ApsTtis- Justice Minister 
9. Vita Te rauda - State Reform Minister (until 30.06.95.) 
10. 0|gerts Pavlovskis - European Union and International Trade Minister 
11. Aija Poca - State Income Minister 
12. Raimonds JonTtis - Industry and Privatization Minister 
13. Druvis Skulte - Privatization Minister (until 20.03.95.) 
14. Peteris Apinis - Health Minister 
15. Janis Bunkss - Local Authority Minister 
1995-1997 (December to January 1997, then February 1997 to July 1997) 
Prime Minister Andris Skele (independent) 
1. Valdis Birkavs - Foreign Minister 
2. Vilis Kristopans - Transport Minister 
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3. Maris Gailis (later Anatolijs Gorbunovs) - Environment and Regional Development 
Minister 
4. Janis Gaigals - Education and Science Minister 
5. Aija P o c a - State Income Minister 
6. Andris Berzins - Employment Minister 
1997 (August) -1998 (October) 
Prime Minister Guntars Krasts (TB/LNNK) 
1. Valdis Birkavs - Foreign Minister 
2. Vilis Kristopans - Transport Minister 
3. Anatolijs Gorbunovs - Environment and Regional Development Minister 
4. Janis Bunkss - Local Authority Minister 
5. Aija Poca - State Reform Minister 
1998-1999 
1. Vilis Kristopans - Prime Minister 
2. Anatolijs Gorbunovs - Transport Minister 
3. Valdis Birkavs - Foreign Minister 
4. Janis Gaigals - Education and Science Minister 
5. Karina Petersone - Culture Minister 
6. Aija Poca - State Income Minister 
1999-2000 
Prime Minister Andris Skele (People's Party) 
1. Anatolijs Gorbunovs - Transport Minister 
2. Indulis Berzins - Foreign Minister 
3. Valdis Birkavs - Justice Minister 
4. Karina Petersone - Culture Minister 
5. Janis Bunkss - Special Tasks in Local Authority and Public Administration Refrom 
Minister 
2000-2001 
1. Andris Berzins - Prime Minister 
2. Indulis Berzitis - Foreign Minister 
3. Anatolijs Gorbunovs - Transport Minister 
4. Karina Petersone - Culture Minister 
NOTES 
' See Cigane (2003). 
2 Kircheimer (1966): p. 184. 
3 Pannebianco (1988). 
4 Baltic Social Sciences Institute (2001 and 2002). 
• The paper is based on ten interviews leading Latvia's Way, party members, including two 
former Prime Ministers and party Chairmen, as well as a number of parliamentary deputies 
and Ministers. Other primary sources include newspaper interviews with leading political 
actors, political memoirs, as well as party programs. Basic information such as party 
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programmes and statutes are available from the LC web site: http://www.lc.lv (accessed 
15* July 2003). 
h Li Bennich Bjorkman (2003). 
7 Interview with LC parliamentary deputy: 10* March 2002. 
8 From the classical liberalism of John Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1689) and Adam 
Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) to the modem liberal debate on state intervention 
discussed by the economists John Maynard Keynes and von Hayek's The Constitution of 
Libert}: (1960) and latterly the political scientists Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974) and Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). 
' Oxford Manifesto (1997). 
1 0 Club 21 was an organization founded in late 1991 by 21 leading members of the Latvian 
business and political communities, with the stated aim of bringing together the Latvian 
elite in an informal forum where various economic, social and political issues could be 
discussed. 
" Founded in 1956. this organization representing all Latvian organizations based outside of 
Latvia. The representatives in Jurmala were thus the emigre political elite, http://www.pbla. 
lY 
1 2 Lieven (1994): p. 301. 
1 3 The Liberal International is based in London, uniting political parties with liberal ideologies. 
It defines liberal parties as being those that accept its basic documents - the Liberal Manifesto 
of Oxford (1947); the Declaration of Oxford (1967); the Liberal Appeal of Rome (1981). 
http :/7www. I iberal -international .org;' 
1 4 Interview with ex-LC Minister: 8* April 2002. 
1 5 Interview with LC Parliamentary Deputy: 8* April 2002. 
16 Klubs, May 1995, p. 4. 
1 7 Interview with ex-LC Minister: 21 s 1 August 2003. 
1 8 Fukuyama (1992). 
" Interview with LC Member and Central Office Employee: 11* April 2003. 
2 0 As of July 2004, in a total Latvian population of 2,309.339, 58.7% was ethnic Latvian, 
28.8% Russian, 3.9% Belarussian, 2.6% Ukrainian and 6% other. 470,220 people (around 
20% of the population) were non-citizens, www.np.gov.lv (Naturalization Board). 
2 1 "On the Renewal of the Republic of Latvia's Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles 
of Naturalization' passed by the Latvian Supreme Council on October 15", 1991. 
2 2 In the 2002 national election 85.6% (48) of candidates on the LC list were ethnic Latvians. 
Only 2 were Russian, 1 Polish, 1 Lithuanian. 1 Lib (a Latvian tribe) and 3 did not identify 
their nationality. (Latvian Central Election Commission - www.cvk.lv accessed 23 T d 
December 2002). 
23 Latvijas Vestnesis, 13* May 1993, p. 7. 
2 4 Jubulis (2001): pp. 8-9. 
2 5 World Bank (2004). 
2" World Bank (2001), p. 3. 
2 7 See 'Baltic Barometers' I to V by Richard Rose et al www.balticvoices.org 
28 Diena, 2 n d March 1993, p. 1. 
2' Latvijas Vestnesis, 13* May 1993, p. 7. 
3 , 1 Nissinen (1999): p. 133. 
3 1 Interview with ex-LC Minister: the interviewee claimed that 'LC has realistically and 
substantively supported EU integration, not just as a political slogan... if you look at 
people working actively for EU integration - Kesteris [Deputy State Secretary at the Uatvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993-2003) and Chief Negotiator for the Latvian Delegation 
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on EU accession (1999-2002)]. Daudiss [LC parliamentary deputy 1993-1997, member of 
the parliaments foreign affairs committee, Latvian Ambassador to the UK from 2001 to his 
untimely death in 2002], Piebalgs [Latvian Ambassador to the European Union 1998-2002, 
Assistant State Secretary for EU Affairs at the Latvian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2002-
present] - they are all from LC. Indeed, leading Ambassadors and functionaries from the 
Foreign Ministry are all from LC". 
3 2 Huang (1999). 
3 5 Interview with LC Member and Central Office Employee: 11 t h April 2003. 
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Kopsavi lkums 
Saja raksta t iek aplukota ideologijas noz ime Latvijas ve iksmlgakas pos tkomunis -
tiska per ioda partijas "Latvijas ceja" darblba. "Latvijas ee l s" rika izveidots 1993. gada, 
gatavojot ies p i rmajam pos tkomunis t i ska per ioda Saeimas velesanarn. To veidoja tris 
dazadi g r u p e j u m i - " K l u b a - 2 1 " dalTbnieki, Latvijas Tautas Frontes l iberals sparna 
parstavji un emigracijas latviesi. "Latvi jas cejs" bija iesaistlts visas astonas valdlbas 
koaltci jas no 1993. lldz 2 0 0 2 . gadam. un ta biedri tris reizes ienema premjerminis t ra 
amatu. Tas pasludinaja sevi par ' l i be ra lu ' partiju. Tomer butu javaica : vai tas bija 
pr ieksvelesanu m a n e v r s vai nozTmlga pol i t iska filosofija? Saja raksta tiek aplukots 
j a u t a j u m s , cik liela m e r a "Latv i jas ce j s" istenoja " l i be ra lu" pol i t iku svar igas tris 
j o m a s : m a z a k u m t a u t l b u j au t a juma , ekonomiska ja po l i t ika un arpol i t ika . La i gan 
l iberal isms sakotneji tika izmantots ka balsu piesais t lsanas ins t ruments un partijas 
ieksejas un arejas ident i ta tes forma (iesaistot sava kodola dazadas noskir tas individu 
grupas) , tas galu gala "iefi l trejas" a n parti jas formuletaja polit ika. 
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FHRUL Bloc: Leftist Parties or Parties of Russian-
speaking People? 
PCTVL bloks: krievvalodlgo partijas vai kreisas partijas? 
Janis Ikstens 
Vidzeme Unive r s i ty Col lege 
e-mail: i k s t ens@la tne t . l v 
The public discourse remains ambiguous about labeling a group of parties currently referred 
to as the bloc of "For Human Rights in United Latvia" (FHRUL). Terms "left-wing parties" 
and "parties of Russian-speaking minorities" are used interchangeably. This paper explores 
social base of voter support for these parties in an attempt to identify a more appropriate term 
and finds that ethnic factors play far more important role, hence, "parties of Eastern Slavic 
minorities" emerges as a suitable label for the mentioned political organizations. 
Key words: Political parties, voting behavior, identities, cleavage theory 
.Although more than ten years have passed since the first compet i t ive multi-part) ' 
elections w e r e held in the post-Soviet Latvia, the publ ic discourse remains ambiguous 
about label ing a g roup of par t ies current ly referred to as the bloc of "For H u m a n 
Rights in Uni ted La tv ia" (FHRUL) . This te rm came into being after the disintegration 
of the "For H u m a n Rights in Uni ted La tv i a " union in 2003 . 
On the one hand , these political organizat ions are called leftist par t ies to stress 
the i r pol i t ical p l a t fo rms . Indeed , p r o g r a m s of the N a t i o n a l H a r m o n y Par ty , the 
Socialist Par ty of Latvia, and "For H u m a n Rights in Uni ted Latv ia" often contain 
re fe rences to s tandard leftist so lu t ions such as inc reased g o v e r n m e n t regula t ion, 
s t ronger i n v o l v e m e n t of the g o v e r n m e n t in to s o l v i n g soc i a l and wel fa re issues 
e tc . On the other hand , these organiza t ions are often referred to as part ies of the 
Russ ian-speaking popula t ion , and rightly so - they advoca te interests o f Slavic ethnic 
minor i t ies , support further l iberalization o f legislat ion regulat ing language use and 
the educat ion sys tem in Latvia. 
However , this ambigu i ty does not attest mere ly to a confusion o f terminology. 
O n e can also dist inguish be tween different identi t ies of the ment ioned part ies that 
are l inked to a par t icular label. Moreover , those ident i t ies m a y affect the electoral 
prospects of part ies. 
One o f the w a y s to approach the issue of par ty identi t ies is to analyze social 
and d e m o g r a p h i c character is t ics o f suppor te rs o f the respec t ive par t ies and their 
voting mot iva t ions . This paper seeks to explore w h a t factors - economic or ethnic -
played a more impor tant role in g iv ing suppor t to the F H R U L bloc and what are the 
impl ica t ions of those findings for the issue o f identi t ies of part ies. T h e paper is based 
on data from a survey of 1196 cit izens of the Repub l i c of Latvia be tween 18 and 74 
years of age conducted in February 2004. 
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Theoretical background and hypotheses 
One of the oldest and still influential t radi t ions in research on vot ing behavior 
is related to explor ing the influence of social demograph ic factors upon the vo te rs ' 
choice. This tradit ion is based on an empir ica l d iscovery in the mid-20th century that 
certain social groups were more p rone to suppor t cer ta in poli t ical part ies (Bere lson et 
al. 1954, Lipset 1961). It w a s asserted that var ious social demographic variables define 
group interests that profoundly affect bo th activities of par t ies and publ ic not ions 
about what parties advoca te what interests. Later, this w a y of thinking about European 
polities led to the formulat ion of c leavage theory (Lipset a n d Rokkan , 1967). 
Al though subsequen t research s h o w e d that c lass vo t ing m a y h a v e w e a k e n e d 
(Clark et.al. 1993) or that vo te r s ' behavior w a s affected by psychologica l factors such 
as party identification (Campbel l 1960) or rational ca lcula t ions of pe r sona l benefit 
(Downs 1957), the impor tance of social factors remains notable (Heath 1990) in spite 
of a number of social and political processes related to the g rowing levels of education 
and welfare , changes in va lue orientat ions etc. (Manza et al. 1995). 
Views about the impact of social factors upon vo te r s ' behav ior in Eastern Europe 
are quite diverse. It was believed soon after the collapse of the communis t r eg imes that 
East European par ty sys tems would largely b e structured a round the s ame cleavages 
that were found in Western Europe (Kitschel t 1994). Electoral per formance of parties 
under recognizable labels (Social D e m o c r a t s , Liberals , Conservat ives etc.) m a y have 
prompted such predic t ions . On the other hand , radical social economic reforms in 
the region and the resul tant social mobi l i ty of individuals ques t ioned prospec ts for 
West European regu la r i t i es to be soon obse rved in E a s t e r n Europe . (Mate ju and 
Rehakova 1997). 
The theoretical disagreements have led to a number of empirical studies to explore 
the role o f social factors in shaping vo t e r s ' choice. A few of them fall wi th in the 
category o f studies o f economic voting, i.e. whether and h o w changes in the economic 
situation o f an individual or his/her percep t ions about the l ikely change in the future 
have influenced his/her vot ing decision (Kiewiet 1983; Sumskas 2003) . Other authors 
have paid attention to h o w an individual assesses the overal l state of the e c o n o m y in 
the past and the likely change in the future, a n d how those assessments have impacted 
support for posi t ion and opposi t ion part ies (Lewis -Beck 1988; Harper 2000) . 
G i v e n the r a p i d s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c c h a n g e s a n d o s c i l l a t i o n o f po l i t i c a l 
sympathies in Eastern Europe, this approach seems to be appropriate both theoretically 
and empirically. However , it fails to explain why par t ies that have ruled ei ther alone 
or as part of a coa l i t ion h a v e m a n a g e d to retain s i zeab le pa r l i amen ta ry p resence 
despite the profound reforms. Also, this approach does little to clarify whe the r there 
are any durable polit ical c leavages , or whe the r political sympathies are formed ad hoc 
and without any long- te rm prospects for stabil ization. At the same t ime, a n u m b e r of 
studies on Eastern Europe suggest that structural factors possess more explanatory 
power for voting behav io r than factors associated wi th economic vo t ing theory do 
(Bielasiak and Blunck 2002) . 
C leavage theory emphas i z ing the impor tance o f pol i t ic ized, deepe r and more 
stable social divis ions for unders tanding the structure of poli t ical sympa th ies (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967) const i tutes the theoret ica l basis for this paper. Ear l ie r research 
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has identified two impor tan t c leavages - the social e c o n o m i c one and the ethnic 
one - (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Norga rd et al 1999), and major part ies tend to 
posi t ion themselves vis-a-vis both of them. Therefore , it is a s sumed that different 
identities of parties of the F H R U L bloc are re la ted to these c leavages . If those part ies 
result from the social economic c leavage, they can be cons idered leftist part ies. If, 
however , they are more related to the ethnic d imens ion , they should be regarded as 
part ies of the Russ ian-speaking populat ion. 
In order to explore the relat ionship of the men t ioned par t ies with one or another 
cleavage, a number of hypotheses will be formula ted and verified on the basis on 
theories of vot ing behavior. 
If we assume that part ies of the F H R U L bloc mobi l i ze support on the bas is of 
their v iews on social economic issues, w e can formulate a n u m b e r of hypotheses in 
line with this assumption. One of the bas ic conc lus ions of class vot ing theory relates 
support for leftist parties wi th lower emp loymen t status (manual worker etc.). One can 
also expect that voters wi th lower i ncome and a lower level of formal educat ion will 
be more enthusiastic about efforts of redis t r ibut ion advoca ted by the leftist part ies. 
However , support to left-wing part ies in t ransi t ion societ ies can also be characterist ic 
of people w h o have an i n c o m e or educa t ion level above average but w h o consider 
themselves to be losers from the p o s t - C o m m u n i s t re form process (Mateju 1999). 
If we regard the F H R U L bloc as a function of the ethnic c leavage, then other 
assumpt ions could be formulated. In this case , the ethnic identity of voters would 
become particularly important , and the F H R U L bloc would be suppor ted first and 
foremost by ethnic Russ i ans , Be lo rus s i ans , and Ukra in i ans . G iven the social and 
demograph ic structure of La tv ia ' s society, part ies of the F H R U L bloc are likely to 
receive m o r e support in the largest ci t ies o f the count ry w h e r e s o m e 8 0 % of the 
ment ioned minori t ies res ide . Regional ly, suppor t for the F H R U L bloc is also likely 
to be found primari ly in Riga and Latgale . 
Thus , it is possible to formulate a n u m b e r of work ing hypotheses : 
1.1. the lower the income level of citizens, the higher their likelihood to vote for 
parties of the F H R U L bloc. 
1.2. the lower the level of formal education of citizens, the higher their likelihood to 
vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc. 
1.3. the lower the employment status of citizens, the higher their likelihood to vote 
for parties of the FHRUL bloc. 
1.4. the stronger cit izens regard themselves as losers from the pos t -Communis t 
transition, the higher their likelihood to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc. 
2.1. citizens who identify themselves as Russians, Belorussians, or Ukrainians are 
more likely to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc. 
2.2. citizens who use Russian as the prime language of communication in the family 
are more likely to vote for parties of the F H R U L bloc. 
2.3. citizens who reside in Riga or Latgale are more likely to vote for parties of the 
FHRUL bloc. 
2.4. citizens w h o reside in the seven largest ci t ies (Riga , Liepaja, Daugavpi ls , 
Rezekne, Jelgava, Jurmala, Ventspils) are more likely to vote for parties of the 
FHRUL bloc. 
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Data and variables 
Data from a survey conducted in February 2004 will b e analyzed to verify the 
above hypotheses . In total , 1196 cit izens of the Republ ic o f Latvia be tween 18 and 
74 years of age were pol led. The sample is representa t ive o f the general popula t ion 
of citizenry. 
To identify suppor ters of parties of the F H R U L bloc , answers to ques t ions "Wha t 
par ty would you vote for, if the Sae ima elections wou ld be he ld today?" wil l be used. 
Respondents that had chosen to support the Nat ional H a r m o n y Party, the Socialist 
Party of Latvia, the "Equa l R igh t s" par ty and the F H R U L will be classified together 
for the purposes of this paper. 
The level of i ncome wil l be es tabl ished on the basis of answers to the fol lowing 
ques t ion: " W h a t w a s the net i n c o m e of your family pe r h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r last 
month?" . In a similar vein, all respondents were requested to indicate the highest level 
of their formal educat ion us ing the fo l lowing scale - p r imary educat ion; incomple te 
secondary educat ion; secondary educat ion; vocat ional secondary educat ion; higher 
educat ion. The level of educat ion w a s coded from 1 (pr imary educat ion) through 5 
(higher educat ion) . Employed persons were ranked in accordance wi th the relative 
status of employmen t , adapt ing a me thodo logy used in other studies - se l f -employed 
persons (also en t repreneurs ) ; senior manage r s ; civil servants and special is ts ; lower-
skilled employees in the service sector: manua l workers . E m p l o y m e n t status is coded 
using a scale from 1 (se l f -employed) through 5 (manual worker ) . 
The concept of winner / loser from transition is difficult to operat ional ize . First, 
p o s t - C o m m u n i s t r e f o r m s affected m a n y vi tal s p h e r e s of social life - e c o n o m y , 
poli t ics , in ter-personal re la t ions etc. Secondly, each individual could have gained 
from transit ion in one sphere but turn out to be a loser in others . Thirdly, bo th gains 
and losses may be in tangible and non-quant i f iable and, thus , near ly imposs ib le to 
compare . Given these considerat ions and the need to establ ish a quanti tat ive variable, 
a self-assessment of winner / loser status from transit ion p rov ided by each respondent 
will be used in this paper . Those r e s p o n d e n t s w h o fully o r ra ther ag ree wi th the 
s tatement that life in the Soviet per iod was general ly bet ter than n o w a d a y s will be 
classified as losers from transit ion whi l e those w h o fully or rather d isagree wi th this 
s tatement will be r ega rded as winners from the p o s t - C o m m u n i s t reform process . 
The verification of the second m o d e l requires informat ion about r e sponden t s ' 
ethnic be longing to be establ ished on the basis of their self-identification. Ethnici ty 
will be coded d ichotomous ly : Latvian (1) and Eastern Slavic (2). Taking in to account 
that self identification m a y not be a perfect tool to establish one ' s ethnic be longing , an 
addit ional question was in t roduced - " W h a t is the l anguage used most frequently for 
everyday communica t ion in your f ami ly?" - to dis t inguish be tween Latv ian (1) and 
Russian (2). Voter support in specific regions and urban settings will be establ ished on 
the basis of information about the p lace of res idence p rov ided by each respondent . 
Analysis 
As t h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e - s u p p o r t to p a r t i e s o f the F H R U L b l o c - is 
d i c h o t o m o u s , the m e t h o d of logis t ic r eg ress ion wi l l b e e m p l o y e d for s ta t is t ica l 
analysis of independent variables. 
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Model 1 is related to es tab l i sh ing the s igni f icance of e c o n o m i c c l eavage for 
support to par t ies of the F H R U L bloc . The m o d e l first cons iders four hypotheses 
out l ined a b o v e . Th i s m o d e l i nco rpo ra t e s t he f o l l o w i n g i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab le s : 
e m p l o y m e n t s tatus; i n c o m e ; educa t ion ; w inne r / l o se r f rom transi t ion. Mode l 2 is 
related to es tabl ish ing the s ignif icance of the e thnic c l eavage . It verifies ano ther 
four hypotheses (2 .1 . to 2.4.) mak ing use of the fo l lowing independent variables: 
ethnicity; language used in family; type of the p lace o f res idency; region. Finally, 
independent variables from both mode l s wil l b e merged to establish the statistical 
significance of each var iable and, potentially, changes thereof. 
Results 
Results of Model 1 (see Append ix 1) demons t ra t e that the status of winner / loser 
from transition is the best predictor of suppor t for par t ies of the F H R U L bloc - losers 
are more likely to vote for these par t ies . Such a result is somewha t surprising if one 
interprets winning/ los ing in economic te rms. It means that support for the F H R U L 
bloc is m o r e dependen t on a s se s smen t s of l ong - t e rm re t rospec t ive changes in an 
individual ' s economic wel l -be ing ra ther than on the current economic si tuat ion of 
each respondent. 
The level of formal educat ion is also re la ted wi th support for the F H R U L bloc -
people with a higher educat ion tend to be m o r e suppor t ive of the bloc part ies. This 
observation runs contrary to theories con tend ing that leftist part ies are m o r e supported 
by people with a lower level of educat ion. O the r var iables did not yield statistically 
significant results. T h e overal l explanatory p o w e r of M o d e l 1 was very poor. 
Resul ts of Mode l 2 (see Append ix 2) at test to a h u g e impor tance o f language of 
communica t ion used in family and the e thnic identification of each respondent for 
explaining the support to F H R U L part ies . In other words - r esponden ts w h o regard 
themselves as representat ives of an Eastern Slavic ethnic minori ty or w h o use Russian 
as their p r imary language of commun ica t i on in their family are more likely to vote 
for part ies of the F H R U L bloc . The regional aspect a lso s eems to p lay a role, but it 
lacks statistical s ignif icance. It is impor tan t to note the s t rong explanatory p o w e r of 
Mode l 2 - it explains 8 1 % of variat ion in support for par t ies of the F H R U L bloc. 
Therefore, Model 2 lends support for theoret ical a s sumpt ions about the role of ethnic 
factors in voting for F H R U L parties. 
When independent var iables o f both mode l s are me rged into a s ingle m o d e l to 
m a k e their significance m o r e exact, var iables of Mode l 1 rapidly lose their statistical 
significance (see Mode l 3 in Appendix 1). Ethnic identification and language in family, 
in turn, retain their explanatory potent ia l . Howeve r , the overal l explanatory power 
of Mode l 3 decreases by 3.5 percen tage po in t s . There fo re , one can conc lude that 
economic factors such as low income , lower level o f formal educat ion and a lower 
status of employment are nearly insignificant for exp la in ing the suppor t for parties 
of the F H R U L bloc . Thus , mobi l iza t ion of suppor ters of these part ies can hard ly be 
facilitated by emphas i z ing economic issues . Further , a s izeable segment of voters, 
whose social demograph ic background ma tches theoret ical descr ip t ions of left-wing 
party supporters , choose to vote for part ies that are not part o f the F H R U L bloc and, 
moreover , can hard ly be cons idered leftist. 
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The results of this analysis show that support for the F H R U L bloc is mobi l ized 
on the basis of ethnic factors. However , a traditional unders tanding of h o w ethnic 
belonging is denned needs to be expanded by adding the use of language in the family 
to the usual indicator of ethnic self-identification. Data show that, in the context of the 
current regression mode l , ethnic self-identification has a somewha t smal le r statistical 
significance than the language used at h o m e . It implies that be longing to a specific 
linguistic space in Latvia carries a m o r e profound poli t ical significance than ethnic 
self-identification does . O n e of the poss ible explanat ions for this observat ion lies in 
the pat terns of consumpt ion of media products by different linguistic groups . 
Conclusions 
This paper explored social factors affecting support for parties of the F H R U L bloc 
on the bas is of the c leavage theory. Given this theoretical f ramework and empirical 
evidence from other countr ies , two theoret ical models were formulated. One of them 
included economic factors while the other emphas ized ethnic factors. 
Logist ic regression analysis was appl ied to data from a survey of 1196 citizens 
of the Republ ic of Latvia conducted in February 2004 . Resul t s of statistical analysis 
demons t ra t ed that e thnic factors w e r e far bet ter p red ic to r s of suppor t to F H R U L 
part ies, wi th use o f the Russ ian l anguage in the family and Eastern Slavic ethnic 
self-identification be ing the strongest statistically significant predictors . Therefore , it 
wou ld be correct to conc lude that the identity of part ies of the F H R U L bloc is closely 
related wi th ethnic mat te rs and that "par t ies of Eastern Slavic minor i t i e s" would be 
a m o r e accurate label for these parties than "leftist pa r t i es" would. 
On the other hand, one has to note methodological difficulties with operationalization 
of the theoretically salient term of winners/ losers from transit ion in the context of this 
paper. This term deserves more attention and better operat ional izat ion in surveys , as 
scholars have somewha t neglected this p h e n o m e n o n in Latvia. 
This paper contr ibutes to the discuss ion of the Latvian party system, its character 
and development . It also provides addit ional evidence of the high sal ience of ethnic 
cleavage in Latvia 's polity. Simultaneously, conclusions reached in this paper question 
the posi t ive assessment o f initial results of the societal integrat ion pol icy pursued 
in Latvia over the last years or, at least, provide a point of departure for long- term 
evaluat ion of this policy. 
Al though results of this study lend strong support to c leavage theory, it mus t be 
noted that par l iamentary representat ion of parties of the F H R U L bloc has gradual ly 
g rown s ince the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s . This cou ld be seen as a consequence of the ongo ing 
na tura l iza t ion p rocess , as a result of wh ich more than 80 000 res iden t s (ma in ly 
Russians , Beloruss ians , and Ukrainians) have obtained Latvian ci t izenship. On the 
other hand , F H R U L part ies have been in par l iamentary opposi t ion s ince 1993. This 
peculiari ty underl ines the necessi ty to verify a number of hypotheses der ived from 
the theory of e c o n o m i c vot ing , as it could provide a l te rna t ive or c o m p l i m e n t a r y 
explanat ions of voter support to part ies of the F H R U L bloc. 
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Kopsavi lkums 
Vairak neka 10 gadus pec pirmajam brivajam Saeimas velesanam, kuras norisinajas 
daudzpart i ju s is temas apstakjos, publiskaja diskursa j op ro j am ir verojama divejada 
nostaja a t t ieciba pret note iktu parti ju g rupu , ko pas la ik ir p ienemts apz lme t sadi: 
P C T V L b l o k a par t i jas . N o v ienas p u s e s , sis par t i jas t iek deve tas pa r k re i sa jam 
part i jam, uzsverot to pol i t iskas platformas. N o otras puses , tas biezi t iek devetas a n 
par kr ievvalodigo iedzivotaju par t i jam, un a n tas nav bez pamata. 
Sada divejada nostaja vedina domat , ka ir i espe jams runat a n par a tsk i r igam 
partiju identi tatem, kas ir saistTtas ar vienu vai otru nosaukumu. Viens no veidiem, 
ka ir iespejams tuvot ies preclzakai izpratnei par mine to partiju identitati , ir aplukot 
so part i ju veletajus un analizet v inu mot ivaci ju atbalst l t sis parti jas. Petot partiju 
atbalstTtajus un vinu mot ivaci ju , netiesi tiek petiti so c i lveku prieksstat i par aplu-
k o j a m a j a m p a r t i j a m , to p o l i t i s k o p l a t f o r m u un nozTmTgakajiem to i d e n t i t a t e s 
komponen t i em. Saja raks ta ir mekle ta atbi lde uz j au ta jumu: kadi social ie faktori -
ekonomisk ie vai e tniskie - ir bijusi nozirnlgaki P C T V L bloka atbalstam, un ko tas 
l iecina par so partiju identitati? 
Anal izejot 2004 . gada februan veiktas sabiedr iskas domas aptaujas rezul tatus 
un izmantojot regresijas analizi , noska idro ts , ka divi ga lvenie P C T V L b loka partiju 
atbalstu generejosie faktori ir piederfba kada i no aus t rumslavu etniskajam grupam 
un kr ievu valodas l ie to jums g imene. Tadejadi var secinat . ka so partiju atbalstTtaju 
pr imara motivacija ir saisflta ar etniskas p i edenbas j au ta jumiem - pretstata labklajibas 
pa rda le s p r o b l e m a t i k a i . N o ta izriet s ec ina jums , ka si b loka part i ju ident i ta te ir 
ciesi saist i ta ar e tniskaj iem aspekt iem un ka preclzaks so partiju apzTmejums butu 
" (aus t rum)s lavu minor i tasu partijas ' 1 , nev is "kreisas partijas'". 
Regression models of support to parties of FHRUL block 
Model 2 Model 1 Model 3 
B S.E. Wald Sig Exp (B) B S.E Wald Sig Exp (B) B S.E Wald Sig Exp (B) 
ETN 1,304 0,370 12,424 0,000 3,683 1,948 0,531 13,483 0,000 7,017 
VALGIM 3,532 0,511 47,731 0,000 34,180 3,569 0,839 18,098 0,000 35,495 
REGION 0,626 0,336 3,475 0,062 1,870 1,034 0,555 3,471 0,062 2,813 
PILS -0,070 0,327 0,045 0,831 ,933 -0,586 0,574 1,044 0,307 0,556 
IENAK 0,187 0,147 1,608 0,205 1,205 0,016 0,239 0,004 0,948 1,016 
NODARB 0,112 0,117 0.9181 0,338 1,118 0,063 0,180 0,122 0,727 1,065 
PAGATNE -0,636 0,133 22,762 0,000 0,53d -0,074 0,201 0,138 0,711 0,928 
IZGL 0,421 0,192 4.8321 0,028 1.5241 0,052 0,291 0,032 0,858 1,053 
Konstante -2,811 1,066 6,955 0,008 0,060 -8,257 0,822 100,777 0,000 0,000 -9,056 2,265 15,980 0,000 o.ood 
% KOP_SK 86,1 90,8 92,5 
% PCTVL SK 0,0 81,3 77,8 
Table 2 
Legend of variables 
Label of variable Variable Scale 
ETN Ethnic self-identification of respondent. 1 - Latvian 
2 - Eastern Slav (Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian) 
V A L G I M Language that is most frequently used for 
communication in respondent's family. 
1 - Latvian language 
2 - Russian language 
REGION Region of residence. 1 - Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale 
2 - Riga, Latgale 
PILS Type of the place of residence. 1 - other places 
2 - Riga, Daugavpils, Liepaja, Rezekne, Jelgava, Ventspils, Jurmala 
IENAK Net income of respondent's family per 
household member last month. 
1 - 40 Lats per month and less 
2 - 4 1 - 8 0 Lats per month 
3 -81 -140 Lats per month 
4 - 141-250 Lats per month 
5 - 251 Lats per month and more 
NODARB Employment status of an employed 
respondent. 
1 - self-employed, entrepreneur 
2 - senior manager 
3 - specialist, civil servant 
4 - lower-skilled employee in service sector 
5 - manual worker 
PAGATNE Attitude towards life in the Soviet period 1 - fully agrees that life in the Soviet period was better 
2 - rather agrees that life in the Soviet period was belter 
3 - rather disagrees that life in the Soviet period was better 
4 - fully disagrees that life in the Soviet period was better 
IZGL Respondent's education 1 - basic or incomplete primary education 
2 - primary or Incomplete secondary education 
3 - secondary education 
4 - vocational education 
5 - higher education 
K O P S K Overall percentage of correctly predicted cases 
PCTVL^SK Percentage of FHRUL support cases correctly 
predicted by each model 
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Impact of Europeanization on Involvement of Society in 
Decision Making Process in Latvia 
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pienemsanas procesa Latvija 
Ivo Rollis 
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The article deals with cognitive and normative structures of Europeanization related to the impact 
of Europeanization on involvement of Latvian society in the decision-making process. The author 
aims to show that deepening of the European integration process in Latvia, after accession to the 
EU, leads to more coherent Europeanized dialogue between state and society in the decision-
making process, development of closer interaction of society with other interest groups on the 
national and international level, and contributes to European political identity formation 
The organization of individuals in the nongovernmental sector with the task to protect their 
interests is an effective way of better understanding the political process, and the possible costs 
and benefits from participation in the Europeanization process. Analyses of the interaction 
process between society and state allows to conclude that despite fragmentation of Latvian 
nongovernmental organizations in different sectors, preconditions are created for further 
strengthening the dialogue between society and state in the further Europeanization process. 
Europeanization positively influences the role of the nongovernmental sector in communication 
with the state and the international community, leading to consolidation and development of 
the sector and the creation of new values and European political identity. 
Key words: Europeanization. European Union, decision-making process, non-governmental 
sector, identity formation, interaction. 
Introduction 
Access ion to the European Union (EU) puts a new d imens ion and psychologica l 
c h a n g e on the E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n p r o c e s s in Latv ia . D i s c u s s i o n is n o l o n g e r only 
about the appl ica t ion of EU di rec t ives , but a lso about the par t ic ipa t ion of states 
and society in c rea t ing them. N e w c h a n g e s pu t an add i t iona l bu rden on socie ty 
in comprehens ion of the var ious new aspects of the Europeaniza t ion process with 
respect to the EU d imens ion - t imely receipt o f essent ia l in format ion and act ive 
intervention in the dec i s ion-making p rocess , en la rgement of the nat ional networks 
also wi th nongovernmenta l inst i tut ions on the European level for definition of the 
relevant national pos i t ions . 
The author a ims to prove that La tv ia ' s access ion to the EU adds a n e w wider 
and deeper d imens ion to the quali ty of state - society interact ion in the decis ion -
mak ing process , requi r ing an active "bo t t om - t o p " approach , which also facilitates 
the formation of European poli t ical identi ty in society. 
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T h e ar t ic le dea l s w i th state - soc ie ty re la t ions as o n e of m a n y d o m a i n s of 
Europeanizat ion. Europeaniza t ion is ma in ly used in the nar rowest m e a n i n g of the 
concept - wi th respect to the EU polit ical process . 
1. Theoretical background 
The process of European integration has started a very complex process determined 
as "Europeaniza t ion" , the process of structural change , var iously affecting actors and 
institutions, ideas and interests and response to EU pol ices . 
Europeanizat ion initially was defined as " Incrementa l process re-or ientat ing the 
direction and shape of poli t ics to the degree that EC polit ical and economic dynamics 
become part of organizational logic of national politics and policy m a k i n g " . 1 2 However, 
the mos t c o m m o n definition is g iven to Europeaniza t ion as a process consis t ing of 
"processes of a) construct ion, b) diffusion and c) insti tutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, p rocedures , pol icy p a r a d i g m s , s tyles, " w a y s of doing th ings" , and 
shared beliefs and n o r m s which are first defined and consol idated in the EU policy 
process and then incorpora ted in the logic of domes t i c (national and sub-nat ional) 
discourse , polit ical s t ructure , and publ ic po l ic ies . " 3 4 5 
A s the E U d e v e l o p e d a n d d e e p e n e d , t he ef fec ts of E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n w e r e 
increasingly experienced in the domains of national policies, politics, and m o r e broadly, 
in the domestic policies of the new m e m b e r states like Latvia. Political scientists in the 
framework of Europeanizat ion have most ly concentrated on the aspects of comparat ive 
poli t ics, international poli t ical economics , theoretical pol icy analysis and systemic 
change. There are possibi l i t ies to analyse Europeaniza t ion through - 1) adaptat ion of 
institutional settings in the broadest sense through rules , p rocedures , n o r m s , practices 
at different poli t ical levels in response to the d y n a m i c s of integrat ion; 2) the role 
of the pre-access ion process in the cont inued democra t iza t ion and "marke t iza t ion" 
of Central Europe ; 3) the emergence of new, cross - nat ional policy ne tworks and 
communi t i e s ; 4) res t ruc tur ing of the strategic oppor tuni t ies avai lable to domest ic 
actors and finally 5) shifts in cognitive and normat ive dimensions - discourse affecting 
policy in response to European deve lopments , no rms and values, political legitimacy, 
identit ies, state t radi t ions - unders tanding of governance , pol icy pa rad igms , frames, 
and narra t ives . 6 The last d imension should be kept distinct from the others as being 
the mos t appropr ia te for analyses o f socie ty i nvo lvemen t in the dec i s ion -mak ing 
process as well as European identity formation. 
W h e n speaking o f "European identi ty" it needs to b e stated what exactly is m e a n t 
as each of these w o r d s taken individually may be very ambiguous . The " E u r o p e a n " 
identity in the context of this article is that of the E U which is part o f Europe , the 
word " Ident i ty" be ing unders tood to m e a n the spirit o f the communi ty and the very 
source of its cohes ion. EU as an organizat ion and its pol ic ies and ach ievemen t s are 
express ion of that ident i ty which a i m s to ensure that its ci t izens and p e o p l e s not 
only unders tand but a l so espouse the spirit of the Un io n if they are u l t imate ly to 
identify with it. Indeed , the U n i o n ' s very ability to survive , grow, act and succeed 
in its work depends on it. 
164 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
2. Participation of society in the decision-making process 
Europeanizat ion is not s imply only about less tangible aspects , such as beliefs, 
values and identit ies, but mutua l ly closely in teracts also wi th formal pol icy rules. 
Europeanization has had a deep impact upon the public pol icy functions of the member 
states, as it can develop from different s tages and forms of the pol icy process , e.g. 
policy formulat ion and put t ing policy into prac t ice . The concept of Europeanizat ion 
is about the impact of European pol icy wi th in the m e m b e r state, leading to close 
interaction be tween state and society in the po l i cy p rocess . It thus entails two steps: 
adoption at the EU level and then incorporat ion at the domes t ic level. The former step 
alone would be comple te only in the E U pre-access ion p h a s e and could be regarded 
to pe r t a in to Latv ia p r i o r to a c c e s s i o n . 7 C o o r d i n a t e d dec i s ion - m a k i n g p roces s 
and act ive society involvement after access ion to the E U must ensure coherence in 
Latvia 's overall European pol icy - defining the pol icy and nat ional interests in the 
EU context and beyond in order to benefit society. 
Practice shows that effective dec i s ion -mak ing can b e achieved by -
• Establ ishment of effectively funct ioning work ing methods (detai led rules , 
procedures and guidelines for all related processes , concrete responsibili t ies 
between involved parties and the best practices) to ensure high quality from the 
beginning - also when decisions have to be prepared and taken in a very short 
time; 
• Development of an operational ne twork and active informal communicat ion 
through personal contacts across institutions and working together using similar 
and well established working methods , being aware of problems, issues and 
details to be considered and addressed; 
• Building substantial knowledge and understanding of EU matters in order to open 
ground for discussions. In later stages of decision making this makes it possible 
to comprehensively deal with the issues of their competence and to quickly 
formulate coherent and well-argued positions in communications with the EU. 
With deepening o f EU m e m b e r s h i p - bo th in t e rms of t ime of member sh ip and 
the gradual expans ion of EU competenc ies - Latvia , s imi lar to the tendency in other 
m e m b e r states, has started to regard E U more as internal ra ther than foreign affairs. 
Therefore there are h ighly necessary ' ' n o r m a l " nat ional dec i s ion-making procedures 
wi th a "European" d imens ion . 
For the society o f Latvia accession to the E U should be regarded first of all as the 
psychological impact on perception of the process . That should definitely influence the 
w a y of part icipat ion of society in the dec i s ion-making p rocess . It m e a n s that before 
accession, all the pol icy initiatives wi th respec t to the EU w e r e much treated as the 
ones where "we do no t have many possibi l i t ies to influence, bu t only to adopt". It was 
a good t ime to learn and bui ld capacity, therefore g o o d pract ices of interrelat ion in 
the dec i s ion-making process were created in some sec tors , e.g. agriculture, fisheries, 
protect ion of c o n s u m e r s ' r ights . Howeve r , there was a lso large pressure to t ranspose 
and implement a la rge n u m b e r of different E C di rec t ives , but after access ion , the 
s i tuat ion has changed . Pe rcep t ions and va lues shou ld be a n d are m o r e and more 
developing in a w a y that decisions on pol icies are not settled by " s o m e b o d y " far away 
in Brussels but actual ly vice versa - the socie ty has r ights , even more obl igat ions , to 
influence the p rocess , p ropos ing bet ter solut ions . 
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To better i l lustrate the idea, Table 1 indicates the pol icy process cycle whe re a 
broken line separates the dimensions (circles marked in gray color) where involvement 
of society at the early stage of preparation of proposals for national posi t ions is highly 
desirable in order to influence the goal of pol icy that is going to be later dec ided 
on the EU level. Therefore a "bo t tom - u p " approach is pushing society m o r e to 
bui ld knowledge , eva lua te needs and values and propose posit ions in a way that is 
mos t beneficial to it through adopted EU pol icy or nat ional law at the later s tage of 
implementa t ion . 
Table 1 
EU dimension in the policy preparation cycle 
Evaluation and 
adjustment of the 
policy that is implemented 
Situation establishes need for policy or its 
changes, and definition of basic problems it 
should solve 
Precise definition of 
possibilities and challenges in 
particular issue in order to 
prepare project of policy document 
Policy \ 
formation i 
V 
Preparation of good 
policy document ( Preparation of action plan 
for implementation of 
^ legislation and guidelines 
For public adminis t rat ion and society of a new m e m b e r state like Latvia, it is even 
harder at the beg inn ing to change psycho logy and real ize that it is n o w possible to 
part icipate in the process from the beginning of preparation of EU level regulation, and 
not just only to under take the implementa t ion obligat ions of the member states. At the 
s ame t ime there are changes in the national co-ordination and decis ion-making system 
itself, and a great n u m b e r of skilled peop le are wi thdrawing from the administrat ion 
in order to m o v e to the private sector or to work in Bmsse l s . 
For the active society groups involved in the process, like the non-governmenta l 8 
sector, accession to the E U opens new dimensions - the number of possibilities, contacts 
and impact channels to the process mainly through partners on the international level. So 
the state is expected to facilitate budd ing of relevant knowledge and to provide relevant 
n e w information on a systematic basis for better involvement in the process . 
The si tuation should be m a d e opposi te to that which prevailed dur ing the pre-
access ion process , w h e n public information work with society on EU issues w a s very 
fragmented due to i imited financial resources. The pre-referendum per iod, when a 
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large amount of money was invested in intensive knowledge/a t t i tude bui lding at the 
vers' final stage of accession, should not be taken into account as ordinary activity, (as 
well as the results from opinion polls) because it was used more to prepare society 
for the part icular decision, but not for the process itself. However , dur ing the period 
after the referendum and since the accession, the intensity level of knowledge building 
and att i tudes, par t iculars towards n e w EU pol ic ies , have s lowed back down nearly 
to the same level as during the pre-access ion per iod . 9 
One of the typical tangible results of Europeanizat ion in society is a high attraction 
to avai lable EU structural funds in Latvia and active involvement of member s of 
society in the process of acqui r ing finance, if such an oppor tuni ty is seen. That 
leads to Europeaniza t ion of interests and the p romot ion of part icular values (e.g. 
values and interests s imilar to those of the farmers or en t repreneurs in G e rman y 
or o ther m e m b e r s ta tes) . At the s ame t ime , a pos i t ive n e w trend that appears is 
more active part icipation of society in dec i s ion-making on policies and future values 
like the one related to EU Financial perspec t ive 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 1 3 , or the Lisbon process 
determining compet i t iveness of the EU in the global marke t , where one can observe 
involvement of the major business associa t ions and N G O partners in the definition 
of initial posi t ions that should later result in new pract ices and values both nationally 
and on the European level. 
Interaction between State and society 
In order to bet ter unders tand the changes and cha l lenges brought forward by 
the impact of the European iza t ion p roces s , first of all there should b e out l ined a 
number of important findings dur ing the EU p re -access ion period in Latvia . For 
instance, often the very l imited capabili t ies of sector par tners (NGOs, enterpreneurs 
and their associat ion, social groups) during interaction wi th the state in a particular 
sector readily eliminated the possibility of developing any further consultation practice 
between the two. even caus ing disbelief in it: 
• In all the sectors of the economy there were very few organizations with modern 
strategic planning, a broad view and an analytic approach. Managers did not 
think long-term, fight with survival problems and operational management. When 
organizations cannot plan their own future, they are not able to co-operate on 
future needs. 
• Representatives of the sectors were not well educated in the market economy and 
public administration, so they did not understand basic principles, and disagreed 
with them. Understandably it takes much time and education to change perception. 
Sometimes people approached officials who were not dealing with their particular 
problem and blamed them for everything, only because they were a part of 
the bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs and nongovernmental organizations are slowly 
starting to realize that consultations in the European integration context would 
assist them in developing lobby practices on the national and international level, 
therefore also building a more European type of identity and good practice. 
• A significant problem was communicating information within represented non-
government groups. Many people were representing their professional view, 
which many times did not conform to the opinion of their organisations' leaders 
or that of other members. Both sides of consultations lack abilities to conduct 
successful consultat ions - bad previous exper iences , misperception, lack of 
Ivo Rullis. Impact of Europeanization on Involvement of Society in Decision 167 
negotiation skills, other interpersonal problems. Associations were not able to 
recruit good specialists, pay appropriate salaries to their managers and spend a 
lot of time on legislation, because they performed some other services to make 
money etc. 
• Because of financial and managerial problems, organisations often were not 
representative - organisations were comprised of. only those enterprises, which 
were active or felt a need for co-operation. Those were represented in two, three 
and even more associations, where they were trying to solve their own particular 
problems. 
• The formal or non-obligatory character approach to the consultations from the 
part of the government , and therefore also a lack of competence, should be 
considered as a problem. 
Usually it was possible to observe a lack of understanding of the non-governmental 
sector regarding the impact of EU legislation on a part icular policy. N G O s not always 
fully comprehend a part icular field, its interrelation wi th the EU and the impact of the 
EU. O n e part of organizat ions has lacked overall comprehens ion about issues that, 
in relat ion to a par t icular field already touch other inter-related fields at the same 
t ime. Therefore, impor tant is the quest ion about the capaci ty of the nongovernmenta l 
sector to attract personnel that could be able to develop within organizat ions such 
systematic unders tanding and to prepare a well - a rgued posit ion. Non-governmen ta l 
structures have the possibil i ty in such k ind of co-operat ion to get to know more about 
the EU, its structure, the basic pr inciples of operat ion, and about the principles of 
legal drafting. 
There were a lso a number of N G O s that tended m o r e toward themselves , internal 
problems, short- term targets and quick results. Never theless , parallel to the increasing 
number of N G O s , there is increasing professional ism of the m e m b e r s in managing 
N G O s , fundraising and legal comprehens ion . Not a lways is it possible to estimate 
where is the exact merit of Europeanizat ion or the development of the political process 
itself. 
The role of N G O s in part icular is g rowing with La tv ia ' s accession to theEU in 
respect to pol icy formation, as it is relevant to ensure a clear unders tanding about 
EU policies and long- term interests. EU pol icy determinat ion should take place on 
the highest level wi th quality input from the N G O s sector. This addit ional layer is 
now already obvious in decision mak ing with respect to the EU dimens ion , where 
part icularly important is t imely public discussion concern ing part icular nat ional EU 
policy. There is a need for developed dia logue in order to formulate nat ional interests 
and their justification. 
Ministr ies have submit ted to the government of Latvia for decis ion making 85 
draft posit ions for the EU Council of Minis ters dur ing the first four mo n t h s of EU 
membersh ip (May - September 2004) . Table 2 indicates the information on results 
of the d ia logue b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the non -gove rnmen ta l sec tor in the 
f ramework of p repar ing these draft dec is ions . I ( : 
Government institutions consider that activity from the side of social partners has 
not been substant ial . T h e mos t c o m m o n reasons have been indicated as a lack of 
knowledge and language skills." The results prove the trend that from one point of view, 
the government irregularly organizes the consultation process, however the situation 
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varies from sector to sector. If some sectors are less active in interrelation with the 
government , then others are oppositely active, e.g. agriculture, environment , social. 
Table 2 
Interaction between government and society in decision making process 
(85 draft positions to Council of Minister) 
The present s i tuat ion indicates exis t ing fragmentation in a number of sectors 
and the need for s t rengthening c o m m o n prac t ice of coopera t ion work be tween state 
and nongovernmenta l sectors , so the Europeaniza t ion process has a good base for 
facilitating that. Analyses of the information included in the national posit ions indicate 
a t rend that for society, more significant are such sector pol icy issues as agricul ture, 
social issues, s tandards. Genera l up-level issues, such as poli t ical and insti tutional -
foreign affairs or European Const i tu t ion Treaty, are less unders tood and significant 
for people in general , even if there exist smal l N G O s like the Institute of Foreign 
Affairs which can p rov ide opinions on external affairs; never the less , in many cases 
it has been indicated that they are not even reques ted or necessary. 
Interaction be tween state and nongovernmenta l sectors is developing a poli t ical 
part icipation culture and creates a feeling of ownersh ip in society that the EU is not 
only the gove rnmen t ' s bus iness . As far as there are possibi l i t ies to part icipate in the 
process , this also facilitates developing European identi ty to a large extent through 
interaction wi th partners in o ther m e m b e r s tates , therefore affording opportuni t ies to 
gain new exper iences , active dialogue organizat ion pract ices wi th the government , 
and lobby techniques. 
One of the substantial effects of Europeaniza t ion after the accession of Latvia 
to the EU are the rights of N G O s in EU inst i tu t ions to be t reated as s imilar co -
operation partners - they have not only rights but also possibi l i t ies to par t ic ipate in 
the prepara t ion of direct ives and laws. There is also the possibil i ty to be heard in 
Brussels . For this pu rpose it is wor th combin ing forces with internat ional partners 
in order to b e listened to both on the nat ional and international level. In this respect 
it shou ld be realized that the pract ice in m e m b e r s ta tes that the EU a n d nat ional 
governments support N G O s and provide finances for act ive interact ion is the case 
where European va lues should be developed a n d tradit ions be cont inued. This should 
be deve loped also in Latvia. 
3. Role of society discourse in Europeanization process 
Europeanizat ion character izes chal lenges a lso to the legi t imacy of discourse in 
society. The latest research has indicated ev idence to the exis tence of diverse national 
discourse providing leg i t imacy to European related i s sues . 1 2 
Possrtions 
harmonized 
5 1 % 
No opinion requested 
or necessary 
45% 
possitions objected 
4% 
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The political p rocess in Latvia, similar to other new member states, should be 
characterized by a " top- to -bo t tom" and not a "bo t tom- to - top" approach. Therefore 
there are l imited poss ibi l i t ies to l eg i t imize different pol ic ies as a result of wider 
discussion in society, exis t ing values and interests. If in the case of the pre-accession 
period it is poss ib le to speak about adjustment to the EU and the process driven by 
the political elite, in wh ich society feels exempted from part icipat ion in the process, 
then after accession to the EU Europeanizat ion would have to undertake a much wider 
and more particular interaction model of social and political process. Th rough reacting 
to external effects Europeanizat ion should facilitate the formation of "bo t tom- to- top" 
driven discourse in society. 
As result of Europeaniza t ion . there is an increase in the need for legit imizing 
discourse of the poli t ical process . That w o u l d a l low ensur ing popu la r support for 
change. Therefore also the future of European integrat ion is dependent on further 
support by society of openness and the European integrat ion process itself. Discourse 
therefore is one o f the impor tant d o m a i n s for e lements of democra t ic pol icy and 
cognit ive - normat ive structures a l lowing to sustain democracy and to provide society 
wi th the feeling o f c o m m o n goals and interests, and put t ing them higher than narrow 
personal interests , as wel l as the suppor t ing long- term interests , pe r fo rmance and 
culture o f par t icular institutions. 
Society should be convinced about the government and the political elite that their 
choice is not only necessary but is also the right one . Such legi t imizing discourse 
is especially important because often pressure for change is not " b o t t o m - t o - u p " but 
" top- to-bo t tom" directed, by trying to justify the intent ions of the gove rnmen t and 
enterpreneurs for e c o n o m i c and inst i tut ional changes as solutions to e c o n o m i c and 
political p rob lems on the national and European level. 
As larger necessity appears for social and political interaction in order to legitimize 
decis ions , the m o r e changes impact nat ional values and identi ty in relation to the 
tradit ional comprehens ion of economic deve lopmen t , social welfare , and political 
democracy . Therefore , responsible eli tes, in order to effect relevant changes , have 
to in t roduce in socie ty discourse that wou ld allow to redefine these bas ic values, 
comprehens ion and also political identi ty in close l ink with n e w chal lenges . 
In addit ion, La tv ia has and will have discourse that differs from the old and new 
m e m b e r states. Each state has a different economic , inst i tut ional and va lue structure, 
therefore having a different reaction to European effects and creating different social 
and political d iscourse . For instance, such old m e m b e r states as France have mainly 
created d iscourse wh ich is closely related to e c o n o m i c and inst i tut ional changes , 
whi le Grea t Britain has b e e n more concerned with global izat ion issues (European 
discourse in Latvia) . 
There is little research for the m o m e n t regarding h o w Europeaniza t ion facilitates 
the development of opin ion in society and change in civil society. Notwi ths tand ing 
that representatives of the government are trying to be the central creators of discourse, 
their place could a lso be taken by political analysts , researchers , interest and social 
groups. In this case, a part icular role is placed on values that a l low to influence social 
and political interaction and change further deve lopment . The driving force for such 
deve lopment in publ ic and social life in Latvia migh t b e c o m e skills to interact in 
the realization of nat ional E U policy. The direction of pol icy should reflect national 
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interests and values in society similarly to the issues re la ted to the i m p r o v e m e n t 
of e c o n o m i c condi t ions for en t r ep reneurs , s t r eng then i n g of E u r o p e a n identi ty in 
society by making Europe closer to peop le , etc. However , it will b e possible to m a k e 
judgments later, when it is possible to see how successfully one or another priority 
policy is operating, their mutua l interaction and l inkage to the processes in society. 
Communica t ion be tween society and the gove rnmen t is one important e lement 
in social and political interaction. Society migh t hesi ta te to p rov ide support for a 
particular direction of the state if it has doubts or is not fully sure about its results 
(Vote in the referendum on accession of Latvia to EU) . The goal of the communicat ive 
function is internal co-operat ion. It m e a n s that the poli t ical elite is not only telling 
society about part icular political p rograms , but a l so wil l ing to listen and change them 
by reacting to opinion in society. One of the m e c h a n i s m s in this case are political 
forums. Before accession to the EU it was meet ings of the Nat ional Convent , presently 
it m i g h t publ ic d iscuss ion about na t iona l EU po l icy a n d in teres ts or some o ther 
important issue in the E U context regarding society or a par t icular social group (not 
only the issue concerning the availabil i ty of f inances from EU structural funds for 
implementat ion of particular ideas) . The deve lopmen t of such discourse is considered 
a n e w chal lenge after access ion to the E U , as before access ion there was a s tronger 
"top-to-bottom'" stream rather than real interact ion with the part icipat ion of society. 
Europeanization on the national level is not l imited only to structural and political 
changes . European values and polit ical pa r ad igms have been al igned to a part icular 
extent also on the state level b y changing d iscourse and ident i t ies . 1 3 Such issues as 
nat ional identi ty migh t b e c o m e impor tant in society. A s a resul t , there can occur 
a rebi r th of identi ty based on na t iona l and e thn ic p r inc ip les , therefore b e c o m i n g 
a potent ial source of res i s tance to E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n (In Latvia oppos i te ly - faster 
integration of non-ci t izens after accession of the state to the EU) . Even churches and 
spiritual societies have come under pressure to adjust their structures and relations 
be tween the state and the pub l i c a c c o r d i n g to the c h a n g i n g con tex t o f E u r o p e . 
The churches are requested to assist in in terpre t ing a n d p rov id ing explanat ion to 
"unification of Eu rope" (The ro le of the clergy dur ing the preaccess ion campa ign to 
the E U in Latvia and Li thuania) . 
4. European identity formation through interaction in decision -
making process 
T h e classic response to the quest ion of European identity is: unity in diversity. 
Ethnic background, cul ture , rel igion and history are cer tainly important factors for 
European identity. Identi ty is subject to change . It is no t someth ing ' s t a t i c ' , g iven 
for all t ime . 1 4 
A s there is still a lot of d iscuss ion go ing on concern ing this issue, it is however 
obv ious that E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n and pa r t i cu l a r ly a c c e s s i o n to t he EU e x t e n d s the 
dimension of the dec i s ion-making process and society invo lvement . Through need 
to adopt favorable decis ions , col labora t ion also extends to other countr ies more and 
more, therefore creat ing a synergy of opinions wi th society groups in other countr ies . 
The mix ing of different national polit ical identi t ies for a c o m m o n purpose actually 
leads closer to the formation of a c o m m o n European poli t ical identity in the decision-
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mak ing process on the national level. The analyses of interaction il lustrated that with 
accession to the E U good precondi t ions for the deve lopment of European identity 
were also established. 
There has been an increase in the extent of the dec is ion-making process in which 
society is involved, with much wide r opportunit ies to influence the process through 
setting contacts wi th international organizat ions, therefore exert ing m o r e organized 
pressure on the i ssues of their concern . Enlarged par t ic ipat ion possibi l i t ies in the 
process actually facilitate the mix ing of national identi ty with European identity for 
the c o m m o n goal to reach synergy and mutual ly favorable decisions. 
Information and the role of bus iness involvement are additional valuable critical 
factors and indicators of performance that might influence further Europeanizat ion and 
provide answers if the decis ion-making transformation process and greater interaction 
develop. T h e first one is an important tool for increasing knowledge and intensifying 
effectiveness of communica t ion . W h a t concerns the other one - large players with 
part icular interests in the process migh t influence the substance of the agenda. 
Main ly it is a p roces s that w e can call the t rans format ion of identi ty. Since 
Latvia is a n e w c o m e r to the EU, m o r e empirical data should be accumula ted before 
putt ing forward ques t ions for further research like - whe the r the level of growing 
interaction be tween different nat ional identit ies in the EU decision m a k i n g process 
gives only pattern for change , more active and quali ty part icipation in the decision 
mak ing process a iming to increase the quality of life or whether it a l so leads to the 
deve lopment of European identity as an additional layer to the nat ional one? Further 
Europeanizat ion of different areas of life and processes and some time after accession 
will al low to test the answer to the establ ished ques t ion . A good bas i s for that is 
already laid with the accession of Latvia to the EU. 
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Kopsavi lkums 
Raksta tiek aplukoti ar eiropeizaciju saistlti p roces i , ga lveno uzmanibu pieversot 
eiropeizacijas ietekmei uz sabiedrlbas iesaisti l e m u m u p i e n e m s a n a s procesa . LTdz ar 
pievienosanos Eiropas SavienTbai padzi l inas a n Eiropas integracijas process Latvija. 
Tas s ekme daudz ciesaka eiropeizacijas dialoga ve idosanos starp valsti un s ab i ednbu 
lemumu pienemsana , attlsta tuvaku sab iedr lbas mi j iedarblbu ar valsts parvaldi un 
citam sabiedr lbas in teresu g r u p a m nac iona la j a un s tarptaut iskaja l imenl , tadejadi 
sniedzot an savu ieguldTjumu Eiropas pol i t i skas identi tates veidosanas procesa . 
IndivTdu o r g a n i z e t a darbTba n e v a l s t i s k a j a s ek to ra ar m e r k i a izs tave t s a v a s 
intereses ir efektlvs ve ids , lai labak izprastu pol i t iskos p rocesus , ka an iespe jamos 
i e g u v u m u s un z a u d e j u m u s n o lTdzdal lbas e i r o p e i z a c i j a s p r o c e s a . A n a l i z e j o t 
sabiedrlbas un valsts mij iedarblbas procesu var secinat, ka, neskatot ies uz Latvijas 
nevalst isko organizaci ju fragmentaciju dazados sektoros , ir radTti p r ieksnote ikumi 
turpmaka dialoga st iprinasanai starp sabiedffbu un valsti turpmakaja eiropeizaci jas 
gaita. Eiropeizacija pozi t lvi ie tekme nevals t i ska sektora nozlmi sadarblba ar valst i 
un starptautisko kopienu, tadejadi veicinot sabiedrlbas konsol idaci ju . att istlbu, j a u n u 
vertTbu un Eiropas poli t iskas identi tates ve idosanos . 
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DAVID LAITIN'S PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
ON THE BOOK 
First, I would like to thank you for mvi t ing me here and for put t ing together such 
a s t imulat ing conference on such an important topic. 1 am very grateful and honored 
to be here and even m o r e so to have a panel here discussing a book that I wrote and 
publ ished in 1998. I am going to start with a small summary of the book , without 
any updat ing, to a l low the commenta tors to react to the book, which they prepared 
for, and not react to m y updating which the}', of course , have not p repared for. 
My research was m a d e in 1993 and 1994. I did fieldwork living in Narva , Estonia. 
I had research assis tants doing comparab le fieldwork in Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. 
Here in Latvia the fieldwork was conducted by Velio Pettai. The question I asked was: 
what would happen to this beached diaspora, to these 2 5 m people, Russians , w h o were 
l iving in the countr ies of the near abroad. H o w would they react - politically, socially, 
and culturally - to the independence of the 14 non-Russ ian republics . That was the 
research quest ion that I went into this project asking. The pr imary findings 1 will 
report now. But I should emphas ize , that the book was not normative. It did not say 
what a good react ion would be, or the best policy, or the most democra t ic outcome. 
It did not m a k e any normat ive c la ims; it was a posi t ive book in the sense that it tried 
to pattern the different trends of the Russian speaking populat ion in the four republics 
to see where it is go ing , not whether it is a good direct ion or a bad one. 
The first of the three points I wil l m a k e is that in all the non-Russ ian republics 
the Russians faced a doub le cataclysm. In 1988-89 there were the language laws in 
all of the four republ ics wh ich essential ly took away from the Russians their historic 
right to r ema in m o n o l i n g u a l . This was a ca tac lysm for Russians , w h o thought of 
it as their r ight that they could go a n y w h e r e in the seven t ime z o n e s and speak 
Russ ian and never h a v e to l eam ano the r l anguage . Tha t was the first ca tac lysm. 
The second ca tac lysm was the independence in 1991 . w h e n they suddenly became 
minori t ies in the titular republics , ra ther than a part of a plurality or even a majority 
in the Soviet Union . Suddenly, they were minori t ies in these republics and had to 
deal with their minor i ty status. This w a s a double ca tac lysm that faced the Russians 
in all four republ ics , and it created a new identity category - the Russian speaking 
populat ion - wh ich b rough t together Jews , Russians , Ukra in ians . Byeloruss ians , into 
one group that faced this cataclysm of linguistic minor i ty status. 
H o w e v e r , and th i s is m y second poin t , in each of the republ ics there was a 
different strategy, a different political orientat ion of the Russian speaking populat ion. 
They all did not act in the same way. In Kazakhstan , the Russian speaking populat ion 
included both Russ ians and Kazakhs w h o were cosmopol i tan Russian speakers , many 
of w h o m did not speak Kazakh . The i r long-term strategy was to p repare for exit: 
" W h e n the nat ional is ts take over in Kazakhs tan , we better have a place to live in 
Russia, Ukra ine , or e l sewhere , because when the nationalists take over and Kazakhs 
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become Kazakhized. there will be no place for Russ ians . " So the Russian speaking 
populat ion, both Russian and Kazakh, were m a k i n g preparat ions for exit. In Ukraine , 
the Russian speaking populat ion included ethnic Ukra in ians as well as Russians, most 
of them from eastern regions of Ukra ine . The re the s trategy w a s not of exit, but of 
voice. That meant that in the southeastern reg ions of Ukra ine there would be a right 
to speak Russian as the language of the locality. So, there was more of the Belgian 
solution in Ukraine, whi le in Kazakhs tan I said there wou ld be an Algerian solution, 
that is . prepar ing for exit. In the Be lg ian so lu t ion the re was a F lemish reg ion , a 
Walloon region, and then Brussels as the p lace where both languages existed side by 
side. In Estonia and Latvia I made m y most controvers ia l c la ims. And those cla ims 
were that the strategy of the Russian speak ing popula t ion was , in the long term, to 
assimilate. That is to adapt , over t ime, more and more to the cultural patterns of the 
titular populat ions. That meant learning Estonian or Latvian in the first generat ion, 
and maybe in the second and third generation actually becoming Estonian and Latvian 
through a process of assimilat ion. My model he r e was the Catalonian, in Spain, where 
the 4 0 % of the Spanish speakers had b e c o m e m e m b e r s o f the Catalan society, learned 
Cata lan , and started to b e c o m e Ca ta l an over t ime . So there were three different 
pat terns: assimilation, voice, and exit. 
In none of the cases , a n d that w a s my third poin t , was conflict absent . Tha t 
is to say. assimilat ion was not more peaceful , in m y j u d g m e n t , than exit or voice . 
All of them had a potent ia l for conflict b e t w e e n groups , and in different ways . In 
Kazakhs tan , I felt the source of the conflict wou ld b e the cosmopol i t an Kazakhs 
versus the nat ionalis t Kazakhs who wan ted to m a k e Kazak h s t an a country whe re 
Kazakh was the language of polit ical rights, and this was a threat to the Russ ian 
speaking Kazakhs . I felt that nationalists versus cosmopol i tans w h o are mostly titulars 
wou ld be the major source of conflict. In Ukra ine . I thought the major source of 
conflict would be in the border zones be tween East and West, over whether these 
areas will b e c o m e Ukrain ian speaking or Russ ian speaking , as the areas that could 
have gone either way, in terms of the dominan t l anguage . A n d Kyiv was the core 
place where the battle was going to be brought out be tween the Russian speakers 
and the Ukrainian speakers . In Es tonia and Latv ia I foresaw the conflict be tween 
the ass imilators , that is the Russian speaking popu la t ion that w a s learning Estonian 
and Latv ian and trying to integrate into the society, and those political leaders in the 
Russ ian speaking popula t ion that wan ted m o n o p o l y representa t ion of their g roup . 
To the extent to w h i c h there wou ld b e ass imi la t ion , I a rgued , there wou ld b e a 
threat to the Russian speak ing leadership, that they wou ld loose their representat ive 
monopoly over the Russ ian speaking popula t ion . Therefore , I s aw a conflict be tween 
the leadership of the Russ ian speaking popula t ion and the society itself, one seeking 
assimilation, one trying to s top it. I have not d o n e research in these republics for ten 
years . I have done s o m e fol low-up in Estonia , but I wou ld be very interested to see 
how this book looks to experts ten years later. 
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Aivars Tabun's comments on David Laitin's book 
Univers i ty of Latvia 
For the first, I wou ld like to point out that this book is a significant study. The quality 
of the book is best characterized by the awards which the author received for this book 1 . 
It will be useful to learn more about it for all researchers interested in ethnic relations. 
In good faith, the author has analyzed the data obtained by h im and other researchers 
by not avoiding data which are inconvenient with his conclusions. H e carefully and 
self-critically evaluated the methods used to obtain the data. This also m a d e it easier for 
m e to fulfill my o w n tasks. Taking into account the l imited time for m y presentation, 
I am going to pay more attention not to those numerous conclusions I agree with the 
author but to the theses and conclusions which, in m y view, are disputable. 
Therefore, I will devote m y paper to: 1) The concept of assimilation; 2) Tipping game 
model ; 3) The concept o f Russ ian-speaking populat ion. It is necessary retell briefly 
those aspects that the author s tudied systematically. However . I h o p e this will not 
distort percept ion o f the main ideas of the author. 
Assimilation 
David Lai t in def ined ass imi la t ion as " the p r o c e s s o f adap ta t ion of the ever 
chang ing cultural p rac t i ces of d o m i n a n t society wi th the goal of c ross ing a fluid 
cultural boundary separa t ing [minorit ies] from dominan t socie ty" (p. 30). 
He wrote that " . . . t h e r e are clear signals of early assimilat ion of Russian-
speakers into Es ton ian and L a t v i a n . . . . Firs t , there is an e n v i r o n m e n t wi th in the 
R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g c o m m u n i t y of a c q u i e s c e n c e , n o t re jec t ion . S e c o n d , t he adult 
generation is making a good faith effort to reach government-set standards of linguistic 
achievement , both sides knowing that these s tandards will of necessi ty be low. Third, 
the young generat ion, still in school, has some , albeit l imited, opportuni ty to develop 
fluency in Estonian. I predict that in the next genera t ion a significant major i ty of 
Russian residents in Estonia will b e as fluent in Estonian as Estonian adults are in 
Russian today" (p. 152). A s the author noted , in this book he treated l anguage as a 
proxy for culture and linguistic ass imilat ion as an indicator of cultural assimilat ion, 
. . . and window on identi ty shift (p. 368). 
The author has men t ioned several t imes three s tages of assimilat ion: 
1. Unass imila ted bil ingualism - people leam enough of a second language to 
perform minor tasks; using it in limited domains, and with great difficulty; 
2. Assimilated bilingualism - people develop full facility in second language, but 
maintaining some facilities m their ancestral tongue; 
3. Assimilation - their children (or grandchildren) may speak only the state language, 
without developing any facility in their ancestral tongue (p. 308). 
In this book, the author has basical ly analyzed the "deve lopment of fluency in 
the state l anguage" cons ider ing it as an initial phase of l inguistic assimilat ion. At the 
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same t ime, one can hardly find facts that wou ld al low the author to m a k e hypotheses 
about the third phase of assimilat ion. Therefore , the au tho r ' s conclus ions m a y be 
rather related to potent ia l i t ies for ass imila ted b i l ingua l i sm but not to ass imila t ion 
as an irreversible p rocess as it is often defined in the academic literature. The very 
latter form of assimilat ion is the one minor i t ies are concerned with, especial ly those 
minori t ies which seek to preserve their o w n identity. O n the contrary, minor i t i es 
perceive bil ingualism as an addit ional oppor tuni ty and least as threats. 
Al though it was pointed out that the author defined assimilat ion as the process 
of adapta t ion of the cul tural prac t ices , never the less , hav ing read the book, it did 
not b e c o m e clear to m e which cul tural p rac t i ces are different for bo th g roups -
titulars and Russian-speaking popula t ion - and whe the r there is a cultural boundary 
separating minorit ies from dominant society. I think it w o u l d more useful to analyze 
not differences in cul tures but differences in poli t ical va lues and goals , which are 
not one and the same. At the same t ime, in m a s s med ia and academic literature we 
can often see attempts to identify cultural and polit ical conflicts. 
The hypotheses about assimilation m a y look more quest ionable when w e examine 
this process in the contexts of the definitions of col lect ive identit ies. In the beginning, 
I will quote a definition of assimilation that is publ ished in Oxford Concise Dictionary 
of Soc io logy : " A term ass imi la t ion . . . u s e d to de sc r ibe the p roces s by which an 
outsider, immigrant , or subordinate g roup b e c o m e s indis t inguishable (under l ined by 
the author) integrated into dominant hos t socie ty ... Ass imi la t ion implied that the 
subordinate group actual ly c ame to accept and in ternal ize the values and cul ture 
(underlined by the author) of the dominan t g r o u p " (p. 20) . 
If we would examine definitions of ass imilat ion in the works of other sociologists 
and poli t ical scientists , we could find that behaviora l ass imi la t ion occurs w h e n a 
n e w c o m e r absorbs the cul tural n o r m s , va lues , bel iefs , and behaviora l pa t te rns of 
the " h o s t " society. Immigran t s or other minor i ty groups are "abso rbed" into a host 
society. The policy of ass imilat ion accelerates the downs iz ing of l inguistic minor i ty 
group(s) and these groups can not p rese rve their own cultural identity. Therefore , the 
European Counci l ' s "F ramework Convent ion for the Protection of National Minori t ies 
Art icle 5 prescr ibes that "Par t ies shall refrain from pol ic ies or prac t ices a imed at 
assimilat ion of persons be long ing to nat ional minori t ies against their will and shall 
protect these persons from any action a imed at such ass imila t ion" . 
As the title of the b o o k suggests, one of the author ' s central themes is formation of 
identities. Studies on collective identities indicate that collective identities are constituted 
through shared memories . These identities are established and mainta ined through a 
variety of mnemonic sites, practices, and forms; common myths and historical memories , 
shared experience (Pal Kolsto). As Barry Schwartz puts it, "collective m e m o r y 2 is both 
a mirror and a lamp - a model of and a model for society" 3 . 
Historical consciousness refers not only to a knowledge of the past but implies the 
use of that knowledge to understand the future. M a n y e lements blur our perception of 
history as it regards current political action. History may be used as evidence in the 
support of particular political positions for the benefit of a group too. It m a y cripple us 
with the realization of the relative inability of individuals to effect change. In addition, 
our memories of the past tend to be selective and short. We m a y remember falsity rather 
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than truth. At the same t ime all of us are affected by the understanding of our historical 
traditions, and in its best form, this knowledge leads us from legend toward truth. 
If we analyse the construction of national identities, we must devote serious attention 
to myths of e thnohis tory and the pol i t ics of symbol ic and cultural representa t ion. 
"Whi le an anxious readiness- to-receive the past exists as something of a general i ty 
in modern everyday life, closer historical at tention will also reveal that very different 
versions and appropr ia t ions of the past cont inue to emerge from different classes and 
g roups" 4 . For this reason social scientists mus t investigate why people are at tached to 
the past; how widespread different historical myths are in popular percept ion (some 
myths have a broad popular resonance and impact on government pol ic ies , but others 
are marginal ised}; wha t impact they have on government policies; h o w the past is 
used as part of a poli t ical agenda and how the past is is mobi l i sed in the formulation 
and composi t ion of local identities and senses of be long ing 5 . 
The next table shows the way in which Russ ians and Latvians interpret different 
events in La tv ia ' s his tory. Of course , the in terpreta t ions which are s h o w n in the 
table are not held b y all member s of the relevant ethnic communi t i es , but they can 
never theless be seen as typical . T h e viewpoints w e r e assembled from the Latvian 
and Russian press , focusing on articles in which j u d g m e n t s have been m a d e about 
Latvian history. T h e y represent those v iews which are expressed mos t c o m m o n l y 
when discussing the count ry ' s history. 
Table 1 
Latvia's history as seen by Russians and Latvians 6 
Latvia's history as seen by Russians Latvia's history as seen by Latvians 
In 1940, the Baltic States, including Latvia, 
were annexed and incorporated into the 
USSR. This was a way in which the Soviet 
Union sought to protect itself, as well as 
the Baltic countries, from Fascism. Latvia's 
incorporation into the USSR can by no 
means be considered an occupation, and 
Russians are not to blame for it. Latvia was 
not occupied, because there was no armed 
opposi t ion to the Soviet army when it 
arrived. The Latvian nation recognized Soviet 
authority, was loyal to it and worked with it. 
Latvians were proportionally represented in 
the power structures of the USSR and the 
Uatvian SSR. Repressions were the work 
of Stalin's regime, and the repressions were 
carried out by representatives of various 
nations, including the Uatvians. 
The peaceful and successful development 
of the Uatv ian s ta te was ended by the 
USSR, which concluded a secret pact with 
Hitler's Germany on the division of Eastern 
Europe. Uarvia was occupied, annexed and 
incorporated into the USSR. This happened 
under conditions of open military pressure 
and threats and in violation of international 
treaties. Membership in the Soviet Union 
was supported by only a small share of the 
Latvian population; some residents of Latvia 
hoped that the country would be able to avoid 
entering World War II in that way. Latvians 
were not well informed about the true face of 
the Soviet regime and about the consequences 
of the occupation. Elections in the summer of 
1940 were neither free nor democratic. The 
Constitution of Latvia did not allow Parliament 
to change the legal status of the state, which 
means that the incorporation of Latvia into the 
USSR was unlawful. Many countries in the 
world never recognised the occupation. 
As the front lines of World War II approached 
the Latvian SSR, the Soviet authorities took 
a series of preventive steps against people 
who were not loyal to the Soviet Union. 
1940 and 1941 are known in Latv ia as 
"The Year of Horror". On June 13 and 14. 
1941, more than 15 000 residents, including 
children and elderly people, were arrested and 
deported - a process which condemned many 
people to death from starvation and disease. 
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When the war wi th G e r m a n y b e g a n . 
La tv ians ce lebra ted the arr ival of the 
German occupation forces. They supported 
and participated in the Fascist program of 
genocide against the Jews. That is why 
Hitler's Germany chose Latvia as the place 
where Jews from all over Eastern Europe 
were put to death. Many Latvians joined 
volunteer police battalions to fight against 
partisans and to implement the policies of 
genocide. In 1943 the German occupying 
forces established a voluntary Latvian legion 
in the Waffen SS. The Latvian Legion fought 
against the Red Army and, by extension, 
fought against the countries in the anti-
Hitler coalition. 
Some Latvians were sympathetic to the arrival 
of the German army in 1941, because they 
hoped that the Germans would get rid of the 
Soviet occupation once and for all. As the 
events of the "Year of Terror'" came to light. 
Latvians became increasingly convinced that 
a new Soviet occupation must be opposed at 
all costs. Most of the Latvians in the Latvian 
Legion were forcibly drafted into the military 
and were not volunteers. This was a violation 
of international norms. The Latvian Legion 
was a military unit, and it did not participate in 
actions against civilians. Many Latvians were 
also mobilized by the Red Army. Latvians 
were forced to fight and die on behalf of other 
countries, and they had no choice but to yield 
to Hitler's or Stalin's regime. 
Toward the end of the war, Nazi collaborators 
left Latvia. 
Fear ing Soviet repression, some 100 000 
residents of Latvia fled to the West as the end 
of the war approached. 
After Latvia was liberated from Fascism, 
people hostile to Soviet power continued to 
hide in the forests for several years. These 
were people who had participated in Nazi 
crimes during the war and did not accept 
Soviet authority. The authori t ies of the 
USSR and the Latvian SSR liquidated this 
opposition. 
After World War II, some Latvians who hoped 
that the independence of the country would be 
restored. Western countries provided military 
assistance to partisans. The Soviet authorities 
were merc i less in their t reatment of the 
national partisans and their supporters. 
On March 25. 1949, and later, the USSR 
and the Latvian SSR transferred non-loyal 
citizens and their family members to other 
regions of the USSR. The organisers of these 
repressions cannot be denounced, because 
they were simply obeying orders. 
On March 25, 1949, 13 504 families (42 
322 people in all) were put into cattle cars 
without any court judgments and deported 
to Siberia. More than 28.000 Communist 
Par ty and Soviet activists part icipated in 
this process. The goal was to break rural 
opposition to "collectivisation" - the process 
during which the state took away everything 
that fanners owned. Collectivisation and the 
accompanying repressions seriously harmed 
Latvia's economic and cultural potential. 
Because of population losses during and after 
the war. Latvia needed an inflow of workers 
from other parts of the USSR to repair its 
economy. Russians and other Eastern Slavs 
turned Latvia into an industrially developed 
count ry , and they made an impor tan t 
investment in the culnire, sciences, athletics 
and other areas of activity of the Latvian 
SSR. 
The number of Latvians in Latvia declined 
considerably as the result of Soviet oppression 
and war. In order to carry out more rapid 
Sovietisation and Russification. the USSR 
implemented a targeted program of migration 
into Latvia. The result of these policies was 
that the propor t ion of ethnic Latvians in 
Latvia declined to 52% in the late 1980s 
(from 77% in 1935). In 1989, there were more 
non-Latvians than Latvians in the country's 
eight largest cities. The building of many 
large factories in Latvia was an economically 
unjustified process, and there were social and 
ecological costs to pay. 
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Despite the fact that the proportion of non-
Latvians in Latvia increased, Latvians were 
never prohibited from speaking in their own 
language and from developing their own 
culture. Ail of the necessary conditions were 
present in schools and in society to allow 
Latvians and other non-Russians to leam the 
Russian language. A truly bilingual situation 
emerged. Ethnic groups used their own 
languages in private, but the main language 
for communication was Russian. 
The nationality policies of the Soviet Union 
were not in any sense aimed at encouraging 
migrants to leam the Latvian language and to 
adopt local cultural traditions. Opportunities 
for Latvians to speak their own language were 
gradually narrowed. The Soviet authorities 
wanted to create a unified "Soviet nation", 
which in truth meant the Russification of all 
non-Russians. The Latvian language, which is 
a small language, did not develop, and cultural 
development was hindered by censorship and 
ideological limitations. 
A period of transformation, openness and 
democratisation began in the late 1980s 
throughout the USSR. Latvia's Russians, 
together with Latvians and other nations, 
participated in this process very actively. 
They supported the efforts of Latvians and 
other ethnic groups to preserve their cultures, 
languages and traditions. 
Latvians perceived the process of restructuring 
as a chance to restore independence and to 
reinstate the sustainability of the Latvian 
nation. The Russian communi ty was not 
united on this issue. Many people continued 
to support the Communists and their efforts 
to reinstate the Soviet regime. Sometimes this 
involved violence (e.g., the "Black Berets" in 
January 1991 and during the August putsch). 
I suppose that assimilat ion may take place when groups have shared historical 
memor i e s and shared future vision. A s various studies and also the au tho r ' s own 
observat ions indicate, titulars and non-t i tulars do not have a c o m m o n percept ion of 
the past and no th ing indicates they are corning closer to it. Therefore, in m y view, 
potentiali t ies for assimilat ion are illusory. 
The Balt ic states can facilitate b i l ingual ism of non-ti tulars in the nea r future, 
al though, as the author himself points out, "Media tors have an interest in keeping 
" their" own peop le monol ingua l , so that they can cont inue to profit from represent ing 
them to the pol i t ica l c en t e r " (p . 338) . W h e n ana lyz ing potent ia l i t ies for further 
assimilation, it is ignored that the Bal t ic countries have a border with Russ ia and 
Russian culture. Mass media and Russ ian state ideology have substantial influence 
on the Russian speaking populat ion in the Baltic states. There are still m a n y people 
as wel l as po l i t ic ians in Russ ia w h o perce ive the Balt ic states as " n e a r abroad" , 
which, in their view, is still a synonym for the word "border land" ("okraini") and 
where they do not w a n t to g ive up the i r influence. If w e take into accoun t these 
c i rcumstances , then, in m y view, there is no ground for discussion of assimilat ion 
at all. Bil ingulists were all national-t i tulars, however , they can hardly b e classified 
as assimilated persons . 
Tipping game 
Rely ing on a m o d e l deve loped by T h o m a s Sche l l ing , the au thor in te rpre ted 
identity shift in terms o f a '"tip" or " c a s c a d e " (p. 21). Such cascades occur because 
people ' s choices about their actions are based on what they think others are going to 
do. If I think n o n e of m y neighbors will sell his house . . . I have no incent ive to sell 
mine. But if I think m a n y others wi l l . . . then I have interest in selling my h o u s e before 
those others do (p. 21) . The author thinks that national identit ies, like social and 
neighborhood identi t ies, have cascade qualit ies (p. 24). If all Russ ian-speakers feel 
that all others will r emain monol ingual in Russian, they will see little need to learn 
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Estonian. But if they fear that many others are already adjust ing to the n e w language 
regime by learning Estonian, they will feel pressure to j o in the cascade (p. 25). 
The author noted that adopt ing a n e w language does not automatical ly mean one 
has adopted a new identity, but he thinks that such "microact iv i t ies are m o v i n g . . . the 
Russian speaking c o m m u n i t y . . . . toward an identi ty t i p " (p. 23). 
On the whole . I think that the scenar io can b e quite poss ib le . But I have doubts 
about o ther aspects o f the t ipp ing m o d e l . T h e r e f o r e , I w o u l d like to draw y o u r 
attention to Figure 1.2.. (p. 29) . 
As Figure 1.2. indicates , when the pe rcen tage of Russ ians w h o speak the titular 
language increases, their payoff decreases? The author thinks that the value of expected 
payoff depends on three separate calculations o f benefits: first, the expected economic 
returns; second in-group scorn, third, ou t -g roup accep tance (p. 56). 
First. I will turn to economic re turns . I h a v e no doubt that, when the percentage 
of Russians w h o speak the titular language is smal l , economic returns of bi l ingual ism 
is h igher in compar i son with the si tuat ion w h e n the n u m b e r o f bi l ingual persons 
increases. 1 also agree with the au thor ' s thesis that, w h e n the number of bi l inguals 
increase, there can be fewer bi l inguals w h o get economic returns from asymmetr ic 
bi l ingualism. However , I cannot agTee with the thesis that in a l inguistically divided 
society economic returns of b i l ingual ism will decrease . Al ready now such industry 
sectors in Latvia as trade, hotel and restaurants, transport, renting, public administration, 
education, health, social work , other c o m m u n i t y and personal services employ m o r e 
than 6 0 % of the work force. Bi l ingual i sm is a profess ional necessi ty in these sectors. 
Bilingual persons a lways have higher e c o n o m i c returns than monol ingua l s have. It 
is supported by European and U S statistical da ta and I do not know anybody w h o 
might think otherwise. 
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Figure 1.2. Competitive assimilation game: Percentage of Russians who speak titular 
language. 
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Second, there is the value of in-group status. David Lai t in points out: "Suppose 
Russian speakers w h o at tempt to learn the titular l anguage suffer r idicule, ostracism, 
or even bodily ha rms from m e m b e r s of their own communi ty ' ' (p. 250) . 
Learning the ti tular language does not imply that a person will not communica te 
with other representa t ives of minori t ies in the Russ ian language at all. I think that, 
when fluency in the t i tular language is rare , Russians will look at this with suspicion. 
When bi l ingual ism of non-t i tulars spreads, in my view, ostracism against bil inguals 
from Russians should decrease. 
Th i rd , there is the va lue of o u t - g r o u p a c c e p t a n c e . Dav id Lai t in po in t s out: 
"Suppose Russ ian-speakers w h o l e a m the titular l anguage are easily identified by 
titulars and are bar red from enjoying the fruits of assimilat ion. Titular c lubs , social 
g roups , and spouses remain out o f bounds for ass imi la t ion, or nouveaux t i tulars" 
(p . 250) . 
"In Pettai 's d iscuss ions with Russ ian-speaking youth in Riga, m e m b e r s of the 
disaffected group of Russian Technical University s tudents told h im that they had 
friends w h o had sufficient Latvian ability to matr iculate in the Latvian University. 
But they were " t reated as second rate the re" anyway. F rom these reports , w e begin 
to see that many Russ ians beginning to feel that Estonians and Latvians do not really 
want them to l e a m the local language" , (p . 283) 
"As the authors of SM-Segodni ia wrote : "The popular (?- my note) phrase 'we 
don ' t need you to k n o w Latvian, w e just need you to know your p l ace" crudely, but 
adequate ly expla ins to peop le w h o don ' t unders tand, what is demanded of t h e m " (p. 
128). Each t ime Russ ian-speakers open their mou ths in front of Latvians , they now 
feel humil iated, a comple te reversal of status since 1988 (p. 283) 
I d o not t h ink that these s i tua t ions are typica l . Second , I see no g r o u n d for 
th inking that fluency in the titular l anguage m a y p rovoke t i tular 's nega t iv i sm. I think 
that those Russians w h o have not learned the language of titulars will be ra ther more 
affected by stricter out -group ostracism. However , these are only m y assumpt ions . 
Something e lse seems to me m o r e confusing in the aforement ioned Figure 1.2. -
w h y the percen tage of Russ ians w h o speak titular l anguage will increase w h e n the 
level of pay-off decreases? 
It seems to m e that the spread o f bi l ingualism (cascade) is more influenced not by 
the expectat ions o f Russ ians how other Russians will act but rather by social pressure 
exerted by titulars and the state. Bu t this is only m y assumption. 
"Russian-speaking population" 
"This discourse analysis reveals that . . . a new category of identity, the "Russian-
speaking population", has emerged (my emphasis) in all four republics" (p.x). "A major 
finding of this book is that the development (my emphasis) of a conglomerate identity 
(Russian-speaking population) . . . is the principal countertrend to assimilation " (p. 33). 
I have doubts w h e t h e r there is g round for discussions about deve lopment . Did 
representa t ives o f l inguist ical ly ass imi la ted groups really use their mo the r tongue 
at h o m e or a n y w h e r e e l s e before 1991 and , on ly after 1991 , b e c o m e Russ ian -
speakers? 
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In m y view, the so called conglomerate "Russ ian-speaking popula t ion" is a group 
that consists of Russians and the ass imila ted non-Russ ians . These assimilated non-
Russians do not know their own mother tongue or do not use it at h o m e ; they are not 
willing to send their chi ldren to schools w h e r e instruction is in their native language. 
It is often common to so called Russian Jews . Organizat ions which represent "Russian 
speaking popula t ion" do not stand for protect ion of language , culture, identities of 
other ethnic groups. I th ink that the concept of Russ ian speaking popula t ion is used 
to disguise ethnic d e m a n d s of Russ ians , the d e m a n d s o f the very group that has 
successfully managed to ass imilate representat ives of other ethnic groups. This is the 
already known old Soviet " in ternat ional is t" ideology. I a lso doubt whether "Russian 
nat ional ism in Russia i tself should differ from the Russ ian nat ional ism of the near 
abroad" (p. 310) . Russ ia act ively suppor ts the poli t ical d e m a n d s of Russ ian non-
titulars. 
I agree with the author that m a n y Russ ian-speakers h a v e characteristic "empire-
consc iousness" (p. 306), they try to preserve the pr ivi leges o f Russians , and a number 
of representa t ives of the g roup share m a n y Sovie t s y m b o l s . T h u s it compl ica tes 
attempts of ethnic compromises , because the largest part of titulars is more concerned 
not with cultural but pol i t ical demands and values o f non-t i tulars . It is another reason 
why I a m quite skeptical about rapid ass imila t ion and cascades of identities. 
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Victor Makarov's comments on David Laitin's book 
First of all, I wou ld like to thank Professor Laitin for wri t ing this book. Being 
one of those who migh t have been an observation object of your s tudy in Latvia, it 
has been a reward ing experience to read your book. It is interesting, informative, it 
explores an important subject, and it is also permea ted by a humanis t ic spirit that no 
academic book should be without. 
I would like to touch upon three issues relat ing to your book. First, I will discuss 
some of the theoret ical points that you build your book on. Second, 1 will look at 
h o w successful your forecasts for identi ty deve lopments in Latvia have been. Lastly, 
I wou ld like to discuss those quest ions which your b o o k leaves unanswered , thus 
put t ing them on the agenda for future research and. hopefully, for a b o o k that you 
migh t want to wri te in the future. 
I wil l start w i t h the theore t i ca l i ssues , b e g i n n i n g wi th the m a i n theore t ica l 
protagonist of the book , namely identity. At a seminar I attended last year, a sociologist 
was invited to act as a discussant on a paper on this subject. She started by saying: "I 
k n o w nothing about this nonsense, and I do no t think this identity discussion is really 
important . It is the rea l -world p rob lems and social p rob lems of integrat ion we should 
be thinking about. T h e identity issue will d isappear w h e n peop le in tegra te ." Some 
scholars bel ieve that identity is no m o r e than an outda ted academic buzz-word . But I 
th ink that your b o o k proves that it is not true, and that identity is. indeed, important , 
and also that it shou ld be linked to other concepts in polit ical science. M y first point 
on the theoretical concept of the book is similar to that m a d e by Professor Tabuns. The 
concept of ass imila t ion that is used as a foundation of your theory is an interesting 
one, but it is also p rob lemat ic . You unders tand assimilat ion as adopt ion of cultural 
pract ices of the dominan t society. Accord ing to your definition, identity is labeling, 
either by in-group out -group, or by the individuals themselves . You rightly not ice that 
assimilat ion does not amount to an identity shift. But it is not only because a change 
in the linguistic reper toire is not enough to change identity. It is also because cultural 
pract ices - and all social practices h a v e a cultural content - can be similar in effect 
but still have comple te ly different mean ings . In other words , people can do the same 
things but interpret them differently. Therefore , the linguistic reper toire m a y or may 
not be relevant for the identity game. The European J e w s provide a good example of 
this: under certain c i rcumstances the language does not matter, but it is the general 
social role, the niche for scapegoat ing that creates a cer ta in negat ive identi ty on the 
outside and a comple te ly different, asymmetr ica l identi ty within the in-group. 
Fur thermore , the definitions of cultural meanings and identities change , and it 
is exactly this change that is interesting, as you noted yesterday: what practices are 
important to assimilate, and what practices are not? It would be good if the Latvian 
society established a clear set of rules about what the integrants and the assimilants 
should do in order to b e c o m e part o f the Latvian identity, but it has been proven 
impossible. Ironically, there is not even a singular and clearly defined titular cultural 
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practice to integrate into. The titular identity that is usually presented as something solid 
is not that at all. It is rather a continuum, a range of different identity combinations. These 
titular practices are not even impermeable to the cultural practices of the minorities. 
Consequently, we can expect various and mult iple titular identities to change in the 
process of integration. Perhaps instead of only talking about the Russian identities, we 
should be considering the process of mutua l reconfiguration of identities. (The Latvian 
case may be more obvious in this sense than the Estonian one.) We may yet see a society 
of cross-cutting cleavages that is based on cross-cutt ing identities. 
My second point on your theory relates to the identity t ipping, or identity cascade, 
which is at the core of y o u r theory. I w a s not comple t e ly satisfied with the way 
you assumed the automat ic bridge be tween the language repertoire cascade and the 
identity t ip . The t ipping g a m e , as you explain it in te rms of the rational choice theory, 
m a y not be the only poss ib le explanat ion for this n e w linguistic trend. Other s imple 
necessi t ies might be the matter. Even m o r e important ly, the main idea of rational 
choice is that people try to max imize the effect iveness of their act ions for achieving 
their goals . This says noth ing about what k ind of goals people set. For example in the 
tipping g a m e , the goals m a y be economica l , but they m a y also be cultural . It would 
be very interesting to revisit the p ragmat ic he ro of your book , Liuba Grigor iev and 
see what she now thinks of the way her Russ ian and Estonian identities mix . and what 
her priorities are nowadays . Especially the Latvian case demonstrates that the political 
discourse is invaded by cultural issues. This is pe rhaps one point to the effect that it 
is p remature to discard identities as an impor tant theoretical instrument. Identit ies are 
an important causal factor as well as a consequence of the polit ical process . This is 
obvious in the Baltic states, and m a y be j u s t as valid for o ther societies. 
N o w I would l ike to address y o u r p r e d i c t i o n s . In y o u r forecast for Latv ia , 
you suggest that the Russ ian populat ion cou ld assimilate or move towards a more 
art iculated conglomerate identity and p e r h a p s even c la im a distinct nationali ty. This 
also creates background for ethnic conflict. This forecast s eems to have c o m e true, 
and yet, at the same t ime, not entirely so. A s has been men t ioned so m a n y t imes, we 
now see that Russians are too difficult to classify as one s ingle identity. N o "moda l " , 
or " typ ica l" Russian exists; instead, there are m a n y groups that are different and even 
socially distant from each other. It is ha rd for any pol i t ical ent repreneur to make 
claims on all of these g roups . Until n o w all such a t tempts h a v e failed. Secondly, it is 
perfectly possible for individuals to engage in two processes s imultaneously: on the 
one hand, assimilation of some cultural prac t ices , and on the other hand, assert ing 
dist inctness in other ways . The core of y o u r forecast is phrased in poli t ical terms: 
will the ethnic conflict escalate? A n d what kind of pol i t ical system will emerge to 
a ccommoda t e these? As y o u present it, it is a choice be tween a pluralist mode l , a 
consociat ional model , and a kind of e thnical ly or cul tural ly control led democracy. 
It is relevant today to look at which of these mode ls have b e e n accepted, but this is 
still a very open quest ion on which j u d g m e n t is in abeyance . We can say, though, 
that the consociat ional and the pluralist m o d e l s are the two main polit ical ideologies 
among the Russian publ ic , and these two mode l s const i tu te the division line within 
the Russ ian public opinion. 
Lastly, I would like to address the i ssues that are not ra ised in your book. The 
most interesting aspect of identities is expressed in the title of this conference: what 
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is the future of ident i t ies , now that the Baltic count r ies have b e c o m e part of the 
European Union? 
First, the EU is a very important external factor. It seems to have transformed 
Rogers Brubacker ' s triangle into a square. How does that relate to the future of the 
nation state? During the ten years that passed since you m a d e your research, the nation 
states themselves have t ransformed And the EU is constructing an identity of its own. 
We can expect more people to call themselves Europeans. Behind this trend lies a deeper 
issue. Identities are not mteresting per se, but because collective identities are a source 
of compliance ideology, to use Wilson ' s term, and in this capacity they are a crucial 
base for the functioning of the political system. The Balt ic societies are struggling to 
construct viable nat ional identities that could rely on the trust and solidarity available 
from ethnic and cultural identities, in order to create m o r e social cohesion. How will 
the EU affect these identity building projects? Neither political trust nor solidarity is in 
abundance in a country like Latvia. The European integration - which is a much broader 
notion than the EU proper - is changing the configuration of the political systems in 
the small nations, as their political p o w e r is leaking out towards the EU institutions 
and European and global networks. At the same t ime, the EU is not guarantee in and of 
itself, of an economical ly and politically successful society. Therefore the nation state 
has to remain an important actor to achieve a sustainable society. The quest ion is then, 
whether we are getting into a vicious circle: the nation state retains the responsibili t ies, 
even as it is losing its powers to the supranational actors, and, through a demonstrat ion 
of impotence, losing support. 
Russia is the second important external influence on Latvian identi t ies. Some 
Russian researchers have recently defined the national identity bui lding project as the 
single most important chal lenge Russia is going to face in the future. The way it looks 
now, the Russian identity building project might spill over the boarders of the Russian 
Federation. This is a l ready reflected in the Latvian political setup. Yet most interesting 
is not the attempt to construct a Russia-friendly polit ical movemen t in Latvia, but the 
more general , and more culturally focused agenda that the Russian state migh t pursue 
in the future to create a stronger link be tween Russia and the diaspora. In accordance 
with the concept of " the Russ ian wor ld" , moderate ly phrased policies are n o w being 
developed in Russia . These policies do not mean direct interference in the countries 
with a Russian diaspora , but never theless , they seek to create a s t ronger l ink be tween 
the ethnic and cultural Russ ians and the Russian state. It is important because what 
we have seen in the last years has not been just one process of border bui lding and 
separat ion be tween La tv ia and Russia . There is a lso a process that m a k e s it easy 
to maintain cultural identit ies beyond the borders of the nation state. T h e costs of 
cultural transactions are gett ing lower, because culture is symbol ic , even immaterial . 
At the same t ime, the gains to be had from a large cul tural identity remain , as does 
the impor tance of identi t ies over the pure ly economic issues. If we apply the rational 
choice model to this si tuation, the ga ins from re ta ining access to big cul tures can 
easily outweigh the ga ins from t ipping into a different, titular identity. 
On the other hand, national identities are less easily transferable outside the nation 
state, because they depend on consis tent inculcation through the educat ional system. 
To take a fresh Latvian example , the Russ ian - l a n g u a g e schools , there is no danger 
that these schools in Latvia will r eproduce loyal Russ ian patriots. The p rob lem is 
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that these schools have failed to create a sensible democra t ic identity of a Latvian 
cit izen that would l ink the cit izen and the s ta te , as we l l as link together ci t izens 
and compatr iots of different ethnicity. This br ings m e to the last but never theless 
important point . Perhaps the real p rob lem that w e should be s tudying is the lack of 
a democrat ic or civic identity. This p rob lem is universa l for the Baltic states as well 
as other countries. M a n y Russ ians have so far failed to establ ish a realistic political 
identity. A l so , for a large par t of the e thnic La tv ian popu la t i on , r ecogn iz ing the 
actual composi t ion of the pol i ty is a difficult cha l lenge . A s professor Zepa ' s research 
demonstra tes , about hal f of the Latvian popu la t ion has difficulty acknowledg ing and 
accepting as compatr iots the citizens and non-c i t i zens wi th another historical and 
cultural background. 
Perhaps in the future we should m o v e a w a y from d iscuss ing the identities of the 
Russian speaking minority, and move over to looking at the mult iple and multi layered 
identities of the Latvian people . This would amoun t to the classical matter of studying 
political and cultural or ientat ions. Then , democracy and not ethnicity would be the 
main protagonis t of this d iscuss ion, and pe rhaps , of Professor Lai t in ' s next book. 
Thank you! 
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David Laitin's response to the comments 
Firs t . I w a n t to thank the two c o m m e n t a t o r s for g iv ing m e the h o n o u r of 
reading m y book . I a m going to m a k e three general points , barely touching on all 
the commen t s , but trying to p ick out areas where I th ink 1 have someth ing useful to 
say. First, on the cri t icism of m y use of assimilat ion. As 1 looked at the definition 
that Professor Tabuns put on the board , I was very pleased. I thought 1 got it right. 
Assimila t ion is , indeed , adaptat ion of the ever changing practices of the dominant 
society. Victor asked m e about Liuba and her family, wi th w h o m I lived. 1 visit them 
every year. L iuba ' s daughter mar r ied a Russian in Koht la-Jarve three years ago, they 
m o v e d to Tall inn, and they changed their name to an Estonian one. They would be 
coded, if you looked at their current n a m e , as part of the Estonian populat ion. They 
wou ld not be coded as assimilated Russians , because their name looks Estonian, they 
speak perfect Es tonian , and they only speak Russian in private themselves . Their first 
child speaks Es ton ian as the first language. So, w h e n assimilat ion occurs , we tend 
not to see it. Aga in and again, the social scientists fail to see assimilat ion because of 
the bad pract ices of select ion bias . If you look at the concrete aspects of daily life, 
you can better catch this process . The language of normal use is the one I picked 
up on for this book . A s someone normal ly gets u p and goes to a newspape r stand 
and speaks in Latv ian , that is an observable adaptat ion of the cultural pract ices of 
the dominant society. Suppose , one listens to Latvian music or buys Latvian music 
as their preferred form of music , or buys Latvian books . Is it not the same thing as 
assimilation, b e c o m i n g a Latvian? I would say, to the extent to which the cultural 
pract ices - to read a book, to listen to the music , to speak the language - become a 
normal part of s o m e o n e ' s life, those are indicators that assimilat ion is a process that 
is taking place. Aivars correctly points out that in the book there are no examples 
of the third s tage of assimilat ion. He says that it is only my assumpt ion . That is not 
quite correct. Tha t w a s m y predict ion o f a trend that I thought would occur, not an 
assumption in any way. It is obvious , that if I were mak ing a prediction of what would 
happen in ten years , m y prediction has failed. Bu t as I was making a predict ion for 
an intergenerat ional process , the jury is still out. 
Sergej Kruk told us today that c o m m o n memor ies were already forming, and we 
can think of dates and events that are c o m m o n l y thought of as important , like the 
Olympics of 2004 and the Latvian part icipation in it. The extent to which it becomes 
a c o m m o n m e m o r y of an event in peop le ' s own history, it suggests another example 
of the ass imi la t ion p rocess . I th ink I deve loped a w a y of empi r ica l ly examin ing 
assimilat ion p rocesses and I have incurred other researchers to look at practices as 
the key indicators of assimilatory pract ices. 
On point n u m b e r two I feel less confident. I have learned from the commenta ry 
today and from many of the ta lks , that I made two general points in the book that 
were in some w a y important or contradictory. The first point was that there would be 
increasing adapta t ion o f Latvian cultural pract ices by Russian speakers . A n d on the 
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social level of everyday pract ice there would be an emerg ing assimilat ion process . I 
also said in the book that I foresee a conflict occurr ing be tween the self-proclaimed 
or elected leaders of the Russian popula t ion w h o wou ld stand against policies that 
incurred assimilat ion, and indeed we see that this has appeared strongly in the past 
few days in Latvia, whe re the elites form t w o blocks of Russ ian speakers and the 
block of Latvians. A n d the former b lock is organized to chal lenge the assimilatory 
possibil i t ies. What I did not see in the book w a s that the emergence of these blocks 
wou ld work against the social p rocess that I w a s de tec t ing from be low, and that 
the emergence of poli t ical blocks could consol idate separate cultural and political 
identities for much longer than I expected. So the elite level politics that was in a 
sense the consequence of the assimilatory pract ices w a s having an effect on those 
assimilatory practices. That was a causal mechan i sm I did not properly analyze in 
the book. Therefore there were several scholars at this conference that raised this 
criticism of my book. I accounted for processes of ass imila t ion on the social level, 
but block politics on the elite level w a s missed in m y analysis . 
Let me say as a third point, about the international level. Victor and Nils Muiznieks 
the other day properly pointed out that I underva lued it in the book and looked at 
the processes pr imari ly as domest ic p rocesses . I will look at the international level, 
as Victor asked me . from t w o different s ides: the integrat ion of Europe , and, two, 
the nat ion-bui lding or rather nat ion-reconstruct ion p rocess in the Russian Federat ion 
itself. In Europe , as I have writ ten e l sewhere and only summar ize today, there is an 
emergent mult i l ingual repertoire identi ty for a European citizen. A European cirizen 
will speak the language of her or his state, he or she will speak English which will 
become the language of Europe , and, as a third language , they will speak the language 
of her or his local region. If he or she is a Cata lan, and a m e m b e r of Europe , they 
will b e c o m e tr i l ingual , and that wil l be a no rma l par t of their cultural repertoire. 
Catalan in Catalonia, Spanish for the state level , and Engl i sh for dealing with matters 
as a European. Why should these state l anguages r ema in important when everyone is 
going to l e am Engl ish? I think the reason is as fol lows: the states in the European 
union will remain in control of the minis t r ies of educat ion . They will make a deal 
with their o w n populat ions. And the deal will look like this: we will teach you English 
and the state language for free, and we wil l give y o u an excellent educat ion; you 
do not need to have a private educat ion because w e have an excellent educational 
system. W h e n your children graduate from our schools , say. in Sweden or Amsterdam, 
they will be better Engl ish speakers than Amer i can h igh school graduates , as wel l as 
speaking the state language . Wha t every ci t izen in the Nether lands will get is fluency 
in the state language and complete capabil i ty in the international language of Europe. 
I bel ieve that Estonia and Latvia as wel l , wil l m a k e the same deal: we will g ive you 
as cit izens of Latvia an excellent k indergar ten to secondary school educat ion which 
will enable you to par t ic ipate in Latvia as wel l as Europe . A n d this will be a part of 
wha t you pay taxes for: you will not need a pr ivate educa t ion . But you will become 
an Estonian or a Latvian as part of that process . The state languages and state histories 
will be taught in state schools . To g ive an example , w h e n my daughter was a fourth 
grade student in Spain , every single day she came b a c k wi th a map she had drawn 
of the country of Spain . It had b e c o m e part of the exper ience of Spanish students 
that they were m e m b e r s of the Spanish state. A n d that was in Catalonia , by the way. 
I be l ieve that the Russ ian s tudents in the future in Latvia wil l be p repared to be 
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member s of Europe , but also they will be acquain ted with and will be part of their 
own history, Latv ian literature, Latvian music etc. So I think that the jo in ing of the 
European Union will consolidate the Latvianization of Russian speakers, w h o will also 
speak Russian. They will be tr i l ingual, but they will be part of the Latvian national 
cul ture. Let m e finally say someth ing about Russ ia and the Russ ian Federa t ion. I 
wro te the book in 1997 and 1998. I was living in Narva in 1993 and 1994. Russia 
was in political chaos when I l ived in Narva and in economic chaos when I wrote 
the book . F rom the point of v iew of the Russians in Ida-Virumaa. in northeastern 
Estonia. Russia was a chaotic m e s s , and Estonia was an orderly society which many 
of them were lucky to live in. It did not occur to m e . al though it should have , that 
Russia would one day regain its stability economical ly and politically. The people 
who have been looking at Russia for the past two weeks may feel it has gone back 
to 1993. I think it m a y be too pess imis t ic . It is a gigantic country with t remendous 
resources . And it presents an oppor tuni ty for Russ ian speakers in Latvia and Estonia 
to identify not so much with the west , but to identify with the cultural, economic and 
polit ical project in the east. The impl icat ions of re -emerg ing Russia are something 1 
did not consider in the book and I have not thought that through yet myself, so Victor 
is qui te correct to criticize me for it. Thank you so much for your t ime. 
